By ANDREW KORYBKO*
What's next after Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump just agreed to start peace talks
February 12, 2025, will go down in history as the day the proxy war between NATO and Russia in Ukraine officially began to end. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth got it started declaring that: Ukraine will not join NATO; the US does not believe that Ukraine can regain its pre-2014 borders; the US will not send troops to the conflict zone; instead, the US wants the Europeans to assume some peacekeeping responsibilities; but the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces.
This was followed by a conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin for the first time since the former returned to power. They agreed to start peace talks without delay, which was followed by a phone call from Donald Trump to Valodymyr Zelensky to brief him on the matter and, presumably, to coerce him into making the concessions he had presumably promised Putin. Donald Trump also suggested that he would soon meet with Vladimir Putin in Saudi Arabia and that each of them might then visit the other's country as part of the peace process.
The first analysis of creative energy diplomacy contains a dozen proposed compromises for each side that could help move the talks forward. Indeed, the U.S. proposal not to extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces in Ukraine is now policy, according to Pete Hegseth, so others may follow. And Donald Trump just commented how unpopular Zelensky has become, which suggests that he is planning a “phased transition of leadership” through new elections, which was also proposed in this article.
It remains to be seen which of these other proposals might soon become U.S. policy, as well as which ones Russia might implement, such as agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the demilitarized zone that will likely be created at the end of this process. Here are the five main issues that will shape the peace talks between Russia and the U.S. on Ukraine, among their leaders, diplomats, and any of their experts who might be invited to participate through the follow-up talks of the second round of negotiations:
Territorial parameters
The most immediate issue that needs to be resolved is the location of the new Russian-Ukrainian border. Pete Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine is unable to reclaim the pre-2014 border suggests that Donald Trump could coerce Volodymyr Zelensky to withdraw from at least all of Donbass, which is at the heart of the territorial dimension of the conflict, although it is possible that his forces will retreat as far as the city of Zaporozhye. Letting Russia control that city and parts of its new regions west of the Dnieper is unlikely at this point.
This is because Donald Trump may not want to face the criticism that would follow from giving Russia a city of more than 700.000 people whose residents did not vote in the September 2022 referendum. The same goes for parts of Russia’s new regions west of the Dnieper River. Instead, he could propose a UN-supervised referendum some time after the fighting has ceased to resolve this aspect of the territorial dispute, while allowing Russia to continue to officially claim these areas. Perhaps that would be pragmatic enough for Vladimir Putin to agree to.
Terms of the DMZ and the role of peacekeeping forces
The next issue to address, right after the previous one, is the terms of the demilitarized zone along the interim border and the role of the peacekeepers who would likely deploy to monitor it. Pete Hegseth’s statement that the US will not extend Article 5 guarantees to EU forces there could dissuade them from playing a major role, which Russia would in any case have to authorize through a UN Security Council resolution, according to Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzia, otherwise they would be legitimate targets. Non-Westerners are therefore much more palatable.
It turns out that the vast majority of UN peacekeepers are from non-Western countries, so they could be deployed under a UN Security Council mandate, as suggested by Nebenzia, and possibly even result in the exclusion of any Western peacekeepers altogether if it is agreed that none will contribute to this mission. Its terms would have to be acceptable to both Russia and the US for this resolution to pass, so it is unclear exactly what they might or might not do, but that brings us directly to the next question.
Demilitarization and denazification
Two of Russia's main goals in the "special operation" are to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, which it initially sought to accomplish by militarily coercing Ukraine to do so in accordance with the terms set out in the draft spring 2022 peace treaty, although this has not been successful due to the UK and Poland. It is unrealistic to imagine that Donald Trump would accept Russia deploying its armed forces throughout Ukraine to implement these objectives, so this can only be achieved through similar diplomatic means involving Kiev's acquiescence.
This is where the possible role that UN peacekeepers could play in monitoring and enforcing what is agreed to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine lies. This could take the form of inspecting suspected illegal weapons sites and all cross-border traffic from Ukraine (including its ports), while having the right to order changes to its media and school curricula as needed. This is the only way to ensure that Ukraine remains demilitarized and denazified after the end of the conflict.
Sanctions relief
Russia has repeatedly demanded the lifting of all Western sanctions, but it is arguable that Donald Trump, the “master of deals”, would never agree to do so all at once, preferring instead to work out a plan for phased sanctions relief as a reward for Russia’s compliance with a ceasefire, armistice or peace treaty. This could take the form of what has been proposed in the creative energy diplomacy review, whereby some Russian exports to the EU could be resumed during the first phase as a confidence-building measure.
While Russia would prefer all measures to be lifted immediately, its policymakers may conclude that it is better to accept a phased plan, if that is all Donald Trump is willing to offer, rather than nothing at all. However, it would be good if Trump made the goodwill gesture of lifting sanctions on Russia’s seaborne oil exports, as this could convince policymakers that he is serious about easing pressure on Russia. This, in turn, would make it easier for Putin to sell his commitment to phased sanctions relief on his country.
New security architecture
Russia envisaged creating a new European security architecture through mutual agreements with the US and NATO in December 2021, in accordance with the security assurance requests it shared with them at that time. In retrospect, these requests were intended to diplomatically resolve its security dilemma, the roots of which lie in NATO’s continued eastward expansion after the Old Cold War, and in particular its covert expansion into Ukraine, rather than the special operation that Putin was secretly planning at that time in case that failed.
So much has changed since then that comprehensive, separate talks on this issue must begin soon after any agreement is reached on Ukraine. The new issues include NATO's military build-up in the east, the new memberships of Finland and Sweden, Russia's hypersonic Oreshniks, its implementation in Belarus, also the installation of nuclear weapons by Russia in that country, the future of New START, which expires next year, and the new space arms race, etc. Reaching an agreement on a new security architecture will therefore stabilize the world.
As you can see, the road ahead will be very difficult given the sensitive issues that Russia and the US have to resolve, but their leaders have shown that they are willing to negotiate in good faith. It is likely that neither side will achieve their ultimate goals, but diplomacy is the art of the possible, so each side will do everything in its power to achieve the maximum possible, given the circumstances. The best possible scenario is a just and lasting peace that truly addresses the root causes at the heart of this conflict.
*Andrew Korybko holds a master's degree in International Relations from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Book author Hybrid Wars: From Color Revolutions to Coups (popular expression). [https://amzn.to/46lAD1d]
Translation: Fernando Lima das Neves.
Note
[1] Here is some information about the broader context:
January 3: “Creative energy diplomacy could lay the foundation for a grand Russian-American deal"
January 17: “The merits of a demilitarized 'Trans-Dnieper' region controlled by non-Western peacekeepers"
February 3: “Territorial concessions could precede a ceasefire leading to new elections in Ukraine"
February 4: “Trump's interest in Ukraine's rare earth minerals could backfire on Zelensky"
February 7: “Trump's special envoy sheds more light on his boss's Ukraine peace plan"
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