By ROMARIC GODIN*
Rise and fall of this fashionable notion, which is conservative and fatalistic on the one hand, emancipatory and active on the other
Historian Adam Tooze has resurrected the notion of “polycrisis,” which has become a favorite topic of the world’s political and economic elites. We consider, below, the rise and fall of this fashionable notion.
Bruno Le Maire, French Finance Minister since 2017, is not a long-winded writer. But, in his spare time, he is also a prophet. In autumn 2021, when he presented the 2022 Finance Bill, he told MPs that his budget was the first stone of a “great decade of sustainable growth”. It was a moment of optimism: the global economy appeared to be recovering quickly from the health crisis. Le Maire's comments illustrate the widespread euphoria that emerged in business circles and among leading economists after overcoming the health crisis.
On January 1, 2021, when the wounds of Covid were still open, one of the main columnists of Financial Times, City of London newspaper, Martin Sandbu, opened the new year with a text titled: “Goodbye 2020, year of the virus; hello ‘roaring twenties’.” The final term of the address (…) refers to the 1920s, which, at least in the United States, was a period of strong growth and the birth of the consumer society. Martin Sandbu's position seemed simple. Consumers, trying to forget the health crisis, just as a century before they had tried to forget the horrors of war, embarked on a spending frenzy, placing the economy in a virtuous circle, that is, “the greatest prosperity in a century”.
This idea will therefore be a great success in 2021. It is understandable. Since the mid-1970s, and even more so since the great financial crisis of 2008, capitalism has seemed mired in a process of never-ending weakening, combining a structural slowdown in growth, financial turmoil and tensions around public and private debt. The expected return to a phase of strong and shared growth seems to lead to a phase of political and social stabilization of capitalism.
The new buzzword
But two years later, the atmosphere changed. Inflation returned to most economies, exceeding 10% in some Western countries for the first time in forty years. The inflationary trend began in mid-2021 and accelerated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine the following year, which once again plunged the world into the threat of all-out war. Real wages began to fall and growth slowed while ecological catastrophes accelerated.
This is how the optimism of the beginning of 2021 ended. We are no longer talking about the roaring 20s, but about a new phase of the crisis, more complex, more general and deeper. On January 1, 2023, two years after Martin Sandbu's column, the same Financial Times defined the year that began with one word: “polycrisis”. This word has become the new buzzword, the privileged word that everyone in economic and political circles has come to adopt. A few weeks later, it became the opening topic of debate at the famous Davos forum, the World Economic Forum.
Where does the word come from? The term was recovered by British historian Adam Tooze in late 2021 and became widespread after the start of the war in Ukraine. Becoming a true star among the intellectual elites of the Anglo-Saxon world in recent years, this 56-year-old Yale University professor has always tried to paint complex historical pictures, as in his 2014 book about the aftermath of the First World War : The deluge.
In recent years, however, his ambition has been to become a “historian of the present”. After his seminal book on the financial crisis published in 2018, which established him as a global authority on the subject, at the end of 2021 he published another on the health crisis, Shutdown, in which he argued that the Covid pandemic changed the dominant paradigm and that this could lead to a more prosperous economy. His prediction is not far from the ideas presented by Martin Sandbu.
But the historian of the present has fallen into the trap of events. When his last book was published, the world was going through new and unpredictable upheavals. Adam Tooze then began using the concept of “polycrisis” in his widely read blog, before popularizing it in October 2022 in an article on Financial Times titled “Welcome to the world of polycrisis”.
The historian explains the term: “In polycrisis, the shocks are disparate, but they interact with each other, so that the whole appears greater than the sum of its parts”. It is as if the chaotic events multiplied and reinforced each other until they culminated in a form of general destabilization of the system (economic, financial, institutional, ecological, etc.). “What makes the crises of the last fifteen years so disarming is that it no longer seems plausible to point to a single cause and, consequently, a single solution,” says Adam Tooze.
Worse still, solutions to certain aspects of the polycrisis are generating new crises. “The more we face [the crisis], the more and more tensions increase”, summarizes the historian. Terrible disappointment, then, for those who thought that the health crisis, and the massive public intervention it provoked, would usher in a new era of prosperity. Although this solution prevented the collapse of the economy, it laid the foundation for a wave of inflation by exacerbating supply weaknesses in the sphere of production. This destabilized the economic order of the last forty years, based on low inflation and low interest rates; behold, two strong shocks characterized, according to economists, as negative “externalities” – we are talking about the conflict in Ukraine and the ecological crisis – made the crisis even more difficult to manage.
A concept by Edgar Morin
This notion of polycrisis is not new. As Adam Tooze points out, it was taken from texts by the French thinker of complexity, Edgar Morin. He used it in the 70s as a way to take ecological issues into account. He gave it a definitive form in his book Terre-PatrieOf 1993.
Edgar Morin defines polycrisis as a situation in which “interconnected and overlapping crises” take the form of an “interdependent complex of problems, antagonisms, crises and uncontrollable processes” that form “the general crisis of the planet”. This vision is very different from what is known in economics as a “systemic crisis”, that is, a crisis that destabilizes an entire system, but whose starting point is a single and identifiable shock. In the latter case, the crisis spiral can be stopped if the contagion can be contained. This is the logic that has governed crisis management since 2008, which has lacked success.
On the other hand, in a multiple crisis, this type of containment is not possible, because the crisis is part of a chain of events so complex that it is impossible to stop it. Even more so, as we have already said, because the proposed solutions give rise to new problems that spread to other areas through contagion. The world subject to polycrisis is not static, it is alive: its crisis modifies the environment, and the environment modifies the terms of the crisis.
Although not described as a polycrisis at the time, the 2008 financial crisis illustrates how “solutions” can become “problems”. This crisis triggered excessive investment in China that saved the global economy from disaster, but led to overproduction of steel and concrete in particular, which worsened the climate crisis. At the same time, this Chinese recovery provoked a reaction in the United States, bringing Donald Trump to power, but also a crisis of overproduction from which China only managed to escape at the cost of a real estate bubble that burst in 2021... Each solution opened a new crisis , causing global destabilization.
Complex thinking developed greatly in the Anglo-Saxon world in the 2000s and 2010s, especially in the field of history. Without using the term “polycrisis”, it has been at the center of controversies about an ancient but very intriguing event: the end of the Bronze Age that occurred at the end of the XNUMXth century BC. A very complex civilizational complex around the eastern Mediterranean collapsed, or rather, it disintegrated over several decades, causing the disappearance of the Hittite empire and the Mycenaean civilization, but also destabilizing the entire region for several centuries.
There have been many attempts to explain the situation, some citing the traditional invasion of the “Sea Peoples” from the west or north, which destroyed Mediterranean civilization, while others cited purely economic, social or environmental causes. But little by little another idea began to prevail, that it was a complex and, therefore, it was at the same time unstable.
Interactions and interdependencies acquired such importance that the smallest grain of sand could disrupt everything and cause a general collapse, through a series of crises that fed on each other. “The more complex a system is, the more likely it is to collapse,” summarizes historian Brandon Drake. From then on, earthquakes, climate crises, social unrest, revolts and invasions followed one another without coherence, accelerating the process of destabilization and ending up shaking the general cohesion of the Bronze Age Mediterranean civilization.
In his book on the subject The year civilization collapsed, anthropologist Eric Cline summarizes the interest of this complexity theory applied to this singular historical event: “We adopted complexity theory because it allows us to visualize a non-linear progression, contemplating a series of factors – and not just a single factor. It has advantages both in explaining the collapse that occurred at the end of the Late Bronze Age and in proposing a way to continue studying it.”
This hypothesis continues to be discussed by many historians, but we cannot help but relate it to the current situation and Adam Tooze's analysis. Crises multiply, follow one another and sustain each other, without any coherent global connection between them being identified. The rise in inflation, the health crisis, the rise in tensions between China and the United States, the Russian-Ukrainian war and the ecological catastrophe are autonomous crises that are certainly self-perpetuating, but they are not the result of an exemplary disturbance that is widespread. .
As you know, Adam Tooze summarizes everything in a diagram that lists these interdependencies. Causes and consequences, crises and reactions intersect to create risks. In this way, the historian can develop a kind of “matrix” of the crisis, indicating the areas likely to deteriorate, those that could decrease and those whose outcome remains uncertain.
According to this scheme, the current crisis is not a systemic crisis. There are multiple disturbances of different origins, not just economic ones, which are leading, through the search for specific solutions, to a destabilization of the whole. Unlike the 1929 crisis, there is no sudden recession, but rather poles of resistance, such as employment and some services, and poles of depression, such as industry and consumption. But the crisis is no less general and profound because it seems unpredictable and uncontrollable. This all looks very much like the “non-linear” trajectory of crisis that some have invoked to explain the end of the Bronze Age.
The question then inevitably arises: how to respond, in such a hypothesis, to this type of complex destabilization? What are the consequences of polycrisis thinking for political and economic action?
The exhaustion of neoliberal treatments
On May 15, 2023, Robert Lucas, the economist who won the Bank of Sweden prize named after Alfred Nobel in 1995, died to great indifference from the mainstream English-language media. However, this man was one of the creators of a piece of intellectual synthesis that founded neoliberalism with his theory of “rational expectations”, presented in 1972.
The idea is simple: economic agents, as long as they are not deceived, are capable of reacting rationally to economic events. It now seems possible to propose a reliable model of market functioning that allows macroeconomic crises to be avoided. This is what led the Nobel Prize winner to declare that the issue of crisis prevention was resolved in 2004.
Robert Lucas exerted considerable influence on the economy until the mid-2000s. Afterwards, his star was dimmed and almost disappeared. When he died in May 2023, it took almost five days for the Financial Times and the New York Times published those usual reduced obituaries. The anecdote is significant. In the era of polycrisis, Robert Lucas's thinking became inoperative. How could agents formulate “rational expectations” in a context of multiple crises with such unpredictable and apparently insurmountable effects?
In reality, this dead end is part of the problem. Indeed, although Robert Lucas's intellectual influence has waned, although no one can seriously propose the “rational expectations” hypothesis, his theories continue to structure economic science and public policy. These suddenly seem disoriented in this period of polycrisis, but the neoclassical neoliberals, geniuses only to themselves, boasted for decades that they had reached the limit of economic knowledge.
In the greatest disorder since 2020, all the main international organizations are tirelessly studying an economic situation that increasingly deviates from their models. Without a doubt, it has always been this way, but the distance from reality is now increasing. “Since the Covid-19 pandemic, economists’ crystal balls have become opaque to the point of caricature,” noted an editorial in Le Monde at the end of May 2023.
This growing ineffectiveness of economic science is now creating a new danger: that of public policies causing new crises, precisely because they are based on this internally flawed science. As the models do not take into account the complexity of the crisis, priority is given to filling the gaps that create new disturbing outbreaks, worsening the polycrisis.
This is what happened with the central banks' monetary tightening policy. Faced with the increase in inflation, central banks had no alternative but to act, given the prevailing models: the rise in prices reduced real interest rates to the same extent, opening the way to the risk of the economy overheating and the inflationary spiral. But rising nominal rates only created further tensions. So much so that Adam Tooze considers this hardening as the new “heart of the crisis”.
In the context of a polycrisis, global management is not only impossible, but also counterproductive. In this context, agents are forced to endure the crisis and the strategy to follow consists only of minimizing its effects. It is not possible to stop the movement or even control it.
As Adam Tooze concluded in his October 2022 article on Financial Times: “if your life has already been disrupted, it’s time to act together. Our endless tightrope will become increasingly precarious and distressing.”
A false solution: resilience
History, therefore, is now falling on people powerless to control its events. Thus, the logic of polycrisis resembles the logic of classical conservatives, who believed that history is a force that people cannot control and that they must therefore endure.
The only possible answer would be “resilience”, another trendy concept that is the twin brother of polycrisis. This term has already entered the technocratic vocabulary: after the health crisis, the European support plan is officially called “recovery and resilience plan”.
Resilience is the ability to resist crises, to withstand the events of history and emerge from them in the best possible way. In this context, the role of public policies borders on impotence. We must give up trying to overcome crises, to control them, because this could cause new crises. It remains to reinforce resilience, that is, the ability to absorb shocks. Polycrisis gives rise to a politics of lesser evil.
But this idea of resilience also reinforces the logic of competition. Faced with crises that we cannot control, we have to try to overcome life's struggles. This is as true for States as it is for individuals. There may be a collective aspect to resilience, but above all there is an individualistic logic.
Thus, it is easy to understand the enthusiasm of certain business circles and the commotion that was generated around the notion of polycrisis, both before and after Davos. In its global risks report published on March 9, 2023, Zurich Seguros saw “good news behind the polycrisis”. And the good news is that there are “risk management” professionals that everyone should trust to increase their resilience.
There are even ways to make money from this chaos. The president of the European Investment Bank (EIB), Werner Hoyer, who was also one of the protagonists of the Greek crisis in early 2010, calmly stated that “the polycrisis is also a poly-investment opportunity”. Therefore, the World Economic Forum could only celebrate such a concept and draw up its own diagram of “interlinked risks” to help people invest and protect themselves in the best possible way.
Although economic agents no longer have the luxury of Robert Lucas's “rational expectations”, they can now adopt an opportunistic stance to do better than their neighbors. From a social point of view, the continuation of such a process seems to give renewed interest to Friedrich Hayek's vision.
Unlike the neoclassicists from whom Robert Lucas descended, Friedrich Hayek believed that agents were incapable of understanding the complexity of economic and social situations. For this reason, together with Ludwig von Mises, he opposed the socialist planning of the 1930s and 1940s.
Friedrich Hayek's idea is simple: if knowledge is always fragmented, the State is not only incapable of optimal management: it itself becomes a disruptive element. The only possible form of coordination is, therefore, the confrontation of individual interests in the market, which gives rise to a “spontaneous order”, in which the only balance is capable of satisfying everyone.
Looking for a “least worst” balance, so to speak, we can see the link with polycrisis: fundamental uncertainty about the situation leads to opportunistic individual strategies, presented as the only truly effective ones in such cases. These strategies have an ideal place: the free market.
Of course, this is not explicitly Adam Tooze's position and, as Edgar Morin argues, a project of collective solidarity can be built to face the polycrisis. The fact is that the basis of the polycrisis theory is conservative. And in the context of the disintegration of the neoliberal paradigm, in which the State should support the development of markets, the polycrisis hypothesis could very well revive the option of individualist and nationalist libertarian radicalism.
A causeless crisis?
At first glance, then, the notion of polycrisis seems to fit the world around us. But he is very problematic. A comparison with the end of the Bronze Age highlights this. As Eric Cline points out, if complexity theory apparently offers an adequate explanation for the collapse of this civilization, it is also because our knowledge of the period is fragmentary and incomplete.
From this perspective, invoking “complexity” seems to be, in fact, an easy solution, a way of hiding the limits of our reflection on reality, either because our knowledge is limited, as in the case of the Bronze Age, or because we are faced with a picture that does not allow clarity in our understanding of reality.
There is another important objection to Adam Tooze's hypothesis: if human systems become more complex throughout history, why are polycrises not systematic? Why does complexity lead to general destabilization at certain times and not others? The notion of polycrisis does not answer this question, which raises questions about its relevance. If complexity is not always synonymous with crisis, it may be because the very framework in which this complexity is exercised and organized is in crisis.
Adam Tooze considers that the notion of polycrisis makes it possible to put an end to “monisms”, allowing us to emancipate ourselves from monocausal explanations. It points especially to Marxism and, to a lesser extent, to neoclassical schemes. But also in this case we could try to follow the easier path, contenting ourselves with a “phenomenology” of the crisis: we identify the shocks, we note the connections between them, but we give up trying to understand how and why the disturbance, why it appears in a certain moment in history.
Capitalism in crisis
Therefore, we are content with the surface of events and limit ourselves to trying to find a way to avoid or overcome their consequences with the help of insurance companies or risk managers. This is also what Adam Tooze does on his blog: an entry is dedicated to each facet of the polycrisis that supposedly demonstrates its complexity, but any other global analysis is discarded.
Such a view then becomes almost tautological: it is because we refuse to understand global dynamics – or we don't – that we theorize its absence in the name of complexity. So it is impossible to understand what moves the whole. In the end, the notion of polycrisis amounts to hiding a central hypothesis: that the multiple current crises are all linked to the inability of the capitalist system to fulfill its historical functions. By talking about a crisis without a single cause, we avoid raising the issue of the exhaustion of capitalism itself. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the success of the notion of polycrisis in Davos and elsewhere.
But there is one obvious fact that must be remembered: capitalism is no longer just another form of economic management. It is now the only mode of economic and social functioning on the entire planet. The logic of accumulation and production of value became widespread. This monism that Adam Tooze so detests is therefore an objective reality. It would therefore be strange if a system that determines the income of almost all countries and shapes human existence were not involved as a system in the gestation of the current crisis.
But if this system itself is in crisis, it cannot be an isolated crisis among others. Why would it be a crisis in the context in which other phenomena occur? It is this hypothesis that we must resort to if we want to understand the multiplicity of crises and their depth.
Contrary to what Adam Tooze suggests, the existence of this type of “primary” cause is not contradictory to a study of the diverse and complex aspects of the crisis. It is quite possible that the original disturbance takes several forms that are transmitted through complex causal links and dependencies. But not understanding this framing of the present crisis is, in reality, refusing to understand it.
The drop in productivity
Therefore, we must turn to capitalism, which is undeniably in crisis. Marxist economist Michael Roberts insists on the “limited” nature of the notion of polycrisis “to the extent that it hides the underlying basis of these different crises, the failures of capitalism”.
And it’s not just Marxists who see things this way. In an editorial published on May 4, 2023, Olivier Passet, economist at the economic channel Xerfi Canal, spoke of the crisis of capitalism and a “mode of production and consumption that is exhausted”. The steady decline in productivity gains over half a century is one of the main symptoms of this crisis. However, no innovation, not even the digital and IT revolutions, has been able to reverse the phenomenon.
The problem of productivity has occupied economists for decades, giving rise to debates that are often inconclusive. But the reality is that the growth of advanced countries is in constant decline, and the slowdown in productivity gains has a lot to do with this: economies with lower productivity gains naturally suffer pressure on the profitability of companies, that is, on the its ability to create value.
This pressure gives rise to reactions, or “counter-trends”. Since the 1970s, there have been countless reactions of this type, from globalization and financialization to the pressure exerted on labor by neoliberal reforms and the massive recourse to debt. The low inflation equilibrium on which the political economy was based after the 2008 crisis is a product of these opposing trends, which helped to limit the impact of reduced increases in labor productivity.
But as the underlying movement persisted, these contrary tendencies exhausted themselves and, in turn, provoked new crises that now threaten the system. Financialization, globalization and wage moderation are, in turn, challenged by the 2008 crisis, the health crisis and the emergence of inflation. Counter-trends are urgently improvised, but they have proven useless: the system is destabilized, with obvious social, environmental and geopolitical consequences.
Michael Roberts theorized this long crisis in a 2016 book under the term “long depression”. He distinguishes between “what economists call recessions […] and depressions.” Recessions are regular economic crises that are quickly absorbed by a recovery in the level of activity. “Depressions are different”, explains the English economist, “instead of emerging from depression, capitalist economies remain depressed for a longer period; There is therefore a lower growth in activity, investment and employment than before”.
According to Michael Roberts, 2008 thus marks the beginning of the third depression in the history of capitalism, after those of 1873-1897 and 1929-1941. And nothing seems capable, in the short term, of taking capitalism out of this sunset phase. Michael Roberts sees an “intensification of the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production in the XNUMXst century”, with three components: economic, environmental and geopolitical.
The collapse theory
This picture does not deny the complexity of the crisis, its diversity, or even the intertwining of its consequences beyond the economy itself. But it points to the exhaustion, in the general framework of human activity, of capitalism. This struggle now to fulfill its historical function: the creation of value from productive activities. This reflection naturally echoes those of Karl Marx in Book III of The capital, expanded by the Polish economist Henryk Grossmann, in 1929.
Grossmann pointed out the inevitable exhaustion of the capitalist system due to the very dynamics of the law of value, which leads to the increase in “dead labor” (machines) in relation to “living labor”, the only producer of value. In his model, capitalism was trapped in its own logic of development, such that it would enter a permanent underlying crisis. The more time passes, the more capitalism will try to find contrary trends.
According to Henryk Grossmann, this exhaustion leads to a “collapse”, not inevitable and natural, but in the form of a “final crisis” in which the class struggle unfolds on an international scale. “If these contrary tendencies weaken or stop, the tendency to collapse is imposed and materializes in the absolute form of a final crisis,” he wrote.
Henryk Grossmann's logic is that the exhaustion of the system will lead to revolution. But his Australian translator, Rick Kuhn, later stressed that this collapse “is contingent”. “Henryk Grossmann does not propose the idea that capitalism will simply collapse, but, on the contrary, it will be increasingly difficult for it to emerge from its crises because profitability will be increasingly low”, adds Michael Roberts. This is precisely what is happening in the current “depression.”
If revolution is not on the agenda, what remains is the crisis of a system that uses all its resources to survive: war, the creation of money, public support for the private economy, technological precipitation, acceleration ecological devastation, etc.
But it's a race to the bottom. We can imagine a recovery in company productivity and profitability thanks to artificial intelligence and robotization, but will this resolve all tensions? From an environmental point of view it is doubtful, as well as from a geopolitical point of view.
It is true that this explanatory framework can lead us to think that the systemic crisis is solely of economic origin. Robert Kurz, founder of the “value critique” school, adopts a different approach from Marx and proposes a more global analysis of the capitalist crisis.
In his seminal book, The collapse of modernization, published in 1991, he argues that there is a widespread crisis in the “world system of commodity production”.
In the ninth chapter of this book, he narrates the various facets of this crisis and its insurmountable nature, painting a picture not very different from the current picture of “polycrisis”. But “the reason for the crisis is the same for all parts” of this global system, he says. This is what he calls the historical decline of the “abstract substantiality of labor.”
With the development of productive forces and the continuous increase in productivity, the commodity system has lost the basis on which it functions. If before capitalism was able to find the necessary resources to perpetuate itself, overcoming barriers, now this is no longer possible.
“With this qualitatively new level of productivity, it became impossible to create the necessary space for real accumulation,” Kurz said in an interview in 2010. As labor was no longer capable of producing sufficient value, it was necessary to find alternative solutions, but all they failed, even, ultimately, trust in the State. Here we find one of the dominant characteristics of the period: the use of the State as a safeguard for the system, which opens the political, social and geopolitical chapters of the polycrisis.
As early as 1991, Robert Kurz had no illusions about the “statism of the end times which, through State violence, will persist in maintaining the empty shell of the money-commodity relationship, at the cost of brutal management tending to terror, that is, absolute self-destruction.” From then on, the “dynamics of the crisis will successively take over not only all sectors of commodity production, but also all areas of life, which for decades became dependent on the expansion of credit because they were unable to feed themselves on production real surplus value and its social redistribution”.
Robert Kurz certainly believes that there are “differentiated spheres” of the crisis that have their own logic and are organized at a socio-institutional and individual level. These spheres are partially autonomous. Some facets of your reality may escape the value crisis, but all of them are affected by this disturbance.
This is how the “polycrisis” unfolds, but it cannot be understood independently of the crisis of the “social totality”. Unless we limit ourselves to a phenomenology of different spheres and refuse to understand the starting point and common point of these disturbances.
The notion of polycrisis is, therefore, perhaps more superficial than its nature, which refers to complexity, suggests. By limiting themselves to stating that complexity is an irreducible fact of life, those who use it do not understand the global functioning of human activities nor the logic that underlies them. All that remains is a simple observation that leads to responses that are, at best, passive defenses and, at worst, individual opportunism.
In short, the notion of polycrisis ignores the existence of a dominant global system that determines the most general aspects of human life: the capitalist system. Given that nothing escapes the domain of commodities, it would be surprising if the commodity crisis were a mere epiphenomenon of a global crisis.
This system crisis does not mean – and this is Adam Tooze's fundamental error – that the disturbances it causes are not complex and difficult to predict. But the many facets of this crisis are symptoms of the system's inability to function.
Understanding polycrisis as the crisis of capitalism itself means that we can foresee solutions that attack the logic of capitalism and the commodity. Easier said than done, without a doubt. In this sense, the two visions of Henryk Grossmann and Robert Kurz, for example, are directly opposed: the classical revolution in one case, the radical critique of the entire way of life linked to commodities in the other.
What is in conflict here are two radically different visions: the metaphysical and quietist vision of polycrisis, on the one hand, and the materialist and historical vision of overcoming capitalism, on the other. In reality, this distinction betrays the distinction between two readings of history: one conservative and fatalistic, the other emancipatory and active. And it is precisely at this point that the notion of polycrisis becomes problematic.
*Romaric Godin it's jornamentalist. Author, among other books, of La monnaie pourra-t-elle changer le monde. Vers une écologique et solidaire (10 x 18).
Translation: Eleutério FS Prado.
Originally published on the portal Without permission.
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