Borba Gato and the Bandeirantes

Willem de Kooning, Litho #2 (Waves #2), 1960
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FELIPE MARUF QUINTAS*

Reply to Leonardo Sacramento's article

We live in times of crisis, not only political and economic, but also, and above all, existential. The historical crossroads that define the current situation in Brazil impose a decision on the future. Since every choice is irreversible, given the irreversibility of History, it is natural that anguish about the future spreads and, correspondingly, uneasiness about the past, increasingly scrutinized in search of references, positive or negative, that guide the present national identity , by affirmation or exclusion, and guide the collective decisions which the country is being invited to follow.

Thus, it is inevitable that, in the turmoil of feelings and desires of a still young civilization like the Brazilian one – which, unlike Europe and its overseas sproutings (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), China and India, counts its History in centuries and not in millennia – create conflicting interpretations about past events and processes, highlighting the impasses and contradictions of contemporary political projects and interests.

Because the past serves as a reference for the present and the future, it becomes essential that the plurality of projects and current interests, when interpreting it, keep the concern with veracity and coherence. The versions must exist based on the facts and not against them, otherwise they become falsifications, harmful insofar as they distort the meaning of the historical construction and, therefore, the understanding of reality and its possibilities.

The article “Borba Gato, Aldo Rebelo and Rui Costa Pimenta”[I], by Leonardo Sacramento, published on 09/08 on the portal the earth is round, serves as an example of historical falsification, even if in good faith on the part of the author.

This article, written in the heat of discussions about bandeirantismo, ignited by the burning of the Borba Gato statue in the capital of São Paulo, supports the incendiary action of the collective called the Peripheral Revolution and criticizes the divergent voices coming from the external field to the Bolsonarist right, nominally mentioned in the title .

In a very summarized way, Sacramento bases his text on the reading that bandeirantismo would be the founding myth of a certain separatist, elitist and racist “Paulista nationalism”, and should, therefore, be incinerated, symbolically and materially, as a reference for building the Nation. However, in his eagerness to “deconstruct” the past that he considers ominous, he commits countless historiographic mistakes.

In the first place, when he states that “Borba Gato, as is known, lived and died before Independence, the coffee and slavery cycles in São Paulo, the Revolution of 1930 and the Revolt of 1932, in a São Paulo that, in practice, , did not exist”, certainly to deny the importance of Borba Gato and the other São Paulo sertanistas for São Paulo.

The author should keep in mind that, yes, there was São Paulo before coffee and industrial modernity, which did not come out of nowhere, but, in large part, from the demographic and economic conditions previously constructed during the Bandeirante March to the West. A São Paulo that, even at the beginning of the XNUMXth century, as a captaincy, encompassed what today are the states of Minas Gerais, Paraná, Goiás, Tocantins, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and Rondônia. The human influx from the São Paulo plateau towards the South American hinterland, beyond the Treaty of Tordesilhas, expanded São Paulo at the same time as it expanded Brazil, demonstrating the importance of São Paulo for the construction of Brazil and Brazilianness.

Then, Sacramento suggests that the supposed bandeirante myth would have been a late fabrication, institutionally dated in 1917, and therefore illegitimate. Thus, he refuses a basic aspect of historiography and historical interpretations in general, which is the posthumous recovery of the importance of certain processes and events that have been forgotten or diminished for a long time. By the criteria he adopted, the racialist movements could never lay claim to Zumbi dos Palmares and Tereza de Benguela, whose historical appreciation took place much later than their vital existence.

Sacramento, however, goes further. He is quite clear in affirming the elitist and regionalist character of the bandeirantism celebration and, in particular, that of Borba Gato, listing data on a supposed association of tributes to the bandeirantes and Borba Gato to the São Paulo oligarchies, to the 1932 sedition and to the coup d’état. 1964. In his words, “Borba Gato appears in the XNUMXth century, in practice, as a result of a supremacist construction by the Paulistas not only on blacks and natives, but on other regional elites.”

It is not surprising that, given the importance of Bandeirantismo for the territorial, ethno-demographic and cultural definition of Brazil, its legacy has been disputed by different social and political groups. It was not just Júlio de Mesquita, father and son, who celebrated pioneering.

The progressive Manoel Bomfim (1868-1932), a critic of the eugenics and racist vogue still common in his time, and also one of the most prominent defenders of the universalization of public education, praised bandeirantism in his books O Brasil na América (1929) and O Brasil na História (1931), seeing it as one of the axes that formed nationality, in opposition to the Portuguese ruling groups.

Also Getúlio Vargas, anathema to the São Paulo oligarchy to which the Mesquita belonged and political godfather of João Goulart, deposed in 1964, repeatedly emphasized the value of the bandeirantes for all of Brazil and, even more, the bandeirante character, that is, integrative and expansive inwards, of its government. Let’s read some of the former president’s speeches:

"The deep reasons for São Paulo's growth are, without a doubt, in your living and dynamic tradition of pioneers and trailblazers. After the era of heroic entries into the rough and wild sertão, of feverish hunting for gold and precious gems, of exploration and conquest, you were able to maintain the same constructive and civilizing impetus on another level and in other sectors. […] São Paulo, a noisy and active hive, part of the Estado Novo, endorsed its common commitments to work harder and better for national greatness. Reacquiring the traditional meaning of expansion, it once again takes on its bandeirante character and opens the trails for the productive occupation of the West [...] unification and aggrandizement of the Fatherland” 23/07/1938[ii].

“The bandeirante contribution represents the basis on which national greatness rests, that is, the economic and social basis of Brazilian democracy. Thus, São Paulo's problems will always have to be placed on a national level, as national is its historical vocation. São Paulo never worked just for itself, we all feel the nobility of that pride, which is to work day and night for the greatness of Brazil.” 10/08/1950 – The Presidential Campaign (1951) – Getúlio Vargas: p. 58-59

It is also worth mentioning the governmental program for the development of the national interior, known as Marcha para Oeste, one of the most important of the Vargas Era, with one of the most famous phrases from the great president: “The meaning of Brazilianness is the march towards the west”. The name made a clear positive allusion to bandeirantismo, at the same time that Cassiano Ricardo, director of DIP-SP and already distant and politically opposed to Plínio Salgado, wrote and published his monumental Marcha para Oeste – The influence of the “Bandeira” on social formation and politics in Brazil (1970 [1940]). During the second Vargas administration, admittedly one of the most popular and democratic in the country's history, it was a presidential initiative to create the Museu das Bandeiras, in Goiás, inaugurated in 1954.

Sacramento's criticism is even less convincing when he associates the valorization of bandeirantismo with the supposed “whitening” eugenic racism of the immigration policy of which São Paulo was one of the main beneficiaries between the second half of the XNUMXth century and the first half of the XNUMXth century.

There is definitely no poetic license to justify the seventeenth-century caboclo Borba Gato, who lived peacefully for about 20 years among indigenous people, being taken as an icon of a policy of attracting European labor that took place centuries later.

Nor can one find any trace of “white/European supremacism” in bandeirantismo as a whole, since the bandeiras, as is known, were intrinsically Mamluk and indigenous.

Without an Indian, there was no flag, since, as it was basically a move to the interior, it was the indigenous people who best knew the routes, trails and intermodalities of transport (land and river) to access the sertões. The indigenous presence was so strong that the “general language”, derived from Tupi, and not Portuguese, was the language spoken in the vast majority of them.

Some bandeiras, especially the latter, had a reasonable black contingent, with blacks sometimes being responsible for capturing fugitive Indians. Fernão Dias Falcão, leaving Sorocaba in 1719, took with him 40 Africans, among them blacksmiths, carpenters and tailors, who would come to participate in the early days of Cuiabá. A little earlier, Pascoal Moreira, having faced the Aripoconés, lost many members of his flag, among them many blacks. The examples multiply (Ricardo, 1970 [1940], p. 305-306)

The caboclo and even cafuza miscegenation in the bandeiras was not just a result of forced sexual intercourse – present, moreover, among the quilombolas, who, not infrequently, kidnapped indigenous women on their escapes, as Roquette-Pinto records in her book Seixos Rolados – Estudos Brasileiros (1927) – but also, and many times, of the volunteer.

After all, “if many bandeirantes took their wives from the Indians, it is also necessary not to overlook the cases of mediation consisting of making people from the troop marry their sisters-in-law (for this there was no lack of priests in bandeiras) in order to win the favor of the leaders of this region. or that tribe” (Ricardo, 1970 [1940], p. 33).

It follows, then, that many indigenous people were allies of the bandeirantes and helped them by fighting enemy tribes. The view that every Indian was a victim of the bandeirantes is actually an ethnocentric and colonial view, which, looking from the outside (and from above) homogenizes them in the Enlightenment category of oppressed, thus suppressing the existence of different indigenous groups that are so foreign among themselves as much as we are of Belgians and Koreans, who fought each other to the last consequences in the dispute over territories and women, and who had enough autonomy and agency capacity to establish functional alliances to their bellicose interests, including with São Paulo and Portuguese.

Another fact that contrasts with the assertion of bandeirantismo as "white supremacy" was that the bandeirantes helped in the fight against European elements exogenous to the Brazilian mestizo formation, as verified in the XNUMXth century, when they provided valuable support to the expulsion of the Dutch, whose country was the main military force of the time, and the English pirates who, at the time, attacked our coast. It is important to remember that, on the occasion of the Dutch invasions, Dom João IV, king of Portugal, had agreed to hand over the north of Brazil to the Netherlands, as Manoel Bomfim explains in “O Brasil na América”. The Batavians were defeated not by royal determination of the Portuguese metropolis, but by the bravery and patriotism of native Brazilians, organized in troops formed, in significant part, by bandeirantes.

There is also no empirical ballast in the author's observation – out of date with the subject of his own article – that subsequent immigration policy aimed to “disappear with the black”. From 1851 to 1931, about 1,5 million Italians, 1,3 million Portuguese (Portugal being one of the original centers of Brazilian training), 580 Spaniards and 200 Germans entered Brazil (Ribeiro, 2006, p. 222). ). Considering that the Brazilian population, in the same period, jumped from about 8 million inhabitants to approximately 35 million, with ample spontaneous miscegenation and without having had any “final solution”, no extermination policy or physical removal of the black population, it is not it can be said that the attraction of Europeans had the deliberate purpose of “whitening” the country.

All the more so because, contrary to what the author suggests, there was no prioritization of “spaces, jobs and studies” for European immigrants. The Land Law of 1850, by establishing that public lands could only be transferred to private individuals through monetary commercial operations and not through simple donations, “was conceived as a way to prevent access to land ownership by future immigrants (Fausto, 2015, p. 169). In a predominantly agrarian country, where opportunities for social ascension and asset formation were still very dependent on access to land ownership, immigrants, as a rule, did not constitute any privileged group. Let D. Marisa Letícia's Italian grandparents say so, many of the workers of the PT's “new unionism” and so many other Paulistas with an Italian surname and modest life, whose ancestors worked hard for a little corner to live, with no other government help than the one instituted only after Getúlio Vargas for all Brazilians, regardless of their origin.

If the objective of the immigration policy, let us suppose, was to carry out a “eugenic miscegenation from São Paulo” – to use a term from Sacramento – it can be inferred, therefore, that, as much as the “elimination of the African element”, there was, at the same time, the elimination of the European, diluted in new phenotypic syntheses, as in large part happened, being the people of São Paulo, today, like all the Brazilian people, an incontestable proof of this phenomenon. Wouldn't the reduction of the statistical black contingent from São Paulo at the beginning of the XNUMXth century, pointed out by the author, be a consequence of miscegenation without the entry of new African contingents?

Returning to the bandeirantes, Sacramento's assertion that valuing their memory has nothing to do with popular belief is very strange. Why not, if the mass popular sertaneja, in São Paulo, in the center-west and even in the interior of the northeast, descendant of the mameluco sertanistas that came from the plateau of São Paulo, inhabits the soil conquered by them to us Brazilians and from them inherited, for example, or retroflex, practically unused and very discriminated against in the metropolitan upper classes? The caipira, the matuto, the Mazzaropian Jeca retain much more of the bandeirante, in their blood, in their language, in their religion, in their habits, in everything, than the upscale people and yuppies from São Paulo, whose models of thought and conduct reflect, colonially, , the trends and fashions of the North Atlantic centers.

Hence the revulsion of the upper floor towards bandeirantes, the rustic and fearless caboclo who, deep in the sertão, fed on worms and quenched his thirst with the blood of dead comrades. It is no coincidence that the editors of the São Paulo oligarchic media, namely the UOL portal and the Folha de São Paulo and Estado de São Paulo newspapers, did not show major reservations about the depredation of the Borba Gato statue, when they did not support it, as in the case of UOL/ Sheet.

This revulsion, elitist in its essence, often uses progressive jargon in a true case of racism, evolutionism and colonialism, when analyzing Brazilian men and women of the XNUMXth and XNUMXth centuries through the lens of later European Enlightenment progressivism. As if the Borba Gato and Anhanguera, living in an absolutely different context, were inferior to the rationalist and cosmopolitan bourgeoisie from overseas in the following centuries, converted into a normative standard not only for the present and the future but also for the past , including the past of others, ours, in the case of the bandeirantes. Yes, Borba Gato was not Sting, nor could he be. Fortunately. Sting, as well intentioned as he may be, would not help lift Brazil up like Borba Gato did. Was there violence in the flags and in the formation of Brazil as a whole? Yes. But what country was not formed by violence? Bandeirantes were no more violent than Protestant reformers and French and Russian revolutionaries. If we are capable of analyzing the latter in a non-moralistic way, understanding their acts in terms of a historical process, why don't we apply the same criterion to the bandeirantes, of whom we are heirs?

Strange, too, is the summary statement by the author of the article that “Borba Gato is a racialized and neocolonial representation”. By “racialized” he means “white supremacist”, which is complete nonsense, since Borba Gato, as already mentioned, was a caboclo who spent most of his life among the indigenous people, in addition to having dedicated himself to the mining flags. , not involved with the seizure of Indians. Furthermore, the statue of Borba Gato carries an aesthetic typical of northeastern popular culture – one of the reasons, by the way, that São Paulo's cosmopolitan elites have always discriminated against the monument by calling it a “doll”.

Let us, however, focus on the accusation that the representation of Borba Gato would be “neocolonial”. It is exactly the opposite. Borba Gato, along with the other bandeirantes, fulfilled a truly decolonizing function, of territorial, ethno-demographic and spiritual construction of Brazil by Brazilians, by caboclos and indigenous people of the land who, from the plateau of São Paulo and with almost no resource other than the mystical will to find Eldorado, they crossed the limits of the Treaty of Tordesillas, defined and supported by foreigners overseas.

Borba Gato and the other bandeirantes, by turning their backs on the metropolitan commands exercised through the coastal cities and entering the continent against the peninsular designs, extended the Brazilian frontier to the west and north, populated and Brazilianized the continent based on the small-scale toolcarrier, they established inland commercial and demographic circuits alien to Atlantic colonial impositions, established autonomous representative political institutions in the interior, as in Cuiabá, and defended Brazil against Dutch and English invaders. They thus practiced a true anticolonial disobedience which, turning Brazil inward, affirmed the existence of the Brazilian people as a new people, distinct from the Portuguese metropolis. With the bandeirantes, Brazil, this new world in the tropics, found itself capable of making history on its own, autonomously building its territoriality and its systems of life.

No wonder, therefore, that the bandeirantes were often repressed by the Portuguese and, of course, by the Spaniards, whose domains they reduced to Tordesillas. Raposo Tavares was arrested and/or persecuted on numerous occasions by order of the Chamber. Borba Gato himself, discoverer of important emerald deposits, was extorted by D. Rodrigo de Castelo Branco, General Superintendent of Mines – a metropolitan official in the service of Portugal, of foreign commands, therefore – being, thus, forced to assassinate him and flee so as not to be captured by Portugal, being granted amnesty only after he was found and constrained to indicate the “map of the mines” to the Portuguese.

The most dramatic case of overseas repression against bandeirantes was the War of Emboabas, in which the Portuguese Crown, already transformed into a veritable colonial instrument over Brazil – far removed from the early days, when in fact it operated as the maker of a new people and a new nation, instead of a colonizer – it massacred the bandeirantes to take possession of the gold and diamond mines discovered by them, in order to settle the chronic trade deficit with England, originated by the Methuen Treaty of 1703.

Thus, the Bandeirante discovery – Brazilian, therefore – of gold and precious stones, usurped by the Portuguese colonizers, served not to enrich Brazil and spread its riches across the interior, as the Bandeirantes did, but, contrary to their will, to enrich of England, which, with Brazilian treasures, supported its industrial revolution and became the hegemonic world power.

Thus, anti-bandeiranismo, and not bandeirantismo, is the true colonial ideology. Without realizing it, Sacramento reproduces it when, in his criticism of Rui Costa Pimenta, he reproduces the Lusophile historiography that, by placing exclusively in the Bragantina imperial elite, non-Brazilian by origin and dynastic loyalty, the merit of the creation and territorial consolidation of Brazil , disregards the seminal importance of native and popular Brazilians, such as the bandeirantes, for the construction of our homeland, which emerged in the XNUMXth century as the second largest in the world, second only to Russia.

There is nothing more colonial than discrediting the mestizo Brazilians who raised Brazil and gave it an internal sense of unity prior to the administrative centralization operated from 1808 onwards, just to praise a foreign dynasty that, having its merits in terms of Brazil's institutional refinement – ​​which, without a doubt, greatly contributed to Brazil's preponderance in the Plata region and in the Amazon in the XNUMXth century - operated, however, based on an autochthonous national reality prior to its oceanic transplantation.

It is also necessary to make it clear that bandeirantismo is not just a historical phenomenon delimited to the period between the second half of the XNUMXth century and the beginning of the XNUMXth century, but, as Cassiano Ricardo defended in Marcha para Oeste, the movement of continental expansion of Brazil and of free occupation of the interior by Brazilians and for Brazilians, asserting Brazilian sovereignty against the overseas political commands transmitted by coastal warehouses.

In this sense, bandeirantes were not only Borba Gato, Raposo Tavares, Fernão Paes Leme and others from that time, but also Alexandre de Gusmão (who formalized the bandeirante territorial conquests in the Treaty of Madrid), José Bonifácio, Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek, the military governments and the Lula government itself, when they idealized and promoted development within Brazil. From entering the Tietê to crossing the São Francisco, it was always about the same phenomenon: solidarity between Brazilians of different colors and origins to tame the sertões and impregnate them with Brazil, the Brazilian conquest of the South American continental mass and its defense against external invaders.

Bandeirantismo and Brazilian nationalism, therefore, are equivalent. Bandeirantismo concerns the physical, demographic and spiritual integration of the Nation to keep it on its feet, turning its back on coastal colonialism and entering the continental heart to govern itself.

Being the component elements of nationality, according to Joseph Stalin, the greatest anti-fascist of the XNUMXth century, “a stable, historically formed community of language, territory, economic life and psychology manifested in the community of culture […] none of these distinct traits , taken in isolation, is sufficient to define the nation [...] it is enough that one of these elements is missing for the nation to cease to exist”[iii], there can be, therefore, no defense of the Brazilian Nation without defending the historical contribution of the bandeirantes, fundamental to the formation, in Brazil, of all the components of nationality mentioned by Stalin.

Even the Trotskyist Rui Costa Pimenta understands this. His geopolitical analysis is perfect, in line with the great geopoliticians like Nicholas Spykman and Hans Morgenthau, who considered territorial extension the first factor of national power (Aron, 2018, p. 63). The bandeirantes, even without knowing it, were decisive in providing Brazil with an unparalleled geopolitical potential in the world, because, in addition to being the 5th largest country in geographic extension, we are, among the top five, the only one that is habitable and arable in the entire its territory.

There is, therefore, no conspiracyist paranoia in discussing, as Rui Costa Pimenta and Aldo Rebelo do, the imperialist actions of the great powers to dismember Brazil and, thus, eliminate a competitor from the dispute for world power and destabilize the whole of Latin America, making of our continent a new Middle East.

England, through the Porto deputies in 1820, tried to operate this fragmentation, which fortunately was not carried out thanks to the internal agreement between the Brazilian provinces for national unity and, also, for the diligent political-military-diplomatic action of D. Pedro I, José Bonifácio and Maria Leopoldina, who guaranteed Brazilian territorial unity in the context of Independence, despite Portuguese pressure to the contrary and the ambiguous role of Great Britain, as described by José Honório Rodrigues in his pentalogy “Independence: Revolution and Against -Revolution” (1975).

Subsequently, the regional revolts during the Regency, the Pirara Question, the Third Reich's plans to create ethnic states in Brazil and the actions of foreign or foreign-funded environmentalist and indigenist NGOs to isolate entire regions of the Amazon from the rest of the country demonstrate the permanence of attempts to balkanize Brazil precisely to weaken us and prevent us from mobilizing our vast geographic and human resources in the service of development from within, freeing us from transatlantic commands.

The demonization of the bandeirantes, in seeking to demoralize precisely the architects of Brazilian power, has the implicit objective of devaluing the Brazilian nation as a whole, so that Brazilians do not believe in themselves and accept the orders and impostures of the North Atlantic countries , which, having a history and formative processes as or more violent than ours, nevertheless claim the right to “civilize” us, in a clear evolutionary and racist bias espoused, albeit unconsciously, by Sacramento, by the Peripheral Revolution and , in general, by all the ardent critics of Borba Gato and the bandeirantes, arsonists or not.

We have our history, our heroes and our myths, and we must defend and transmit them to guarantee the preservation of the Brazilian national identity, without which we will not be able to think and project reality in our own terms, becoming beggars of ideas and values. Mental colonialism – expressed, for example, in the condemnation of the bandeirantes and, therefore, of our history and our country – prepares and solidifies economic colonialism, as it adjusts the desires and expectations of Brazilians and, in particular, of our leaders, to external commands designed solely to subdue us.

It is no coincidence, then, that the great Brazilian statesmen like Getúlio Vargas and Juscelino Kubitschek valued the bandeirante memory, while Bolsonaro, whom Sacramento practically sees as the reincarnation of Borba Gato, did not even come out in defense of the bandeirante memory, limiting himself to attacking the “vandalism”, which, being in fact a problem in itself, is not central in this case.

Finally, I suggest that Leonardo Sacramento carefully read the book O Quinto Movimento, by Aldo Rebelo. The basic message of the book is the need for Brazilians to unite around what is common to us, nationality, to rescue the construction of Brazil and, based on our resources and references, raise our country to higher levels of development and citizenship, continuing to deepen the four previous formation movements of Brazil.

There is no “white identity” in The Fifth Movement. On the contrary, the valorization of miscegenation, which has always horrified white racists like Comte de Gobineau and the Nazis, is the exact opposite of any kind of ethnic chauvinism. Likewise, there is not the slightest trace of fascism and Bolsonarism in the work. There is not a single line consistent with the sadism and warmongering with which Hitler and Mussolini regimented their countries. In the same way, not even a trace of the privatism and the americanophilia intrinsic to Bolsonarist rhetoric is identified.

The XNUMXst century will continue to be a century of nations, as demonstrated by the rise of China, the Russian recovery, the attempts by the Trump and Biden governments to lift the US national economy, and the decline of the member countries of the European Union. Therefore, these days impose on us the task of surviving as a Nation and affirming, for ourselves and for the world, our greatness and our green-and-yellow gallantry.

Brazil has already shown what it is capable of, when, in the last century, from the continental physical-territorial base and the mestizo and syncretic people formed largely by the bandeirantismo, we were the country with the greatest industrial growth in the world and, also, the country of samba, carnival and football. Until today we are consecrated as the country of Pelé, Garrincha, Pixinguinha and Villa-Lobos, an international reference in the construction of large hydroelectric plants, oil companies and urbanism as well as in the organization of sporting events, football-art and artistic vitality and good taste. .

We are all that and we can be much more. More than ever, it is up to us to defend the Bandeirante legacy, only from which we can exercise sovereignty for the benefit of all our compatriots, and honor the brave backwoodsmen of São Paulo by continuing their work of building Brazil for Brazilians. In these troubled times, nothing is more important than rescuing and valuing the great names, events and processes of the past, which, leaving us a Country, are part of what we are and are destined to be.

Long live Borba Gato, long live the bandeirantes, long live Brazil!!

*Felipe Maruf Quintas He is a master and doctoral candidate in Political Science at the Fluminense Federal University (UFF).

 

References


ARON, Raymond. Peace and War between Nations. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2018.

BOMFIM, Manuel. Brazil in America. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1929.

_______________. Brazil in History. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1931.

FAUSTO, Boris. history of Brazil. São Paulo: Publisher of the University of São Paulo, 2015.

RIBEIRO, Darcy. The Brazilian Powder🇧🇷 São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2006.

RICARDO, Cassiano. March to the West – the influence of the “Bandeira” in the social and political formation of Brazil. 2 vol. 4th edition. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Bookstore; São Paulo: Publisher of the University of São Paulo, 1970 [1940].

RODRIGUES, José Honório. Independence: Revolution and Counter-Revolution. Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, 1975.

ROQUETTE-PINTO, Edgard. Rolled Pebbles – Brazilian Studies. Rio De Janeiro: Mendonça Machado, 1927.

VARGAS, Getulio. The Presidential Campaign🇧🇷 Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1951.

 Notes


[I] https://dpp.cce.myftpupload.com/borba-gato-aldo-rebelo-e-rui-costa-pimenta

[ii] http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/getulio-vargas/discursos/1938/22.pdf/

[iii] https://vermelho.org.br/coluna/lenin-stalin-e-a-questao-das-nacionalidades/

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