The crisis of liberal democracy

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By JOSÉ COSTA JUNIOR*

Rather than seeing democracy as a defined program that has come to an end, we increasingly need to understand it as an ongoing project.

Questions out of place

Doubts and questions about democracy seem to be out of place. After all, the democratic government seems to be the political organization that most enables freedom and equality, removing domination and violence and promoting the flourishing of everyone's life. However, in recent years, several situations have stimulated reflections on the value, scope and limits of politics, especially in relation to democracy. Concerns of all kinds have arisen, coming from philosophy, political science and psychology, among other theoretical efforts. It has become common to speak of a “democracy crisis”, in reference to the problems in the system of political organization that seemed stable in most of the so-called civilized world in the last three decades. However, for some reason still little understood, the democratic assumptions of freedom and equality, of a government carried out in “the name of the people and for the people” are no longer so receptive even in democracies that we imagined established. For many, “politicians” and “politics” no longer have the necessary credibility to define the direction of our social organization. A good part of democratic societies are polarized, with no concerns beyond their own vision and situation, which makes debate and the free exposition of ideas unfeasible. Thus, the intensity of conflicts and verbal and physical violence increases, as well as tensions regarding the future.

In what follows, we analyze some hypotheses of the debate on the current state of democracy. The main questions that cross the writing are the following: Why and how does democracy seem to be in crisis? What does this system not offer its citizens? Doesn't democracy make societies more stable? Or, more generally, for those of us who believe we would always live in democratic societies: were we cheated?

The democratic and liberal promise

At the end of the Cold War, with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991), many came to believe that the only viable political system from then on would be liberal democracy. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama (1952) was one of the main supporters of this position. He published an article titled “The end of the story?” in 1989, questioning whether we had not reached the end of the history of political organizations, where liberal democracy would be the final answer to the way human beings should organize themselves. In 1992, he dropped the question mark and published The end of history and the last man, a book in which he developed and expanded his hypothesis. It would be a matter of time and reflection before liberal democracy would suppress forms of domination such as imperialism, fascism and communism, reaching the vast majority of the peoples of the world. Or, as Fukuyama himself put it:

“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of History as such: that is, the end point of humanity's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the ultimate form of human government.

The hypothesis that the path to human social organizations would be liberal democracy received diverse reactions, both favorable and critical. A series of questions arose, mainly in relation to the scope of the democratic political system: To what extent is liberal democracy legitimate for all peoples? Would the western way of life be the desire of the entire world population? Does liberal democracy really represent the ideals of freedom and opportunity? Several events, such as the maintenance and actions of tyrannical governments and political and religious extremism, together with the difficulties of achieving equality and democratic participation in some countries have been constant questions to Fukuyama's hypothesis. In 2006, the political scientist gave an interview to the Roda Viva program and offered a response:

“The end of history is a theory about modernization. If you think back over the last few centuries, progressive intellectuals saw a direction for history with modernization leading to a socialist society. What I observed, in the 1989, dated original article, was that we were not moving in the direction of socialism and that, if there was a termination point, it would be something like Western liberal democracy and an unplanned market-driven system. It is obvious that we have new challenges, because democratic systems are not perfect.”

Many of us, particularly those born in the West after the 1980s, live most of our lives in democratic societies. In a way, we believe in Fukuyama's “democratic and liberal promise”, as we do not experience risks to democracy, which seems to be the “normal pace of the world”. Tyrannical regimes and political violence seem to be something from the recent past, to which we cannot return, after all, we naively believed that we lived in a reasonably stable world, despite the need for some changes. However, in the last decade, some events have contradicted Fukuyama's hypothesis and it seems that the story has not come to an end.

Mistrust

At the end of the 1962th century and the beginning of the XNUMXst century, several situations showed that democracies had serious difficulties. An example is inequality in access to production and consumption, one of the most striking traits of Western societies. In addition, the process of approximation and circulation of people and goods that we identify as globalization did not generate the inclusion that many expected, even expanding some conflicts within societies, as can be seen in situations of xenophobia in Europe since the beginning of the new century . Such tensions and difficulties in the daily life of democratic societies favored, in some countries, the emergence of politicians and leaders with little commitment to freedom and citizen participation. The Dutch philosopher Rob Riemen (XNUMX) presented his suspicions regarding the future of the socio-political organization of that period, mainly regarding the cultural and economic dynamics of the so-called “democratic” world. In The eternal return of fascism (2010) Riemen warned that our cultural and educational processes did not seek to form citizens – with concerns beyond their own intimacy and demands. Thus, in times of social crisis and uncertainty, most of us are prone to frustration, resentment, and violence. In a world where economic instability is constant, such traits will be common in Western societies.

In scenarios of uncertainty, demagogues and unprepared individuals can assuage society's insecurities by proposing quick and effective solutions, increasingly occupying the political scene with the support of many people, who no longer have hope in relation to politics and politicians. Thus, with less and less involved with the world around us, without valuing the cultural formation that stimulates doubt and reflection, favoring purely utilitarian knowledge transmission models, our democracies are always available for the “eternal return of fascism”. For Riemen, by forgetting to understand and avoid “the worst in ourselves”, that is, fear, resentment, frustration and violence, we end up making political organization difficult, opening the way for leaders with false promises and speeches that postulate easy solutions to complex situations.

Other suspicions about the future of democracy in the 1939st century were launched by the historian of ideas Tzvetan Todorov (2017-XNUMX). Born in Bulgaria, Todorov lived under totalitarian German and Soviet regimes throughout the XNUMXth century. Throughout his studies he dealt with what he identified as “the misadventures of the Enlightenment and Humanist individual”, in an allusion to the expectations of rationality and freedom of the philosophy of the XNUMXth century. Even with hopes that social organization could offer more freedom and equality, the XNUMXth century saw many conflicts and brutalities. Democracy emerged victorious over “external enemies”, such as fascism, Nazism and communism, creating great expectations about the future. However, other enemies were always present (and still misunderstood).

Em The Intimate Enemies of Democracy (2012) Todorov develops a series of diagnoses about democracy in the XNUMXst century, based on assumptions close to those analyzed by Riemen. However, his hypothesis details some “dangers”, identifying possibilities internal to democracy itself that may contribute to its failure – the “intimate enemies” of the title: (i) populism, which involves the emergence in democracies of charismatic leaders with solutions to the problems of such societies, speaking “what people want and need to hear”; (ii) messianism, which involves the almost mythical, religious and infallible character of leaders and policies, which find support in the social and economic difficulties of individuals; (iii) neoliberalism, which involves increasingly exclusive and unequal economic dynamics. Given the inherent difficulties of the democratic political system, such situations are increasingly common in societies and it seems to be difficult to combat them. A common topic in such diagnoses is populism. Todorov sees demagoguery as the main trait of populists, with trivial speeches of little depth and without solid political commitments. With the increasingly sophisticated mass media, such discourses penetrate deeper and deeper into societies, limiting the possibilities for broader and more effective political concerns. But what is populism?

According to the political scientist Ernesto Laclau (1935-2014), we understand little of populism as a way of doing and organizing politics because it has been relegated to a marginal position in political science. In the populist reason (2005), Laclau analyzed the nature of political phenomena understood as populism, mainly in relation to the way in which the connection between the people and the political leader takes place. Its objective is to better understand how certain discourses and practices involve people, creating differentiated bonds between represented and representatives. Laclau, who experienced the emergence of charismatic and undemocratic leaders in his native Argentina, sees in establishing this connection a rationality that captures the feelings and insecurities of the mass identified as “the people”. In this way, the connections between the politician and the people make possible the emergence of democratically elected governments, possessing legitimacy, but limited in relation to the practice of democratic exercise. It is thus a highly effective means of reaching and staying in power.

Here, a question may arise: How do we let ourselves be carried away by populist discourses? We imagine ourselves as sovereign and rational subjects, capable of controlling what affects us, especially in relation to empty proposals and promises. After all, in theory, we are conscious subjects capable of distinguishing “the true from the false”, as the Greeks and the Enlightenment wanted. But are we really that rational? According to Spanish political scientist Manuel Árias Maldonado (1974), no. Several empirical investigations into the origin and functioning of human rationality have shown that situations and emotions involve us much more than we think, which explains the potential of populist discourses in our political participation.

Maldonado argues in Sentimental Democracy: Politics and Emotions in the XNUMXst Century (2016), that we were never as sovereign as we thought. Whether through the platforms, television, radio or social media, our feelings and emotions are much more impacted in political decisions than we assume. With the expansion of the reach and potential of technologies, messages reach us and impact us more and more. We are talking here about a “post-sovereign subject”, influential, not very coherent and limited in terms of rationality. This picture differs from the “enlightenment” and “humanist” expectations analyzed by Todorov, which limited the impact of emotion and sensations on political agency. For Maldonado, the increasing stimulus to a type of skeptical reason, which doubts and evaluates before accepting questionable views and hypotheses, can contribute to reducing the impact of inflamed and shallow discourses. However, this step requires the recognition that we are not as rational as we think we are, along with the design of institutional circumstances and stimuli that encourage such procedures.

There are those who doubt that democracy can function effectively dealing with agents so limited in their power of understanding and analysis. This is the case of the British philosopher Jason Brennan (1979). In Against Democracy (2016), Brennan questions whether democracy is really the best system of government when compared to other possibilities. However, Brennan is not a supporter of dictatorships or tyrannies, but of structuring a more qualified political process of participation. More often than not, democracy is judged on its intent and foundations rather than on its results. In times of populism and political responses in forms of bravado, it is necessary to rethink democratic foundations. Even the obligation to vote should be reviewed according to this philosopher, since it encourages those who have no interest or preparation for the exercise of democratic choice. According to his argument, a more effective democracy would approach an “epistocracy”, that is, a system in which only those who know and understand what is at stake could participate (from the Greek episteme, knowledge) This would remove populist risks and totalitarian temptations, as agents would know how to analyze and choose what is best for everyone.

Brennan's hypothesis goes against some of our most basic intuitions about the functioning of democracy and the right of public participation – always consulting everyone. It also sounds elitist and unrepresentative, especially disregarding the high levels of inequality in the world. However, it also draws attention, often provocatively, to the way we deal with politics, its function and relevance. It would be interesting to understand what candidates and voters think about the nature of politics, its role in society and the risks it involves. In times of tensions and fears, the distrusts we addressed show that some serious problems surround democracy, mainly in relation to the knowledge and information available to democratic agents.

Transitions, rages and ruptures

Such suspicions are growing at a time when everything seems to be going faster. The process of globalization, fueled by cultural and technological changes that feed each other, promoted intense cultural and social changes. The Brazilian political scientist Sérgio Abranches (1949) identified the current times as an “age of transition”, where conflicts between the new and the not so old are increasingly constant, with concrete examples in consumption habits, in family structures, in political relations and in the forms and means of education. In The Age of the Unforeseen: The Great Transition of the XNUMXst Century (2017), Abranches argues that we are experiencing a transition between modes and organizations from different centuries, and when thinking about these changes, we think about ourselves, since we are involved in this movement. On the other hand, a considerable part of understanding the transition also involves understanding the depletion of paradigms and models of the ways in which we live and organize ourselves, which can generate conservative and extremist reactions, coming from all political spectrums.

The different effects of this transition can be allocated in three instances: (i) socio-structural change, with social, political and economic effects; (ii) scientific and technological change, impacting the ways we deal with others and our circumstances; (iii) climate change, with environmental effects determined by human action. Among other instances, in the midst of the great transition, we humans are dealing with new scenarios that we ourselves have created and that seem risky to us. Without demonizing the transition, Abranches recognizes that it is likely that we will build satisfactory responses to the challenges and changes in which we are inserted. Crises can also arise, as in the case of contemporary democracies. However, a risk of this scenario is that individuals, lost between the market and the state and stunned by the critical changes of their time, no longer believe in democracy as a safe and necessary instance.

In this sense, the fear and tensions of a completely open and transient world can generate extreme and angry political reactions. In the view of the British essayist Pankaj Mishra (1969) we live in a “time of anger”, a moment in which the absence of answers and certainties regarding the near future causes disorientation and resentment. In Age of Anger (2017) Mishra addresses the ways in which globalization enhances the processes of modernization and displacement in social, political and economic terms. Family ties, political organization and work change, generating anxieties, achievements and frustrations. As not everyone has access to the benefits of modernization and its emancipatory promises, resentments, frustrations and violence arise. Traditional politics and institutions find it difficult to deal with such tensions and the populist and extremist discourses described by Riemen, Todorov and Laclau will find fertile ground in this scenario of discontent. According to Mishra's argument, the assumption of liberal democrats, such as Fukuyama, that the end of the Cold War would usher in an era of economic prosperity accompanied by global harmony and tolerance was based on an error. Such assessments did not consider the situation of part of the world's population that was left out of the process of economic globalization and material advances. An example is the situation of young people, who experience inadequacy and discomfort in a world that changes all the time and devoid of expectations in relation to what to do with their own lives. In a world where anything and everything can happen at any time, political programs fueled by resentment can find fertile ground. In this scenario, hatred and violence can mix with politics, mainly due to the rise of demagogues with little commitment to social stability and democracy.

A world in transition, where anger and resentment can lead to political and social changes that have not yet been properly considered. The Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells (1942) identifies such alterations and possible political changes as “ruptures”. Also recognizing the dynamic advances of the contemporary world, Castells also draws attention to the collapse of relations between rulers and ruled. occurred in several countries. The crisis of representation exposed by such a collapse is based on people's disbelief in institutions, especially political ones, that do not represent their constituents. The individual thus comes to see the politician as an enemy, someone to be fought vehemently. Then, within the democratic processes, there is a demand for individuals who are not part of traditional politics, what Castells calls figures anti-establishment. It is curious that we have come to highlight and value candidates in democratic processes who paradoxically claim that they “are not politicians”. Castells identifies this situation as an indication of the difficulty of representativeness, a central element of democratic processes. This review is available at Rupture: The crisis of liberal democracy (2018), whose opening sentence expresses the author’s concern: “Evil winds blow on the blue planet”.

Is it the end of democracy?

Are contemporary democracies really at risk? If yes, how does this break occur? Once again, several recent productions in the field of political science have addressed such tensions and most publications have little optimistic expectations about the future of democratic countries. Three recent hypotheses are relatively skeptical about the consequences of contemporary changes for the future of democracy. American political scientists Steven Levitsky (1968) and Daniel Ziblatt (1972) point out in how democracies die (2018) that in less than 30 years liberal democracy ceased to be a universal good for its system in recession. In our century, democracies no longer fall through authoritarian coups, but by choice of the voters themselves, giving rise to illiberal democracies and dictatorships. Starting from dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction on the part of people with the direction of political organization, these authors see in the context of the crisis of contemporary democracies a gateway to outsiders, people with no long-term involvement in politics, who end up being depositories of hopes and votes, in addition to the risks of personification of power and authoritarian escalations. They point out four points to identify a government with authoritarian tendencies: (i) rejection of democratic rules; (ii) denial of opponents' legitimacy; (iii) tolerating or encouraging violence; (iv) and propensity to restrict civil liberties, including those of the media.

The German-American political scientist Yascha Mounk (1982) also recognizes the conflict between the representative and the represented in contemporary scenarios. However, he does not bet on the end of democracy, but on two possibilities: (i) the emergence of a democratic form without concern for rights, in an “intolerant democracy”, or (ii) the emergence of a “non-democratic liberalism”, with the recognition of rights without democracy. These avenues are explored in The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It (2018), where Mounk presents the various causes of the decline in the prestige of democracy today. Among these, it highlights (i) the new communication technologies, which allow the dissemination of extremist ideas and little analysis, (ii) the economic difficulties and tensions, after periods of stability and relative security and (iii) the growing hostility between the various ethnic and religious groups. In such contexts, traditional politics takes time to diagnose and point out solutions to society's problems. The crisis of representation stems from these circumstances, placing the “people against democracy” – as the title of Mounk's book points out –, paving the way for more liberal and intolerant forms of government.

In addition to Levitsky and Ziblatt's diagnoses of death and Mounk's emergence of radicalism, the British David Runciman (1957) believes that it is necessary to completely restructure democratic processes and adapt them to new times and circumstances. In How Democracy Comes to an End (2018), explores possibilities that belie the title of the book: democracy is not over yet, but it is experiencing a “midlife crisis”, looking for new and perhaps daring experiences. What comes to an end is the traditional form of democracy, which must open up to new possibilities. Among these, Runciman analyzes forms of democratic pragmatism, which come dangerously close to authoritarianism, in addition to carefully analyzing Brennan's proposal on limited political participation to those who present the necessary qualifications. He also advocates a more robust application of technological processes for both democratization and voter information. However, and this is perhaps his main message, new times require our forms of political organization:

“Contemporary representative democracy is tired. It became vindictive, paranoid, deluded, clumsy, and often ineffective. Most of the time, he lives off the glories of the past. This sad scenario reflects what we have become. But today's democracy is not what we are. It's just a system of government, which we built and can replace. So why not exchange it for something better?”

As they are the work of contemporary political science professionals, such analyzes alarm us and draw attention to the increasingly visible signs that politics and democracy are no longer non-negotiable values ​​of our way of life. This pessimism about Western governments frightens us and makes us forget that liberal democracy has some resilience and that it has been tested a few times. In societies with freedom of expression, attribution of rights, opposition and criticism, and some legal independence, democracy still finds support and shelter in its own citizens, even amidst the storms and insecurities of a world in transition. However, its defenders always need to be attentive to changes, tensions and crises, which can end up leading us to the dangerous paths of authoritarianism.

dangerous path

Both Levitsky and Ziblatt, and Runciman and Mounk point to a scenario of major democratic crisis, but do not address more specifically what we will have if democracies really collapse. All these diagnoses show concern about the possibility of authoritarian governments, but how would policies of this nature be implemented? The British philosopher Anthony Grayling (1949) developed his hypothesis about the crisis of democracy already evaluating scenarios like this. In Democracy and its crisis (2017) Grayling resumes two problems about democracy highlighted in Classical Greece by Plato (427-347 BC): (i) the possibility of the government being captured by the least capable, which would lead the city to anarchy and tyranny or ( ii) the possibility of power being captured by oligarchs, through demagoguery and manipulation. Grayling points to examples of how democracy has not worked well in recent years in some western countries due to this last possibility: the power of demagoguery and manipulation. Even though liberal democracies were designed so that people could have some representation and authority, this fundamental trait has been lost. The causes involve (i) the distancing of people from politics, (ii) the lack of concrete results in their lives and (iii) the intense manipulations provided by governments and applicants with questionable interests through the use of communication technologies. It is a dangerous path, increasingly open to authoritarianism. Without transparency and without clear commitments, in a context of increasing uncertainty, the first possibility raised by Plato may come true: unprepared and inexperienced leaders take over the government, creating democratic impasses and limits to freedom.

The manipulation of individuals' emotions and their political effects mainly through technology is also highlighted in the work of historian Timothy Snyder (1969), entitled The road to unfreedom (2018). Specifically evaluating recent events in Russia, Europe and America, Snyder shows procedures and strategies adopted by governments to rise and remain in power based on fears and emotions of citizens. According to the author, one can first observe in such governments a “policy of the inevitable”, based on populist discourses that promise the best for everyone, with strong nationalist and heroic tendencies in an uncertain and unstable world. It is also possible to notice an “eternal policy”, which identifies internal and external enemies, which need to be fought for the “people” to really enjoy what is their right. Among such forms of politics, an authoritarian government can be structured, with broad popular support and with increasing power. Snyder uses Vladimir Putin's Russia as his main example, where control of the information to which the population has access is strict, the press is constantly observed and other countries and ways of life are identified as inadequate. The path that leads a democratic society to authoritarianism is guided by fear and control, resentment and doubt about the future. The “surrender of freedoms” seems to be even the most rational thing to do for many people, who don't even have the possibility of evaluating the circumstances, since their feelings and emotions are manipulated.

Many see in the current global political scenario a parallel with the events of the 1920s and 1930s. Crises, anxieties and fears sustained the rise of fascist and totalitarian governments in Europe, which would become the center of its World Wars. The Czech-American diplomat Madeleine Albraight (1937) sees some similarities between the situation of democracies today and that period. Like Todorov, Albraught lived under the shadows of the Nazi and Communist regimes and warns against the risks of democracy failing in Fascism: A Warning (1918). Among these, he warns of the risk of increasing the intensity of political violence, the absence of civilized and organized discussions and the constant disrespect for rights and modes of existence. Albraight's hypothesis was criticized by some specialists, mainly in relation to the definition of fascism, which would be closer to the use of force, violence and weapons to maintain power, as happened in Italy and Germany in the first half of the XNUMXth century. . However, Albraight draws attention to the growth of attitudes of violence and hatred guided by political motives, which bring more and more instabilities to democratic life in the first decades of the XNUMXst century. The totalitarian impulses observed in democratically elected leaders are signs that the risks of fascism are not so far away. In a more general analysis and responding to his critics, Albraight defends that “fascism is not an exceptional stage of humanity, but a part of ourselves”.

With debates increasingly violent and close to barbarism in democratic processes, Albraight's hypothesis seems to find some support in reality, even with reservations about the meaning of “fascism”. An example of violence and rudeness is the use of increasingly aggressive speeches, with terminologies and questions that seem to be inappropriate for the place they occupy, but which find receptivity among voters. This situation of democracy under the strong impact of propaganda caught the attention of the American philosopher Jason Stanley (1969), especially in times like ours, where the reach of digital communication increases every day. Dealing specifically with fascist tendencies in political speeches, Stanley published How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them (2018), in which he addresses political co-option strategies in democracies. Among such strategies, Stanley highlights a certain fetish towards the past, the massive appeal to propaganda and slogans of order, anti-intellectualist and unreflective tendencies, violent division between us and them, and anxieties of gender and sexual control. Once again, even if today we do not have any democratically elected government that can be identified as “fascist”, certain tendencies and attitudes of some political groups can dangerously approach policies of this nature that already caused much suffering in the not so distant past.

And now?

As we have seen, the confidence in the promise of democratic and liberal stability characterized by Fukuyama meets with many challenges in reality. The risk of crisis, transitions, inequalities, ruptures and uncertainties in the contemporary world place us in front of unprecedented challenges in recent decades. The paradoxical scenario outlined by some specialists, in which people started to question democracy, either by their own will or through manipulation, makes the scenario even more complex. However, as Todorov and Albraight argue, democracies have never been completely risk-free. We can even go further and find in the old Platonic suspicion that democracy and tyranny are always involved. However, even if we have been misled by history and our confidence in a democratic stability that has not come, we still live in democracies and can broaden our understanding of the circumstances. In this way, instead of seeing democracy as a defined program, which has come to an end, we need to understand it more and more as a project always in progress, with laughs inherent to it, which need to be considered and understood in a world of post-sovereign subjects, who are afraid and anxious about the future. It is not and has never been the end of the story.

*Jose Costa Junior Professor of Philosophy and Social Sciences at IFMG –Campus Ponte Nova.

 

References


ABRANCHES, Sergio. The Age of the Unforeseen: The Great Transition of the XNUMXst Century. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2017

ALBRIGHT, Madeleine. Fascism: A Warning. Translation by Jaime Biaggio. São Paulo: Review: 2018.

ARIAS-MALDONADO, Manuel. Sentimental democracy: politics and emotions in the XNUMXst siglo. Barcelona: Indómita Page, 2016.

BRENNAN, Jason. Against Democracy. Translation by Elisabete Lucas. Lisbon: Gradiva, 2017. (2016)

CASTELLS, Manuel. Rupture: The crisis of liberal democracy. Translation by Joana Angélica Melo. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2018.

FUKUYAMA, Francis. The end of history and the last man. Translation by Aulyde Rodrigues. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1992.

GRAYLING, Anthony. Democracy and its crisis. New York: Oneworld Publications, 2017.

LACLAU, Ernesto. the populist reason. Translated by Carlos Eugênio Marcondes de Moura. São Paulo: Three Stars, 2013. (2005)

LEVITSKY, Steven; ZIBLATT, Daniel. how democracies die. Translation by Renato Aguiar. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2018.

MISHRA, Pankaj. The Age of Anger: A History of the Present. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2017.

MOUNK, Yasha. The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It🇧🇷 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018.

RIEMEN, Rob. The eternal return of fascism. Translation by Maria Carvalho. Lisbon: Bizâncio, 2012. (2010)

RUNCIMAN, David. How Democracy Comes to an End. Translation by Sergio Flaksman. São Paulo: However, 2018.

SNYDER, Timothy. The road to unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018

TODOROV, Tzvetan. The Intimate Enemies of Democracy. Translation by Joana Angélica d'Avila Melo. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.

 

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