By ANDREW KORYBKO*
Comparisons between the conflict Russian-Ukrainian and the recent Israeli-Lebanese war
The recent Israeli-Lebanese war and the Ukrainian conflict are so different from each other that they are practically incomparable, yet Russia can learn some general lessons from Israel if it so chooses. The first is that prioritizing military objectives increases the chances of achieving political objectives. Russia’s special operations continue to be characterized by self-restraint, influenced by magnum opus by Vladimir Putin”About the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, contrary to Israel’s conduct in its war with Lebanon.
The expectation was that rapid advances on the ground during the initial phase of the conflict would coerce Volodymyr Zelensky into agreeing to the military demands made of him. The tiny collateral damage that would have occurred could then facilitate the process of Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation. This plan was based on Volodymyr Zelensky’s capitulation, which did not happen. Instead, it was convinced by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to keep fighting.
Israel never thought that a lasting agreement with Hezbollah was possible, as Russia did, and no doubt still thinks it is possible with the post-Maidan Ukrainian authorities, which is why Tel Aviv would never follow Moscow’s playbook of “goodwill gestures” to achieve it. From Israel’s point of view, political goals can only be achieved after a military victory, and not the other way around, as Russia believes, with the notion that a political victory can lead to the achievement of military goals.
The second lesson is the importance of superior intelligence services. Russia was apparently under the impression, cultivated by its Ukrainian assets in the run-up to the special operation, that the locals would greet its troops with flowers and that Volodymyr Zelensky’s government would then collapse. The intelligence gathering focused mainly on the socio-political situation in Ukraine, which turned out to be incredibly inaccurate, lacking military details. That is why Russian troops were surprised by Ukraine’s arsenal of Javelins and Stingers.
In retrospect, it also appears that Russia’s Ukrainian assets told their handlers what they thought they wanted to hear, either to deceive them or because they thought that by telling them hard truths they could be taken off the payroll. Either Russia failed to verify the sociopolitical information it received, or the other sources it relied on were driven by the same motives. In any case, an alternative reality was created that reinforced the priority of political over military objectives.
Israel is certainly interested in the sociopolitical situation in Lebanon, but it is much more concerned with tangible military information that can be verified with images than with intangible impressions of public opinion that may be obscured by the biases of their source and are not so easy to verify. These different intelligence gathering priorities are a natural result of the different conflicts they have planned to wage, as explained in the preceding lesson that Russia can learn from Israel.
The third is that Russia remains sensitive to global public opinion, another result of its prioritization of political objectives over military ones, while Israel is impervious to public opinion at home, in Lebanon and around the world. Consequently, Russia will put its troops in harm’s way, capturing locations block by block, rather than engaging in “shock and awe,” as Israel is doing in Lebanon. While Russia’s approach has resulted in far fewer civilian casualties, it continues to be criticized as much as Israel’s, if not more so.
Israel believes that fear inspires respect, while Russia does not want to be feared because it thinks that this impression would help the West’s efforts to isolate it from the Global South. Respect, as Russia believes, comes from self-restraint in order to protect civilians, even at the expense of its own troops. Russia has also criticized the US for the way it conducted the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, etc., and so does not want to appear hypocritical by prioritizing military objectives, even at the expense of civilian lives.
Israel does not have the natural resources that Russia has, so its opponents should have had a much easier time isolating it, at least by getting others to impose symbolic sanctions, but no one has sanctioned Israel, despite its responsibility for far more civilian deaths than Russia. Nor has Russia itself sanctioned Israel, despite its criticism of that country. To be fair, the Global South has not sanctioned Russia either, but it needs Russian resources, so it probably would not sanction it even if it were responsible for far more civilian deaths.
Furthermore, the Global South's partnership with Russia accelerates multipolar processes for their collective benefit, while the European Union's anti-Russian sanctions were intended to slow them down. It should therefore have been foreseeable that the former would not submit to American pressure, while the latter would. The calculations of both have nothing to do with Russia's responsibility for civilian deaths and everything to do with their own grand strategy. Russia's sensitivity to world public opinion may therefore be misplaced.
The fourth lesson is that Israel’s permanent military, intelligence and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) are more convinced of the existential nature of their conflict than Russia appears to be. This is not to say that the Ukrainian conflict is not existential for Russia, which has been explained here e here, but only that Russia would have prioritized military objectives over political objectives if its “deep state” fully shared this assessment. Israel’s certainly does, regardless of whether or not one agrees with its conclusions.
Russia continues to restrain itself, by continuing a improvised “war of attrition” with the West in Ukraine, after failing to coerce Volodymyr Zelensky to agree to military demands made of him during the initial phase of the special operation, instead of escalating to “shock and awe”. It continues without destroying any bridges over the Dnieper River due to the priority it gives to political rather than military objectives and sensitivity to world public opinion, even though I have already missed several red lines.
The West certainly won't cross Russia's definitive red lines by attacking it or Belarus directly, or relying on Ukraine to launch large-scale proxy attacks against them, since it doesn't want World War III, but some hawks are now talking about the latter scenario, hence Russia has just updated its nuclear doctrine. In contrast, Hamas's sneak attack on October 7, 2023, crossed one of Israel's red lines, but did not represent ipso facto an existential threat, as it was repelled, although Israel’s “deep state” still saw it differently.
Despite some differences of view among its various members, this group as a whole remains convinced of the existential nature of the ensuing conflict, which means that prioritizing military objectives over political ones is the opposite of the Russian approach. To this day, despite the convincing arguments of Russian officials about the existential nature of their country’s conflict, its “deep state” as a whole still does not seem to be as convinced of this as their Israeli counterparts are of their own conflict.
A change in perception would lead to a change in the way this conflict is fought, but that has not yet happened, despite of drone strikes against the Kremlin, strategic air bases e até early warning systems, among many other provocations, including the invasion of the Kursk region by Ukraine. Repeatedly, despite reminding everyone of the existential nature of this conflict, Russia continues to exercise self-restraint. Political goals continue to take priority over military ones, and Russia remains sensitive to world public opinion.
That could change if Israel learns its latest lesson about “radical determination”. Philosopher Alexander Dugin wrote that “those who act decisively and boldly win. We, on the contrary, are cautious and constantly hesitate. By the way, Iran is also following this path, which leads nowhere. Gaza is gone. The leadership of Hamas is gone. Now the leadership of Hezbollah is gone. And President Raisi of Iran is gone. Even his pager is gone. But Volodymyr Zelensky is still here. And Kiev is acting as if nothing had happened.”
He ended on an ominous note: “Either we enter the game seriously or… The second option is something I do not even want to consider. But in modern warfare, time, speed and “dromocracy” decide everything. The Zionists act quickly, proactively. Boldly. And they win. We must follow their example.” Alexander Dugin was the first to foresee the latent existential threat that the 2014 “EuroMaidan” posed to Russia and, therefore, since the beginning of the special operation, he has been urging the country to stop exercising self-restraint.
The “goodwill gestures” and self-restraint are not appreciated by Ukraine, which sees them as a sign of weakness that has only encouraged it to cross more Russian red lines. While these policies have reduced the number of civilian deaths, they have not yet advanced the intended political goals, two and a half years after the start of the latest phase of this conflict that has been going on for a decade. So perhaps it is time to finally change them, considering how different the conflict has become since then.
Vladimir Putin’s lofty plan for a grand Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation after the special operation ends seems further away than ever, but he still believes it is feasible enough to justify staying the course and continuing to prioritize political goals over military ones. He is the supreme commander-in-chief with more information available to him than anyone else, so he has solid reasons for doing so, but perhaps Israel’s example in Lebanon will inspire him to see things differently and act accordingly.
*Andrew Korybko holds a master's degree in International Relations from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Book author Hybrid Wars: From Color Revolutions to Coups (popular expression). [https://amzn.to/46lAD1d]
Translation: Fernando Lima das Neves.
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