By MILTON PINHEIRO*
In a more precise reading of the numbers that determined winners and losers, we can see that the right-wing parties emerged victorious, with a strong advance of the neo-fascist far-right.
“He who kneels before the accomplished fact is not capable of facing the future” (Leon Trotsky).
1.
Brazil after the second round of the 2024 municipal elections inspires an in-depth analysis of the political scenario that actually exists. Something that is empirically consistent, but that finds, in the unveiling of political interpretation, a meaning to understand the electoral impact that occurred in both rounds of these elections. However, aspects that are presented combined or separate, but that point to some poor reflections, others dubious due to the epilogue that manifests itself as an early defense of the errors of the “left” that is comfortable in the office of order, are still thrown to the winds of the storm that must be measured as a political thermometer.
Repetitive readings by some doomsday analysts, whose explanatory logic is an eternal crisis of leadership on the left, sympathetic prophets who manage to find schematic juggling to explain that we have a left that is front-oriented, another that is radical/leftist and in between, the PSOL, even without delving into the fact that within this party these two versions also exist.
We still have those who attribute the defeat to the impactful and morally abject role of Bolsonarism and its actions outside the law. Others appear, generally architects of virtual networks who, with a populist odor, venture to affirm a discourse from the indiscreet window of petty bourgeois logic that the left is unable to dialogue with the various peripheries and favelas, vulgarly understood by these entities of the shining night (where their notebooks reflect), as something compact and universal, without being able to understand the enormous diversity and plurality of this human geography from the point of view of gender, politics, ideology, race, age and the desires of belonging of these social subjects exposed to the massacre of the order of oppression and capitalist exploitation.
There are also explanations that already state some factors for the defeat in advance. These include the lack of entrepreneurial initiatives for poor youth; the lack of dialogue that could reach the outskirts – even if it is platonic – and, the cherry on the cake, the lack of any action to open a dialogue between the left and neo-Pentecostalism. Not to mention, on the other hand, that there are sterile and inconsequential criticisms of the manifestation, in the open field of politics, of discourses that affirm conflicting identities.
However, in the retail evaluations, there are still official statements that try to prove the PT's victory based on the 2020 numbers, resorting to the small increase in mayors and councilors, but pretending to be unaware that this same party governs the Republic. The courtiers who embrace these arguments take advantage of the tired information that, since 2016, PT has been attacked by Lava Jato, the corporate media and the institutions of the bourgeois State.
Therefore, there is nothing new on the front as a justification to explain the small “victory”. In this same field, some who are more enthralled by the defense of PTism, claim that Bolsonarism was defeated, including because the right-wing parties, which were largely victorious, are part of the National Union coalition of the bourgeois-PT government. Even with this abuse that disqualifies the analysis, there are still those who, in the environment of the fait accompli, consider that nothing can be done given the composition of Congress that we have and in view of this, PT and Lula were victorious.
In the margin of error, without much explanatory power in this vast scenario, a small group tries to explain the electoral process through the logic of abstention and null votes. Speculating that this form/political manifestation would denote immense dissatisfaction among the popular masses and that this “feeling” could be captured by the left. This interpretation of the electoral process does not present the diverse and broad field of motivations for non-attendance, which could even be attributed to the long holiday, to other factors that would justify political indisposition or criticism of the process, which could have ideological connotations of various shades, including right-wing ones, but which, for now, we cannot prove without an in-depth investigation.
It can be seen that there is a diverse, confusing, plural and rich set of analyses. This in itself already denotes the importance of the last electoral process and signals, with these concerns, the possibility of understanding new paths that can improve the positioning of political competitors in the space of formal democracy, generating early examinations of paths for political intervention.
2.
In a more precise reading of the numbers that determined winners and losers, we can see that the right-wing parties, commonly known as the “Centrão”, emerged victorious from the electoral process, with a strong advance of the neo-fascist far-right. In this political map, the parties that elected the most mayors in the ranking of the biggest competitors were: PSD (885), MDB (853), PP (746), União Brasil (583), PL (509), Republicanos (433), PSB (309), PSDB (273), PT (252), PDT (151), Avante (135) and Podemos (122), among others. It is important to note that the left represented by the PCB, PSOL, PSTU, PCO and UP did not elect any mayors and the PC do B elected 19.
In the vast territory of political dispute in the municipal space, it is inadequate to say that the dispute is not ideological. We know that this space of confrontation is marked by physiologism, by the influence of local power, by the immediate interests of the population, by religious subordination, but all of this is covered by the ideological component.
It was in this territory of dispute, also ideological, that the councilors who make up a vast majority of the right were elected: MDB (8.113), PP (6.953), PSD (6.624), União Brasil (5.490), PL (4.961), Republicanos (4.649), PSB (3.593), PT (3.130), PSDB (3.002), PDT (2.503), Podemos (2.329) and Avante (1.525), among others. On the left, the PCB, PSTU, PCO and UP did not elect any councilors, while the PC do B elected 354 and the PSOL elected 80.
The elections in the capitals indicate a strong presence of the right and far right, with the victories of PSD (5), MDB (5), União Brasil (4), PL (4), Podemos (2), PP (2), Avante (1), PSB (1), PT (1) and Republicanos (1). This scenario is practically repeated in the country's major cities. The consequent assessment of this process is that Gilberto Kassab, Tarcísio de Freitas, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, Bolsonaro, the Barbalho family, the leadership of União Brasil and right-wing and far-right forces emerged victorious. Just as we can identify that PT, Lula, PSOL and the left lost in this electoral dispute.
3.
The electoral map should raise questions about the Lula government, the PT and the PSOL, and call the revolutionary left as a whole to reflect. The consortium of the governing order cabinet, composed of the PT, PC do B, major sectors of the PSOL, social segments, popular organizations and trade unions, needs to examine the political form by which the government they support is consolidating itself as a centrist government, configured in a coalition of National Union and operated by the inseparable logic of the bourgeois-PT relationship.
The Lula government has resignedly submitted to bourgeois control, without any capacity or interest in reacting. The right wing, represented by the Centrão, has obtained benefits, such as the almost secret parliamentary amendments, which to a large extent also had a strong impact on the victory of the right wing and the defeat of the left wing.
In addition to this institutional infamy, the government acts to take away rights (cuts in BPC, unemployment insurance), acts against public service and public agents based on the administrative reform that is under debate, makes budget cuts in areas essential to the people's lives such as health, basic and higher education, environmental disasters, etc. Not to mention the Finance Minister's obstinacy in destroying social life to operate a zero deficit as a form of subservience to the “market”.
There is growing frustration with the Lula government and the leadership of the PT, a fact that only serves to strengthen the right and the extreme right, and could strengthen political resentments that could lead to a shift of popular segments to the right. Lula and the government and the PT do not engage in dialogue with the working masses, Lula and the PT do not engage in dialogue with the left, Lula repeats the outdated and defeated formula that he will solve the localized problems of the people without politicizing these issues.
Meanwhile, the right and the extreme right exercise a dense and vulgar politicization of the issues that they consider important to mobilize the popular masses and keep their core of militant confrontation active.
The Lula government, the PT, and its way of governing are comfortably established in the logic of control established by the PP, União Brasil, Republicanos, MDB and PSD. No tactical signal is perceived that signals a change of direction in this relationship. The people continue not to be called to the center of the struggle that could change the correlation of forces and that would end up impacting the National Congress. The bourgeois-PT government acts according to the logic of the State as a stimulator of the market and the market as a manager of the government.
The broad front articulated by Lula and the PT made the current government hostage to the Centrão and defeated the late social democracy camp in this year's electoral process, as well as allowing the victory of right-wing forces and the advance of the extreme right. In addition to this clear issue, the political incapacity of this camp (Lula-PT) was added to a total absence of a popular project to dialogue with the youth, popular masses, women and segments of the “middle class”, opening a huge corridor for the emergence of populist leaders, such as coach Pablo Marçal, a far-right figure who had the strength to polarize the elections in São Paulo and generate engagement in other parts of Brazil.
4.
The left of order presented itself for a major dispute in the elections of the capital of São Paulo. A broad spectrum of left-wing forces was articulated to face the candidate of Jair Bolsonaro and mainly of Tarcísio de Freitas, Mayor Ricardo Nunes. However, Guilherme Boulos' campaign proved incapable of showing an opposition profile; it was yet another Lula-style campaign. Letter to Brazilians than someone who wanted to show the counterpoint to the power system in the capital of São Paulo. The candidate showed himself to be surrendered (the current Guilherme Boulos defeated the Guilherme Boulos of the historical struggles), went beyond ideological uncertainty, did not address the main issues that put the control of the city hall by businessmen in the spotlight and avoided general issues, such as the sale of SABESP, abortion, drugs, etc.
It was a rich campaign (80 million) that only managed to be an instrument for marketing, with a bureaucratic tone that did not excite left-wing activists, much less the youth, as in 2020. It opted for the depoliticization of the discourse, lost combativeness and, in the end, appealed to the logic of individualistic entrepreneurship and the strengthening of the armament of the Municipal Guard. This explains how the campaign lacked political and ideological direction.
To top off the tragedy, in the second round Guilherme Boulos accepted Pablo Marçal's invitation for a political conversation. What we saw was the good-natured act of the leftist representative who was unable to confront the far-right populist.
It is a pity the meaning of the “comments” that emerged from the PSOL about the defeat. The candidate himself said that his campaign represented “the dignity of the Brazilian left”, and an internal group of the party released a card saying: “Congratulations on your strength and courage, Boulos!” Despite the sense of solidarity, this moral explanation does not account for the defeat and should not.
5.
The right and the neo-fascist far right have achieved a victory and significant progress in the current political situation. This electoral victory impacts social life, fuels conservative and reactionary forces, gains popular space and promotes racist, sexist, LGBT-phobic, irrationalist and xenophobic agendas. And the serpent's egg has begun to ferment.
In today's Brazil, there are no projects in dispute. Brazilian poverty is manifested on the one hand by the late social democracy leading a centrist government. This logic was explained by Minister Paulo Pimenta when he stated that Lula and the government are centrist and that is why they emerged victorious in the electoral process.
A government composed of a bourgeois-PT coalition, with a National Union character, with almost no class conciliation, given that the interests of the working class are not represented in the government's actions and, on the other hand, the far-right bloc movement that manages to present itself to the popular masses as an opposition force, with an anti-systemic character (which is ridiculous) and with a clear agenda for the exercise of politics.
This Brazilian misery is most evident in the electoral process, because the party system in Brazil, with rare exceptions on the left, is a business structure (cf. Sofia Manzano). Therefore, this new polarization between the right and the extreme right represents a particularity manifested by the need to lead the business structure.
Ultimately, what is needed is self-criticism and redefinition of the left. Without illusions about the field of order that has already capitulated to the bourgeois project, but with the strength to resume grassroots work, the ability to understand the new configuration of the working class and, therefore, act to reveal, without reservations, the meaning of the struggle against the oppressions of capitalist sociability, advance in the dissemination of its strategic project, implement this project in the framework of tactical mediations, build a dense program with the strength to articulate the unity of action of the field of the socialist left, act with conviction and creativity in the dialogue with the proletarian and popular masses. After all, the left has something to say (cf. Mauro Iasi).
*Milton Pinheiro is a professor of political history at the State University of Bahia (UNEB) and a member of the PCB.
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