By JOHN KENNEDY FERREIRA*
The Lula project is exhausted, the room for maneuver to irrigate the poor sectors with compensatory incomes and not affect the income of the rich has reached its limit
The Carlos Brandão (PSB) government is experiencing a favorable political environment, benefiting from the rise of democratic forces – in a broad alliance involving liberals, progressives and left-wing sectors – which has enabled an improvement in public finances. Maranhão's economic growth this year will be 2.2%, slightly below the national 3.3%, driven by the secondary sector (2.3%) and the tertiary sector (2.5%), since there was a slowdown in the mainstay of the Maranhão economy, the value of grains and commodities -3.9%.
The labor market also saw a significant improvement of 1.5% in 2024, with the unemployment rate dropping to 7.9%, above the national 6.2% and below the 10.8% recorded in Maranhão in 2022. Of the 2,84 million people employed, the majority of workers are linked to (the boom in) civil construction, which grew 21.2%, followed by agriculture with 14.1%, services 1.7% and industry 1.3%.
The quality of occupations draws attention: the number of PJ[I] is 757 thousand, well above the 535 thousand registered with a formal employment contract in the private sector and 464 thousand in the public service, of which 222 thousand are civil servants. The majority of workers in Maranhão live in the informal sector, making up 55.5% of the workforce and the per capita income is R$949,00; it also has the worst monthly income in the country with R$409,00 per inhabitant. The data on compensatory income show the fragility and seasonality of the Maranhão economy: 753 thousand families are covered by Bolsa Família – which represents about 3,2 million people –, that is, a little more than 50% of the state's population (6,3 million). The poverty data are also revealing: of the 100 poorest cities in the country, 40 are in the state of Maranhão.
The favorable political environment did not bring about significant changes in the political economy; on the contrary, the 6.4% growth in large estates and their agribusiness are responsible for an abrupt change in the countryside policy, loss of land by small landowners generating 103 areas of agrarian conflicts, with 7 deaths and more than 200 death threats due to land disputes between large rural properties and populations such as indigenous people, quilombolas and rural workers, the poor.
Law No. 12.169, enacted in December 2023 by Governor Brandão (known as the “land grabbing law”), makes it easier for large landowners to take over land. The consequences of this offensive can be seen in the environment, which is being severely punished, putting the Maranhão Cerrado at risk of extinction. For example, in Balsas, more than 24 thousand hectares of land were deforested to make way for soybean and corn plantations, and pastures for cattle raising.
Several complaints and mobilizations led to the public prosecutor's office being contacted by environmental entities, unions, Pastoral da Terra, CNBB, CONTAG and other organizations, as they accuse the socialist government of rigging state institutions for the benefit of large landowners and also denying information to civil society.
The scenario in the immense mineral reserves of Maranhão reveals a behavior of neglect and absence of any responsible project for economic, environmental and social development. The oil reserves of 30 billion liters, of gas 46,3 billion liters, are added to 8 million tons of gold, 246 million tons of gypsum, in addition to the other thousands of tons of bauxite, limestone, copper, diamonds, opal, uranium and manganese, in addition to the growing market for solar, wind and green hydrogen energy. All of this is internationalized, with ENEVA standing out in gas production, Petro Victory in oil production, Alcoa, Alca and the denationalized Vale do Rio Doce in the minerals market.
In these regions, there have been several conflicts over land ownership between residents, farmers and large companies. It has become common to see several popular demonstrations against the actions of mining companies, such as: Equinox Gold, owner of Aurizona in the Godofredo Viana region; Vale do Rio Doce, Petrobrás, Copape (an irregular diesel distribution company with suspected links to the PCC); Alca, Alcoa Alumar, accused of leaking toxic waste that increases air pollution in the capital and significantly increases the occurrence of respiratory diseases and lung cancer. All of these urban and rural demonstrations still do not have a common outlet.
The logic of the business bourgeoisie (and of the economic, political and cultural elites) is that of exporting commodities. There is little concern for the environment, for the indigenous peoples and for the vast majority of the poor and working population in the countryside and cities. It is worth noting that this logic has great support in the political environment of Maranhão.
In general terms, Maranhão practically does not realize direct added value; wealth, jobs and the future are exported and cell phones, tablets, clothes, shoes, etc. are purchased, something similar to exporting wood and buying tables and coffins. In other words, the development process and dialogue with social demands will only be possible with a change in the economic-social structure and political mentality.
It is clear that since the coup d'état that began in 2007 and ended with the impeachment of Governor Jackson Lago (PDT) in 2009, the left and the progressive camp in Maranhão have been orphaned, without a project or political expression. Since then, the neoliberal prescription has been consolidated with forceps, which largely explains why it is the last provincial state in the country to develop. Ironically, this was reinforced by the successful Broad Front policy against Bolsonarism, which consolidated the participation of the PC do B and PT as junior partners in the local neoliberal concertation. The two main groups contribute cadres and activists to secretariats and positions, but there is no serious questioning of the policies developed in the state.
Of the elections
The elections in Maranhão and its capital, São Luís, had as a backdrop the evaluations of the mandates of President Lula (who classified the elections as a third round, between him and Bolsonaro), Governor Carlos Brandão (PSB) and current mayor Eduardo Braide (PSD), both from the allied base of the Lula Government.
We highlight that Carlos Brandão, following in the footsteps of his political godfather, Flávio Dino, was elected in a coalition of 9 parties (PSB, FE Brasil (PT, PCdoB, PV), Federação PSDB Cidadania (PSDB, Cidadania), MDB, Patriota, PP), achieving an impressive 51.14% of the vote in 2022. We recall that the Flávio Dino (PSB) governments were initially marked by the promise of “a shock of capitalism” in 2014 and in 2018, when reelected, he presented a clear agenda of resistance to the far-right that had reached the federal government. His second term was marked by scientific rationalism in the fight against the pandemic and defense of the constitutional order, in the face of denialism and coup threats from Jair Bolsonaro.
Carlos Brandão benefited from the victory of the Broad Front and skillfully expanded his support base by incorporating the political parties Podemos, União Brasil, Solidariedade and PSD into his government. Thus, the electoral scenario was almost a contest between supporters of Carlos Brandão's policies (and, at the national level, of President Lula), and a hitherto inconsistent far-right opposition.
In the 10 main cities of the State, the performance of the support camp for the governor and the president was positive: the Broad Front won in eight cities and the governor's base in nine.
In Imperatriz, the second city in the state, the winner was Rildo Amaral of the PP, after a dispute with the surprising candidate Mariana Carvalho of the Republicans, who was boosted to the second round with the in-person support of Nikolas Ferreira and Jair Bolsonaro. In São José do Ribamar, Dr. Julinho of Podemos won. In Timon, Rafael of the PSB emerged victorious. In Caxias, Gentil Neto of the PP won in a tight dispute. In Codó, Chiquinho Fc of the PT was elected. In Paço do Lumiar, Fred Campos of the PSB won by a landslide. In Açailândia, União Brasil won with Dr. Benjamin. In Bacabal, Roberto Costa of the MDB won the election. In Balsas, Alan Marisol of the PRD won. In São Luís, we had an easy dispute, won by a large margin by Eduardo Braide of the PSD.
| City | Game | Brazil: Opposition or Broad Front | Maranhão: opposition and allied base |
| São Luís | PSD | Wide Front | allied base |
| Imperatriz | PP | Wide Front | allied base |
| St. Joseph of Ribamar | We can | objection | allied base |
| Timon | PSB | Wide Front | allied base |
| Caxias | PP | Wide Front | allied base |
| Code | PT | Wide Front | allied base |
| Lumiar Palace | PSB | Wide Front | allied base |
| Açailandia | union Brazil | Wide Front | allied base |
| Bacabal | MDB | Wide Front | allied base |
| Rafts | PRD | Opposition | objection |
In smaller cities, the scenario is not very promising for the governor's support camp, the left and progressives; in many small and medium-sized cities we saw (the continuation of) the rise of the right and extreme right with mayors and elected chambers with all members linked to the right and extreme right, such as: Altamira do Maranhão, Joselândia, Igarapé do Meio, Lima Campos, Maranhãozinho, Miranda, Passagem Franca, Sambaíba, São Francisco do Maranhão, Satubinha and others.
In these cities, it is possible to imagine the implementation of policies linked to Bolsonarism, such as: “schools without parties”, military civic schools, outsourcing and privatizations; moralist agendas in general, such as sexual abstinence, actions against homosexuality, women's, black and indigenous rights and reinforcement of the patriarchal family, all this alongside a reduction in public spending and consequently an increase in unemployment, social marginalization, exodus, etc.
Voting for mayors from right-wing and far-right parties:
| Game | 2016 | 2020 | 2026 | Total |
| PL | 0 | 39 | 40 | |
| PP | 15 | 17 | 30 | |
| Republicans | 07 | 24 | 19 | |
| PRD (merger of PTB and Patriotas) | 06 | |||
| PTB | 5 | 14 | - | |
| Patriotas | 0,0 | 0,4 | - | |
| Union Brazil * merger of DEM with PSL | 26 | |||
| PSL | 01 | 02 | - | |
| DEM | 02 | 11 | - | |
| PRTB | 00 | 00 | 00 | 121 |
Of the 217 municipalities in Maranhão, 121 will be administered by the extreme right, even considering that orthodoxy and ideological coherence have never been a strong point in Brazil and Maranhão in particular, the numbers are quite expressive.
| party | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 | totaling |
| PL | 229 | |||
| PP | 261 | |||
| Republicans | 111 | 204 | 165 | |
| PRD (merger of PTB and Patriotas) | 144 | |||
| PTB | - | |||
| Patriotas | 0 | 66 | - | |
| União Brasil * merger of DEM with DEM | 272 | |||
| DEM | - | |||
| PSL | 46 | 37 | - | |
| PRTB | 43 | 28 | 05 | 1.077 |
Out of a total of 7.573 elected councilors in Maranhão, the far-right group has around 1.077 and the number of votes cast for mayors is 1.016.273 votes out of a universe of 5.80.738 voters, that is, something quite expressive. The growth of parties aligned to the right – even with considerations about the ideological heterodoxy of Brazilian parties and politicians in the interior of the country and Maranhão – responds to the political agenda of this group on the one hand, and on the other hand, the inability of left-wing and progressive groups to present an alternative agenda, limiting themselves to saying that they are defenders of the “social programs of the Lula government and Governor Brandão”.
In turn, the left, which represented a significant number of city halls (PCdoB, 22, PDT, 42 PT 1, PSB, 16, PV 4, Rede 01) suffered a significant setback.
| Game | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 | Total |
| PCdoB | 46 | 22 | 02 | |
| PSB | 06 | 19 | ||
| PT | 07 | 01 | 02 | |
| NETWORK | 00 | 00 | 00 | |
| PV | 00 | 00 | 01 | |
| PDT | 42 | 18 | ||
| PSOL | 00 | 00 | 00 | 52 |
The combination of these numbers added to the triumphant rise of the centrists: PSD and MDB, allow us to assess that it is possible – even with a link to national agreements – a change in the composition of the Brandão Government, for these last two years, including reflections on the state succession.
Performance of the left and progressive camp in the 10 largest cities
| City | 2024 elected party | He competed with a candidate for mayor | Councilors elected by the progressive camp |
| São Luís | PSD | PSB | PSB 06, PDT 01, PCdoB 01, PT 01, PV 01 |
| Imperatriz | PP | PCdoB | PDT 02, PT 01, PV 01 |
| St. Joseph of Ribamar | We can | PSB | PDT 02, PSB 01, PcdoB 01. |
| Timon | PSB | PSB and PDT | PSB 03 PDT 02 |
| Caxias | PP | - | PSB 02, PT 01, PDT 01 |
| Code | PT | PT | PSB 01, PcdoB 01 |
| Lumiar Palace | PSB | PSB | PSB 03 |
| Açailandia | union Brazil | - | PSB 01 |
| Bacabal | MDB | - | PSB 03 |
| Rafts | PRD | - | PDT 03, PSB 01 |
Observing the participation of the left and center-left in the main urban centers of Maranhão, we see that the PT and PC do B managed to elect 03 councilors each while the center-left elected 21 with the PSB, 11 with the PDT and 01 with the PV. The participation of the left and the progressive field also did not perform well in Greater São Luís.
| City | 2024 elected mayor | He competed with a candidate for mayor | Councilors elected by the progressive camp |
| São Luís | PSD | PSB | PSB 06, PDT 01, PCdoB 01, PT 01, PV 01 |
| St. Joseph of Ribamar | We can | PSB | PDT 02, PSB 01, PcdoB 01. |
| Lumiar Palace | PSB | PSB | PSB 03 |
| Raposa | PL | - | PDT 02 |
| Alcantara | PSB | PSB, PCdoB | PSB 03, PDT 01, PCdoB 01 |
| Axixa | MDB | PDT, PSB | PSB 03 |
| Bacacabeira | MDB | - | PSB 03 |
| Big Waterfall | PL | PSB | PDT 02, PSB 01 |
| icatu | PSDB | - | PT 02, PDT 01 |
| Morros | PL | PSB | PDT 02, PSB 01 |
| President Juscelino | PL | - | PSB 01 |
| Rosary | PDT | PDT, PT. | PDT 03 |
| Santa Rita | MDB | - | PcdoB 01 |
Looking at the map of Greater São Luís, we see that the left did not elect any mayors and that only the two center-left parties, PDT and PSB, managed to elect in 3 cities; this reduces the left's ability to act in the construction of public policies for the metropolitan region (urban transport, sanitation, etc.). Likewise, the number of councilors: PT and PC do B elected only 3 councilors each, while PSB and PDT elected 14 and 22 councilors respectively and PV elected 01.
Exhaustion of a management model
The management model formulated by Flávio Dino, followed by Carlos Brandão, shows signs of anemia and weakness, the composition with sectors ranging from the base of Bolsonarism to Petism, strengthens the right-wing field, as the state “avoids intervention” in social conflicts and equally leaves the economy at the mercy of market forces, which are the central core of Carlos Brandão's government.
In this way, popular and workers' demands are left aside and discontent can be felt in the approval of the socialist government: only 33% approve and 54% disapprove of the government (see here). This could mean the end of a cycle in the 2026 elections.
The left in Maranhão
The three main left-wing parties in Maranhão have been gradually pushed into political marginality, economic growth and income distribution achieved with the commodities boom in the 2000s have been exhausted and the distributive capacity is at its limit, placing the federal government and its parties under the sword of Damocles, between choosing to “tax the rich and put and (keep) the poor in the budget”.
In Maranhão, both the PT and the PC do B have been losing electoral momentum in recent years. The PT is being confined to a party that exists in small municipalities, being practically excluded from the big cities. The PC do B, which was the main party of Flávio Dino's government until 2022, has practically melted away in the big cities. The PSOL, unlike what happens in other states of the federation, was unable to elect a single councilor in the state, remaining on the sidelines of representative politics and the regional scenario.
| Left-wing parties | Votes for mayors | Managed population % |
| PT | 41.612 | 2,19% |
| PCdoB | 16.019 | 0,56% |
| PSOL | 04.586 | 0,0 |
In turn, the strength of the left has always been associated with labor and social movements. Contradictorily, the left-wing parties in the region have a distant relationship with workers and popular labor struggles in the city and countryside. It is very rare to find a party leader or a parliamentarian supporting social demonstrations. This distancing has the counterpart of accommodating government positions, union and party positions, all of which means that the left has little presence in poor and peripheral neighborhoods and also among young people.
In this way, the agenda linked to popular demands ebbed and identity-based agendas rose, whose social base is made up of segments that earn on average more than five minimum wages per month; that is, a sector of middle-class workers, liberal professionals, etc. Likewise, with this agenda, collective candidacies emerged and candidacies that expressed opinions and proposals for structural changes within society ebbed.
Likewise, significant sectors of the left have come to be dominated by neoliberal agendas, such as: supporting entrepreneurship, military civic schools, projects linked to NGO funding, uncritical engagement with conservative Protestant groups, etc. The result was not very encouraging: of the elected mayors, only 19.53% are women, and only one is from the left; among the elected mayors, 62.79% are black or mixed race, and none are from the left. The identity agenda is dominated by the right.
Election in Sao Luis
São Luís is a chapter apart, eight candidates ran in the elections: the current mayor Eduardo Braide (PSD), Duarte Junior (PSB), Dr Yglésio (PRTB), Fábio Câmara (PDT), Flávia Alves (SOLIDARITY), Wellington do Curso (NOVO), Franklin Douglas (PSOL) and Saulo Arcangeli (PSTU).
Despite the number of candidates, the elections focused on Duarte Junior supported by Governor Carlos Brandão, supported by a coalition that involved 12 political parties and, on the other side, the current mayor Eduardo Braide, from the liberal right, who was reelected in the first round, obtaining 1%.
While Braide's candidacy presented itself as a candidacy that had carried out works such as: asphalting the potholed streets of São Luís, urban organization with viaducts, opening corridors, expanding tourism, bringing artists from Bahia to local festivals, etc. The center-left candidacy appeared timid, without a brand, and avoided discussing the Master Plan that favors large construction companies, the reduction of the rural area of the capital by 55% with areas being destined for real estate speculation, public service exams, the "Bahianization" of popular festivals, income distribution and the alarming pollution in the river region, particularly in the Cachorros River, which is at levels similar to those of Cubatão in the 1980s, displaying more than 580 calamity alarms this year alone due to the emission of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, ozone, etc., produced by large companies.
It is worth noting that the damage to the environment (flora, fauna) and people is very great when we observe that only 20% of the population has basic sanitation and sewage treatment, and we can see that people are drinking, washing themselves, and eating from this water. These issues, which could express a qualified debate with another profile of urban development, could not happen, since the current mayor's and governor's base all voted for the same proposals. It is worth noting that the hegemony of the agenda linked to the extreme right and neoliberalism was also strengthened in the chamber, among the new councilors, there is not a single voice that disagrees with this tune.
Conclusion
Lula's project is exhausted, and the room for maneuver to irrigate the poor sectors with compensatory incomes and not affect the income of the rich has reached its limit. The middle-class working-class fractions that formed the PT, the CUT and various social and union movements in the 1980s: bank employees, civil servants, social security workers, metalworkers, chemists, etc., have been penalized over the years with increased taxes and inflation in services. This sector, called class C, has organically distanced itself from the left, whether due to the expenses it has been suffering or the bureaucratization of union and social entities. This sector has sought alternatives to express itself politically.
On the other side of the spectrum, the message from the ballot boxes was clear; agribusiness, large mining companies, and big business do not want to negotiate, they want to overcome the constraints they find in their free development, and they acted in these elections with a “tactical variation” of Mao Tse Tung in reverse: they surrounded the cities with business in the countryside and now they surround the State with all their power, seeking to establish themselves as government in 2026. This is the meaning of the schism between Brandão and Dino.
The chances of reversing this situation are slim, and it requires an understanding of the situation as a whole, it requires understanding the extent of the pent-up bourgeois violence that will be unleashed on the most disadvantaged workers; it requires thinking about new tactics and a broad policy of alliances that goes beyond one's own borders, it requires thinking about a new political agenda and a new development model.
*John Kennedy Ferreira Professor of Sociology at the Federal University of Maranhão (UFMA).
Note
[I] The term PJ refers to the practice of a worker opening a company and being hired as a legal entity, without basic labor rights.
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