The declared civil war

Image_Elyeser Szturm


The current assault on power by the right is very different from what happened in 1964. Now, endogenous reasons prevail over exogenous ones, inversely to what happened in the previous main paradigm.

To the memory of Chico de Oliveira

Radical Historical Criticism

For the political bloc defeated in October 2018 in Brazil (the working class and its allies), the electoral rise of an ultra-right political bloc underlines the urgent need for self-defense measures, in the face of an openly declared class civil war. It also calls for a radical and far-reaching historical critique, no less vital for workers' political survival.

The return – in a new key – of the military to the direct control of the State marks a change in the regime and in class relations. Nevertheless, the open cycle now has some elements similar to those of the civil-military regime that took power. militarily in April 1964, on behalf of the consortium between monopoly capital and the Brazilian Armed Forces-FFAA. [I]

On the other side of the mirror, the past has not passed

But how to support a radical historical critique in order to distinguish social classes and their fractions, as well as the game of political actors? In this case, it must be based on the concrete criticism of two myths or fallacies of the so-called “New Republic” (1985-2018), now ended. Criticism, therefore, of myths that were translated into illusions of overcoming the totalitarian cycle, namely, in short, of the putsch civil-military agreement of April 1964, AI-5 (Institutional Act 5, 13.12.1968) and the 'lead years' of the Médici (1969-74) and Geisel (1974-79) governments.

Seen as opposites, the fallacious myths of the “New Republic” fueled a fictional dispute for more than thirty years. Under such a dispute, a common fund was eclipsed – the true axis of power in Brazil – which now openly takes back direct control of the State, to the surprise of the unwary (of which there are many) and the relief of the “consortium” that has long been in charge.

paralyzing effects

Two myths in one, therefore, or a fallacy split into two: 1. that of the celebrated “Transição” (1984-5), the “original scene” of the “New Republic”; 2. the success of the “social policy” of the “New Republic” during the Lula I and II governments, translated into the “Lulista” distribution formula, which at its peak (2010) obtained an approval rate of 80%, as good or great government.[ii]

the totem                                                                              

Under the two faces of the Janus of the “New Republic” there is a totem: that of the civil-military consortium that prohibits the political front between workers and petty-bourgeois sectors. From such a front derived the struggles for “basic reforms” and others, before the April 1964 coup.[iii] Under this totem, all references to the political autonomy of workers and class struggle were prohibited. To the weight of the ban was added another fallacy: that of modernization and social development through capitalism.

Modernization ex machina

Both myths, the “Transition” and “Lulismo” (derived from the first), met the prescription of continuity totemic of the consortium between the monopolies and the FFAA, always reverent to external influences. So, what is the trace of continuity, under the yoke of the consortium? The cult of modernization dependent, that is, due to external inversions. Attracting them is a typical rite of a caste of big businessmen and subordinate circles.

In short, the class content of the regime and the internal mode of production were constituted under the protection of the state of dependency and the association with monopoly capital, which are inseparable from external inflows. So, the precepts totems throughout the “New Republic” infused a similar class tone into all its governments. Its fundamental nexus has always revolved around the “dependency associated”, that is, of the supposed benign coexistence between the central and peripheral economies.[iv]

a critical theory

The theoretical debate about the relationships of dependency in Latin America has gained international recognition and is vital for a critical understanding of the so-called “Transition”. Contrary to the thesis ofdependency associated”, the critical work done in exile by the Marxist Theory of Dependency group (RM Marini, V. Bambirri, T. dos Santos and exiled German economist Gunder Frank)[v] constructed a new series of specific concepts about dependency, such as those of “overexploitation” of work and “subimperialism”, thus giving rise to a systemic critique of the unequal and combined relationship between central and peripheral economies.[vi] Later, in 1978, Marini formulated the notion of a “counterinsurgency state”, in which he included the intrinsic function of guardianship, exercised by the FFAA as the fourth power of the regime.[vii]

Such critical constructions establish parameters for a critical approach to the inflection of the Brazilian dictatorship from 1972 onwards, and also to what follows, including the social inflection of the “New Republic” or “Lulismo”. However, it is also necessary to confront such an elaboration with the historical analysis of current data, in order to answer the question question posed and urgent about the economy, genesis and class structure of the current new order.

In one way or another, such a question implies a critique of the illusions inherent in the state of “dependency asociada”, which formed the fallacious environment of the myths of the so-called “New Republic”. In summary, such fallacies led the PT to prioritize modernization and capitalist growth, following the same model and, therefore, to cultivate ties with monopoly capital and the parties of order.

In practice, such fallacies naturalized the adoption of procedures and habits inherent to the political system engendered by the false “Transition”. Therefore, how can we imagine another end to the program of alliances and objectives that the PT set itself, if, in Italy, the PCI, by prioritizing economic growth and allying itself with monopoly capital, seen as a modernizer, took the path that led to the self-dissolution?[viii]

Historical Criticism I: the “Transition”, face and reverse

The declared origin of the “Transition” myth lies in the elections for the Senate (15.11.1974), consented by the dictatorship. The victory of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) in this competition gave rise to the myth of the “bus party” for the “Transition”. However, such a fallacy served to cover up the laboratory work of the dictatorship, for the false transition process, as a preventive action. In fact, underlying the proclaimed and celebrated local version, multiple external factors influenced. Since the beginning of 1974, Spain and Portugal were observed as a model and alert respectively.

However, before such antithetical examples came into play, there was the backstage intervention of a counterinsurgency specialist. Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard has acted as a consultant to the Brazilian dictatorship since at least October 1972.[ix] Therefore, the regime's “political decompression” project dates back much before the MDB's electoral rise. [X] Taken as a whole and beyond the circumstances, the case is interesting as an index of the global imperialist articulation and the dependency “permanent”, and also for its secondary effects, analyzed below. Indeed, Brazil was no exception and Huntington was primarily the key author of a “global counterinsurgency doctrine” (post-1968).[xi]

"Tied and well tied (tied and well tied)"

Therefore, any script of “political decompression”, conceived as a preventive action, also implied the parallel script of counterinsurgency techniques. Spain was the most notorious case in the 1970s of such a palace plot.[xii] It relied on the active collaboration of Eurocommunist parties[xiii] and became aShowCase” of “decompression” techniques. In other words, the process of replacing military dictatorships with tutored democracies compatible with capitalism.

Indeed, the Spanish transition proved to be “tied and well tied (tied and well tied)”, as the tyrant said.[xiv] Thus, the recycled regime, according to dynastic molds, had its political and class guarantees, as well as its historical pillars preserved. At the same time, the “Transition” opened space for economic modernization and business leadership, with the full consent of the PCE.[xv]

In these terms, the Spanish transition soon became the nec plus ultra, not only political, but also economic, of the peripheral bourgeoisies. Part of the Latin American ruling classes, who aspired to a new cycle of modernization-conservation – or “passive revolution”, as Gramsci would say –,[xvi] signed up for the new training internship and related favors from Washington. Accordingly, in Brazil, General Geisel, who governed from 1974 to 1979, already in his inauguration speech (15.03.1974) presented the formula of the so-called “slow, gradual and safe political opening”, echoing the Francoist formula.

In fact, in Brazil, such a seed proved to be lasting and bore fruit for the following bourgeois generations. The Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP), founded in 1969 with grants from the Ford Foundation, was the meeting point for the think tanks civil society of followers of the Iberian model, under the leadership of sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso-FHC. Ideologist ofdependency associated”, in addition to heralding the political and modernizing role of businessmen, FHC began to reproduce in his texts the main arguments of the Spanish legend.[xvii]

Indeed, after some setbacks, such as the unexpected death of Tancredo Neves (21.04.1985), Suárez's local successor, and economic setbacks inherent to the dependent economies, Brazil acquired, if not a new king like Spain, at least a new currency (by involuntary or historical irony called “real”, in 1994), and FHC, a few months later, was hailed as president of the republic.[xviii] In addition to monetary modernization and “constitutional improvement” to obtain re-election, FHC, as plenipotentiary of the “consortium”, also updated the economy according to the “Washington Consensus” (1990).

Historical Criticism II: 2003-10, the social miracle of “giving without taking”.

The union leader Lula, from the so-called Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT, succeeded FHC after ensuring compliance with all the “fixed clauses” of the false “Transition”, enriched by the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus: to promote modernization in line with financial institutions multilateral agreements and respect debts and signed contracts; keep dependency associated with Brazil, respecting the key role of business protagonism; not to open investigations into acts of State terrorism carried out by the military and maintain amnesty for torturers. It was enough for Washington to recognize and praise Lula's “reasonability”.

From then on, Lula's qualities were acclaimed internally and externally. Given the critical studies above, it is unnecessary to detail their distributive policies.[xx] I will limit myself to underlining that Lula's ephemeral magic (which "gave to many without harming anyone", according to an emblematic business leader)[xx] was of an exclusively monetary nature, thanks to the temporary rise in the prices of commodities minerals and agro-industrial.[xxx]

In any case, the “Brazilian social miracle” was praised as a global paradigm of distributive multiplication, insofar as it redistributed income, as in a distribution of dividends, preserving property relations and the absolute asymmetry of power between classes.

Similarly, Lula's pragmatic wisdom kept ispsis litteris or even enjoyed as a virtuoso the political party system inherited from the false “Transition”, generally obtaining large majorities in Congress. In fact, Lula redistributed income at all levels, including other partners and shareholders of “Transição”.

False dilemmas

The new cycle does not differ substantially in terms of dependency, except for evolving according to the new pace of the White House. Nevertheless, it surprises many that, given the turn of the political wheel in Brazil, today's government includes more generals as key ministers, almost a dozen, than all military governments after 1964, not to mention the nearly one hundred officers ( 99, according to a recent major journal count) of high rank in other key roles.[xxiii] Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that, if at the time of the generals (1964-85), these were currently considered as conspirators and usurpers, now they return as “redeemers”, summoned by the polls of last October. This is the new “Brazilian miracle”, which is important to decipher.

decipher me or i will devour you

In summary, the new elements of the situation appear in the inclination of the votes that sought out the ultra-right and gave it unprecedented electoral support.

In contrast to the current fate of the ultra-right, the working class is continually delegitimized as a political subject and degraded by the press. The justification for the attacks comes from the collapse of the PT and its moral discredit, slanderously transferred to the entire class. The political and historical criticism of the PT, as well as the false “Transition”, in whose profits the party participated, is therefore fundamental for the reconstruction of the political perspective of the workers independently of the PT.

Furthermore, the complexity of the PT's situation, politically dubious and very dangerous for the workers' perspective, is impossible to decipher without first examining the substantive reasons and chronology of the political collapse of the PT as a Party of Order. It is necessary to elucidate the political, social and economic fraud that the party promoted, to understand the enormous popular disappointment consecutively engendered and that nourished the ultra-right.


Going against the current of most Brazilian analyses, the Argentine economist and Marxist Claudio Katz underlined:

“These workers listened, tolerated and finally accepted right-wing propaganda for having been defrauded by the PT. This disappointment explains the fulminating rise of the troglodyte (...) Many assessments of Bolsonaro's triumph omit this assessment or present the PT as a mere victim of right-wing ruses. They avoid the question of their political responsibility for the final result”. [xxiii]

In effect, the workers' disappointment was appropriated, swallowed (digitally manipulated) and fused with the historical and structurally anti-democratic reactionary of the propertied classes in Brazil, such as the one that “manufactured 1964” as a historical class project.[xxv]

Hence, from such an industrially processed fusion, the anti-PT typhoon erupted, which took over large portions of the petty bourgeoisie. This phenomenon even divided and dragged sectors that had benefited from the increase in consumption and credit, propitiated by the monetary policy of the PT governments, even though they were also affected by the evangelical preaching and the Blitzkrieg (lightning war) broke out on social networks. In this way, not only the tiny social groups organically linked to monopoly capital, but also broad sectors of the subordinate classes voted for ultra-right candidates and parties.

2013-2016: crisis, collapse and declaration of class civil war

In summary, the political collapse of the PT, on the one hand, and the unilaterally declared class civil war, on the other, are the decisive phenomena that determined the end of the conciliatory cycle of the false “Transition”. They weighed decisively on the political outcome of 2018. Both phenomena were configured as sets of facts and reasons, listed and commented below. However, the events that led to the two main phenomena (namely, the PT's political collapse and the unilateral declaration of class civil war) had different logics, rhythms and origins, which must be specified.

Later, both phenomena began to evolve in interaction and acquired, of course, a mutually activated dynamic, directly opposing each other. Thus, today, both appear simultaneously and in opposite poles, as happened, for example, in the second round of last October's election: on the one hand, the PT, isolated and literally persecuted on social networks by electronic militias; on the other, the ultra-right, which capitalized on the declared civil war, resorting to all kinds of weapons, including the orchestration of serial lies, as the Nazis did, to crush what was still left of the PT.

However, one phenomenon precedes the other. Collapse precedes the declaration of war. It is necessary to bear in mind the course of events, otherwise it will be impossible to understand how the ultra-right bloc, historically small, has grown so much electorally. The ultra-right, originally insignificant and without any party machinery, took root and prospered, with resources of a different order, in a devastated field. What field? That of the dashed hopes that resulted from misguided policies (if not outright and deliberate fraud) and the PT's hypocrisy.

The order of factors

In summary, the political collapse of the PT and later a large part of the anti-PT sentiment generated from it constituted substitute phenomena, in that order, for the false success of the social inflection of the “New Republic”. The order of factors, in a chained progression, was therefore: 1. the inconsistency of the social magic of “Lulismo”, revealed by the economic crisis and later aggravated by the hypocrisy of the party's alliance with monopoly capital; 2. the political collapse of the PT; 3. The explosive growth of anti-PT sentiment, far beyond its original enclave (demographically restricted to certain sectors of the propertied classes), among which an endemic anti-communism subsisted, now deliriously reinvigorated, since the new president has already erupted in public, a few times, in insults to the USSR (sic)!

In short, resilient anti-communism comes from economically powerful groups, able to influence decision-makers but historically unable from an electoral point of view. How they arrived at such explosive growth is what now matters to determine.

Genesis of a class war

In this context, it should be noted that in the field of big capital a specific dynamic was produced, which gave rise to the civil class war, unilaterally declared by monopoly capital. Until now, this has received strong support, but for other reasons, from the petty and middle bourgeoisie, thus mixing with other factors and class variants, relative to these last social strata. However, in the beginning, this dynamic had unique characteristics, inherent in the strategic objectives and needs of monopoly capital.

The latter, in fact, only against its will entered into conflict with the government and the PT, and only after having tried to preserve the association and support the austerity policies proposed by the Rousseff government. Thus, even after the political mobilization against Rousseff had begun, there were some personal demonstrations by leaders of large economic groups, and even the opposition, in support of the former.[xxiv]

Finally, the alliance of the monopolies with the PT and the government was lasting and reasonably solid, and it lasted well beyond the first acts of rupture by the middle and upper classes, as well as the parliamentary maneuvers for the overthrow of Rousseff, criticized in the editorials of periodicals. as The Globe (07.08.2015), or by personalities with weight in the opposition.[xxv]

Fire warning in VIP cabins

In fact, the offensive of monopoly capital against the rights of other classes was born out of the need to recompose the mechanisms of accumulation in the face of the economic crisis, and simultaneously in response to the political collapse of the PT. Thus, both problems, the economic crisis and the political crisis, combined and became immediate and concrete losses for monopoly capital, as they caused a strong reduction in financial flows and government contracts. In fact, for ten years, from 2003 to 2013, the PT government associated itself in many ways with monopoly capital, favoring it decisively through financing, contracts and tax exemptions, etc., claiming to foster economic growth.

Emergency exits for monopolies

Faced with the collapse of the government and the power of the PT in Congress (discussed below), monopoly capital did what is often done in the business world: it threw its ruined partner into the sea and went in search of booty, aiming first, that is, of course, the state. In short, it chose to seize the assets of state companies and public funds destined for social services (education, health, housing, social security, family allowance, etc.) which, even though they are precarious as social benefits, constitute funds important to modify the balance sheets of transnational groups in crisis.

Causa mortis: politics, not guns

However, the current assault on power by the right is very different from what happened in 1964. Now, endogenous reasons prevail over exogenous ones, inversely to what happened in the previous main paradigm.

Thus, to elucidate the content of the “class coup”, the book by Dreifuss cited above[xxviii] investigated in detail the broad spectrum of preparatory activities for the April 1964 coup, promoted by organizations such as IPES and IBAD, irrigated by monopoly capital. Certainly, a similar investigation should be carried out on the current class war, in the course of which there was also a multiplication of institutes – born like mushrooms – to popularize the neoliberal doctrine, just as during the political crisis several youth militias popped up for the ultra-right political agitation.[xxviii]

However, neither neoliberal mushrooms nor youth militias (phenomena limited to the sphere of different strata of the bourgeoisie) caused the collapse of the PT. It is a fact that the siege of the PT was conceived just like a class coup. But the fall of the PT from the government was not fundamentally a consequence of exogenous factors, as occurred with the Goulart government in Brazil in 1964 and that of Allende in Chile in 1973, both overthrown by military coups due to the absence of loyal troops and sufficient weapons. to defend the government.

This time, on the contrary, the PT's inability to defend itself against the class coup has endogenous roots and undeniable characteristics of crisis and political collapse. The chapter of Rousseff's downfall was very well summarized by UNICAMP economist Plínio Sampaio Jr, [xxix] exponent of the left wing of PSOL:

“After denying all her electoral promises, Dilma began to outsource her own government. We cannot forget that Temer came to exercise the function of Dilma's main political articulator. It has outsourced government to such an extent that it has become superfluous. She left with a flick. Dilma is a victim of the blow she dealt to the working class, which emptied her government, creating a power vacuum that these delinquents led by Eduardo Cunha and Temer occupied”.[xxx]

If this is not understood, neither will the subsequent electoral rise of the ultra-right be understood. In summary, the political weakness of the Rousseff government and, in its wake, the relative electoral weakening of the PT, in the 2016 and 2018 elections, always stemmed from the growing degradation and consequent disconnection of the party with its electorate and its support bases. organized support. Later, this phenomenon spread and affected other classes. It is therefore necessary to go back to June 2013 to distinguish the outbreak of the epidemic from such symptoms.

* Luiz Renato Martins is a teacher from ECA-USP. Author, among other books, of The Long Roots of Formalism in Brazil (Chicago, Haymarket/ HMBS, 2019).

(Text originally published on the blog of the Argentine magazine Tools in August 2019.)


[I]On the class character of the 1964 coup, see the “classic” work by René A. Dreifuss, 1964: Conquest of the State, Petrópolis, Voices, 1981 (originally, ditto, State, Class and the Organic Elite: the Formation of an Entrepreneurial Order in Brazil 1961-1965, PhD thesis, Glasgow, University of Glasgow, 1980).

[ii] On the fallacy of distribution in question, as well as the policy of economic dependence that sustained it, see Pierre SALAMA, 'Reprimarización sin industrialización, una crisis estructural en Brasil', en Herramienta, magazine of debate and Marxist criticism, available in ; Rolando ASTARITA, 'Brazil: the economy of the PT', in Without permission, available in ; . See also Plínio de Arruda SAMPAIO Jr., Chronicle of an Announced Crisis: Criticism of the Political Economy of Lula and Dilma, Sao Paulo, SG-Amarante Editorial, 2017.

[iii] See Luiz Alberto Moniz BANDEIRA, The Government of João Goulart: the Social Struggles in Brazil, 1961-1964, 7 a.m. ed., rev. and expanded, Rio de Janeiro, Revan/ Brasília, UnB, 2001.

[iv] See Fernando Henrique CARDOSO and Enzo FALETTO, Dependency and Development in Latin America: Essays on Sociological Interpretation [1970], 3rd. ed., Rio de Janeiro, Zahar Editores, 1975.

[v] For documents on the direct confrontation between the two currents, see FH CARDOSO; José SERRA, 'Las Desventuras de la Dialéctica de la Dependencia', in Mexican Magazine of Sociology, vol. 40, extraordinary issue, Mexico City, UNAM, 1978, pp. 9-55. For Marini's response at this time, see RM MARINI, 'Las Razones del Neodesarrollismo (Respuesta a FH Cardoso y J. Serra)', in Mexican Magazine of Sociology, vol. 40, extraordinary issue, Mexico City, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, UNAM, 1978, pp. 57-106, available at . For a current summary of the issue, see Claudio KATZ, The Theory of Dependence, Five Years After, Buenos Aires, Battle of Ideas, 2018.

[vi] Its critical impact reached the thinking of several other economists and sociologists: the Egyptian Samir Amin, the Italian Giovanni Arrighi, the North American I. Wallerstein, etc. However, such theory, elaborated in exile (basically Chile and Mexico), was never allowed to effectively circulate in Brazilian universities.

[vii] This formulation dates from the moment when the new global framework led Washington to propose a cycle of modernizing changes in the set of Latin American military dictatorships. See RM MARINI, 'The State of Counterinsurgency', in Political Notebooks, no. 18, Mexico DF, Ediciones Era, oct.-dec. 1978, pp. 21-29; available in .

[viii] See Ernest MANDEL, 'Le PC italien apôtre de l´austerité', in Critique of the Eurocommunism, Paris, Maspero, 1978, pp. 236-68.

[ix] See Thomas E. SKIDMORE, "Chapter VI: Geisel: Toward Opening", especially pp. 165 and following, in idem, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil: 1964-1985, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 160-209.

[X] See Samuel HUNTINGTON, “Approaches to political decompression”, 1973, available at: See also about the following government, idem, “Carta ao General Golbery do Couto e Silva [Letter to the General….]”, 28.02.1974, available at: -samuel-huntington#page-17>. Later, as an adviser to the Carter administration, Huntington boasted of the role he played in Brazil. See ditto, American Political Science Review [1988], Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(01), March, pp. 3-10.

[xi]  See Michel J. CROZIER; Samuel P. HUNTINGTON; Joji WATANUKI, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, New York, New York University Press, 1975. A doctor in controlled transitions, Huntington also advised the South African government during the period of “decompression” of the regime of the apartheid.

[xii] The Valencian novelist Rafael Chirbes, one of the most authoritative voices on the period, summed up the conspiracy of the so-called “Transition” in this way: “Franco died in bed and the Spanish parties of the Transition were assembled from abroad: external agents and external money. They were not the result of an enveloping democratic wave provoked by the anxieties of the Spanish people”. See R. CHIRBES,'Franco died in bed and the parties of the transition staged themselves from the outside. Interview'in worker world, April 24, 2013, available at: ; see also the investigative report by Gregorio Morán and Antonio Yelo, “The priests of the Transición were absolutely impresentable. Interview”, in Jot down, ten. 2013, available at: ; see also the testimony of former general secretary of the PCE (7-1982), mining worker Gerardo Iglesias, member of the Central Committee of the PCE during the negotiations, to Álvaro Corazón Rural, “We are marching a gigantic step a la frontera de What was Francoism? Interview”, in Jot down, dec. 2013, available at , accessed in 29.12.2013.

[xiii] On the collaboration of the Eurocommunist parties for the capitalist reorganization of the economy, see André Gunder FRANK, “Economic crisis, Tercer Mundo y 1984”, in idem, Reflections on the Economic Crisis, trans. Angels Martínez Castells et. al., Barcelona, ​​Editorial Anagrama, 1977, pp. 57-8.

[xiv] “1969 Francisco Franco's Christmas Speech: Todo Está Atado y Bien Atado. King Juan Carlos”, video Retroclips, 1969/2014, 0'59”, available in . For Nixon and Kissinger's blessing on the designation of the Francoist heir, see "18 Richard Nixon Visits Franco", retroclips, available in: . For Gerald Ford's blessing and Kissinger's second blessing, see “Visita de Gerald Ford a la España de Franco. Year 9”, in Hortographic Taliván, available in .

[xv]  On the call for “national reconciliation” and addressed to the “business sector, protagonist of the new industrial society (....)”, proposed by the Democratic Board, a supranational front led by the PCE, see the document officially presented by the secretary general Santiago Carrillo and by the Catholic intellectual linked to Opus Dei, Rafael Calvo Serer, in Paris (29.07.1974). Several other parties and personalities later joined as co-signers. See Vv. Aa., Declaration of the Democratic Board of Spain, available in .

[xvi] See Peter THOMAS, “Modernity as 'passive revolution': Gramsci and the Fundamental Concepts of Historical Materialism”, in Journal of the Canadian Historical Association/ Revue de la Société Historique du Canada, vol. 17, No. 2, 2006, pp. 61-78, available at URL: ; DOI: 016590/10.7202ar.

[xvii] Compare, in particular, the aforementioned document from the Board of Directors and the first chapter of Cardoso's 1975 book, in which the author also endeavors to disqualify theses and authors of the Marxist theory of dependency. See FH CARDOSO, “The new mistaken theses”, in idem, Authoritarianism and Democratization, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975. For a summary of the points of convergence between Cardoso's texts and the Board's document, see Luiz Renato MARTINS, “International Benefit Society of Friends of Form and Bulletin on the Brazilian Division”, in The Long Roots of Formalism in Brazil, Chicago, Haymarket, 2019, pp. 268-71. On Cardoso's role as an intellectual articulator, establishing the political forces that should be excluded from the negotiation, see the previous pages in idem, pp. 266-68.

[xviii] In fact, after having demonstrated that he knew the way of the stones, FHC was elected president of the republic at the end of 1994, after having launched, months before, the Real Plan, a kind of local version of the monetary reform of the European Union, according to option similar to the one he defended in politics, adapting the arguments of the Spanish transition to the Brazilian context. As for the procedural similarities between the Real Plan and the application of the euro, see LR MARTINS, on. cit., pp. 261-64.

[xx] See footnote 2.

[xx] See Emílio Odebrecht's testimony in the video “PET 6664 – Emílio Odebrecht Speaks of Lula, a 'Bon vivant', According to Golbery do Couto e Silva”, available at . Odebrecht, moreover, stated in the aforementioned testimony that he collaborated with several suggestions for the elaboration, during the 2002 electoral campaign, of the “Letter to Brazilians” (22.06.2002). By “Brazilians”, the letter referred to the protagonists of monopoly groups, including Odebrecht. See Luiz Inácio Lula da SILVA, “Letter to the Brazilian People”, available at

[xxx] For more details, see footnote 2.

[xxiii] Additional appointments of admirals were planned in the future, according to The state of Sao Paulo (03.03.2019)

[xxiii] See Claudio KATZ, '¿Cuáles son las cções para la izquierda?' (last topic) en idem 'Interrogantes de la Era Bolsonaro' [17.11.2018], in La Haine (website), available at .

[xxv] Ver note 1.

[xxiv] See, for example, Rubens OMETTO (Cosan), 'Dilma has changed a lot, and businessmen have to deal with anxiety, says Ometto', in Folha de São Paulo, available in ; idem, 'Owner of Cosan says that it is necessary to recognize Dilma's merits', in Valor Econômico, 22.07.2015, available at ; Roberto SETÚBAL (Itaú Unibanco), 'There is no reason to remove Dilma from office, says president of Itaú Unibanco', in Folha de São Paulo, 23.08.2015, available at ; Sérgio RIAL (Santander), 'Government can still regain confidence, says president of Santander', in Folha de São Paulo, 10.04.2016, available at .

[xxv] See, for example, Fernando Henrique CARDOSO, “FHC says Dilma's impeachment 'doesn't do anything'”, in The state of Sao Paulo, 09.03.2015, available at ; O GLOBO, “Manipulation of Congress goes beyond limits” (editorial), in The Globe, 07.08.2015, available at ; Delfim NETTO, “Delfim defends Dilma from impeachment, but criticizes the president’s actions”, in Valor Econômico, 26.10.2015, available at .

[xxviii] See footnote 1.

[xxviii] See Angela ALONSO, '2019 Will Not Be Merely a Reissue of 1964', en Folha de São Paulo, 30.12.2018, available at .

[xxix] The PSOL, born in June 2004 and made up basically of deputies, is a parliamentary branch of the PT, formed when the first Lula government sent a set of neoliberal reforms to Congress.

[xxx] See P. by A. SAMPAIO Jr., 'For an Economist, PT Failed by Not Facing Structural Problems', interview with Luis Sagimoto, 02.06.2017, Journal of Unicamp, P. 5/9, available at .

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  • Strengthen PROIFESclassroom 54mf 15/06/2024 By GIL VICENTE REIS DE FIGUEIREDO: The attempt to cancel PROIFES and, at the same time, turn a blind eye to the errors of ANDES management is a disservice to the construction of a new representation scenario
  • PEC-65: independence or patrimonialism in the Central Bank?Campos Neto Trojan Horse 17/06/2024 By PEDRO PAULO ZAHLUTH BASTOS: What Roberto Campos Neto proposes is the constitutional amendment of free lunch for the future elite of the Central Bank
  • Chico Buarque, 80 years oldchico 19/06/2024 By ROGÉRIO RUFINO DE OLIVEIRA: The class struggle, universal, is particularized in the refinement of constructive intention, in the tone of proletarian proparoxytones
  • Volodymyr Zelensky's trapstar wars 15/06/2024 By HUGO DIONÍSIO: Whether Zelensky gets his glass full – the US entry into the war – or his glass half full – Europe’s entry into the war – either solution is devastating for our lives
  • The melancholic end of Estadãoabandoned cars 17/06/2024 By JULIAN RODRIGUES: Bad news: the almost sesquicentennial daily newspaper in São Paulo (and the best Brazilian newspaper) is rapidly declining