By RENATO JANINE RIBEIRO*
Reality demands that we understand from now on that the left, especially the PT, has no alternative other than the name of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for 2026.
1.
Let's start our analysis of the current political situation at the end: the 2026 presidential election should be our point of conclusion, but reality demands that we understand from now on that the left, especially the PT, has no alternative but to nominate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for this election. Lula has established himself as the only leader capable of uniting two crucial points: commitment to popular agendas and political negotiation skills.
Lula is very popular, mainly due to his communication skills and his ongoing commitment to the poorest and most vulnerable groups. He speaks a language that is accessible to everyone, regardless of their cultural or educational level.[I]
In addition to his popularity with the poorest masses, Lula has demonstrated remarkable skill in political negotiation, managing to articulate himself even with conservative sectors, something rare for a leftist figure. This skill, evident in his first terms, is essential today, with a Congress where the left occupies only a quarter of the seats. All these factors make Lula an inevitable candidate to succeed himself.
This success, however, raises a concern: if Lula is reelected, he will leave the presidency almost half a century after emerging as a great popular leader, something rare in complex democracies like Brazil. A comparable case would be Fidel Castro, but Cuba is a smaller and less complex country, in addition to not being a democracy. I must point out that I do not blame Lula for the PT not having produced, in this long period, leaders comparable to his own; from what I know of the President, he has always strived to project qualified names, among them Fernando Haddad. But it is a fact: the PT is smaller than the so-called Lulism.
2.
And this worrying situation occurs even though the PT is the only party in Brazil worthy of being called a party! Although we have dozens of groups, the PT is the only one with clear political convictions. In addition to the always small communist or socialist parties, we have had another large party with defined values, the PSDB, which defended, under the name of social democracy, a policy considered by some to be neoliberal. This policy sought to liberalize the economy, while promoting better social policies than those of previous governments in Brazil. However, being currently the only party worthy of such a name, the PT shows the remaining “desert” of political discussion in which we live.
Alberto Carlos Almeida, a political scientist, has a relevant phrase: in Brazil, everyone has the right to a party to call their own. This means that when someone loses a dispute within a party, they create a new party to defend their ideas. This attitude makes it difficult to form a solid political education, because any disagreement becomes a rupture, preventing the growth of ideas within a common political family. This is one of the reasons why we have so many parties, and the relationship with them ends up being patrimonialist, that is, each party becomes private property.
Recently, the PRTB, a party with no representation in Congress, nominated Pablo Marçal as its candidate in São Paulo. A controversy ensued: there had allegedly been an agreement before his nomination to hand over the leadership of the party to a specific person – which would suggest that the PRTB would be treated as private property. This trend is not uncommon in Brazilian parties – a model that the PT is not following.
In fact, at the beginning of Lula's government, an irreconcilable divergence within the PT resulted in the creation of the PSOL. It is true that the divergence was radical, and the two groups did not fit into the same party.
In more advanced democracies, differences of opinion give life to the party itself. In 2008, after a fierce dispute for the presidential nomination between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, both remained in the Democratic Party. Hillary Clinton became Barack Obama's Secretary of State and later ran as his candidate to succeed him. In Brazil, this kind of coordination is rare. Consider the episode at the PMDB convention in 1982: when Franco Montoro won the nomination, his opponent Orestes Quércia threatened to change parties and jeopardize his victory; Franco Montoro ended up giving him the position of vice president on his ticket. In this case, however, it was not a compromise, but rather a near-blackmail on the part of Orestes Quércia.
3.
In the debate that followed my speech, someone raised the question of the need for a democratic right-wing party – and whether we, who are not right-wing, should fight for it. The problem is that, although a democratic right-wing party is desirable, this idea is defended more by the left than by the right. We have already had this democratic sensibility on the right, especially with the group that formed around Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the 80s, culminating in his presidential election in 1994.[ii].
This movement sought to show the right and the business community that it was possible to contest and win elections without resorting to coups or dictatorships. In part, we owe this catechism of the right by those who came from the left the relative institutional peace that we experienced from the impeachment of Fernando Collor in 1992 to that of Dilma Rousseff in 2016. It was probably the only period in our entire history in which we had a democratic right.
However, after losing four consecutive elections, the right-wing forces supported the 2016 coup. They paid a price for this: they became a mainstay – a subordinate – of the far right. Sometimes it seems to me that the far right is like an insect that causes an incurable disease: it is difficult, once extremism has been adopted, to return to a position that is in line with the democratic arc. Thus, for two decades, even those with extremist sensibilities voted for a party, the PSDB, that had a history of defending human rights and social concerns. Its leaders came from the struggle against the dictatorship.
However, when, in order to impeach Dilma Rousseff, the candidate she defeated in 2014 subordinated himself to the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, even though the latter was accused of corruption crimes, the weight of the two tendencies was reversed. Instead of having a small far right voting for the right, we now have the right following the far right. That is what we have today.
In fact, the right wing's education to accept democracy was due to a part of the left wing, which became more moderate and became convinced, at some point during the long agony of the dictatorship, that democratization could not come from the left, or only from the left, but needed a civilized right wing. In this way, a divergence was established between the then progressive forces, some of which created what they intended to be a “great popular party” (which ended up being the PT), while others prioritized a grand alliance with the right wing, which no longer (?) supports torture, censorship and dictatorship. This second family would end up being Fernando Henrique Cardoso's coalition, which united forces from the moderate right wing to the center-left wing.
4.
In the 2000s and part of the 2010s, Brazilian politics was commonly divided into three parts: one third supported the PT government, another third was in opposition, and the last was variable, changing according to the situation. I created the expression “fat third” for the PT’s victorious performance, which went beyond 36% and reached almost 40, which proved to be enough to win elections, by expanding and also attracting, in the second round, votes from the neutral third; and the “thin third” for the PSDB’s drop below 30%. The third third was disputed, and many voters were convinced of it, starting from the electoral campaign.
This was a period in which, throughout the campaign, the left grew. The political debate thus met what we expected of it: it clarified proposals, dispelled lies, and brought voters closer to their interests. This stopped happening at some point – possibly in 2014, when the avalanche of lies and fabricated facts took off. The brief enlightenment was exhausted, given the intensity of what was not yet called fake news, but it already had its traces. The 2014 campaign showed this, with lies spread on the eve of the election and with the magazine Veja distributing posters with the cover of the issue dated the day of the election, when political propaganda was already prohibited.
But, beyond the lies, this exhaustion of the political debate already showed the stagnation – which would soon occur – of the three thirds. Note that in recent years, in Brazil as in the United States, the defeat of Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump did not, far from it, reduce the number of their supporters or supporters. Possibly, the shift of the entire political debate to the issue of corruption contributed greatly to this. When it comes to crimes, there is nothing to negotiate. We can negotiate social and economic policies, everything, but with criminals there is nothing to negotiate. The criminalization of politics by the Lava Jato supporters has thus depoliticized the Brazilian environment, replacing dialogue with hatred.
Over the last ten years, this rigidity has been expressed in the fact that a far right has taken over the space of the old right. In Brazil and other countries, this far right does not adopt the democratic values typical of the traditional right, such as the European right, making dialogue difficult and reducing the willingness to change opinions.
This context also led to a shift in focus towards moralistic agendas, emptying politics and moving away from essential issues. Lula, however, is one of the few leaders who can move between different segments, including conservative sectors, as demonstrated in his first terms.
5.
The Lula 1 and 2 governments, followed by Dilma, promoted what was called social inclusion through consumption, allowing the low-income population to acquire basic products, thus benefiting the national economy.
Consumption or political education?
However, there were criticisms of this social inclusion policy, pointing out that it did not generate political awareness. The PT lacked, during the governments of Lula and Dilma, a political education that would better explain what it means to be right-wing or left-wing, going beyond caricatures and campaigns based on accusations of corruption or incompetence.
A true political education would involve, first and foremost, understanding the differences between the right and the left based on the proposals and values of each side. This type of discussion is lost when campaigns focus only on discrediting the opponent, using the most common argument in Brazil – the accusation of corruption. (Incidentally, in the early days of the PT, the most common accusation against it was incompetence – to the point that Paulo Maluf, who claimed to be competent, was once mocked by Lula, who said that his opponent competed, competed and lost).
The second point of political education concerns public and social policies, which were important in social democratic governments such as those in Western Europe and Canada after the Second World War. By guaranteeing basic rights such as health, education, public transport and security, these governments sought to equalize opportunities at the starting point, which made inequalities at the finishing point tolerable.
I will give examples of the lack of political education observed in the governments of the PT, Lula and Dilma Rousseff. Before that, I recall the comment made by political scientist Luciano Martins, a personal friend of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who in the 90s criticized the PSDB for not promoting political education in Brazilian society. Although he did not go into detail about what he understood by this education, it is something that I consider important, and I will try to explain it based on some examples.
During Lula's government, he often expressed joy in his speeches when he said that the poorest people were finally able to have three meals a day and occasionally eat meat on weekends. This was symbolized by the image of a barbecue with picanha, representing the gain in comfort and pleasure for the low-income population. In addition, there was an expansion in access to white goods, with more Brazilians acquiring refrigerators, stoves, microwaves, and washing machines, items that were previously inaccessible to many.
However, this discourse and image were ethically neutral. Lula emphasized comfort and pleasure, but did not present the fight against hunger as a major ethical issue. The eradication of hunger was communicated more as a well-being achievement than as a lofty moral goal. The PT thus distanced itself from the ethical rhetoric that characterized it when it was in opposition, where it always defended two central causes: the fight against poverty and the fight against corruption.
Before taking office, the PT was considered a party with a strong ethical commitment, to the point that many doubted that it would be able to govern once it came to power. However, over the course of its term, its discourse changed, focusing more on bringing comfort to the working classes and less on upholding an ethical banner. This focus on material satisfaction created an opening for Lula's opponent, Geraldo Alckmin, to use the slogan “For a decent Brazil” in the 2006 campaign – something that would have been inconceivable at any other time. This approach was one of the factors that weakened the PT's image, especially among the middle classes, who are very sensitive to the issue of ethics in politics.
This episode illustrates how the PT, between 2003 and 2016, failed – or even tried – to maintain a robust ethical vision in its communication. This lack not only affected the party’s perception, but also weakened what I consider essential in progressive politics: a positive ethic. Unlike the right, which often limits ethics to the absence of corruption – which is a form of what I call negative ethics, an ethic of restraint rather than action – the left must have an affirmative ethic that promotes values such as food for all and a dignified life.
At the beginning of my work as Minister of Education, I mentioned this vision to President Dilma Rousseff, understanding that the fight against hunger and poverty should be treated as a fundamental ethical cause. We should not leave ethical issues to the opposition – which would have a timid, only negative view of ethics – but we needed to take back this, which had been a PT banner. Dilma Rousseff liked the idea, and liked it again months later when I returned to the topic. The fact that she liked it the second time also indicates, however, that the subject had fallen off her radar: this idea was lost.[iii]
In short, ethics are fundamental to a progressive policy, which aims at the emancipation of human beings and the transition from the “realm of necessity” to the “realm of freedom”, as conceptualized by Marx.
Another incident occurred during the Dilma Rousseff administration, during the launch of the Pinheirinho housing complex in São José dos Campos in March 2014. At the time, Dilma told residents that they owed nothing to anyone, but only to themselves and to the mobilization itself. Although the intention to prevent politicians from exploiting the handover for electoral purposes was understandable, this statement downplayed the importance of public policies and the government's role in social achievements. In this way, the impression was created that popular mobilization would be enough to achieve these achievements, which diminishes the recognition of politics as an essential instrument of transformation.
This case shows how difficult it is, even with the best of intentions, to expose public policies as being indebted to politics. Such is the aversion of ordinary citizens – and of President Dilma Rousseff herself – to politicians that the baby is thrown out with the bathwater. Even if our politicians are not up to the task, we have no choice but to turn to politics.
6.
This situation raises a double question: why have the PT and the left stopped being attractive to idealistic young people and also to the peripheral layers of the population?
Two examples of this loss of appeal are the defeat of the PT in the outskirts of São Paulo and the rise of figures like Pablo Marçal, who represent a conservative and individualistic vision. An interesting case is that of Congresswoman Tábata Amaral. Thirty years ago, someone with her profile would probably have joined the PT, which was the party of young idealists committed to changing the world. Today, the PT no longer seems to attract this type of activist.
This loss of appeal, both among the peripheral classes (to the benefit of Pablo Marçal) and among middle-class idealists (such as Tábata Amaral, although she comes from a poor background), who once formed a significant part of the PT's membership, is a point that should generate concern and reflection on the future of the party and the left in Brazil.
The cases of Tábata Amaral and Pablo Marçal are instructive, although it is important, especially for a left-wing audience, to remember that they are different and opposite. In the recent electoral campaign in São Paulo, Tábata Amaral was the one who most courageously confronted Pablo Marçal. However, both represent indicators of the PT and the left’s failure to reach audiences that historically would be theirs.
Tábata Amaral is young, idealistic and has taken up education as her banner. In the 1990s, it would have been natural for her to see the PT as a platform for her values and commitment. However, in the last decade, she has taken a different path, finding space to work in education through third sector institutes, financed by the private sector, with a focus on improving basic public education. Thirty years ago, it would have been almost unthinkable for someone like Tábata Amaral not to turn to the PT.
This brought together all the proposals for a better world, including those that contradicted each other. But this is no longer the case, and this phenomenon should make us wonder why the PT stopped being the outlet for many who want to improve the world. Attacking the middle class does not solve this. Criticizing or attacking it does not solve this fundamental issue.
Pablo Marçal’s case is quite different. He appears to have no ethical values, as was seen in his campaign, but he attracted many people from the poor outskirts of São Paulo, who saw in him a personal and individualistic solution to their problems. In this case, it is also useless to try to disprove or refute him (even less so, to try to “explain” to me why he is not a positive role model; I know this very well; if someone does not understand that I know, I can only regret it). It is necessary to understand why he managed to make this connection, while the PT, which historically represents this public, did not.
This problem is reminiscent of a criticism made by Elio Gaspari of the PSDB when the party was at its peak: he said that when people disagreed with the PSDB, they would repeat the same position with different words, believing that the disagreement was due only to a lack of understanding. Now, this rhetoric is appearing in the PT. [iv]. When someone criticizes the party, the response is to explain in a paternalistic and condescending way why Tábata Amaral or Pablo Marçal would be wrong and why the PT's vision would be right. Thus we see a party, which opened so much space for discussion and divergence, being taken over by an orthodoxy.
They simply explain, including to me, why Tábata Amaral would be wrong and why Pablo Marçal would be even “a little” worse. As if I didn’t have my differences of opinion with both of them. And worse, as if I or many other people didn’t know how to think, and the only way out would be more of the same, much more of the same. This attitude is very worrying, because, to put it simply, it means that when something doesn’t work out, instead of fixing it, we insist on the same mistake.
Radicalization in error is something that should be avoided by those who engage in politics. Because it is a sure path to defeat!
7.
This was evident in the campaign for mayor of São Paulo, where President Lula insisted on Marta Suplicy's candidacy as vice-mayor, without this having a significant impact on Guilherme Boulos' votes. The proportion of votes was practically the same as four years ago, even taking into account Marta Suplicy's electoral record. Therefore, it is essential to understand what is happening, lower your “high heels”, respect the divergence and seek to understand the current scenario.
Finally, let us talk about the current impasses – starting with the civilizing contribution of two extraordinary presidents in Brazil’s recent history. The first is Fernando Henrique Cardoso. I know that a simple mention of him in praise may generate reactions here from those who do not even want to hear what will be said. But, in my opinion, Fernando Henrique’s greatest work was not so much the Plano Real, which stabilized inflation and removed from Brazil the terrible discomfort inherited from the military dictatorship, which left power with an inflation rate higher than that which served as a pretext for the deposition of João Goulart by the Brazilian right, 21 years earlier.
Fernando Henrique's main achievement, in my opinion, was to normalize the relationship between the right and the left. I even remember a statement by Luis Nassif, saying that his greatest work was to hand over the presidency to Lula... To a large extent, that was exactly it: when Lula handed over the presidency to Dilma Rousseff, it was the first time in the history of Brazil that a democratically elected president[v] received the position from someone equally elected and handed it over to another, in this case another person, also elected by the people.
And we need this to happen again, since the deposition of Dilma Rousseff and the more than dubious election of Jair Bolsonaro have created a problem in the normalization of Brazilian constitution.[vi] In any case, the exemplary transition carried out by Fernando Henrique was perhaps his greatest achievement, in reducing political hostility, which, as we know, grew again under the Dilma Rousseff government.
Lula's greatest achievement, in my opinion, was to allow a large part of the Brazilian population to align their vote with their interests or political conscience. In the first presidential elections in which Lula participated, it was common for the organized poor to vote for him, while the unorganized poor voted for right-wing demagogues. This was the time when Paulo Maluf in São Paulo, Antônio Carlos Magalhães in Bahia and several other colonels in the interior of the country were at their peak.
Under Lula, a series of public policies changed the perception of many poorer people about their situation, giving them the feeling that they could act directly, on their own behalf, instead of depending on the always meager charity of the great oligarchic lords. This progress allowed Brazil to move along a path that characterizes advanced democracies, where voting is aligned with self-interest.
This awareness of self-interest is generally more visible in the classes with greater economic power, who vote and campaign to defend their interests. Now, if it were always like this, the right would have the votes of the rich and the left of the poorest, meaning that the left would always win the elections. Here in Brazil, since 2002, in all free elections, the left or center-left have won, with the exception of 2018, disfigured by the partisan actions of Lava Jato, which included the suspension of political rights and imprisonment of the favorite candidate, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
To avoid this alignment of votes, the right wing often introduces other issues into the debate, such as the “culture wars” in the US, where issues regarding sexuality are brought up with obsession. In Brazil, such issues initially focused on education, which was the target of heavy investment and expertise by the PT governments, especially Lula and Dilma Rousseff. During Dilma Rousseff’s government, factoids such as “School Without a Party” and “gender ideology” emerged, frightening families with unfounded fears about their children’s sexuality and alienating sectors that benefited from the public policies of the PT governments.
Subsequently, issues such as the fight against abortion emerged, even in cases provided for by law, such as the recent “pro-rapist” bill, submitted by a far-right congressman, which proposed a harsher prison sentence for women who had abortions than for the rapist himself.
This investment in factoids and lies was and is intense. We recently saw this in the US elections, which Donald Trump won by manipulating precisely these fears and negative passions. In Brazil, the far right even managed to get mayors reelected who failed to protect Porto Alegre from floods and São Paulo from power outages.
The alignment between voting, participation and political awareness has been distorted by recent history – post-2008, that is, after the economic crisis that spread from the United States to the rest of the world, spreading poverty, hunger and, more generally, loss of opportunities. An essential discussion today, on social media, in the media and in political circles, is how the PT can deal with this situation.
An interesting ingredient comes from 2011, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso wrote the article “The Role of the Opposition”, placing the opposition in the singular and highlighting the opposition of the PSDB, at the cost of ignoring the significant performance of Marina Silva, in the then recent presidential election of 2010.[vii] For him, the PSDB would not have much to offer the poorest, who would be PT voters, but as this contingent improved their lives, the PSDB would win their votes and convictions. Fernando Henrique's idea was that the PSDB would attract the poor, as they prospered and became middle class.
In practice, today we see former PT voters in the outskirts of the city voting for the far right, which is much more extreme than the PSDB of the time. Fernando Henrique got it wrong about the beneficiary, but he got it right 13 years ago about the displacement. What we saw in this election reveals the attraction that the entrepreneurial agenda exerts, combined with the fear of more liberal sexual agendas.
Pablo Marçal's campaign in São Paulo also showed the PT's difficulty in attracting app workers. The PT denounces the exploitation of these workers and proposes regularization of labor laws with social security rights, but many prefer the flexibility of working with apps, which allows them to set their own hours and avoid the strict (and in-person!) control of their bosses, an issue that the left tends to disregard.
8.
These issues illustrate values that have not been embraced by the left. The candidacies of Pablo Marçal and Tábata Amaral – completely different from each other, especially since she was the one who most opposed him during the campaign – show what the left should reflect on in its discourse. Tábata symbolizes young idealists who prefer to work directly on projects to improve public education, rather than traditional union activism, as was so well conducted by APEOESP.
This point deserves attention. When I was Minister of Education in 2015, I realized that there were three groups in education policy: the government, education workers, and the third sector, made up of NGOs and institutes that discuss expertise and propose good practices, including those from abroad. The third sector is willing to work with any government, which by the way – given its collaboration with the Temer government, when it supported a reform of secondary education that proved to be confusing, and its attempt to cooperate with Bolsonaro, who wanted nothing to do with it – only increased the distrust of public education sector unions in relation to the third sector itself.
But the key is for the left to regain its ability to attract people. It seems that much of the left's work in the educational field is limited to calling for more funding for education; this is necessary, but not sufficient.
Why doesn't the left invest in mobilization and political education strategies, such as the summer universities of European parties, especially Portuguese and French ones, which are major political education events for young people? I spoke about this to PT leaders, who showed no interest. Our left, despite being historically popular, doesn't do this. This attests to a lack of new leaders and a difficulty in attracting an idealistic young audience, who feel motivated by other political figures.
In practice, this lack of interest leads to a distancing of young people, especially idealists. It is crucial that the left starts to treat these young people not as “them,” but with dignity and respect. After all, talking about these groups in the third person, like an entomologist talking about insects, instead of like a politician talking to his interlocutor, is a big mistake. If we want to show respect, we must speak in, or rather, with, the second person. In other words, to attract and engage with these people, the left needs to listen to them and genuinely respect them.
Pablo Marçal's case is quite different. While Tábata Amaral shows how the PT failed to generate new leaders, Pablo Marçal's case points to the party's failure to attract masses of poor young people, who prefer to bet on "every man for himself", which is the great motto of the extreme right today. Yes, individualism is the norm for the right, but the difference with the extreme right is that it proposes an aggressive individualism, which does not hesitate to destroy others, whether out of necessity or even pleasure.
This is a difficult challenge, because in our country the brainwashing to value the private over the public has been intense, and there is resistance to new experiences and dialogues.
In addition to the summer universities, which I suggested, there is a relevant historical experience, which is that of the complaints book, the notebooks of complaints that the Third Estate deputies took to the meeting in 1789 that would eventually lead to the French Revolution: in each city, in each village, everyone's complaints were written down. I think that the PT, at this time when it is discussing how to position itself in the face of the new social and political reality of the country, including that of its traditional bases, could and should develop a strategy starting from the bottom, from each urban group, from each factory or neighborhood association, gathering complaints and proposals, always with the support – but not paternalistic – of some political leader, in order to give the voice to those who should have it. That would be more important, in fact, than calling on us to give our interpretation of what the masses want.
Finally – and now for real – it is not enough to understand why factoids and lies have such a political impact. We need to know what people want.[viii]
*Renato Janine Ribeiro is a retired full professor of philosophy at USP. Author, among other books, of Machiavelli, democracy and Brazil (Freedom Station). https://amzn.to/3L9TFiK
Notes
[I] See my The Educating Homeland in Collapse, chap. “Where the government went wrong”, for a comparison between the ways in which presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula communicate.
[ii] I say to the right, and not from the right, because there was always, in those “heroic” times of the PSDB, a factor that came from the left, present in the social policies that the party defended – certainly more timid than those of the PT, later, but better calibrated than those of the social assistance tradition, which was from the right.
[iii] I report this fact in my book The Educating Homeland in Collapse, 2017.
[iv] A PT mayor protested against this statement when I made it on Instagram, saying: “The professor [in this case, me] made a huge effort to say “what about the PT, huh?”. First, he refers to the PT as a whole based on a conversation he had with an unidentified person. Then he compares the PT to the PSDB (now it wasn’t just one interlocutor, but the PSDB as a whole). That’s not right, professor.”
Well, another case of someone who doesn't want to understand what I'm saying. But I think it's worth noting this refusal to understand when someone makes a constructive criticism. It's a symptom of a conviction of one's own purity, even if this belief carries a high political cost.
[v] Obviously, I do not consider the elections to be democratic during the time of systematic electoral fraud, practiced in the Old Republic.
[vi] If Lula is reelected in 2026, another transfer of office under these conditions will only occur in 205 or even 2039… In other words, the coup will have inflicted on us an institutional delay of almost thirty years.
[vii] https://interessenacional.com.br/o-papel-da-oposicao/.
[viii] I wrote this text based on a speech at the Perseu Abramo Foundation on November 5, 2024, opening a series of debates that should culminate in a national meeting of the Workers' Party, focused on the challenges posed by the new national political reality – and why not say, international, since it was the very day that Trump won the US election; and on a speech the following day, to a group of APEOESP leaders, led by Congresswoman Bebel Noronha. Since none of them were recorded, I wrote from memory.
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