By JOÃO QUARTIM DE MORAES*
There was no lack of coherence and ambition in the national industrial development plan launched by Ernesto Geisel
1.
After the 1964 coup, the ruling circles of big capital accepted that the military leadership would remain in direct command of the state apparatus. From 1964 to 1985, executive power was monopolized by the generals-presidents of the dictatorship.
During these politically traumatic years, the mass of the bourgeoisie oscillated from militant support for the coup to save God, the country, the family and especially property from the clutches of the communists, to discontent with the perverse consequences of Roberto Campos' economic policy (control of inflation through wage restraint and credit restrictions) and a diffuse sympathy for the democratic mobilization of 1968, retreating into obsequious silence after the decree of Act 5.
Delfim Neto's economic "miracle", combining wage flattening, high growth rates and foreign debt, in a favorable international situation, calmed the bourgeoisie, but left a heavy financial liability, aggravated by the "oil shock", which made its effects felt exactly when the "czar" of the Brazilian economy was leaving the Ministry of Finance, which he had occupied since 1967.
In Brazil, immediately after the 1964 coup and the establishment of the military dictatorship, the expectation was that the new regime would abandon and even liquidate the state sector of the economy. Paulo Schilling, a Brizolist theorist exiled in Uruguay, insisted on this opinion in articles published during that period. The facts showed that the prophecy was wrong. Roberto Campos, who led the dictatorship's economic policy from 1964 to 1967, was a pragmatic reactionary.
His priorities were focused on combating inflation (basically through wage cuts) and “adjusting” public finances. He was committed to applying the so-called “price truth,” cutting indirect subsidies embedded in the prices of public services, food imports, etc. To those who protested against the sharp increases in electricity rates, he sarcasticly replied: do you prefer “cheap darkness”?
This socially cruel method of stabilizing the currency had the side effect of strengthening the state sector of the economy, ensuring profitability for public companies. The relative weakness of the national bourgeoisie and the lack of haste of international capitalists to invest in Brazil, despite the great facilities offered by the dictatorial regime (foreign financing initially came from the US government and international organizations under its control) left ample room for the economic predominance of state capitalism.
This situation continued during the seven years that Delfim Neto was in charge of economic policy (1967-1974), to the point of alarming the plutocrats most attached to the vulgar liberalism. Thus, in a speech of thanks upon receiving the title of “man of vision” in 1974, granted by the magazine of the same name, in Rio de Janeiro, the rancid but celebrated liberal ideologue Eugênio Gudin warned his associates that Brazilian capitalism “was more controlled by the State than that of any other country, with the exception of the communists”. Ernesto Geisel was not impressed by the message, especially since he had received this strong State control from the generals who had preceded him in leading the dictatorship.
2.
When he took over as head of the regime, Brazilian GDP growth, which had peaked at 13,97% in 1973, fell to 8,15% in 1974 and 5,17% in 1975. The difficult economic situation he inherited did not inhibit his developmentalist ambitions. He intended to revive Brazil’s self-centered industrialization project, with strong state participation. In his aforementioned autobiographical statement to the CPDOC, regarding a comment made to him (“In your view, then, the State in Brazil is a crucial agent of development”), he responded that it was, arguing against those who celebrate the “millions of dollars” entering the stock market. “I am against this, because this money is now invested in the stock market, it makes a profit, but when the guy sees that he has already made a good profit, he leaves […] instead of contributing to our development, he is sucking us dry! Getúlio fought hard against this.” And he reinforces: “the State has to direct” (p. 252-253)
Further on, he emphasizes that development “must be homogeneous”. Using the example of the steel industry, he again cites Getúlio Vargas regarding the installation of the Volta Redonda plant and points out the lack of planning for the industrialization that followed, starting with Juscelino: “they set up a series of industries, refrigeration, washing machines […], the automobile industry itself, without considering at the same time providing the necessary raw materials. They left steel production meager, insignificant, and the steel needed for this production had to be largely imported. […] it was necessary to expand the steel industry. For this reason, the steel mills of Volta Redonda and Usiminas were expanded, and those of Açominas and Tubarão were started […]” (p. 301-302).
He also highlighted the heavy investment in the construction of the Itaipu and Tucuruí hydroelectric plants, which made possible the national production of aluminum, which until then had been almost entirely imported. Regarding nuclear energy, he justified the agreement with Germany because of the “terrible service” provided by the American trust Westinghouse, which the Medici government had commissioned to build the first nuclear power plant.
The national industrial development plan launched by Ernesto Geisel was not lacking in coherence and ambition. However, the consequences of the “oil shock” had a strong negative impact on its implementation. He had always defended the Petrobrás monopoly, but in the energy crisis, he resorted to “risk contracts” with the oil cartel of imperialist vultures. “I had to accept it in light of the emergency the country was going through” (p. 308).
But Shell, Esso et caterva, which usually operate with easy and certain profits, contributed little or nothing to alleviate the fuel shortage that plagued the country. The solution found was the launch of the alcohol program, financed by the State, which made it possible to ensure sufficient supply to vehicles with engines adapted to the new fuel.
Ernesto Geisel quotes Getúlio Vargas a lot, generally positively, but in a neutral tone. After all, he played a prominent role in the 1964 coup and the dictatorship that was established at the time, whose explicit objective was to eliminate communism and Getúlio Vargasism from national politics. However, he did not lose sight of two essential criteria of nationalism: autonomous economic development and independent foreign policy.
It is ironic that the first president elected by popular vote after the end of the dictatorship, the “playboy“Fernando Collor, during his fortunately short term, promoted the opening of the economy to the large imperialist monopolies, to the detriment of national industry. He did this to “please the Americans”, pondered Ernesto Geisel, using the example of petrochemicals, but also referring to other basic industries: […] “we are in a recession […]; abroad they are also in recession. So they sell at marginal costs […] because they have production that has no outlet”. They finance these sales with interest rates much lower than those charged in Brazil. “The government knows this. Does it do anything? It does nothing” (p. 253). (We remember that these autobiographical statements were taken between July 1993 and March 1994; the president was Itamar and the Minister of Economy was FH Cardoso).
*João Quartim de Moraes He is a retired full professor of the Philosophy Department at Unicamp. Author of, among other books, Lenin: an introduction (Boitempo). [https://amzn.to/4fErZPX]
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