Donald Trump's sanctions on Russia/India relations

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By ANDREW KORYBKO*

Donald Trump's preference for sanctions could disrupt India's careful multi-pronged alignment between the US and Russia, forcing it to choose between them

The media has been awash with reports speculating how relations between Russia and India could suffer as a result of the latest US energy sanctions, given that they have recently focused on large-scale imports of discounted oil from Moscow through Delhi, which could be harmed by these latest unilateral restrictions. An unnamed Indian source told the media that “Russia will find ways to catch up with us” and predicted deeper discounts to neutralize the new sanctions risks: so there is no cause for concern for now.

The measures will not come into effect until March, so there is still time for both sides to plan alternative solutions, one of which is taking the form of India expanding its pool of Russian insurers to include non-sanctioned companies, although it is not yet clear what they will do about Russia’s sanctioned “shadow fleet”. In any case, it is a step in the right direction and shows the importance India attaches to continuing its large-scale import of discounted Russian oil, the strategic significance of which will be explained now.

This move not only helped avert a polycrisis in recent years – which could have catalyzed disastrously cascading consequences across the Global South by late 2023 – but also resulted in India’s impressive growth trajectory, thereby maintaining its attractiveness for foreign investment. Furthermore, India preemptively avoided Russia’s potentially disproportionate dependence on China by diversifying its energy revenue streams, thus preventing Russia from becoming China’s junior partner.

This has interrupted the Sino-American bi-multipolar tendencies and facilitated the tri-multipolar transition phase of the global systemic transition towards a more complex multipolarity (“multiplexity”). This outcome may be seen by some US policymakers as detrimental to their country’s larger strategic interests, but on the other hand, Russia has not yet become a reserve of raw materials to turbocharge China’s rise as a superpower, as it might have already become were it not for India’s diversification of Russia’s energy revenue streams.

India’s major strategic interests lie in preventing this from happening because of the possibility that China could one day leverage its senior partnership with Russia to force the latter to restrict and ultimately suspend (regardless of the pretext) new and spare military supplies to India. Moreover, Russia’s turbocharging of China’s superpower rise could force India to become a junior partner of the US in kind, which could lead to serious concessions to its hard-won strategic autonomy.

These imperatives suggest that India will do everything in its power to maintain its large-scale import of discounted Russian oil, since the alternative is to risk Russia becoming China’s junior partner, with all that this would entail for reshaping the global systemic transition by restoring Sino-American bi-multipolarity. Should India feel coerced into complying with these latest sanctions—as if Trump were duped by misguided advisers into threatening crippling secondary sanctions—then it could try to reach a compromise.

In exchange for sanctions relief – which India could argue is necessary to prevent Russia from becoming a raw materials reserve to fuel China’s rise as a superpower at the expense of America’s broader strategic interests – it could try to persuade Russia to accept Donald Trump’s peace plan. While it is not yet clear exactly what Trump has in mind, the signals he has sent so far suggest that he will demand tough compromises from Russia, which Vladimir Putin may reject and then Donald Trump may escalate in response.

This could lead to even more anti-Russian sanctions, including the imposition of threatened secondary sanctions against third countries such as India, and more armed aid to Ukraine to perpetuate the conflict. If Russia does not accept the ceasefire, armistice or peace terms offered, then it may have no choice but to become China’s junior partner out of desperation for financing and potentially even military-technical equipment in exchange for selling its resources at bargain prices, as it has refused to do so far.

Donald Trump wants to “pivot (back) to Asia” quickly to contain China more forcefully, which requires resolving the Ukraine conflict quickly, since its possible continuation could delay his plans indefinitely as this state of affairs results in Russia ultimately turbocharging China’s rise as a superpower, which he wants to avoid. He and his aides may not see it that way, but India can help convince them of this scenario, to which some on his team may be receptive given their indophilia.

Even if India fails to convince Donald Trump to demand tough compromises from Vladimir Putin and then fails to convince Putin to accept them, it can still defy the foreseeable threats of secondary sanctions from the US to continue importing discounted Russian oil, even if perhaps not on the same scale as before. This possibility is based on the great strategic importance of its energy ties, as they relate to the global systemic transition from India’s perspective and the imperative of preventing Russia from becoming China’s junior partner.

With all this insight in mind, the likelihood that the latest US energy sanctions will harm Russia-India ties is low and nowhere near as high as some in the media have speculated. But there is still a risk that they could be damaged if they fail to pioneer alternative solutions. The other significant variable is whether India can convince Donald Trump to grant it a sanctions waiver because of how these large-scale purchases prevent Russia from becoming China’s junior partner, or in exchange for mediation in Ukraine.

Donald Trump's preference for sanctions and his latest threat to double secondary sanctions in this case could derail the careful alignment India’s multiple position between the US and Russia, forcing it to choose between them, which is not its plan under any circumstances. This contextualizes India’s recent expansion of its Russian insurer pool as a pragmatic compromise, at least for now, which proves how much India does not want to be forced into the aforementioned dilemma, although it still may be.

Ultimately, it all depends on how far Donald Trump is willing to pressure India into its large-scale import of discounted Russian oil and the degree to which India can then defy him. Trump may be persuaded by India to reconsider everything, while India may then boldly pursue its grand strategic interests if this does not happen, albeit at the risk of a serious crisis with the US. Observers should therefore keep a close eye on these dynamics because of their potentially enormous impact on the world order.

*Andrew Korybko holds a master's degree in International Relations from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Book author Hybrid Wars: From Color Revolutions to Coups (popular expression). [https://amzn.to/46lAD1d]

Translation: Arthur Scavone.


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