By RAFAEL DE ALMEIDA PADIAL*
Marx's analysis of the concept of Bonapartism, as a bourgeois response to the permanent revolution, and its position sui generis in the face of such an authoritarian phenomenon
Introduction
In discussing the problem of the working class’ strategy for conquering political power, Marx’s assessment of the 1848 Revolution is of great importance. It had a great impact on the revolutionary, who drew conclusions from it throughout his life. The Marx of 1852 – when, from our point of view, the author concluded his assessment of this revolution – is quite different from the Marx of 1847. However, the younger is often mistaken for the older, resulting in the erasure of fundamental historical lessons.
This text is divided into three parts. In the first, we will analyze how Marx initially outlined a democratic-revolutionary strategy for intervention in the 1848 revolution. However, in the midst of the revolutionary process, the German realized that this strategy was historically limited. In the second part, we will address the development of the concept of permanent revolution in Marx's work, as a result of reflection on the limits of the 1848 revolution. In the third part, we will examine his analysis of the concept of Bonapartism, as a bourgeois response to the permanent revolution, and its position sui generis in the face of such an authoritarian phenomenon.
The democratic-revolutionary strategy
In the period immediately prior to the revolution of 1848 – which began in France and soon spread to several countries in Europe and the world – Karl Marx had already adopted communist positions.[I] However, just as modern communism was a historically new phenomenon, so too was the communist strategy for a revolutionary situation being developed.
In his work on the German revolution of 1848, Marx initially outlined a democratic-revolutionary strategy, which conceived that it was necessary to first establish the bourgeois order (against the forces of the Ancien Régime), and only then begin a communist struggle to overthrow that same order.[ii]
Although briefly, this is contained in the final chapter of Communist Party Manifesto (written at the turn of 1847-1848), when it states the following: “In Germany, the Communist Party, as soon as the bourgeoisie enters the scene in a revolutionary way, fights together with the bourgeoisie against the absolute monarchy, feudal land ownership and the petty bourgeoisie. But it never fails for a moment to form among the workers the clearest possible consciousness of the hostile opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, so that the German workers can immediately turn the social and political conditions which the bourgeoisie must necessarily create by its rule into so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, so that after the overthrow [of the bourgeoisie] they can use their power to bring about a new and more powerful struggle against the bourgeoisie.”after the storm] of the reactionary classes in Germany, begin the fight against the bourgeoisie itself immediately.”[iii]
As you can see, the The Manifest expresses a position that today would be called “stage-based”: it would be necessary to first carry out a bourgeois stage, and then a communist stage. Possibly, Marx, in this regard, emulated concepts derived from the great revolution of his time, the French Revolution of 1789, which, after establishing the rule of the bourgeoisie, created the bases for the development – for the first time in history – of modern communist ideas.[iv]
It is not clear, in the The Manifest, how the proletariat would appropriate political power in a communist revolution. The text contains the well-known sentence, often debated: “We have already seen above that the first step of the workers' revolution is the elevation of the proletariat to the dominant class, the struggle for democracy [die Erkämpfung der Demokratie] ”[v]
What would this “elevation” look like? Would it be appropriate to take over the existing State and use it in favor of the working class? If so, how, and with what measures? Would it be appropriate to emulate the strategy carried out by the bourgeoisie in the French Revolution, in which – after the popular uprising – the legislative power was conquered and this was used as a lever to conquer executive power?
That it was a question of taking power from the then existing State is clear from the famous ten transitional demands presented at the end of chapter 2 of The Manifest: Expropriation of land and use of land rent for state expenses; Strongly progressive taxation; Abolition of the right of inheritance; Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels; Centralization of credit in the hands of the state through a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly; Centralization of transportation in the hands of the state; Expansion of national factories, instruments of production, cultivation and improvement of land according to a collective plan; Compulsory work for all, with the creation of industrial armies, especially for agriculture; Combination of agricultural and industrial activity, aiming at the gradual elimination of the distinction between city and country; Free public education for all children. Abolition of child labor in factories in its current form. Integration of education with material production, among other measures.[vi]
In fact, Marx and Engels followed the experience of the French Revolution, as David Ryazanov argued: “The tactics maintained in the The Manifest was based on the study of the events of the Great French Revolution, on the idea that the conquest of political power by the proletariat would follow forms analogous to those of the Convention [Jacobin terror]”.[vii]
Possibly, the poorly determined strategy of the The Manifest – about the character of the revolution, the transitional measures to be implemented and the means of carrying out the seizure of power – did not arise from the political mistakes of the authors, but from the immaturity of the working class’s struggle against the capitalist order. During the revolution of 1848, particularly in the German Confederation, such “strategic indeterminacy” proved to be a trap; it resulted in the submission of the workers to the particular (non-progressive) interests of the bourgeoisie.
The democratic-revolutionary strategy in the first phase of the revolution
The outbreak of the French Revolution in February 1848 found Karl Marx in Brussels, Belgium.[viii] For political reasons, the revolutionary was expelled to France (where he intended to go to participate in the revolution). In Paris, he learned of the beginning of the March Revolution in the German Confederation. Starting in Vienna, the revolution quickly spread throughout German territory; in some reigns it overthrew monarchs and, in others, created semi-parliamentary forms.[ix].
Still in France, with leadership powers in the Communist League (composed mainly of Germans), Marx rebuilt the leadership of this organization and wrote, with his companions, a pamphlet containing seventeen demands to be disseminated in the German Confederation (very similar to the ten demands at the end of chapter II of the Communist Manifesto)[X]. It is the pamphlet called “Demands of the Communist Party in Germany”, from March 1848.
Despite the similarity to the claims of the The Manifest, this pamphlet contained points that made clearer the bourgeois-democratic character of the communists' immediate actions in the revolution. Let us highlight, for example, the tenth demand: “10. All private banks must be replaced by a state bank [Staatsbank], whose currency is legal tender. This measure allows regulating credit in the interest of the entire people [lucky people] and thus undermines the dominance of money men. By gradually replacing gold and silver with paper money, it will reduce the price of the indispensable instrument of bourgeois commerce, of the general medium of exchange, enabling gold and silver to function in foreign trade. Ultimately, this measure is necessary to tie [to the point of failure] the interests of the conservative bourgeoisie [conservative bourgeois] to the revolution.”[xi]
Later we will comment on Marx and Engels’ self-criticism regarding this programmatic point. For now, it is only worth noting that Friedrich Engels, when he wrote the short text entitled “Contribution to the Communist League”, enclosed the pamphlet of the seventeen demands as a historical document, but he omitted point 10 and the entire lengthy commentary cited above…
As can be seen in this tenth demand, Marx and his companions literally wanted to tie the interests of the “conservative bourgeois” to the German revolution. This was precisely the German industrial bourgeois, who would possibly have an interest in revolutionaryly overthrowing the “money men” [worker].
The democratic-revolutionary project of New Rhenish Gazette
Shortly after arriving in the Rhineland, Karl Marx considered that the clandestine activities of the Communist League were limited; that it was necessary to find ways of acting more influentially on the revolutionary movement as a whole. For this reason, he suspended the clandestine activities of the League (against the wishes of leaders such as J. Moll and K. Schapper); he helped to found the Democratic Association of the city of Cologne (a broad organization, not strictly proletarian).[xii]; and, above all, he founded the daily newspaper New Rheinische Gazette. His strategy consisted of joining the “democratic party” to criticize it from within, seeking to take it to the left, to radicalization.[xiii]
A New Rhenish Gazette initially followed the general line of the aforementioned tenth item of the “Demands…” pamphlet. As if reviving his performance at the head of the old Rhine Gazette (in the years 1842/43), Marx sought to establish an alliance between the urban proletarian population and a possible radical, supposedly revolutionary or progressive, sector of the German bourgeoisie. The subtitle of the new newspaper itself, in the header, made his intentions clear: “Organ of Democracy” [Organ of Democracy][xiv]. According to Engels, the program of New Rhenish Gazette was: “A democratic, united and indivisible German republic and war against Russia, including the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland.”[xv]
The alliance between the proletariat and a section of the bourgeoisie perhaps did not seem impossible to Marx, after all the new Prussian ministry itself, formed as a result of the March Revolution, contained old acquaintances of his, such as the Minister-President G. L. Camphausen, the main figure in the government, and the Minister of Finance, D. Hansemann. Both were shareholders in the first Rhine Gazette (1842/43) and approved Marx's direction of this. So, if the head of the new government of the main kingdom of the confederation was formed by men with whom Marx could dialogue – why not then try to radicalize them politically?
The initial bourgeois-democratic character of New Rhenish Gazette came to light before its publication, in the “declaration of intent”. In a public letter to the Italian newspaper The sunrise, published at the end of May 1848, Marx, on behalf of the New Rhenish Gazette, wrote the following: “We extend our hand to the Italian people in a fraternal way and we want to show them that the German nation [the german nation] repudiates in every way the policy of oppression that is carried out in your country by the same people who have always pursued freedom in ours. We will do everything possible to promote unity and good understanding between the two great and free nations [der beiden großen und freien Nationen], which a shameful system of government has until now led to believe are enemies. […]”.[xvi]
We highlight the presence of the idea of the nation-state as an amalgamation of a “people”. It does not make major distinctions between the classes within the nation; it is characteristic of bourgeois thought and is consistent, to a certain extent, with the democratic-revolutionary strategy initially outlined by Marx for Germany. The “enemy” that fights “freedom” in both Germany and Italy are the Prussian and Austrian monarchies (and not the ruling classes, including the bourgeoisie, of these countries).
Contradictions in the democratic-revolutionary strategy
A few months after the revolutionary process began, Marx – as expected – began to publicly criticize the bourgeoisie of the “democratic party” that he himself had been a member of. This “party” was criticized for being too vacillating and centrist, for not carrying the revolution forward, for not really consolidating its victories – that is, for always opening a gap for the Prussian feudal-monarchist enemy to reorganize and recover battle fronts.
This is what the author argues, in the second issue of New Rhenish Gazette, in the article “The Democratic Party” (2/6/1848): “We ask the Democratic Party to be aware of its position. This demand arises from the experiences of the last [two] months. The Democratic Party has given itself over to the delirium of its first victory. Intoxicated by the joy of finally being able to proclaim its principle loudly and openly, it imagined that it only needed to declare it to immediately ensure its implementation. After the first victory and the concessions directly linked to it, it did not go beyond this proclamation. But while it was generous with its ideas and embraced as a brother all those who did not dare to challenge it immediately, the others, who left or ceded power, acted.”[xvii]
In the same text, Marx criticizes those capable of “conquering an intermediate position between the democratic party and the absolutists, advancing on one side and retreating on the other; those who are at the same time progressive – against absolutism – and reactionary – against democracy”.[xviii]
As can be seen, Marx did not consider such individuals to be mistaken because they were far from the pole of the working class, but from the pole of the democratic party; he did not consider them centrists because they were against the aspirations of the working class, but because they were opposed to “democracy”. This term still functions as an umbrella over class interests.
The conciliatory sector criticized here was “the moderate and prudent bourgeoisie”, present both in the German National Assembly and in the cabinet led by Minister-President Camphausen. This bourgeois sector, Marx also said, deceived the “people’s party” [People's Party]; with his centrism, he capitulated before a “powerful reaction, which reached power even before he had carried out a revolutionary action”. Such capitulators were, according to Marx, the “hypocritical friends”, who claimed to agree with the “democratic principle”, but doubted the possibilities of its realization by the “people”. “Such people are dangerous”, he asserted.[xx]. To the indeterminacy of the political objective – “democracy” – was added the indeterminate political agent – the “people”.
The paradox of democratic strategy – dictatorship and terrorism
A few days later, Marx registered a turning point in his revolutionary-democratic strategy. Exasperated by the vacillations of the bourgeois democrats, the author argued that they should act “dictatorially” if they wanted to secure power and prevent the feudal-monarchical reaction. In an article dated June 7, 1848, this understanding – the defense of a “dictatorship” – appeared for the first time in his work.
There he demanded that the German National Assembly act energetically, without expecting anything from the Camphausen ministry: “[T]he then situation in Germany gave it [the National Assembly] the opportunity to overcome its unfortunate material situation. All it had to do was to oppose it dictatorially [diktatorical indications] to the reactionary incursions of the outdated government everywhere, because in this way it would gain such power in popular opinion that, against it, all bayonets and rifles would shatter”.[xx]
However, instead, the National Assembly “bored the German people” with shows of parliamentarism and high-sounding phrases (what Marx in 1852 called “parliamentary cretinism”). This gave more space to reaction, he argued.
However, the “dictatorship” claimed was not yet associated with the class rule of the proletariat. Marx did not once use the expression “dictatorship of the proletariat” in New Rhenish Gazette. If carried out, it would be a dictatorship of the then constituted National Assembly, of heterogeneous (“popular”) class character, against the monarchical remnants (particularly in Prussia, the reign of Frederick William IV remained standing and pretended to adapt to popular demands).
Interestingly, when arguing for the need for a dictatorship, Marx first presented his defense of the strategy of dual power. The desired “dictatorship” would be that of the legislative power (of the National Assembly) against what remained of the monarchical-feudal executive power (the Crown of Frederick William IV). Marx’s strategy thus emulated – as we have already argued – what had occurred in the most radical moments of the French Revolution, particularly under the National Convention, when a dictatorship of the legislative power swept away the Ancien Régime.
Here is what the author says about the need for a dictatorship and the existence of parallel powers: “Any provisional situation after a revolution requires a dictatorship, and indeed an energetic dictatorship [energetic decree]. […] Thus, while Mr. Camphausen slept the constitutional dream, the defeated party strengthened its positions in the bureaucracy and the army, and even risked an open struggle here and there. The Assembly […] stood on the side of the Crown, on an equal footing. Two equal powers [Zwei gleichberechtigte Mächte] in a provisional government!”.[xxx]
The two powers were the monarchy of Frederick William IV and the National Assembly; the Camphausen ministry, in turn, was an intermediary or unifying element (“two equal powers in one provisional government”). The ministry’s function was to reconcile the two powers, avoiding the outbreak of civil war. Marx, on the other hand, hoped for the end of the unsustainable conciliation; he wanted the duality of powers to develop and move towards the definitive destruction of the monarchical-feudal power by that of the National Assembly.
As he argued: “The Crown and the Assembly are face to face. The 'conciliation' resulted [also] in separation, in conflict. Perhaps it will be up to weapons to decide. Whoever has more courage and consequence will win!”[xxiii]
Two months later, Marx seemed even more exasperated. As if the word “dictatorship” were not enough, he became more incisive. Analyzing the defeat of the revolution in Vienna and seeing a cloudy future in Germany, he wrote that “the cannibalism of the counter-revolution itself will convince the peoples that there is only one way to simplify and concentrate the death pangs of the old society and the bloody birth pangs of the new, only one means – revolutionary terrorism [nur ein Mittel – den revolutionären Terrorismus] ”[xxiii]
In May of 1849, the New Rhenish Gazette was suppressed. Its last issue – famous for its red-ink fonts – featured a threat from Marx: “When our turn comes, we will not disguise terrorism!”
How different is this Karl Marx from the one in Communist Manifesto! Instead of the abstract “struggle for democracy”, we have the need to carry out “terrorism” by means of an “energetic dictatorship” of the Legislative power (representing the majority of the “people”), leading a civil war against the Executive power. A “Jacobinist” Marx is now on the scene.[xxv] However, this is still far from the conclusion of the author's learning, regarding revolutionary strategy, from the revolution of 1848.
*Rafael de Almeida Padial holds a PhD in Philosophy from Unicamp. Author of On Marx's Passage to Communism (Mall). [https://amzn.to/3PDCzMe]
Expanded version of book chapter in ANTUNES, J.; MELO, R. & PRADO, C., Bonapartism, history and revolution. Uberlandia: Navigating, 2022.
References
ENGELS, F., “Marx und die 'Neue Rheinische Zeitung', 1848-1849”. In MEW, vol. 21. Berlin: Dietz, 1962;
Der Bund Der Kommunisten Dokumente Und Materialien, Berlin: Dietz, 1983;
MARX, K., “Brief an editor of the Zeitung L'Alba". In MEW, vol. 5, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959;
______. “The Democratic Party”, 02/06/1848. In MEW, vol. 5, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959;
______. “Die Krisis und die Kontrerevolution". In MEW, vol. 5, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959;
______. “Program of the radio-demokratischen Partei und der Linken zu Frankfurt”.In MEW, vol. 5, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959;
______. “Sieg der Kontrerevolution zu Wien”.In MEW, vol. 5, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959;
MARX, K., & ENGELS, F., Communist Party Manifesto. In MEW, volume 4, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977;
MARX, K., ENGELS, F. et al., "Forderungen der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland". In MEW, vol. 5, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959;
MCLELLAN, D., Karl Marx, his life and thought. London: Macmillan, 1973
MEHRING, F., Karl Marx, the story of his life, New York: Sundermann, 2013;
RIAZANOV, D.I., Manifesto of the Communist Party – Notes by DI Riazanov, Mexico City: Popular Culture Editions, 1978.
Notes
[I] As to this, see our book, On Marx's passage to communism, op. cit.
[ii] What we call there “democratic-revolutionary strategy” could also be called “democratic-popular strategy” or, even (according to texts of the time), “democratic-radical” strategy.
[iii] Cf. MARX, K., & ENGELS, F., Communist Party Manifesto [Manifesto of the Communist Party], in MEW (Marx-Engels Werke), volume 4, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977, p. 493. Italics ours.
[iv] Still, the author maintained that the German bourgeois revolution would occur with specificities, since the German proletariat was more developed than the English and French proletariats in their bourgeois revolutions. Thus, the bourgeois revolution in Germany, even at a certain stage, would be only an “immediate prelude” to the communist revolution. See the same excerpt from The Manifest.
[v] Ibidem, P. 481.
[vi] Ibid, pp. 481-82. Marx and Engels argue in the preface to the 1872 German edition that “no importance should be attached to these demands” because the revolutions of 1848 and 1871 historically negated them. This article is partly responsible for demonstrating this.
[vii] RIAZANOV, D.I., Manifesto of the Communist Party – Notes by DI Riazanov, Mexico City: Popular Culture Editions, 1978, p. 151.
[viii] For a general contextualization of the situation of 1848 and Marx's role in it, see the centenary biography by MEHRING, F., Karl Marx, the story of his life, São Paulo: Sundermann, 2013 (chapter “revolution and counterrevolution”). However, this biography has weaknesses and should be used sparingly. For example, it deliberately hides the figure of Andreas Gottschalk, who will be analyzed later.
[ix] Although we sometimes use the term “Germany” in this text, it is worth remembering that at the time the national identity contained in that name did not really exist. The correct term to refer to is the German Confederation, a unit of 39 kingdoms, duchies, principalities and free cities, established after the Congress of Vienna (1815), commanded by the kingdoms of Austria and Prussia. The confederation was dissolved in 1866, during the Austro-Prussian War.
[X] Regarding the attribution of Marx at the head of the League of Communists at that time, see “Beschluss der Zentralbehörde des Bundes der Kommunisten in Brüssel über ihre Verlegung nach Paris”, in Der Bund Der Kommunisten Dokumente Und Materialien, Berlin: Dietz, 1983, pp. 713–14.
[xi] MARX, K., ENGELS, F. et al., “Demands of the Communist Party in Germany”], in MEW, vol. 5, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959, p. 4. The pamphlet, written by Marx, is signed by him, K. Schapper, H. Bauer, F. Engels, J. Moll and W. Wolff.
[xii] In Cologne, the Democratic Association was in partial competition with the proletarian Workers' Association, founded and led in its early days by Andreas Gottschalk, a former member of the Communist League, an advocate of so-called “real socialism” (or “German socialism”) and a pupil of Moses Heß. We shall return to Gottschalk later. On the two associations, see MCLELLAN, D., Karl Marx, his life and thought. London: Macmillan, 1973, chapter 4.
[xiii] The “democratic party” did not formally exist as a legal entity with that name. The notion of “party” is used here in the broad sense, as movement of all those (organizations and individuals) who fight for democracy.
[xiv] The names can be confusing. Marx was at the forefront of two newspapers with similar names, both based in Cologne (Rhineland region). In October 1842, when he was a liberal supporter, he became editor-in-chief of the Rhine Gazette (Rheinische Zeitung). This lasted until March 1843. Marx achieved great political success at the head of the newspaper. Rhine Gazette was a bourgeois-democratic organ and its subtitle was “For Politics, Commerce and Industry” [für Politik, Handel und Gewerbe]. In June 1848, indicating a certain continuity with his previous work, Marx founded the New Rheinische Zeitung – Organ of Democracy (Neue Rheinische Zeitung – Organ der Demokratie), with which he also had political success (“the most famous newspaper of the German revolutionary period”, said Engels in his text “Marx and the New Rheinische Zeitung”). The second experiment lasted about a year.
[xv] ENGELS, F., “Marx und die 'Neue Rheinische Zeitung', 1848-1849”. In MEW, vol. 21. Berlin: Dietz, 1962, p. 19.
[xvi] See MARX, K., “Brief an den Redakteur der Zeitung L'Alba” [“Letter to the Editor of the newspaper L'Alba”], in MEW, vol. 5., op. cit., P. 8.
[xvii] Cf. MARX, K., “Die demokratische Partei” [“The Democratic Party”], 02/06/1848, in MEW, vol. 5, p. 22
[xviii] See Ibid, p. 23.
[xx] All the latest little quotes ibid, pp. 23-24.
[xx] Idem, “Program of the Radical Democratic and Left Party of Frankfurt”, 07/06/1848, in ibid, pp. 40-41.
[xxx] Idem, “Die Krisis und die Kontrerevolution” [“The Crisis and the Counterrevolution”], particularly the article published on 14/9/1848, in ibid., P. 402.
[xxiii] Ibidem, p. 404. It is worth noting that the notion of “duality of powers” had already appeared, but en passant, in the article “Programs of the Radical Democratic Party and the Left of Frankfurt”, already mentioned by us. After the article now worked on – “The crisis and the counterrevolution” –, the notion of duality of powers will be increasingly present in NGR. See, in particular, the articles “Freedom of Deliberation in Berlin” (17/09/1848); “The Crisis in Berlin” (9/11/1848); “The Counterrevolution in Berlin” (12/11/1848); “The Ministry is Accused” (15/11/1848); “The Attorney General’s Office and the New Rhenish Gazette”(22/11/1848); “The trial against the Rhenish district committee of the Democrats” (25/02/1849 and 27/02/1849).
[xxiii] Idem, “Sieg der Kontrerevolution zu Wien” [“Victory of the Counter-Revolution in Vienna”], 07/11/1848, in ibid, P. 457.
[xxv] It is known that after leaving the Rhine Gazette (the first, from 1842/43), and before moving to Paris (October 1843), Marx studied the French Revolution of 1789 in depth. In it, he certainly sought to understand the general laws of a revolutionary process. Marx even intended to write a “History of the Convention” (the period of the Jacobin “terror”). However, in none of his notes at the time did he reveal any great appreciation for the Jacobin path of the French Revolution. In his first article written for publication – “Remarks on the latest Prussian instruction on censorship”, written in February 1842, but only published in February 1843 – Marx directly attacked the terrorism of the Jacobins. Later, in his French period (late 1843), in defense of democratic notions – such as “universal suffrage” – Marx defended socialist paths such as those of Dézamy and Cabet, against the “dictatorial” communist current that, directly from G. Babeuf, came from the French Revolution and led to P. Buonarroti and A. Blanqui. Now, in 1848, we have a Marx who was truly drinking from this other, “Jacobinist” vein of the French Revolution. It is worth noting that Engels, in his article “Marx and the New Rhenish Gazette", of 1884, comments that the NGR largely imitated (although unconsciously) the tactics of L'Ami du Peuple, by Marat. As we know, he represented one of the most radical wings (along with the Hébertists of Paris) of the Jacobin petty bourgeoisie in the French Revolution of the 18th century.
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