By WÉCIO PINHEIRO ARAUJO*
The awakening of Brazilian neo-fascism did not begin and does not end with Bolsonarism
Bolsonarism alone does not explain the extreme right-wing reactionary uprising that we witness in the contemporary Brazilian political conjuncture; quite the contrary, it is the strongly reactionary character of the Brazilian social formation that explains Bolsonarism. From the perspective of a social critique, the question that I decided to take as the object of my research – and that I share with the reader in this brief essay – is to analyze how the channeling and ideological amplification of a certain political culture historically favored the emergence of a movement mass political movement of a strongly reactionary and anti-democratic character at the beginning of the XNUMXst century, even after a long period of left-wing governments in the so-called Lulo-PT era. To critically scrutinize this political culture and its contradictions, we need to look at the present without losing sight of the Brazilian social formation.
The end of the dictatorship installed in 1964 did not represent the end of the anti-democratic mentality that served as its basis in various sectors of Brazilian civil society. With the 2016 coup and the election of Jair Bolsonaro, this authoritarian civil background is ideologically channeled and amplified by the so-called Bolsonarism, in a movement that progressively takes on the political form of mass neo-fascism. This is the process that I call the ideological awakening of neo-fascism in Brazil and which, in turn, I intend to analyze in this brief exposition.
The awakening of Brazilian neo-fascism did not begin and does not end with Bolsonarism. Although, it finds in it an important leap of political-ideological consolidation, despite the defeat of Jair Bolsonaro in the 2022 elections. an authoritarian civil background ingrained in the Brazilian social formation, which from 2016 onwards with the parliamentary coup of lawfare and, especially since 2018, with the arrival of Jair Bolsonaro and his minions to power, it has been progressively consolidating itself in civil society as a mass neo-fascism, based on the strengthening of the phenomenon that became known as Bolsonarism. Under this political perspective of the historically determined and culturally conditioned Brazilian social formation, I also intend to use the concept of micro-fascism to deepen the analysis in question – as I will explain later on.
After the result that gave victory to Luís Inácio Lula da Silva in the 2022 elections, what a large number of analysts agreed to call the “third round” began in Brazil, especially from the criminal movements of occupation of roads that started in the evening of Sunday, October 31; followed by anti-democratic acts at the doors of the barracks. However, we cannot reduce the complexity of today's political conjuncture to some cliché that perhaps mystifies it much more than it helps to understand it. However, without any pretense of establishing any definitive analysis, the starting point I suggest for thinking about the hypothesis posed is the following: it is not a matter of thinking only of Bolsonarism, its survival or not. To try to better understand the complexity of the situation, I divide my argument initially into two parts.
Firstly, we must not forget that the coup de lawfare given in 2016 is still ongoing in civil society, despite its cycle ended in the institutional field with Lula's victory. Dismantling the coup in civil society is far from being achieved only at the polls. In the ideological form of a strongly reactionary mass political movement, neo-fascism is still alive and cannot be underestimated.
Second, it is about strengthening a neo-fascism of the masses that found in Bolsonarism a conduit of passage and empowerment, but which is far from exhausted with the defeat of Jair Bolsonaro – or even a possible weakening of Bolsonarism itself. This process produces an essentially fascist mass movement, however, it cannot be fully identified with the classic fascism that started in Italy in the early 1930th century – or even with the Brazilian integralism founded by Plínio Salgado in the XNUMXs.
For this reason, the need arises, not just rhetorically, to use the term neo-fascism, not as an addicted jargon on the pretext of not thinking about the problem in depth, but as a theoretically qualified reading key. Despite presenting elements of content that are essentially fascist in the classical sense, in today's situation, mediations renew themselves dialectically with regard to what underlies my reading key to speak of mass neo-fascism, namely: the subjective ways in which individuals experience politically the content of social relations that objectively constitute the experience of life in society, that is, political life.
It is in this process that individuals are culturally formed as political subjects in a society; thus, speaking of ideology from the perspective of the subject requires thinking about the process of cultural formation of this subject, which evidently implies a historically determined and socially conditioned process. Therefore, based on these aspects that I consider to be crucial, I divide my analysis into three parts.
Brazilian neo-fascism
In general, what I call the ideological awakening of Brazilian neo-fascism can be understood as a neoconservative mass movement of a strongly reactionary and anti-democratic populist character, located on the extreme right of the ideological spectrum. This mass movement emerges historically determined by the social formation of a political culture capable of producing a deformed political subject with regard to their ways of experiencing the content of social relations in the democratic experience of life in society. To better situate the issue, it is worth noting that in the historical period of the 2016 post-coup, this process of social formation is marked by three fronts, which historically are cumulative in a synchronic way, namely: (i) The formation of a social subjectivity which produces a business subject modeled on and by neoliberalism – in Brazil, this process begins with the neoliberal economic primer applied from 1994 onwards, namely: the Real Plan, and is consolidated with the labor reform of Michel Temer's coup government; (ii) The legal form that embraces the law as a political weapon against the democratic logic of the rule of law, better known as lawfare – which has its corollary in Operation Lava-jato and in the coup d’état itself. lawfare in 2016; (iii) The channeling and ideological amplification operated by Bolsonarism, especially since the 2018 elections, of this process of social formation of a reactionary political subject moved by discursive practices that find in authoritarianism and hatred the only ways to experience politics as an experience of life in society. This last aspect is my focus in this essay. In this direction, I intend to use the concept of microfascism to carry out my analysis – which I will detail later.
As I have already demonstrated in other reviews published on the site the earth is round, in contemporary Brazil this reactionary uprising is triggered from a hybrid war against the left strongly marked by anti-PTism, which has its beginning – still very confused – in the June 2013 days. However, in order to understand the warp that sews these three fronts that formed a reactionary political subject empowered in the political scene as a growing mass movement, I began to ask myself the following question: how to make a critical analysis, from the perspective of the subject, of this historical process that led to a political and ideological revival of the most reactionary elements present in the Brazilian social formation?
In the direction of trying to contribute to answering this question, my intention is to try to understand this question and its contradictions, from some aspects related to the Brazilian social formation in its most recent period, terrain in which this political subject that represents the mentality of this reactionary uprising that, in its awakening, acquires in Bolsonarism the ideological form of mass neo-fascism.
As I highlighted at the beginning of this exposition, Bolsonarism alone does not explain the issue of this neo-fascist uprising; quite the contrary, it is the strongly reactionary character of the Brazilian social formation that explains Bolsonarism. Therefore, it seems fruitful to me to walk in the direction of rescuing some elements of the Brazilian social formation from a critical perspective of this reactionary political subject and its processes of subjectivation; what I will try to do here with emphasis on the historical period that corresponds to the contradictions of Lulism and the emergence of Bolsonarism and its mediations with the ideological forms in which individuals politically experience the content of social relations in Brazilian society. For this, I formulate the concept of microfascism in the direction of analyzing the historically determined and culturally conditioned passageway capable of contributing to demystify the ideological formation of this reactionary mentality.
Microfascism as a mediation of neofascist subjectivation
From the historical experience of fascism widely analyzed by critical thought throughout the twentieth century - which for obvious reasons I will not recover in this brief essay[I] – is that I propose a critical way of thinking about neo-fascism, directed specifically at the subjective ways in which individuals ideologically experience life in society as political subjects. For this, I formulate the concept of microfascism, which can initially be defined by the set of reactionary subjective microelements produced in the power relations that culturally form and subjectively lead individuals as political subjects (parties, movements, etc.) in a democratic society. This process ideologically involves from the family nucleus to the school, the church, the political party, the union, the company, etc.
In the experience of Brazilian political life, micro-fascism is expressed in and through small ideological elements – from apparently harmless jokes to heteronormative, denialist, conspiratorial narratives, etc. – which are constituted as a myth of ideological significance of reactionary discursive practices resulting from the social and political formation of a colonialist, slave-owning and authoritarian society, such as racism, sexism, homophobia, denialism, etc. These discursive practices end up being morally sanctioned in a process of cultural formation that acquires a character of ideological deformation in the production of a political subject and a ethos contrary to the democratic logic of social citizenship and human rights. Therefore, micro-fascism focuses on analysis directed towards civil society and its socially determined and culturally conditioned subjectivation processes, with emphasis on the cultural formation of individuals as political subjects.
It should be noted that talking about micro-fascism has nothing to do with some slight reduction of a Brazilian fascism to the European way of the last century. It is much more complex: in the historic era of the emergence of Bolsonarism, we do not have a classic fascism, that is, in this second decade of the 1919st century, there is not exactly a fascist state as happened in Mussolini's Italy in XNUMX, as pointed out by historian Robert Paxton in his masterful work Anatomy of Fascism (2007). In order to analyze some mediations immanent to the cultural formation of this reactionary political subject in question, I formulate the key to reading microfascism. Let's go to the story.
In the scenario that unfolded after the coup d'état lawfare that led to the overthrow of the Dilma government and its sequence strategically conducted by the coup sectors, we reached a moment in the Brazilian historical formation, in which a mythical vision of a nation constituted under a chauvinist envelope, needed a leadership that embodied the reactionary political profile of a authentic representative of the typical “good man” and his discursive practices: hypocritically fearing the Christian God, head of the family in the patriarchal model, who puts order in the house under the hypocritical authority of a Christian moralism emblazoned in the speech by the audacity of ignorance, which has its bases in the denial of the ethics of human rights and in the rejection of scientific rationality.
At this point, all the demons of the Brazilian reactionary mentality were looking for a leadership that would embody this political revival in the most perfidious social narratives laden with micro-fascist elements. As Madeleine Albright warns, in Fascism: a warning (ALBRIGHT, 2018), “the energy of fascism is fueled by men and women shaken by a lost war, a lost job, a memory of humiliation or the feeling that their country is going from bad to worse”. In this way, the demand for a myth capable of incarnating a political messiah that could “save” Brazil from the petista scourge of corruption and the “communist threat” arises, under the mission of moral cleansing.
This process takes place under the sign of the contradiction established between the social content and the political form. Under the inflection of these discursive practices ideologically modeled by microfascism, we can obtain the following advance in our reading key: the reactionary discursive practices established in the ideological way in which individuals experience politically the content of culturally conditioned social relations, are determinant for the formation of multiple correlations of forces that constitute power relations in Brazilian society, from the everyday sphere to the institutions through which power acquires centrality in the State.
More specifically, it is about those authoritarian micro-elements of subjective vector that appear as an immanent progression to the cultural formation of a political subject determined by discursive practices that form and deform individual and collective behaviors in the social experience and, therefore, produce a subject reactionary politician. Therefore, under the determination of micro-fascism, this formation process acquires a political character of deformation of the political subject that it historically produces.
We can say that these discursive practices consist of those social practices in and through which the objective conditions of a society are externalized as objectified subjectivity in concrete political acts. In turn, in the historical formation of this society, the authoritarian micro-elements are objectified in the discourse understood as a social practice that determines the reactionary ideological form of this political subject to experience power relations. Daily life is the region in which, through these micro-fascist vectors, ideology operates as a material force, “harmonizing” the contradiction inherent in the social formation of this subject, established between, on the one hand, the content of social relations situated in objective facts , and on the other, the subjectively deformed forms of this content being experienced politically, that is, between, on the one hand, the facts, and on the other, the subjective forms of these facts being ideologically experienced in the experience of life in society.
In the case of the Brazilian social formation, this experience as a concrete experience that “educates” the individual socially and politically, as a rule, occurs in the form of a moralistic authoritarianism marked by the affection of hate as the only way to experience political life in the field of ideological disputes , which always presents a mythological outline with an essentially anti-democratic nature, aimed at a leader anointed by the Christian God and who, therefore, is above the laws and rules of the game. These elements are formed and strengthened from everyday life, whether in the speech of the housewife or the father of the family and champion of morals, known as the “man of good”, hardworking and fearing the Christian God. As Jason Stanley analyzes, “In a fascist society, the leader of the nation is analogous to the father of the traditional patriarchal family. The leader is the father of the nation, and his strength and power are the source of his legal authority, just as the strength and power of the householder in patriarchy is supposed to be the source of his supreme moral authority over his children and wife” ( 2020, p. 22).
Consequently, this subject's identity relationship with those he will choose as his representatives in the exercise of political power in the State will hardly occur from progressive political discourses, based on philosophical or scientific rationality, and even less on the defense of human rights. The social and cultural formation of this political subject reveals itself as an ideological (de)formation of a reactionary mentality. But how to understand this concept of formation?
In general, political life is socially determined by the historical development of the human being as a self-produced being based on work, but not only in what corresponds to the world of material production of goods; it is also necessary to take into account the world of ways of subjectively experiencing the objective content of social relations. It is the world of praxis in which people act concretely through actions endowed with consciousness mediated by language in the form of subjectivity that materializes ideologically in social practices.
In modern times, as the German philosopher GWF Hegel (1770-1831) pointed out, when through work human beings produce an object, they also produce it as culture and subjectivity, that is, when producing something material, not only is it produced a technical knowledge, but also and simultaneously an art, a science, a policy, an ethics, an ideology and a morality of this object as a product of the work process and, because of this, the being who works is also worked on. In short, it is this conception of cultural formation (Education) that I assume here, and that can be summarized in a few words: by producing material content, work as a human activity also produces a culture as a subjective form of this content being experienced by human beings themselves.
In this sense, the concept of training (Education) of the Hegelian conception provides us with a philosophical foundation (ontological-dialectical) to understand the formation of political subjects as a social and economic process, but also inevitably cultural and ideological. I reiterate: this understanding is anchored in the fact that work does not only produce material things, but above all produces culture and processes of subjectivation that form and socially educate the individual, so that he appears in political life as a subject capable of organizing himself to from a certain ideologically established political culture, whether in the form of social movements, political parties, etc.
This world of praxis (social, cultural, political, etc.) – if we want to recall the origins of this term in Aristotle – corresponds to social life as a maker of consciousness and individual and collective subjectivities in the form of discursive practices and their ideological manifestations in political life as social practices that reveal themselves as a fertile field for the production of various social narratives condensed in the popular imagination of a society. Therefore, culturally formed discursive practices in a society reveal themselves politically as ideological forms for the subject to subjectively experience the content of social relations through ideas that only come true by being said, that is, in language. After all, the work process itself only takes place by being said, and for this reason this animal that works is also, as Aristotle called it, an animal that speaks (zoo logos echon) and, consequently, a political animal (zoo politikon).
In the historical aspect of this culturally conditioned social formation, the mediation that serves as a passageway for the processes of subjectivation of micro-fascism lies in the historical formation of the narrowest social narratives that form an authoritarian mentality in a large part of the Brazilian people, for example - as already mentioned mentioned – racism, bossism[ii], sexism, homophobia, etc. The reactionary uprising takes place as these microfascist narratives are ideologically experienced as discursive practices with real implications in social experience, in order to allow the organization and empowerment of a mass political movement capable of acting as a political subject. This is precisely what we witness with the emergence of Bolsonarism.
From the daily life of this individual located in the family and in more specific social groups linked by a certain belief or conviction, to the sphere of ethical-political collectivity in which power acquires centrality in the State, the power of micro-fascist narratives is, not infrequently, the the only ideological force that determines the discursive practices of this political subject, in order to promote the formation of mass association movements for the promotion of hate practices as a form of political manifestation.
In summary: in this reactionary subject, the political experience finds its most prominent affective form in hatred. A process that in contemporary Brazil begins with anti-PTism. With the important caveat that this label goes beyond the Workers' Party itself. In fact, anti-PTism ends up becoming the main way of identifying and naming the political enemy of this chauvinist and anti-democratic patriotism that takes the form of mass neo-fascism.
From this context, we can make a summary of the opera: in the Brazilian social formation, the mediation of micro-fascism located in the contradiction established between the social content and the political form, produced (and produces) the reactionary mentality that finds representativeness in a historically determined State by the logic of exception and which, as of 2016, has its legal form geared to the contradiction that I called the authoritarianism of the rule of law promoted by the coup d’état. lawfare. It is precisely in this process that the reactionary element operates that determines the ideological character of the political coup maneuver innovated by the tactic of lawfare, socially instrumentalized by the seam of neoliberal governmentality with an eloquent reactionary moralism in its discursive practices laden with microfascist elements.
The most serious social effect of this micro-fascist formation lies in the fact that, as a rule, it becomes impossible for most individuals in this society to be educated in order to form an effective democratic culture, capable of promoting the overcoming of selfish-passionate subjectivity. , through the formation of an ethical-political subjectivity of citizenship – which would really be a process of political education capable of strengthening democracy not only as a government regime, but above all with culture.
Therefore, in this context, when we activate the concept of micro-fascism to think about the problem in question, the first conclusion reached by my analysis is the following: this reactionary political subject empowered in and by Bolsonarism, does not recognize or identify with the ethos democratic, precisely because its cultural formation is, not only alien to the ethical-political values of democracy, but above all, and even worse, it is ideologically deformed by a political culture that is structurally anti-democratic and that unfolds in hatred as the main way of living the experience politics with regard to everything that disagrees with their way of being. And more: it is not simply about being conservative, in fact, it consists of the process of cultural formation of a reactionary political subject marked by an anti-democratic neoconservatism.
It is worth noting that not all conservatism is necessarily reactionary, not least because democracy does not mean the elimination of conservative groups. Quite the contrary, conservatism has its legitimacy, as long as it is anchored in a democratic culture, even if ideologically conservative in terms of customs or economics, for example, and not in the fascist logic of “us against them”.
With regard to Bolsonarism, the determining aspect is not whether or not there is hatred in politics, it is more complex: it is about when hatred becomes the unidimensional way for the individual to experience politically the content of power relations in relation to their opponents , that is, those relationships through which life itself in society is realized as a plural political experience capable of guaranteeing the collective exercise of freedom between convergences and divergences.
In turn, I would like to go a little further on the issue in a more specific way, through the following question: in Brazil, how does ideological mediation operate in this process of cultural formation of this reactionary political subject that, in Bolsonarism, took the form politics of a mass neo-fascism? Let's see next.
Microfascism and ideological colonization in the Brazilian social formation
In contemporary Brazil, we experience the corollary of historical determinations produced from a social formation imposed by the elites in the wake of the class struggle and its immanent contradictions, which ended up being ideologically “harmonized” in the order of discursive practices that modeled power relations. through a process of “conservative modernization”, structured through historical narratives conceived solely from the perspective of the winners (read: oppressors).
Therefore, it is necessary to think about history against the grain of this continuous and linear conception, rescuing the ruptures capable of giving voice to the vanquished and oppressed. It is in this direction that The Reasons for the Enlightenment (1987), “Sérgio Paulo Rouanet invites us to think with Walter Benjamin: a continuous and linear conception of history – which for Benjamin is always the history of the victors – is opposed by a history conceived from the perspective of the vanquished, based on rupture and not in continuity” (MORAES, 2011, p. 11). In this way, “History thus conceived is not a succession of silent facts, but a sequence of oppressed pasts, which have a 'mysterious index', which impels them towards redemption” (ROUANET apud MORAES, 2011, p. 11) .
In the history of Brazilian society, this process of producing narratives conceived solely from the perspective of the elites takes place from the ideological colonizers of the past (the Jesuits, for example) to the ideological colonizers of the present (a good part of the neo-Pentecostal pastors). It is essential to understand how this process determined and still largely determines the politically deformed formation that is expressed in the way that individuals, such as supporters of Bolsonarism, politically experience the content of social relations. In today's conjuncture, this neo-fascist political subject finds fertile ground for his ideological proliferation in some Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal evangelical groups, a process that popularly consolidates the mentality that was ideologically channeled and amplified by Bolsonarism.
After all, as shown by data presented in the Research Magazine (FAPESP, 2019): “Between 2000 and 2010, the Brazilian evangelical population jumped from 26,2 million to 42,3 million, in a movement opposite to that of Catholicism, which has been losing followers since the 1980s, according to the last census of the Catholic Church. Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)”. Together with this, we cannot forget to highlight the civil-military character of the 1964 dictatorship, precisely because, although the military fell in the 1980s, the civil-authoritarian fund that ideologically supported them, continued to proliferate, in order to guarantee the formation of a strongly reactionary political subject that continued to develop as an immanent progression to the constitution of the Brazilian popular imagination, in a way strongly linked to most of these evangelical groups – as properly analyzed by journalist Andrea Dip, in the work entitled In who's name? The evangelical bench and its power project (DIP, 2018).
As an immanent progression to the politically deformed formation of this reactionary subject, the ideological “harmonization” established between the content of social relations and the discursive forms of this content being politically experienced, is strongly determined by microfascism. This process is ideologically consolidated through the production and reproduction of discursive practices completely alienated from the democratic logic of social citizenship, given that its ethos politics is based on a theocratic conception of society and, therefore, anti-democratic. Wide sectors of society find themselves completely alienated in relation to the ethical-political values pertaining to a democratic culture. Therefore, it is a political subject estranged from himself since his own social formation and, therefore, incapable of recognizing himself in the other from an ethical-political perspective of the experience of life in society in a plural way.
In the context of how ideology operates, as described by Wilhelm Reich (REICH, 2001, p. 17), with regard to the subject, “whatever the social class to which he belongs, he is not only the object of these influences, but also reproduces them in their activities […]. But social ideology, insofar as it alters man's psychic structure, not only reproduces itself in him, but also […] becomes an active force, a material power”.
From the way Reich suggests, I propose to understand ideology in the wake of the functioning of this culturally (de)forming structure of the character of the political subject it produces. From this point of view, the formative process of the subject in which micro-fascism operates ideologically, places us before the possibility of beginning to answer the question with which I ended the previous section, based on three initial points – obviously directed towards Brazilian society: first , in the Brazilian social formation were and are ideologically produced and reproduced, the reactionary determinations that historically modeled and still model the subjective forms of individuals politically experiencing their affections (and disaffections), their sexuality, their desires and their fears under an authoritarian and politically one-dimensional ingrained by this theocratic moralistic perspective, from childhood to adulthood. The ideological weakening of Catholicism in Brazil was not due to Enlightenment reasons, but due to the growth of Pentecostal Protestantism.
Secondly, ideologically, this process of social formation strongly determined by micro-fascism constitutes the cultural basis of the reactionary uprising that materializes in Bolsonarism; that is, microfascism is the immanent mediation of the Brazilian social formation that produced and reproduced Bolsonarism as the formation of a political subject deformed by the complete political estrangement in relation to democracy, not only as a government regime, but above all as a culture capable of politically promoting scientific values and the ethics of human rights. For this reason, all denialism fits him like a glove.
Third, Bolsonarism emerged and gained strength as these micro-fascist determinations are ideologically channeled and amplified in the political arena, by the most reactionary sectors of Brazilian society, especially in times of crisis, when tensions related to social life and its conflicts are intensified. politicians from the perspective of class, race and gender. In this direction, at the level of the Brazilian State, the coup de lawfare perpetrated in 2016 becomes a political-institutional passageway for this reactionary uprising that takes political and ideological form in Bolsonarism, as it compromises the political significance of the democratic rule of law, not only in the institutional sphere, but above all in the ideological forms of individuals to politically experience the content of social relations.
In the case of the revolutionary uprising in Brazil and its progressive outbreak after the coup d'état lawfare in 2016, forms of ideological consciousness visceral to the Brazilian social formation emerge legitimized in the discursive practices of this political subject armed with a neo-fascist mythology marked by historical and scientific denialism, as well as the rejection of the ethos democracy and human rights.
All these determinations converge to the revival of three typical elements of the fascist ideological universe, which, intertwined, properly characterize this reactionary neoconservatism as a political phenomenon that has its most genuine expression in Bolsonarism as the awakening of mass neofascism: (i) A mythical vision of the nation under a chauvinist patriotic discourse marked by hatred as a unidimensional way of experiencing the political experience; (ii) The vision of the other in the political field, not as the necessary opponent that must be antagonized in the democratic game, but, on the contrary, as an enemy that must be eliminated and that, in the face of this, that chauvinist patriotism is guided by the need mythological salvation, which expresses itself marked by the cult of the figure of a political messiah who anthropomorphizes and incarnates “the myth” capable of defeating the left stigmatized in anachronistic labels such as “communism”; (iii) A political pragmatism that manifests itself in the cult of action for the sake of action ideologically marked by historical and also scientific denialism (like those who deny the civil-military dictatorship of 1964, racism, vaccines, etc.).
We are facing what About Brazilian Authoritarianism, anthropologist and historian Lilian Schwarcz (2019) identifies it as a mythology of the State, governed by the elocution of the polarization of “them” against “us” or “us” against “them” – an ideal condition for mass neo-fascism empowered in society Brazilian. Also Adorno, when analyzing the pattern of fascist propaganda, points out that “The overwhelming majority of the agitators’ declarations are directed ad hominem. They are based more on psychological calculations than on the intention of gaining followers through the rational expression of rational goals.” On the agenda, the symptomatic synthesis of this movement is in the viral, one-dimensional and neo-fascist maxim: “SOS Armed Forces: save Brazil from communism”.
*Wecio Pinheiro Araujo Professor of Philosophy at the Federal University of Paraíba (UFPB).
References
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Notes
[I] There is a constellation of authors who for decades have been producing serious studies on the issue of fascism under a plurality of approaches inside and outside Brazil, such as Wilhelm Reich (?), Theodor Adorno (?), João Bernardo (2015), Robert Paxton (2007), Madeleine Albright (2018), Leandro Konder (?), Carla Brandalise (?), Paulo Casimiro and Christina Lynch (?), Consuelo Dieguez (?), Pedro Doria (?), Leila Fernandes (?), Jason Stanley (?), Federico Finchelstein (?), Leandro Gonçalves and Odilon Caldeira Neto (?), José Policarpo Junior (?), Rudá Ricci (?), Pablo Rosa (?), Enzo Traverso (?), Simone Tormey ( ?), Francisco Weffort (?) etc.
[ii] According to Lilian Schwarcz (2019), mandonism concerns the fact that “Even with the end of the Empire [...], the image of the provider lords was perpetuated, before whom it was necessary to act with loyalty and submission. This patriarchal and masculine ethos was thus transplanted to the times of the Republic”.
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