By DIOGO FAGUNDES*
Capitalo-parliamentarism is not a mere state structure, but a hegemonic subjectivity since the mid-80s
A minimum of contact with mainstream journalism and what is successful in the editorial market under the heading of “politics” is enough to notice the fixation on a theme: the crisis of democracies.[I]
The Trump phenomenon, Bolsonarism, the growth of the European far-right (visible in the British Brexit and the growing protagonism of Marie Le Pen's party in French politics) and now Javier Milei and Giorgia Meloni – even though these two don't cause that much discomfort , since they are pro-NATO, unconditionally defend Israel and think that China is a great threat to Western civilization… – they provide plenty of material so that this publishing market has a guaranteed audience for the near future.
Many hypotheses are raised, in a combined and somewhat uncoordinated way, without the hierarchies being very well identified. For those more sensitive to the economy, we have the following list: the growth of inequality, the impoverishment of the middle class, deindustrialization, the increasingly precarious job market and marked by the danger of unemployment. For those who prefer to highlight “cultural” issues, there is another: the anxieties and fearful or resentful impulses fueled by “multiculturalism”, immigration, the rise of China as an economic and technological power, the advance of feminism and the liberalization of customs…
All of this obviously makes a lot of sense, but we prefer to point out a more radical hypothesis. The fundamental reason lies in the rise and consolidation, since the 1980s, of what we could call dominant politics in the West: capitalo-parliamentarism.
We owe this concept to the activist and political thinker Sylvain Lazarus and his colleague Alain Badiou, both organizational colleagues for almost forty years (1969-2007). What, after all, does he mean?[ii]
Capitalo-parliamentarism is not a mere state structure, but a hegemonic subjectivity since the mid-80s, at least. In that decade, there was a generalized crisis of Marxism, as a theory capable of political attraction and inspiration, prevailing in intelligentsia.
After serving as a pillar for an entire militant generation – anti-national liberation struggles, movements against the wars in Algeria and Vietnam, the civil rights struggle of African-Americans in the USA, May 68 and the new labor movement of the 1970s -, Marxism was exchanged in the name of accepting that, despite its problems, the West was better than the alternatives that actually existed. The anti-totalitarian philosophy of the “new philosophers”, anticipated by the shock of conscience provided by the publication of Gulag Archipelago[iii], once again acclimatized Western intellectuals to their birthplace: legal freedoms, political liberalism and humanism – not that of Sartre and Fanon, in search of the “new man”, but in a classical and anti-revolutionary modality (individual autonomy: that each cultivate your own garden and seek individual happiness) – they once again became the alpha and omega of consciences.
The collapse of the USSR and Eastern European states consolidated and worsened this situation. The idea of any alternative to the hegemonic order was no longer even conceivable, and anyone who still defended this possibility was, at best, foolish and archaic, at worst, totalitarian criminals.
It was in this environment that one of the most impressive spectacles in the history of the left came to light: the (long) Mitterrand governments (1981-1995).
Elected under a radical program (there was even a proposal to nationalize the financial system!) and built with long political preparation - the Common Program and the Left Union began to dictate the center of the French Communist Party's policy since 1973 -, celebrated with lots of celebration and hope, carried out the first two years of many reforms. All this soon ceased. From 1986 onwards, the surrender was complete. Not only was everything reversed, but there was a real kickstart to what has marked the European agenda ever since: endless privatizations, financial liberalization, “productive restructuring” (eliminating millions of industrial workers as if they were nothing), the increasing submission to US hegemony in foreign policy, the obsession with Islamic immigrants as a problem (“Le Pen asks the right questions”, a Mitterrand minister once raised). The result, in the mid-nineties, was the following: unemployment had doubled and the far right tripled its votes.[iv]
It is against this background that began in the 80s that Lazarus formulates the idea of capitalo-parliamentarism. It is not due to the mere fact, in itself banal, that parliaments and multi-party electoral systems constitute the essence of Western States, but to a new phenomenon: the State must serve a Master that is external to it – relentless economic needs, dictated by the agents of the “market” (today a true fetish, personalized as a substantial entity in the form of metonymy: “Faria Lima”, “the GDP”, etc.) and by “public opinion” (a small group of large business conglomerates controlled by financial interests)
The new idea was the following: it was no longer about believing in programs to change the world or in political decisions, marked by the possibility of choice and the action of collective will. The State is strictly functional to the interests of the market (it is good when it follows them effectively and without question, it is bad when it does not operate in this sense) and to the shaping of the “consensus”, in which large media groups play a large role. We know what this consensus is based on: any idea contrary to privatizations, the deregulation of the labor market and public services, the unbridled freedom of the accumulation of private potentates, is immediately excluded from the game.
The parties, previously responsible for organizing social segments or classes in conflict (the left would represent the unions and workers, the right would represent the bourgeoisie), with different and well-defined programs, their own ideologies and well-established links with “civil society”, they become mere state appendages, responsible only for recruiting electoral clientele in accordance with the State's calendar and rites.
The distinction between “left” and “right”, necessary for the belief that elections make sense and can reverse or change political orientations, is no longer operative, focusing on minimal issues. The consensus is expanding: the center-left and center-right, deep down, are part of the same family and are in agreement on fundamental issues. There is no more ideological conflict. “Progressives” may prefer bike lanes to cars, a more pious ethic rather than a competitive one, a vegetarian menu rather than a carnivorous one, a greater enlightenment and cosmopolitanism regarding modern customs in relation to attachment to provincial or patriarchal traditions, perhaps even , they read and value intellectuals and artists (sometimes they may even be one of these types), rather than pragmatic bourgeoisie interested purely in business, for whom the rest is poetry and useless philosophy about being and nothingness. But regarding the general destiny of society and the world, they are only momentary and moderate adversaries, never enemies.
The theme of fighting classes, represented in ideologized parties and with their own programs capable of galvanizing the support of these groups, which has animated all Western politics since at least the end of the Second World War, has disappeared. In its place, the cult of the middle class, a true bastion and fetish of modernity, to be cultivated, pampered, domesticated and infantilized. The divisions occur within this class: on the one hand, a more progressive segment, linked to the liberation of customs and thematic attachment to democracy and human rights, on the other a conservative fraction (generally those who are further down within it, close to the threat of proletarianization), afraid of immigrants, sensitive to the issue of public security and the frightening changes in “our ways of life”.
This is the true origin of our problems: at the global level, there is no longer a dispute regarding the orientations for humanity (socialism or capitalism). At the national level, the predominance of capitalo-parliamentarism, Margaret Thatcher's “there is no alternative” (TINA) (after all, didn't Labor itself, with Tony Blair, admit that she was right?), making any thought unviable critical or desire for emancipation.
The first and most visible result could only be widespread disenchantment, subjective nihilism, a complete lack of hope with politics. Strictly speaking, capitalo-parliamentarism detests politics and makes it unfeasible, as it prevents there from being real disagreement. If there is only a single policy, the result is that there is no more policy, as this implies some degree of agonisticity regarding world views and strategic orientations. Without Two, there is only management and administration, no more politics. To provoke our “democrats”: this is a true totalitarianism of the markets, as monolithic, rigid and oriented only towards the perpetuation of injustices as the worst version of the liberal nightmares regarding state socialism.
The second byproduct is complete indifference to people's thoughts. The fact that extremely unpopular measures, heavily rejected in opinion polls, continue to be approved – even appealing with exceptional measures, such as the case of Macron and his pension reform – indicates that our “democracies” they are totally indifferent to what ordinary people think. High abstention rates, surveys indicating very low approval or confidence in practically all institutions, low party memberships and the complete bureaucratization of political life have set the tone for more than forty years.
It is necessary to remember, after all, that without the existence of popular mediations (classic role of mass parties and popular unions and associations), the people cease to have any participation in the political life of their State. What constituted the strength of modern democracies was the existence of strong parties rooted among the lowest strata on the social or political scale. The pioneer was the German SPD, the Marxist social democrats, at the end of the 19th century, but this grew in the 20th century, mainly after the victory of the USSR against Nazi-fascism and the consolidation of socialist or communist parties – let us remember the strength of PCF or, even more so, the PCI – in the political life of nations. Even parties outside the left, such as Christian Democracy or Gaullism, sought to organize the population (Christian Democracy worked in unions!), in order to have representative power,
Contrary to this past cycle of politicization, today it is more valuable to listen to marketers, experts and technocrats than knowing and caring about people's real lives and thoughts. After all, wouldn’t worrying about what people think, especially when they are hostile to the “scientific” advice of experts, the height of much despised “populism”?
Capitalo-parliamentarism was, therefore, consolidated as an elitist positivism, something that was precisely criticized in the USSR (a nomenklatura endowed with truth, as it represented an infallible science), much more oppressive – as it was bombarded with incessant and “spontaneous” propaganda. via media, intellectual servility and markets – and nihilism.
The very idea of time is abolished: there is a succession of moments, without any memory or project. You quickly forget everything, something from two years ago is already part of the Paleozoic period, and the future is obscure; At best, it is an incessant repetition of the present, at worst, we only glimpse the end of the world or a dystopian becoming, in a case in which reality gradually surpasses the most ambitious science fiction.
The time of capitalo-parliamentarism was increasingly dissolving: if not long ago it was said that “political” thought could not go beyond an electoral cycle (two or four years), with no space for large projects or long-term vision. period of the country's past and future history, today we have not surpassed the time of stock exchanges and social networks. Any “controversial” statement generates blackmail – a variation in the exchange rate, for example -, an incessant shouting from the markets, in real time. The world without time, this kind of frozen cosmos, despite the frantic appearance of sudden speed, typical of financial markets and digital bubbles (a sounding board for the worst interests, even more damaging and short-sighted than the old corporate press), prevents us from any concentration of thought and discipline of will were constituted.
As propaganda for increasingly disillusioned masses, all we are left with is borrowing a classic religious theme: there will be a promise of salvation after much sacrifice and resignation. Infinite reforms – how many pension reforms do we still need? And each time at a shorter pace between them! – do not bring well-being, far from it, but they promise, at some point, perhaps in our lifetime, perhaps for the next generations, an improvement capable of making the derailed train return to proper functioning (if it weren’t for the unions, the populist politicians , the ignorance, on the part of critics, that evil always comes to good, perhaps we could already be glimpsing progress…). The fact that modern Western societies increasingly seem to go backwards and not improve the quality of life of their citizens should not discourage us: Salvation comes to those who have faith and to those who perform works. (In this case, the classical theological conflict harmonizes).
This modern religion does not lack doctrines, scholastics, and their apostles and priests, namely: economists. By “economists”, we mean those who deserve to be heard and taken seriously (for this reason, their opinion cannot cause discomfort in a banker or speculator), not those who have “ideology” or speak and act as if matters scientific studies could be the target of controversy and political decision.[v] They swarm in the press, are seen as undisputed deities (even if this deity takes the libidinous and transgressive form of a “Blonde Devil”), and provide recipes and prescriptions just as a prophet preaches the Law, written in stone, to be followed by whoever doesn't want to go to hell (and remember that God doesn't like spendthrifts or people with ambitions against his Providence).
This is, in short, the oppressive structure of the contemporary world, incapable of promoting any value for youth other than the most shameless selfish and opportunistic careerism (requiring, in addition to competence, the indispensable and rare luck) or despair, whose corollary is nihilistic self-destruction or the anguished search for false Masters (a Bolsonaro or a charlatan guru, a type that abounds so much in contemporary culture, marked by coaches and crooked “philosophers” and “religious” leaders). In the absence of anything that could constitute hope or true value (justice, equality), young people from favelas and outskirts – with less chance of being “successful” than those born into the right families – are left to try, perhaps, to become an MC or footballer. If this dream does not work out – and statistics indicate that the chances are small – there is only organized crime or obscurantist religious sects. This, of course, presupposes a blessing: not falling down a ravine and losing everything after a storm, not being killed by a stray bullet or by a police officer's “confusion” – or even in the most explicit form of deliberate, motivated extermination. by police vendettas against family members or even against random people who had the misfortune of being in the wrong place, as in the case of the recent murders in Baixada Santista celebrated by Tarcísio de Freitas, which does not seem to cause any drama or critical scruple on the part of our “ Democrats.”
Capitalo-parliamentarism: coup d'état and consolidation with Michel Temer
Our hypothesis is the following: even though Brazil has gone through all these effects over the last forty years, capitalo-parliamentarism was not effectively consolidated here until the occurrence of a decisive milestone: the 2016 coup and the government of Michel Temer .
What had made it impossible for Brazil to have a different destiny – at least for a while – in relation to the tired countries of the Old Continent was the existence of something contrary to the post-80s global picture: a strong left that was not limited to electoral rituals. The labor movement from the end of the 70s onwards, an intellectuality that was not entirely renegade and servile, the student movement, the creation and gradual strengthening of the PT and the CUT, the newness of the MST and its power of attraction, made it possible, despite the hardships, that the country still had a flame of real politics burning.
Of course, there was the entry of the PT into the State consensus from 2003 onwards and its subsequent increasingly intense adaptation to the status quo, (to the point that it is legitimate today to assume that PTism as a political-intellectual phenomenon may have died, paradoxically, even with Lula's new government), which led to suspicions that we could have, finally, “modernized” to the European standard ( what a dream for our “elites”!).
However, the specter of the class struggle still lingered. From the second Lula government onwards – we must remember the reactionary vanguard role played by Veja magazine -, but more intensely from the Dilma government onwards, political antagonism (which tends to fuel complaints from a sector of the petty bourgeoisie, chronically incapable of taking side by allergy to politics, regarding an unwanted “polarization”) returned in the classic form that our right knows: street demonstrations led by demagoguery (the beneficent and anti-corruption character of car wash was supported by many serious people; today fortunately there are no longer many with this “courage”), reactionary panic and repressive coup.
A “consensus” (without anyone outside respectable places being actually heard, of course) was established by the Temer government: the country needed to put an end to the vacillations of PTism (too susceptible to populist spending due to its origin and base society, incapable of tough and necessary measures with due forcefulness) and engage the march of fiscal austerity, ascetic budgets and indispensable reforms (the market is a very emotional, unstable and spoiled animal, it needs to be constantly satisfied in its demands). The ten commandments were finally crystallized. We had the Bridge to the Future.
There are countless impressive elements, now forgotten, in this story: Temer and his program were and still are unanimously hailed by the press and the market as one of the best presidents in Brazil[vi], despite having the lowest approval rates in our history. Is there a better example of the complete disconnect between what our masters think and popular feelings and aspirations? A president loved by no one but a few privileged ones, without any idea or vision of his own about the country other than serving powerful and rich people, incapable of charming any public, deserves eternal greetings and memories for a job well done.
This detachment was already present in the completely different assessments regarding the FHC II government: there is a gap between the balance of important people in relation to almost everyone who lives solely from their workforce. While the government was widely considered disastrous, providing spectacles of infrastructure collapse, electrical blackouts, industrial collapse and unemployment rates of an incredible 25% in the metropolitan region of São Paulo, to the point that FHC never appeared in any electoral propaganda again PSDB until, timidly, returning in 2014 – review, on YouTube, José Serra's campaign in 2002: it seems oppositional! -, economists praise this period as the peak of good Brazilian macroeconomic conduct. However, at least its defenders could argue that it created the conditions for Lulista's good years. Let us ignore the “forgetfulness” that this was also the result of policies rejected and fought by them, such as irresponsible increases in the minimum wage (indexed to social security, I believe!) and in public investments. None of this can be said about Temer.
The promised recovery, the zillions of jobs from the labor reform (although many people maintain, without much shame, that any improvement in the country's economic potential even today is due to such “reforms”), a fairer and more prosperous society, never came, but the fundamental thing was done: establishing a new consensus. Technical and indisputable. Politics must surrender to the inexorable needs dictated by those who are actually in charge. Conceiving something different is impractical.
Temer, however, does not have the best profile for the role of puppet of capitalo-parliamentarism. Too old-fashioned in terms of vocabulary and appearance, a friend of many unseemly people from “old politics”, his biography of life does not have any sentimental appeal capable of enchanting our middle classes eager for great stories of overcoming or meritocracy, it does not talk about the environment nor does it have ability to pretend to care about women's and homosexual rights. He is not an Emmanuel Macron, let alone an Obama. But there is no reason to despair: Tábata Amaral has been working well for some time to occupy this role one day. She is a good student, she always has been.[vii]
* Diogo Fagundes he is studying for a master's degree in law and is studying philosophy at USP.
Notes
[I] The most famous products of this Zeitgeist, although not the best, are two bestsellers: “How democracies die”, by Stephen Levitsky, and “The people against democracy”, by Yascha Mounk. They comprise, alongside books aimed at discussing (in a journalistic and superficial style) the philosophy of “traditionalism” (such as the production of Benjamin R. Teitelbaum, the doxa of vulgar anti-fascism, that is, of current progressivism.
[ii] To understand the concept (although Lazarus does not have much sympathy for this word, too philosophical, scientific or dialectical), see its original formulation at the end of the third part of the text “Peut-on pensar la politique en interériorité?” (pp.135-140), contained in the collection of Lazarus texts, organized by Natacha Michel, “Political intelligence”, published by Al Dante in 2013.
[iii] This is a strange phenomenon, after all, the height of the Gulag and the great Soviet terror took place in the 30s until the 50s. At this time, what we can least say is that Marxism had been affected as an intellectual and political inspiration in the West. On the contrary: it was the height of the influence of Marxism on culture and of Western communist parties as a political reference! Furthermore, the selective absorption of Alexander Solzhenitsyn by Western intellectuals causes some curiosity: an admirer of the tsarist imperial monarchy, anchored in Slavophile (and quite anti-Semitic) Christian culture, without any admiration for parliaments or democratic institutions, he became a symbol for an entire apologetic generation of the liberal West as an idea commensurate with Humanity and the end of History. When we remember that most of these intellectuals, such as Bernard-Henri Lévy, are exalted supporters of the State of Israel even in its most brutal and extreme actions, labeling any critic of the country as anti-Semitic, curiosity takes on an air of humor (albeit macabre). ).
[iv] See “Eight observations about politics”, in “Towards a new theory of the subject”, Alain Badiou, ed. Relume Dumára, 1994.
[v] Even economists from mainstream, like Nobel laureate Angus Deaton (we leave aside the ridiculousness of the very idea of “economic science” being awarded alongside serious things like physics, mathematics and literature), point out the disastrous state inherited from the depoliticization of the discipline, which is even harmful to its prosaic ends: to manage and administer, without major disturbances, societies marked by the single mediocre objective of reproducing themselves infinitely. According to Angus, there are five major deficiencies in the contemporary economy: the neglect of power structures in economic analyses; the marginalization of philosophical questions; the obsession with efficiency; the restricted interpretation of empirical methods and the blind fixation on inferential statistics; and the lack of humility towards other social sciences. To see using this link.
[vi] More than one editorial Sheet and Estadão He has already lamented the country's ingratitude against his supposed great legacy.
[vii] Good behavior is manifested in simple acts, such as the trip to Israel accompanied by CONIB's Zionist lobbying. Did Tabata say anything bad about Israel? Of course not, she only pointed the finger at those who dare to criticize the Palestinian genocide, like Lula. What a polite girl! We must never disturb the hosts or the respectable opinion of our press editorialists. And remember that Jacques Chirac, leader of the French right, had at least the basic courage to criticize Israeli crimes against international law and the rights of Palestinians, when he visited Israel... Our “center”, so modern and so lifeless, He doesn't have this shred of dignity.
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