By JEAN MARC VON DER WEID*
The military's plan for amnesty was very far from the opposition's slogan inside and outside Brazil
The Brazilian diaspora during the dictatorship deserves further study. This article simply aims to provide a personal account of the struggle for amnesty undertaken by exiles, especially in Europe, the United States and Canada, conceived in support of the movement in Brazil.
My “place of speech” is justified by the role I assumed in exile, both in denouncing the repression, torture and murder of political prisoners and in the creation of the Brazilian Committees for Amnesty (CBA), having been coordinator of the first CBA abroad, in Paris and, in 1978/1979, as coordinator of the group of CBAs in the organization of the last and largest event of the diaspora, the International Conference for Amnesty and Democratic Freedoms in Brazil.
First movements — denouncing the torture and murder of political prisoners in Brazil
When the group of 70 prisoners exchanged for the Swiss ambassador arrived in Chile in January 1971, this country was already the largest center of convergence for those who had to go into exile to avoid prison or much worse. Less than four years later, at the time of the coup that overthrew President Allende, it is estimated that the number of Brazilians in Chile was close to a thousand, probably representing two-thirds of the total spread throughout the world.
As far as I know, there was no political organization of Brazilians exiled in Chile focused on campaigns against Brazil. What existed was “Caixinha”, an organization that supported newcomers to the country and aimed to provide housing, food and employment to those in need. Caixinha was organized by a group of the oldest exiles, led by José Serra, and its principle was to support everyone, without privileges or distinctions based on political party.
Over time, it gradually added to its coordination some of the new exiles, coming from all political persuasions. As I do not know the details of this organization, I will not mention the names of its many activists, but we cannot forget its essential role in supporting those who arrived, often with nothing more than a helping hand.
At that time in exile, there was only one political group spreading denunciations against the dictatorship, centered in Paris and called the Brazilian Information Front (FBI), led by former congressman Márcio Moreira Alves and bringing together some organizations from the Brazilian left: VPR and ALN and others that I don't remember, but I believe they were all linked to the armed struggle against the regime. I don't think the PCB, which had a representation in Paris, was part of it. The AP was part of the FBI for a while, but when I arrived in Chile it had split and I never found out why. The FBI distributed a newsletter denouncing the regime and publicizing revolutionary actions by the left.
The group of 70, the day after our arrival, called an international press conference, held at our accommodation, the Pedro Aguirre Cerda Home. The political leaders of the armed struggle organizations that had been kidnapped formed a political coordination, with the participation of the VPR, ALN, PCBR, MR-8 and VAR-Palmares and this group invited me to lead the meeting with the journalists, in my capacity as president of the UNE.
The armed struggle organizations did not invite me to coordinate this because the AP, the party to which I was affiliated, had not adopted this form of struggle at that time, but they thought that mass leadership was important when communicating with the public. Incidentally, this ambiguity would give rise to a good discussion about the role of armed struggle and mass struggle in the revolution, but this is not the place for that.
I accepted the role and was somewhat concerned that the coordination team did not give me any guidance for the debate with the press. On my own, I decided to focus my initial presentation on denouncing the dictatorship, particularly the torture and murder of political prisoners, which justified kidnapping as an extreme way of saving the lives of activists. No one on the coordination team thought the choice I made was bad, and in a statement of agreement and trust, they proposed that I represent this “armed front” in an international campaign with the same content that I had given at the press conference, denouncing torture and murder.
I had already decided to dedicate some time to an international campaign to denounce the dictatorship, taking advantage of the fact that I had a Swiss passport and spoke English and French, but I intended to do it in conjunction with the AP. The “armed front” did not see any problem in this association with the AP in the campaign, although, obviously, it would have an image closer to the AP than to them, given my affiliation and more prominent role in this activity.
In 1971, this “united front” of denunciations worked in part. In Switzerland, I presented myself as president of the UNE and not as a “representative of the 70” or as a member of the AP. As a (half) Swiss and in a very conservative country where I was a sensation mainly because I had been replaced by the Swiss ambassador, who had been kidnapped by the VPR, I would have lost much of the support and solidarity of humanitarian groups that were essential to isolating the dictatorship.
In Italy, which is highly politicized and has more left-wing organizations such as lotta continues, Operatic Vanguard, Power Worker and more conventional ones like the PCI and the PSI, all with important bases among the proletariat, students and, to a lesser extent, the peasantry, in addition to the strong parliamentary base of the latter two, speaking on behalf of the 70 did not cause any reactions. Even less “political” entities, like the Vatican Human Rights Commission, welcomed me to listen to my denunciations against the dictatorship.
In this long campaign lasting almost two months, I invited two of my 70s comrades to participate in the events with me: René de Carvalho, from the PCBR, and Roberto Fortini, from the VPR. We visited more than 15 major cities, including Rome, Milan, Turin, Florence, Bologna and Venice. And other smaller cities, such as Sassari and Cagliari, in Sardinia, Varese, Parma, Verona and several others. I think it was the campaign with the greatest mass impact that I have participated in.
When we arrived in the cities, one or more political interlocutors would welcome us, and there were often so many events that we had to split up to attend all of our commitments. I will tell you about one of them, in Milan, to give you an idea of the atmosphere.
Invited by the “extra-parliamentary” left-wing organization, Operatic Vanguard, but with the support of a dozen other organizations, including Christian Democracy (Italy was a very unique political space!), I went to speak to the workers at the Pirelli factory at the end of the workday and found myself in a huge assembly of over a thousand people. At that point in the campaign I already spoke Italian fluently and gave the speech and debate without translators. Many questions were asked about the conditions of the working class in Brazil and about the unions and the revolutionary struggle against the dictatorship.
At the end of the event, the union delegate linked to the Christian Democratic Party (right-wing and in government since the end of the Second World War) proposed a fundraising campaign “to finance the purchase of weapons for Brazilian revolutionary organizations.” The crowd booed him, which confused me a bit, but the reason was the lack of coherence of the guy, who was pretending to be a revolutionary… in Brazil. Others supported the motion, but left it up to the Brazilians to decide how to use the funds. A good amount of money was raised in the campaign, perhaps because they were very concerned about the prospect of transferring the Pirelli factories to Brazil.
After the debate, the union leaders invited me to dinner in the working-class neighborhood where they all lived, Sixth San Giovanni and I accepted delightedly.
We arrived at an alley in the neighborhood where there were already dozens of tables side by side, with the mammas and nonnas placing plates and platters of food, accompanied by many bottles of wine. It was very pleasant and delicious, with no serious political talk. At the end, they started singing revolutionary, anarchist, communist, socialist and even Christian songs. It was a great united front of solidarity and everyone sang the songs in chorus.
After listening to several vibrant songs and drinking many toasts to the Italian and Brazilian people, my closest contact in that world asked for silence and summoned me: “sing a Brazilian revolutionary song”. I got stuck. I didn’t know the Internationale in Portuguese very well and the national anthem, of course, didn’t fit in there. I thought about “underdeveloped”, but that didn’t seem appropriate either. I ended up singing “Caminhando e cantar” by Vandré, shouting my little hoarse voice.
I ended up with a disappointed silence around me and someone commented loudly: “If it depends on music, the Brazilian revolution won’t go far.” I had the presence of mind to respond: “If it depended on music, you would have already made the revolution.” I was applauded.
The campaigns continued throughout 1971, 1972 and 1973, passing through France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, England, Scotland, Ireland, Canada and the United States. In the first one I still shared with René, but in the rest it was a solo flight, with occasional partnerships with exiles who lived there, some linked to the MR-8, the VPR, the ALN and, in most cases, the AP, of course. But there were no organizations of exiles structured in fronts in these countries.
In 1972, I ended up focusing on the case of the AP peasant leader, Manoel da Conceição, who was arrested in January in the interior of Maranhão and disappeared for almost the entire year. I traveled to several of the countries mentioned, aiming to obtain statements from “important people” from any sector of society, preferably from the center and even the right, since the dictatorship would not be bothered by protests from leftists.
It worked and I received support from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Canadian Parliament, the Swiss Peasant Party (a member of the government), the Cardinal of Paris, the Swedish government and part of the Democratic caucus in the US Senate, among others. In December, Manoel was brought before a judge and had his situation regularized after months of torture and death threats in several Armed Forces barracks.
In several of the places I visited, when I met Brazilians, whether exiled or not, or foreigners, willing to carry out the campaign at a local or national level, I created solidarity committees with the Brazilian people, with whom I maintained contact and provided information and guidance in subsequent years, generally until the coup in Chile.
After Chile
The coup took dozens of comrades to the National Stadium or the Chilean Stadium, with some of them murdered by the military. Many others took refuge in the embassies of Argentina, Panama, Venezuela, Sweden, Mexico and, for citizens with dual nationality, France, Italy and Switzerland. The diaspora, until then concentrated in Chile, dispersed to dozens of countries, mostly in Europe, with around 350 in France, almost all in Paris.
A second important refuge country was Sweden, with about a hundred. A few dozen ended up in Switzerland, Belgium and Germany. A handful took refuge in Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, England, Canada and the United States. I have no idea how many ended up in socialist countries, but I suspect that the largest number went to Cuba.
In total, I don't believe there were more than 1500 of us, despite the Brazilian press having reported in 1979 that there were 10.000. This over-exaggerated number originated from an interview for the magazine Veja by José Anibal Pontes, one of the members of the CBA Paris. I questioned this assessment at a meeting of the committee's coordination and Zé said that he had extrapolated the number of exiles in France, according to him more than 3000.
I was astonished, because in our most numerous demonstrations of exiles we never gathered more than 400 people, including Brazilian students who were there legally, doing their masters and doctorates. I looked for the French government agency that dealt with exiles from all over the world in that country and I learned, “off”, which would be 327, if I remember correctly, including a newborn baby (Liszt Vieira's daughter).
Throughout 1974, a period in which the majority were settling into their new countries of refuge and reorganizing their lives, the campaigns denouncing the dictatorship cooled down.
I had ended this stage of my life and activism when I went to Chile shortly before the coup and saw no point in resuming my travels around the world in this activity. I tried to stay in Argentina for a few months, but the intensification of the Peronist right (Triple A) anticipated the coup that followed Perón's death and I decided to return to Paris. The organizations that I had created or attracted to take permanent action against the Brazilian dictatorship turned to solidarity with Chile, the most recent and macabre case of liberticide, or, soon after, to Argentina. The diaspora of exiles from these countries was much larger than ours and attracted the attention of progressive entities around the world.
In the second half of 1974, a left-wing front began to meet in Paris with representatives from the ALN, VPR, PCBR, MR-8, POC, MEP, AP and PCB. The PCdoB did not want to participate because it did not recognize the Party as an interlocutor.
The representation of these organizations among the exiles in Paris was small, due to the great political upheaval caused by the succession of important falls of their militants and leaders in Brazil. This resulted in a distancing of many of the exiles from their parties of origin, many becoming what was known as “independents”. For the same reasons and even more so due to growing divergences in the evaluation of the armed struggle that was dying out in Brazil, the legitimacy of the representatives of the organizations in Paris was very tenuous.
The first public act of the Left Front was the holding of a series of debates on the Brazilian situation, centered on the October electoral process, already under the government of General Ernesto Geisel. Attended by a hundred participants, most of them independents, these debates led to the confrontation of two positions: those in favor and those against participation in the electoral process. Given the distance between the representatives of the left-wing organizations and their bases and leaders in the country, neither the positions taken had any relation to what was being discussed in Brazil, nor were they able to have any impact on the much diminished left-wing field in the country.
This became clear when the AP base (me and about 10 others in France and Switzerland) took a position that diverged from the party's past positions, supporting participation in the elections and abandoning the slogan of null voting, but we had no idea what the AP survivors in Brazil thought. We took a good beating from the party representatives in the debate, but we were supported by the PCB and the majority of independents.
Particularly virulent was the criticism from the representatives of the MR-8, Franklin Martins and Carlos Alberto Munis, who even pointed out our place in the “trash heap of history”. The two did not know it yet, but the leaders of the MR-8 in Brazil had already approved a tactical redirection, abandoning the armed struggle and participating in the elections. At the next meeting, already informed, the two “made a self-criticism” and endorsed the vast majority that supported this position. Our little group at the AP was comforted to learn that the party in Brazil had adopted the same line.
The debates on the current situation continued, with assessments of the surprising result of the elections, especially with the victory of the MDB, electing 16 of the 22 senators and having a majority of null and blank votes in two states where only ARENA had candidates.
In March or April 1975, the Left Front began discussing a strategy for political action in France, with the aim of “isolating the dictatorship”. The denunciation of torture and the murder of political prisoners, an emphasis from the previous period, was maintained. However, more proactive campaign ideas were put forward, such as the defense of a Constituent Assembly, the rule of law, the end of censorship, and others. Inspired by the news of the creation of the Women's Movement for Amnesty, of which my mother was one of the founders, I proposed that we focus our campaigns on this theme.
After much debate, we ended up agreeing that this was the proposal with the greatest reach in terms of political support and capable of unifying the largest number of currents inside and outside Brazil. The logic, brilliantly defended by the POC representative, Celso Castro, was that an amnesty would not be possible without implementing a series of other changes to the regime. And amnesty as the flagship of a campaign for democracy had great appeal in Brazilian society. The Left Front decided to create a Brazilian Committee for Amnesty, as an instrument for organizing the vast majority of independents among the exiles.
In the early days of the CBA, the decision-making power remained with the Left Front, but this was soon overcome by the need to democratize the process. We ended up creating an organizational structure based on an assembly of all engaged activists, whose number varied between 40 and 60 people, reaching a hundred during public events. This assembly began to elect the coordination (six people) and decide the direction of the campaign. The Left Front continued to exist for a while, but it worked to get its positions approved by the broad collegiate. Little by little, the CBA became predominant and subsumed the Left Front.
If I remember correctly, I was the only party “representative” (AP) to be elected as executive coordinator, a position that was always shared with another activist, initially with Bona Garcia, and later with Liszt Vieira, both independents and former VPR activists. This activism in the AP, however, was not what determined my choice for this position, but rather the connections I had between parties and independents who trusted in a conciliatory stance between the tendencies.
The CBA aimed to mobilize French public opinion to express its views on the need for amnesty in Brazil, but also on a wide range of democratic demands, which were emphasized according to each of the specific sectors of society with which we worked. Thematic and sectoral committees were formed with a great deal of autonomy to streamline the campaigns. If I remember correctly, we had committees to contact political parties (parliamentary), trade union movements, the “cultural sector,” universities, legal and legal organizations, churches, human rights organizations, and the press.
It didn't take long to interest the diaspora in other countries, and CBAs soon sprang up all over Europe, in some cases with more than one group in different cities (Lausanne and Geneva; Stockholm and Lund/Malmo; Berlin and Cologne). Each defined its own priorities and forms of organization, but all had the hallmark of being entities that brought together activists and not party fronts. It was an exemplary experience of a political front that maintained a large unity of action, with only one split, localized and limited, towards the end of the exile.
I don't remember when the CBAs were created in Brazil, I think it was in late 1975 or early 1976, but as soon as they emerged we established relationships with several of them, most frequently with those in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais. The connection with the MFPA came naturally, through the participation of mothers of several of us among the activists of this movement.
The CBA carried out several campaigns, such as those in solidarity with the protests against the murder of Alexandre Vanucchi, in support of the growing action of the Catholic Church against the regime, in support of the strikes in the ABC region, in denouncing the arrest and torture of Inês Etienne and the wave of arrests that hit the MEP, in support of the resumption of the university student movement with the formation of the Caminhando and Refazendo movements, and in denouncing the massacres carried out by the FFAA in Araguaia. Among many others.
It would be too long to present here all or even part of our activities at the CBA in Paris, but I can say that we had several successes in mobilizing parts of French society, disturbing the peace of the dictatorship's embassy, occupied by former minister Delfim Neto, also known as “monsieur said for a hundred”, due to the fee he charged for agreements between French companies (such as the Paris Metro) and the Brazilian military government. The ambassador was particularly affected by a petition signed by hundreds of great French artists (from cinema, theater, music, painting, etc.) who surrounded the embassy to hand him over.
Or the defense of amnesty stated by the Cardinal of Paris in a homily at Notre Dame Cathedral, delivered together with the bishop of Olinda and Recife, Dom Helder Câmara. Or even the participation of Brazilian exiles in the May Day union demonstrations.
Of all the actions for amnesty and other democratic demands organized by the CBA, the most important was the Conference for Amnesty and Democratic Liberties, held in Rome at the end of June 1979.
The conference proposal came from the coordination of CBA Paris, immediately supported by all the others, in the second half of 1978.
The Brazilian political context was one of “slow, gradual and safe détente” promoted by the Geisel government. Visitors from Brazil and multiple reports we received indicated a growing mobilization of Brazilian society on several fronts of struggle while the most hardline sectors of the regime suffered defeats. The so-called “tigrada” was decapitated with the dismissal of the Minister of the Army, General Silvio Frota, and the displacement to reserve or to posts without troop command of several leaders of the repressive apparatus.
After several arbitrary measures using institutional acts (revocation of parliamentary mandates, creation of “bionic” senators, and others) Geisel felt confident in his strategy of continuing to control the country in a semblance of a rule of law, making some concessions such as the reestablishment of habeas corpus, lifting direct censorship of the press, withdrawing the direct participation of the Armed Forces in repression, with the dissolution of the DOI-CODIs (but maintaining military intelligence services such as Ciex, Cenimar, Cisa and SNI).
Ernesto Geisel was sure of his succession, controlling the electoral college to anoint his henchman General Figueiredo, from the SNI, as future president of the Republic, with the mission of preparing the departure of the military in the following term and, it was said behind the scenes, promoting a political amnesty.
Ernesto Geisel's maneuvers were successful and the year 1979 began with the inauguration of João Figueiredo, who soon opened the debate in Congress about amnesty. Iramaia Benjamim, mother of a banished and an exiled man and an activist of the CBA in Rio de Janeiro, passed through Paris announcing that "we were ready to return to the country."
The military's project for amnesty was very far from the opposition's slogan inside and outside Brazil, of a “broad, general and unrestricted” amnesty and provoked the beginning of a series of demonstrations on several fronts pressuring Congress to expand the scope of the project.
Those convicted of armed actions (guerrilla warfare, bank robberies, kidnappings, attacks against the Armed Forces or military police) would be excluded from the amnesty. The suspension of the ban on 130 militants was part of the package, but a good number of these would be excluded from the amnesty based on other criteria.
According to my lawyers, my situation was dubious. I had not taken up arms, but I had been convicted of burning an army jeep during a student demonstration in Rio de Janeiro in 1968, and this could be classified as a “terrorist act.” On the other hand, my dear and combative lawyers had information that my activities denouncing the dictatorship abroad had created resistance within the Armed Forces to my inclusion among those pardoned.
It was at this time that the proposal to grant what was called “reciprocal amnesty” emerged. The military government never adopted this language, which was adopted by General Pery Bevilaqua. He publicly defended that all those who participated in illegal acts during the dictatorship should be granted amnesty, whether they were for or against the regime. This would “cover up” the responsibilities of the officers and soldiers who committed acts of torture and murder of political prisoners. The top brass of the Armed Forces saw this approach as an opportunity to create an institutional wall to defend against any attempt to bring to justice all those responsible for human rights violations and even those responsible for the breakdown of the country’s legal order in the 1964 coup.
The proposal to increase pressure for a general and unrestricted amnesty for those persecuted by the regime and for the removal of torturers and other military personnel implicated in the coup from the amnesty project under discussion became the goal of our latest campaign abroad. However, the CBA coordination in Paris decided to take other demands that we considered essential to the organizing board of the International Conference.
With an amnesty being discussed in Brazil, it seemed to us that simply demanding an expansion of the proposal was like trying to break down a half-open door. The proposal we brought to the first board meeting, attended by all CBAs from abroad, was to expand the scope of the conference to include what was generally defined as “democratic freedoms.”
This proposal was unanimous in Paris and we did not expect any disagreements at the first preparatory meeting in Rome, the city chosen to hold the conference. However, the representative of the CBA in Brussels, Atos Pereira, did not agree, arguing for maintaining the more restricted objective of focusing solely on amnesty. We had to hold two more meetings to try to maintain the exemplary unity of the Brazilian diaspora over four years and to bring the small group in Brussels to our proposal.
We tried to change the language, replacing democratic freedoms with “democracy” or “freedom,” but it was all in vain and we ended up deciding to maintain our original proposal, regretting the non-participation of the Brussels CBA. I even planned a visit to the group to try to convince them directly, especially because of the importance of the participation of Vladimir Palmeira, the greatest leader of the 1968 student movement, who was a member of the group. Zé Duarte, my cellmate on Ilha das Flores, another member of the Brussels group, convinced me that the attempt was futile — the opposing position was the majority in the group and quite consolidated.
We sought to bring to the event in Rome the largest possible number of guests from each country, chosen for their political and/or cultural importance, in addition to the most important CBA activists, and we had a success beyond expectations.
Among the exiled figures, we had some difficulties. We were unable to convince Brizola, Arraes and Prestes to participate in the Conference, although they all sent messages of support. However, important historical figures such as Gregório Bezerra (PCdoB), Diógenes de Arruda Câmara (PCdoB), Apolônio de Carvalho (PCBR), Manuel da Conceição (a peasant leader from Maranhão, AP) and José Barbosa Monteiro (former president of the metalworkers union of São Bernardo, AP) attended the event. In all, about one hundred exiles and about 50 foreigners spent three days discussing amnesty and the democratic freedoms to be achieved in Brazil.
Despite some difficulties in drafting the inaugural message of the coordinating council and the final resolution of the Conference, we reached important consensuses, given the political diversity of the participants. Two months later, Congress voted on the bill sent by the executive branch with some expansions, but maintaining the exclusion of those who took up arms and the inclusion of torturers, murderers and coup plotters.
Before concluding, I would like to recall the names of two women chosen to read the opening message and the resolution of the conference: Carmela Pezutti and Ruth Escobar. The choice of the former, as well as the text she read, were the subject of intense discussions in the council and were unanimously approved, but the text of the resolution and the choice of Ruth were decisions made by a few of us in the rush of the last night before the conclusion.
It may seem incredible, but the fact is that an event planned down to the last detail with extensive consultations with the many organizers spread across several countries came to an end without a process having been defined for the collective drafting of its most important document: the political resolution. I realized this on the evening of the penultimate day, after the rapporteurs of all the debate committees had brought their reports to the event secretariat and dispersed into the Roman night. We needed a document for the final plenary session the following day and there was no way to find the various members of the organizing committee.
The final text was written by me and Luíz Travassos, who shared an apartment with me. The following morning I managed to consult Liszt Vieira and Luiz Eduardo Greenhalg, who made small observations that were quickly included in the text and we handed it over to the translators.
Fortunately, no one raised any objections in the plenary and everything was approved by acclamation, a sign that we had achieved the miracle of satisfying the Greeks and Trojans of the diaspora.
It was a sign of the changing times that representatives of the CBAs of Brazil participated in the conference without fear of reprisals upon their return to the country. Luiz Eduardo Greenhalg (CBA, São Paulo), Manuel de Carvalho (leader of the CBA of Bahia and leader of the PCdoB) and Ruy Cesar (Bahian candidate for the presidency of the UNE in reorganization) and a federal deputy elected by Rio de Janeiro took an active part in the conference.
I leave these memories as a brief record of a struggle that deserves to be the subject of master's or doctoral theses, for the benefit of the memory of the Brazilian people. And I take this opportunity to announce that a documentary about the Rome Conference is being completed, using footage taken at the event.
*Jean Marc von der Weid is a former president of the UNE (1969-71). Founder of the non-governmental organization Family Agriculture and Agroecology (ASTA).
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