By LUIZ CARLOS BRESSER-PEREIRA*
Academics talk about nationalism, but they refer to their own nationalism, its history, its concept; they do not talk about imperialism, much less about the necessary anti-imperialism.
If a country is externally dependent, this means that it is subordinate to an empire – a country that is much more powerful economically, militarily and culturally. In this relationship, the Empire gives priority to its national objectives and transforms the group of dependent countries within its sphere into an instrument for achieving its own objectives. Since these countries are formally independent, the Empire cannot subdue them by the simple use of force; it must use its ideological hegemony or “soft power” – the name that American international relations experts themselves give to this power.
In the Western world, the Empire is the United States. We could also consider the other rich countries of the West, but these countries are often also victims of imperialism, as we saw in relation to Japan, which in 1985 was imposed the Plaza Accord that interrupted its great growth since the war. More recently, the European Union, by fully accepting the neoliberal economic policies influenced by the United States, also entered into stagnation, while the Empire never fully implemented them. With Donald Trump and Joe Biden, this country became developmentalist while continuing to be imperialist – with the second Donald Trump, radically imperialist.
I know that talking about empire is unpleasant, not so much for Americans who know that their country is an empire, that it is the center of the system, but do not like it when we on the periphery call it that. But I am not making a moral judgment; economic power leads to imperialism almost inevitably.
In the Global North – another name for the Empire where it is clear that it involves more countries than the United States – it is not only conservative intellectuals who do not talk about imperialism, except when it is explicit as in the case of Donald Trump.
Academics talk about nationalism, but they refer to their own nationalism, its history, its concept; they do not talk about imperialism, much less about the necessary anti-imperialism. In 1996, Gopal Balakrishnan organized an excellent book with texts by the best authors who have written on the subject.[1] The ideologists of the Empire criticize nationalism on the periphery of capitalism, which for the establishment is always populist and irrational. This is their role.
On the other hand, important intellectuals such as Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger,[2] developed the theory of stability. It is different from the realist theory of international relations, which recognizes and considers imperialism inevitable, and also from the liberal theory, which sees the world as a great space of cooperation coordinated by the hegemon. For stability theory, the hegemon (the United States, in the 20th century) is the system of power that stabilizes and allows the entire international system to function. A thesis that has its reasons and arguments, but is highly debatable.
In fact, it is not only the nation-state that needs internal order; international relations also need a certain order. But for this to happen, a single Empire is not necessary; it is enough for the most powerful countries to talk and make agreements. Simply accept the thesis of stability and the Empire is legitimized.
The first objective of the American Empire, as had been that of Great Britain before it, was to prevent the countries on the periphery of capitalism from industrializing and developing. Both empires have always sought to “kick the ladder” away from those who wanted to climb it. This threat to its power and wealth was first felt by the United States when, in the 1970s, the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) emerged – the four Asian tigers, Brazil and Mexico.
In 1980, the Empire, which until then had been moderately developmentalist, made a mistake and made the “neoliberal turn” of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, which had as one of its objectives to put an end to this uncomfortable competition. It failed in relation to the countries of East Asia, but was successful in Brazil, Mexico, and throughout Latin America.
The second objective is to maintain “unequal exchange,” with the Empire exporting sophisticated goods with high per capita added value that pay good wages and importing commodities that have the opposite qualities. Unequal exchange is inherent to underdevelopment, but what the peripheral countries aim to do is adopt a developmental strategy that overcomes this limitation – something that the Empire seeks to make unfeasible.
The third objective is to export capital. But isn't this also in the interests of developing countries? It is, but on the condition that net capital inflows do not reach the country to finance a current account deficit and, therefore, consumption instead of investment. In other words, that the country does not have a chronic current account deficit, as is the rule. An external deficit necessarily implies an appreciation of the exchange rate, industrial companies lose competitiveness, external savings replace domestic savings instead of complementing them, and industrialization aborts.
The Empire's main instrument for exercising its domination is economic liberalism (or neoliberalism). It is a liberal counter-strategy that: (i) prevents the use of import tariffs on manufactured goods, which are essential for the beginning of industrialization; (ii) also prevents countries from implementing an industrial policy based on subsidies; (iii) and in the case of commodity-exporting countries, prevents these countries from using mechanisms that neutralize the Dutch disease.
Given the strategic character that economic liberalism assumes for the Empire, it tries to pressure and persuade the economic elites, politicians and economists that neoliberalism is the best strategy for a peripheral country to develop, but this is not true. No country has made its industrial and capitalist revolution (its take off) within the framework of liberalism; it has always occurred within the framework of developmentalism, that is, based on an economic development strategy characterized by moderate State intervention in the economy and economic nationalism.
And it is interesting to note that developmentalism, if we use computer language, is the “default” strategy for industrialization – it is the form that the industrial revolution takes in all countries when it begins. This is true even for the first countries that industrialized (England, Belgium and France); they did so within the framework of mercantilism, which was the first historical form of developmentalism.
Once the industrial revolution is over, the country has two options: either continue with the developmental strategy or opt for economic liberalism. The best alternative is always developmentalism, which gradually becomes more moderate, but the historical trend is towards liberalism because it is the preference of the bourgeoisie or the rich.
How can a peripheral country achieve the structural change that characterizes industrialization? It will have to adopt an anti-imperialist position. As Barbosa Lima Sobrinho said, “nationalism always implies an ‘anti’ position.”
The anti-position does not mean that the country should confront the Empire. The costs are very high. Take the case of Venezuela and Iran. The Empire is powerful and when it is confronted, imperialism by hegemony, soft power, is put aside and he turns to violence, to more and more economic sanctions.
The alternative is ideological struggle and resistance. There was once an ideological struggle between communism and capitalism that ended in 1989 with the victory of capitalism. But the ideological struggle between the Empire and the peripheral countries has not ended, with the former defending economic liberalism, while the others must adopt developmentalism. I say “must” because many countries submit. This submission is not complete, there are degrees of submission or autonomy, but it is enough for the country to grow more slowly or to stagnate.
To resist external pressure, the country would need to unite its forces around developmentalism, but we know how difficult this is. Let's look at the case of Brazil. Since the great foreign debt crisis of the 1980s, the economic elites have abandoned developmentalism and their interests have come to identify much more with those of the Empire than with those of the Brazilian people.
In 1990, within the framework of the new liberal truth, the government did what was expected of it, Brazil opened its economy and since then its economy has been almost stagnant. The increase in productivity is strictly stagnant, and the economy has been growing at a rate that does not allow it to do what it should. catch up. On the contrary, its per capita income is moving away from that of the United States.
The vast majority of politicians, whether conservative or opportunistic, follow the position of the economic elites. The same is true of most economists, some of whom have doctorates in the United States or the United Kingdom, where they are taught a rigorously liberal economic theory. And most other intellectuals (like most economists) do not understand the problem and remain distant from it, paralyzed. After all, only the common people have not surrendered to the Empire, partly because they are not wanted.
Over the past 20 years, a group of developmental economists and I have developed the New Developmental Theory – a continuation of Celso Furtado’s classical structuralist theory. Perhaps this theory will help Brazilians and their economists, intellectuals, politicians and some businesspeople to better understand why economic nationalism is anti-imperialist.
The current situation does not allow us to be optimistic. The hope is always that one day a developmentalist coalition of classes will be rebuilt, as was the case in Brazil between 1950 and 1980. The Lula government is an attempt in this direction, but the task is far beyond the government's capacity. The problem is not the government's, but the Brazilian nation's.
* Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira Professor Emeritus at Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV-SP). Author, among other books, of In search of lost development: a new-developmentalist project for Brazil (FGV Publishing House) [https://amzn.to/4c1Nadj]
Notes
[1] Gopal Balakrishnan, ed. (1996) A Map of the QuestNational, Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto Publishing.
[2] Gilpin, Robert (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press; Charles P. Kindleberger (1973) The World in Depression 1929-1939, University of California Press.
the earth is round there is thanks to our readers and supporters.
Help us keep this idea going.
CONTRIBUTE
