By DIOGO FAGUNDES*

In a somewhat dogmatic and brutal way: there is no politics in Brazil. Or rather: there is only the politics of capitalo-parliamentarism, therefore no politics

Jair Bolsonaro: anti-system?

Today, when Bolsonarism, although very strong, is hardly respectable by “serious” people (the fact that it once was is, in itself, something pathological), due to the insurrectionary outbursts and the incredible obscurantism and negligence in the issue of vaccination public during the Covid pandemic, we forgot an essential fact: how much Jair Bolsonaro was not only accepted and naturalized, but also explicitly preferred by the people of bufunfa against Fernando Haddad, who, as we see today (but did anyone really think differently?) is far from of being a terrifying leftist for the markets.

While the USP professor spent precious time during his campaign isolated in São Paulo, trying to convince Fernando Henrique Cardoso to provide him with support (which never came) in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro was seen as the best option by 99 out of 100 people in the our economic and media elite.

This forces us to ask the question: to what extent is Jair Bolsonaro heterogeneous to the installed Brazilian capitalo-parliamentarism consensus?

Now, let's do the check list.

He believes that socialism and communism are a cancer responsible for everything bad in the country and in the world (check), those largely responsible for Brazil's terrible situation were left-wing ideas (and unfortunately from time to time the PT and Lula listened to them a little...), essentially corrupt and disastrous (check), there is an excess of labor regulations and social rights that prevent the country from progressing (check, including the STF and figures like Luís Roberto Barroso, today his supposed arch-enemy), much more needs to be privatized and commodified (check), the country's greatest privileged people are teachers, retirees, health professionals, nurses, social workers, etc. that make up the mass of public service and social security (check), unions are life delay (check), Petrobrás is an obsolete dinosaur, as are ideas of sovereignty over our resources (check), a good political leader is one who obeys the injunctions of the financial market and does not make any assumptions about the economy, outsourcing everything to someone who actually knows, a market agent elevated to the status of super-minister (check).

Even visibly crude features, such as contesting the results of the polls – hadn't Aécio Neves and Gilmar Mendes done the same after Dilma's victory in 2014? –o, they were nothing new. The demagogic criticism of the “political world” had already been amplified for some time: “managers”, stage presenters or people directly from the business world were presented as possible better options for running the State.

Even unconditional and servile submission to an external leader is merely a matter of taste: Bolsonarism prefers Donald Trump, but the stance of our “democrats” in Globo network is the same in relation to the other faction of North American politics, as they agree that the USA must lead the planet and fight energetically, militarily, for its interests (therefore, China is a growing bogeyman), which converge with those of the humanity.

Right, the rude style, the taste for mass political spectacles, a rhetorical “exaggeration”, a lack of care for the image (it is possible to practice policies that are devastating to the environment without being so brazen in the intention to deforest, support illegal miners and killing Indians, right?), which is not very good for the approval of those we must please (the “foreign investors”), all of this does not “beautify”, as they say in the interior of São Paulo. But, without any problems, Tarcísio de Freitas is already the leader prepared for Bolsonarism 2.0., purified from his too popular side, with all the blessing of Faria Lima.

And Lula? Well, as long as there is not too much “petism” (i.e. workers, peasants or anti-imperialist spirit having any voice) in it it can be acceptable. It is useful for normalizing and giving social consensus to already approved neoliberal reforms (after all, in right-wing governments, the left tends to oppose things that it later endorses), but it is not trustworthy, much less your party, especially when it is start having your own ideas. It is too hesitant, due to its commitment to its social base, to do what must be done immediately: delink salaries from social security, cut constitutional floors for education and health, charge tuition fees at universities, etc. The future of his “broad front” is uncertain, because if Bolsonaroism presents itself more in the Tarcísio de Freitas style than in the Bolsonaro family style, it will no longer be useful.

If the future of Brazilian politics consists of completely depoliticized disputes between figures representing a more modern and “social” aspect of capital-parliamentarism against a more vulgar and disqualified one, as a possible macro version of this current media clash between Tábata Amaral and Pablo Amaral in the pre -municipal elections, the peace of cemeteries is guaranteed.

The “polarization” of the USA is the best example of this state of affairs: an ideological hyper-agitation, as incessant and fascinating as it is ridiculous, without there being any real political issue dividing the electoral landscape – see what both candidates say about it of Israel. It is too easy to polish with an antagonistic and violent aura that which has no real heterogeneity: the example of the 1914-1918 War is the great historical example. Real politics is another thing.

What to do?

In order not to fall into incapacitating whining and opinionated chatter from an external and superior point of view – as is often the case in an environment increasingly marked by social networks – let us try to formulate some tasks, even if they are not very promising for us. who has little patience and likes to feed illusions for themselves or others about the future.

Let us declare, in a somewhat dogmatic and brutal way: there is no politics in Brazil. Or better: there is only the politics of capital-parliamentarism, therefore no politics, because without the existence of a contrast between different policies, there is only management of order. In effect, if we adopt the thesis of the aforementioned Lazarus, politics is not of the order of an invariant (a legal-state superstructure of any social formation), nor spontaneous or co-extensive with demands movements, but rare.

Now, of course there are movements, organizations, social struggles, pressure groups, critical opinions, etc. But is this enough to constitute an effective policy?

On the PT's part, there is the “containment dam” stance: being in government to avoid the return of Bolsonarism, cooking on the back burner until the next elections, with some modest growth, without any bold proposal, but capable, perhaps, of to provide a minimum of improvement for the poorest. This is the idea. There are two problems: (i) is this enough to stop the strength of a very mobilized, organized and ideologized extreme right?; (ii) the market is insatiable and asks for more “reforms” in order to overcome the impasses caused by the new fiscal framework and the promises of zero deficit. Let's just say that giving fascism the monopoly on defending popular agendas (such as the fight against social dissolutions or cuts) on a platter does not seem to be the most intelligent tactic for dealing with the danger of Bolsonarism's return.

To those who dislike Lula – and many have their reasons – we can only say: the tendency is to get worse when the inevitable biological fate arrives. Lula, whether we like it or not, is a popular leader, with connections to the most impoverished masses, linked to the labor movement, with some trajectory of minimal tension against imperialism (if only because of his refusal to play the role of anti-Cuba leader in the continent).

With the brutal crisis of trade unionism (the bourgeoisie is grateful to Michel Temer for no reason), the end of the old world from which the politician Lula was born, and the lack of genuine popular leadership in the PT, there does not seem to be any reason for much optimism with the future of the party. Of course, new historical movements, in the form of unpredictable events, can always emerge, enabling new leaders and organizations to occupy a similar role in the future. However, it is sensible to note that mass political leadership on the left is neither improvised nor very frequent.

This PT stance, evidently, does not constitute anything different in relation to the capitalo-parliamentarism agreed upon in 2016 (proof: no reform by Michel Temer or Jair Bolsonaro is even discussed as subject to reversal, contrary to the abundant promises during the period of opposition to these governments), but relies on the modesty of a possibly credible objective (winning the next elections), since there is no other way.

If total and uncritical adherence usually does not generate anything good – on the contrary, it harms the discussion of directions, assessment of the past and rectification of errors, and, thus, always prepares future defeats or otherwise prevents a victorious path –, is there any opposition left?

The problem lies in a classic vice that we can call “oppositionism”. It consists of believing that politics consists of a mix of agitation and propaganda (more or less doctrinal, depending on the case) and denunciations, complaints and complaints. Trotskyism, fertile in cultivating such a style, had the misfortune, in its history, to know well the impotence of this stance: denunciations of “crisis of leadership” do not usually lead to much, they limit politics to the formation of “pressure groups”. ” or, in the worst case, to vague and hardly credible promises (“when I’m in government, it will be different!”). To be frank, it is a culture that tends to favor opportunism.

This, of course, does not mean that it is not important to form a critical and questioning opinion about the government, nor to ideologically influence the country's cultural climate in this sense. It's just not advisable to be under any illusion about your role. Therefore, even if there are left-wing groups – with different differences, but agreeing that the country's direction is horrible – active or even with elaborate programs, there is currently no policy pointing out the seeds of a possible new strategic orientation, other than mere intentions. and proclamations.

Perhaps this is inevitable due to the current situation we are in – terrible not only at the national but global level –, amid the initial rudiments of a new politics, without any organization or leader being able to present itself as the “vanguard of the proletariat” or have such pretensions without sounding ridiculous.

In addition to “oppositionism”, which is sterile as long as it does not serve to produce new, real and affirmative possibilities through the slogans of organizations putting masses in movement in rupture with the order, another increasingly current vice is prophetic millenarianism, a classic of the ultra-left.

Due to environmental crises and the urgency of the ecological issue, there is a comfortable stance of preaching the imminent apocalypse, whether ecological or economic, without presenting any political alternative. God knows how there are leftists who cry with joy over crises! The more catastrophic they are, the more promising they are for winning over the public around their preaching and radical aesthetics, which can be useful for selling books and attracting attention, but they tend to lead more to immobility and panic (or, in the opposite sense: belief naive idea that any movement on the corner is the announcement, finally, of the end of capitalism) than generating a sense of militant urgency.

You have to be brutal again. Politics, after all, often requires it, which tends to repel the petit-bourgeois full of affinities for nuances and subtleties (many academics transform this ethos in life career): anyone who talks a lot about catastrophe without defending and practicing a policy antagonistic to capitalism (which is not a vague anti-capitalism, but a new communism) is irresponsible. Mainly, it condemns unilaterally and en bloc – when it comes to being anti-communist, the nuances of academics go to waste – every past experience that, in fact, generated fear in the capitalist world (how many times did our prophets manage to do this?), with the most banal and obvious terms and evaluations possible. It only serves to encourage aesthetic, salable and even profitable nihilism, with an aristocratic flavor.

If the posture of prophetic waiting, apocalyptic or millenarian preaching (one day there will be the Rapture, and capital will magically dissolve, with the immediate end of merchandise, currency, law, the State, etc.) is, Therefore, another deleterious and classic tic in the history of the left, a true epistemological obstacle preventing the formation of promising paths, we must then be realistic: our tasks are of a more basic, pre-political nature, and may not sound so enchanting in reality. short term for those who want quick results.

What is meant by “pre-political”?

Simply this: before having any finished program or strategy developed in the laboratory – which is frank idealism when there is no anchoring in effective political work that produces verifiable results –, it is better to focus our energies on other indispensable, but prior, things. The strategic path, apart from very general guidelines, can only be developed in a real way after a policy exists and gains shape and power.

We can list four of these “things prior” to the existence of a new politics: (a) formation of a qualified Marxist intellectuality oriented towards a new communism; (b) creation of organic links with the masses; (c) insertion into existing movements, with a very demanding nature (therefore, pre-political) but with the potential for politicization; (d) carrying out an intellectual and investigative effort regarding the country and the world, and its organizations and political sequences since at least the beginning of the 20th century.

Regarding the first task: it is not simply a question of carrying out analyzes and making critical opinions about capitalism. There is nothing easier than speaking ill of capitalism – even some capitalists do! –, and that never did any harm to this method of production. The central task is to create conditions for a new communism, affirmative, resolute, without paying a toll. This is only possible with an honest and inventive assessment of the failures and obstacles of the previous communist sequence, inaugurated by the October Revolution of 1917. The dogmatism of merely defending the past must be fought as much as those who think that everything must be recreated from scratch and not there is good to learn or defend.

This will inevitably produce a certain isolation at first, as “communism” is still a cursed word. Even intellectuals critical of the order are reticent when it comes to giving new weight and glory to this word. But ending this curse is our first task, because without order in ideas, it is impossible to have order in matters of organization, as Mao would say. And without an effective ideological struggle, no political orientation is possible, according to the same Chinese.

The second task is probably the most laborious, difficult, prolonged and not very rewarding (at least in the short term), but it is the most indispensable. It is about creating links between communist intellectuals and the working masses, wherever they are, in the environments of work, housing, socialization, etc. The path of “popular courses” – despite the limits, as it is something easily subject to depoliticization –, the investment in popular education in peripheral areas, the resumption of the university extension movement (such as law and popular doctors), are the most promising bets in this direction.

 It is probably necessary to create a mixture of aid organizations (with first aid services, legal aid, clinics for mental health and addiction problems, organization of community restaurants, literacy and school assistance, etc.) with political schools transmitting everything which concerns the history of the struggle between capitalism and communism over the last two centuries at least. The path of Brazilian organizations from the 1970s and 1980s that invested in popular work must be resumed. We need to study them.

The third is probably the one that currently occurs most in practice. Monitoring, assistance, dissemination and propaganda of movements such as VAT (Life beyond work) or app workers. However, two mistakes must be avoided. The first is to use movements in an instrumental or opportunistic way, just to fish for pictures or to claim credit in the event of victories. Classic equipment, in short. The other is unreflective support, mere “support”, without contributing anything to moving beyond the purely demanding stage or with the formulation of slogans with the capacity to unify, mobilize and obtain political victories (regarding the reduction of working hours , for example).

Finally, the last task involves a collective effort, both theoretical and experimental. It is not merely a question of studying the history of social formations, although that is important, but of constituting an archive, perhaps an encyclopedia, of the history of popular movements and emancipatory policies of the last century, at a global and national level.

This study of the past must be complemented by an effort to carry out concrete investigations (that is, fieldwork through meetings with people involved) regarding the main questions of contemporary capitalism – how urban life is structured, what the peasantry is contemporary, the great international migrations, what the life and thoughts of those who live on the outskirts of our metropolises are like, how the new world of work is structured, how the dispute for raw materials and minerals takes place across the globe – on the largest possible scale , that is, it is potentially and ideally international work.

Of a more immediate political nature, it is necessary to look at, at the very least, the most recent historical movements, making a detailed assessment of their failures or limitations. An example: the recent insurgencies in Colombia (which gave rise to the Petro government), in Chile (which gave rise to the Boric government), but also in Ecuador and Peru, where huge mobilizations did not generate successful leftist governments. In Brazil, it is crucial to reflect on June 2013 and the school occupation movement of 2016.

More decisively, however, it is necessary to take stock of the organizations and political struggles that took place in the last decades where the flame of revolution was alive: the 1960s and 1970s. In Brazil, this implies studying both the armed struggle and the organizations that chose through a “peaceful” path, not necessarily electoral. The most interesting ones were not, in fact, fixed on either of these two well-defined vertices.

These decades of intense politicization, with the national liberation struggles, the Black Panthers, the post-May 68 period, new forms of workers' struggle and the creation of a new communist movement (often with ideas inspired by new references, such as the Maoism and the Cultural Revolution) are often poorly studied and understood. Carrying out this study is a necessity and, therefore, a duty.

Finally, here are some indications and suggestions for Brazilian communists:

Let us not make the mistake of thinking that we already have a ready-made party theory for 21st century communism. There is simply no example of a successful revolutionary party in our time, unlike the time when Marxism-Leninism was a true paradigm. There is no need to throw the past away, but it is ossified dogmatism to believe that the structures of the Third International and ancient Marxism-Leninism can achieve our objectives.

The political, organizational and strategic theory of the third stage of communism still needs to be created, and it necessarily involves understanding why the party-states of the Third International became allergic to communist political invention and failed, as well as understanding the complexity - today obscure and covered under a veil of total ignorance – of the Cultural Revolution in China, the most radical and concrete attempt to create an innovation within the Marxist-Leninist camp.

This is the Paris Commune of the 20th century: a defeat pregnant with meanings and lessons for a new politics. We must repeat Lenin's gesture and not merely copy without creativity a codified doctrine: just as he fought to create a theory and a policy capable of overcoming the problems of the Paris Commune - this is directly at the origin of works such as Things to Do –, it is necessary to study the interesting things (and there are many), as well as the fatal and disastrous mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. Marxism is in its post-Maoist stage.

Both Stalinism and Trotskyism are conservative ideologies in current times. The dogmatic, militaristic and caricatured Maoism of organizations inspired by Shining Path as well. The groups professing such references and that managed to survive did so at the cost of a lot of dogmatic rigidity, becoming cumbersome and incapable of innovation, or through eclecticism and dilution that make a good part of these words inoperative or meaningless. Dialogue with these conservative groups must be respectful but controversial, always indicating the inappropriate nature of these obsolete terminologies and references.

 There are two crucial problems to be faced head on: electoralism and federalism. Anyone who underestimates the corrupting and inertial force of bourgeois state institutions and thinks they can easily shield themselves from their effects is mistaken. Even groups without an electoral strategy in the history of the communist movement (i.e., anti-revisionists, critics of Eurocommunism, etc.) easily find themselves prey to the defensive posture of orienting their tactics around maintaining their apparatus or corrals when entering the institutional game. . We see this even in Trotskyist groups in their unions.

The inertial and possibly conservative contagion of strategies that focus on conquering and maintaining parts of the State (be they city halls, universities or unions) should not be underestimated. When electoral life starts to dictate the organization's time, it is difficult to have an effectively alternative path to capitalism. At least we have never seen this in all our historical experience.

Federalism has already become a kind of spontaneous ideology of the movements of our times. This is the conception of politics that identifies it with the multiple set of struggles of social movements organized around their own agendas, forming a kind of positive connection between them all, a circuit of Feedback positive ones without any greater political unity or overall strategic vision.

The great modern formulation of this ideology is found in intellectuals and activists, such as Félix Guattari, who saw in May 68 not a possible political unification of a new type provided by the diagonal between intellectuals, workers, peasants and masses, but a fragmented explosion of multiple struggles dispersed and marked by their own and self-interested content.

This is the cauldron that forms the soup of contemporary movementism, operating even in major historical upheavals. The hypothesis to be raised is that in the case of Chile this was particularly clear: the sum of partial struggles (of movements of gender, race, education, health, national minorities, etc.), unified only by the denial of Pinochet's Constitution, without The existence of a leading political organization capable of creating an active popular unity, through an overall view of the situation and precise and simple prescriptions, disabled the struggle for the new Constituent Assembly, which became a great sounding board for fragmented movements.

These indications have only one purpose: to encourage Brazilian communists to build the rudiments of a new political path. This task is still at a very early and precarious stage, but there are promising aspects: the youth's enthusiasm for the new communist intellectuals – many of them, of proletarian origin –, who are quite popular on social media, is quite encouraging.

However, lucidity involves not being blinded by momentary successes and nurturing false expectations. The leap we need to be able to create an effective policy is enormous. Leaving contemporary nihilism is not an easy task. Therefore, let us say, provocatively, like Mao: “Not having a correct political point of view is like not having a soul”.^[I]

Let us fight, then, to have a soul, and thus, perhaps, sustain the ambition of less nihilistic times: salvation and immortality. Without needing, however, any transcendent Heaven. It is telluric matter, of the here and now.

* Diogo Fagundes he is studying for a master's degree in law and is studying philosophy at USP.

To read the first part of this article click using this link.

Note

^[I] This quote is in one of the most important political texts in our history (“On the correct treatment of contradictions within the people”). However, who, in fact, paid due attention to it and still reads it?

the earth is round there is thanks to our readers and supporters.
Help us keep this idea going.
CONTRIBUTE