Two years of misrule – the tragedy of neoliberal capitalism



The state bureaucracy assumed an important role as a political agent of the counterrevolution and conservative restoration


The election of Jair Bolsonaro to the Presidency of the Republic in 2018 was the culmination of a political process that began in 2013, with the crisis of the Dilma Roussef government amplified by street demonstrations initially called as protests against increases in bus fares and later shifted to a critique of “politics as a whole”.

What should be highlighted in this process is that it was a displacement of the conservative discourse, which was ideologically defeated in the controversy of the More Doctors Program, isolated occasionally during the rise of the neo-developmentalist project of the Dilma government in 2011 and 2012 that divided sectors of the classes dominant positions, enabling the polyclassist alliance led by the PT to bring sectors of the domestic big bourgeoisie to its base, and all of this guaranteed record approvals in the PT administration.

Displacement of the discourse occurred with the insertion of the moral component through the narrative that the problems faced by society (including what motivated the fight against the increase in the price of public transport) were caused by the lack of ethics in politics, by corruption , etc. There would be an innate evil in the universe of politics and a “renewal” was needed.

This narrative was directly married to Operation Lava-Jato, which began in 2014 and which gradually became the court of “revenge” against political corruption. This Operation focused its actions precisely on attacking the heart of the neo-developmentalist project of the PT governments: the alliance of the State, through instruments such as public development banks and state-owned companies, with sectors of the internal big bourgeoisie.[I] There is strong evidence that such an operation was inspired by US imperialism due to the change in the position of Brazil (and Latin America) in the world geopolitical scenario[ii]. In fact, Brazilian foreign policy, even without breaking completely with the US, signaled a multilateralism, prioritized South-South dialogue, in particular Latin American integration, and moved towards the construction of a powerful economic zone with the BRICS ( Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa), countries with huge territories and populations.

The moralist discourse was a way of disqualifying and dismantling the entire base of support for this project (even though it provided, at its height, a situation of almost full employment) serving, mainly, the interests of sectors of transnational rentier capital desiring to place Brazil on the periphery of geopolitics.

However, such discourse was only effective due to a new pattern of sociability built from the current models of production and reproduction of capital, also known as the neoliberal phase of capitalism. What I intend to demonstrate in this essay is that neoliberalism builds a form of sociability and understanding this is fundamental to understanding the foundations of contemporary fundamentalist discourses and also the perspectives of building an alternative way out.

The boom years of capitalism and the countercultural rebellions

Neoliberalism can be classified as a conservative restoration of capital in the face of the passive revolutions of the Social Welfare State projects that gained strength in the post-war period, particularly on the European continent. After the defeat of Nazi-fascism in World War II, capitalist countries suffered the ideological pressures of communist and socialist organizations, strengthened both with the constitution of the Eastern European bloc and by the participation of these organizations in the resistance to Nazi-fascism.

At the same time, capitalism, after the great crisis of 1929, consolidated a paradigm of production and reproduction based on the expansion of consumer markets and state investments to leverage economic growth. All this led to socio-political pacts in which portions of the working class were incorporated into the political sphere, with the recognition of social and labor rights, institutionalization of trade union organizations and workers' parties.

It was based on this scenario that what was called the “golden years of capitalism” was consolidated. However, not without contradictions, particularly on the international scene. It is a fact that this project prospered in the center of capitalism, but the search for the expansion of new territories for the reproduction of capital found barriers, particularly in the new nations that were emancipating themselves from their conditions of colonies. In the late 1950s, the world had a much larger number of independent nations, most of them seeking to build national projects.

The great geopolitical contradiction of the moment was the Cold War, the dispute between the blocs led by the United States and the then USSR. And, taking advantage of this international geopolitical contradiction, the independence movements of countries that were then colonies obtain victories and the forces that lead such processes build strategies to build their national economies. For the most part, such strategies, being national, do not automatically align with one of the two blocks, but push for independent action. The Egyptian thinker Samir Amin proposed the concept of delinking to define this anti-imperialist strategy and as a way to constitute a polycentric world.[iii]

It is a fact that imperialism did not passively accept these movements. Episodes such as the Vietnam War, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the various invasion attempts in Cuba, the US intelligence agency's sponsorship of the various coups d'état in Latin American countries in the 1960s, the invasion of Guatemala, all of this it signaled that, quite contrary to what it might seem, these “golden years of capitalism” were also bloody years. Most of these former colonies were suppliers of inputs and raw materials and the maintenance of their economies in a subordinated way was essential to maintain the standard of reproduction of capital at the levels that were found.

In this contradictory scenario, some contesting narratives emerge that provide the basis for understanding the changes in the paradigms of capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s.

(a) The counterculture narrative of the 1960s that, among other things, will challenge the “one-dimensional” paradigm of sociability of capitalism. The concept of unidimensionality was proposed by Herbert Marcuse. This author points out that productive technology has ideology as it imposes a rhythmicity on life and also colonizes what Freud calls the “principle of reality” into the “principle of performance”. The values ​​of capitalism transcend the economic sphere and are inserted in the dimensions of life, creating a typology of subject suited to the system. That is why Marcuse says that this process generates a “society without opposition”.[iv]

(b) Feminist and anti-racist narratives, particularly the so-called “second wave” feminism (which is based on the thinking of Simone de Beauvoir) and the struggles for the civil rights of African Americans in the 1960s. the public debate issues that transcend the economic aspect, such as behavior (including in the private sphere), everyday attitudes and the very constitution of the official public sphere (for example, denial of the right to vote to African Americans). Such movements broadened the archetype of citizenship and the exercise of citizenship, incorporating race, gender and sexual orientation as political issues.

(c) The anti-imperialist struggle, mainly the mobilizations against the Vietnam War.

These mobilizations in this period of capitalist growth will face a very different scenario in the 1970s and 1980s with the crisis of the post-war capitalist accumulation model.

From crisis to conservative restoration

Douglas Kellner states that the countercultural rebellions of the 1960s took place at a time of capitalism in the golden years when a post-war generation of young people questioned that the bonanza occurred due to barbarism and multiple oppressions. However, such rebellions were being mitigated with what he calls the “period of scarcity” motivated by the cyclical crisis of capital in the 1970s.

“During the 1970s, the world economic recession caused the post-war bubble of prosperity to burst and the discourse about a post-scarcity society was replaced by others that spoke of lowering expectations, reduced growth and the need to reorganize the economy. and the State. Such a reorganization took place in most of the capitalist world in the 1980s, under conservative governments that made cuts in social welfare programs while expanding the military sector and increasing the public account deficit”.[v]

This process was radicalized particularly after the end of the Cold War between 1989 (fall of the Berlin wall) and 1991 (end of the Soviet Union), a period that the Egyptian historian Erik Hobsbawn considers as the end of the “short XNUMXth century” or the “era of extremes”.[vi] More than the end of an era, the result of the Cold War was the victory of the forces led by the United States, which then began to impose societal paradigms as a reference: the model of liberal democracy and the market economy.

These paradigms occur against the backdrop of the reorganization of capital accumulation and reproduction models. Already in the 1970s, ideas of the flexible accumulation model flourished as opposed to the Fordist model of industrial production. The hegemony of this model caused industrial production to shift from large industrial plants concentrated in a territory to networks of productive niches that are articulated globally – due to this demand that information and communication technologies have developed extraordinarily in recent times, the what some thinkers rather imprecisely call the “information age” as opposed to the “industrial age”. In fact, this is not a “post-industrial” phase, but rather a change in production paradigms – industrial production takes place in a different way and information and communication technologies are the main support.

It is important to emphasize that these changes occur within a unique historical moment: the victory of the forces of capital in the Cold War. Regardless of the positive or negative evaluations of the experience of the Eastern European regimes, it is a fact that this result of the Cold War was fundamental for the advance of conservative forces.

The social demands of the post-war period were being managed, in capitalist countries, through public policies and welfare state models. While it was a way of managing such demands within the institutional parameters of liberal democracy and the market economy, they were of interest at that time to the reproduction of capital as consumer markets expanded. Fordism, Keynessianism, Welfare State combined. And, at the same time, they imposed a form of sociability that made possible the countercultural rebellions of the 1960s, which questioned the unidimensionality of this subject included in the system.[vii]

For this reason, such a situation can be considered as a “passive revolution”, Gramsci's concept to designate when subaltern class groups come to power and their demands incorporated in political systems that have not gone through revolutionary ruptures. The incorporation of social labor rights and the entire constitution of a social protection framework in several nations, carried out in some cases by parties with a strong working-class base (such as the English Labor Party) are transformations in the post-war period that so much met the social demands of subaltern classes, ideologically strengthened with the existence of the reference of the socialist states of Eastern Europe and the strength of the world communist movement, as well as the needs of the pattern of reproduction of the capital of the period.

“We have seen that the notion of passive revolution can be linked – as Buci Glucksmann and Therborn do, following the trail opened by Gramsci – to the idea of ​​reform, or even reformism, although it is ultimately a conservative reformism and 'at the top '. As we have seen, a true process of passive revolution takes place when the dominant classes, pressured by those from below, accept – in order to continue dominating and even to obtain passive consent on the part of subordinates – 'a certain part of the demands that came from below' , in the words already quoted by Gramsci. This was precisely what happened during the Welfare State and the old social democratic governments.

Indeed, the moment of restoration played a decisive role in Welfare: through the interventionist policies suggested by Keynes and the acceptance of many of the demands of the working classes, capitalism tried and managed to overcome, at least for a while, the deep crisis that involved between the two world wars. But this restoration was articulated with moments of revolution, or, more precisely, of reformism in the strong sense of the word, which manifested itself not only in the conquest of important social rights by workers, but also in the adoption by capitalist governments of elements of programmatic economics, which until that moment had been defended only by socialists and communists”.[viii]

The end of the “brief twentieth century” is marked by a restoration or counter-reform, another concept of Gramsci. Carlos Nelson Coutinho recalls that this concept occasionally appears in Gramsci's writings, however it fits into this rearticulation of the capitalist system of the late 1980s that is called neoliberalism.

“In the neoliberal era, there is no space for the deepening of social rights, even if limited, but we are facing the open attempt – unfortunately largely successful – to eliminate such rights, to deconstruct and deny the reforms already conquered by the subordinate classes during the time of passive revolution initiated with Americanism and carried out in Welfare. The so-called “reforms” of social security, labor protection laws, the privatization of public companies, etc. – “reforms” that are currently present on the political agenda of both central and peripheral capitalist countries (today elegantly renamed “emerging”) – have as their objective the pure and simple restoration of the conditions proper to a “savage” capitalism, in which they must to enforce the laws of the market without brakes”.[ix]

The Brazilian singularity will be that this counter-reform or conservative restoration of world capitalism will coincide precisely with the moment of advance of the country's democratization, with the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 and the promulgation of the Constituent Assembly in 1988. At the same time that the reconstruction was observed from the political public sphere with the emergence of new collective subjects, the pressure of big transnational capital sought to interdict the advances. For this reason, democratization in the country was contradictory precisely because of this coincidence of historical agendas in the political field in Brazil and economic agendas in the global field.

Hence, the conservative restoration and counter-reform constituted a socio-political force that was going to confront the democratic pact itself of the end of the 1980s and the so-called Citizen Constituent was going to be attacked by the right (despite its evident limitations).

Brazilian political scenario: passive revolution and counterrevolution

Coutinho states that Gramsci calls passive revolutions restoration (that is, movements by conservative sectors to block the revolutionary rise of subordinate classes) and renovation (meeting the demands of these classes in a controlled manner). The institutional transformations signaled by the so-called Citizen Constituent Assembly of 1988 expressed something close to this. At the same time that social rights were recognized, the public security system remained intact with the ideological conceptions established during the dictatorship, such as the militarized character of the police, the failure to elucidate and punish crimes committed by the repression forces during the dictatorship, the centralized model of concession of broadcasting channels, among others.

On the eve of the 1989 presidential elections, the Escola Superior de Guerra prepared a document entitled “Structure for National Power for the 1990st Century – 2000/XNUMX is a vital decade for a modern and democratic Brazil” in which it points to the need to face the potential outbreaks of destabilization of the system: the “abandoned minors” and the “belts of misery”. The idea underlying this ESG concern, the think tanks that supported the ideology of national security during the 1964/85 military dictatorship, was that the “new internal enemy” were the populations of the peripheries, precisely the social group that would tend to expand with the implementation of the neoliberal model. Hence the need to keep the repressive security policies intact even with the end of the dictatorship.[X]

The black movement since the 1970s denounced that the repressive apparatuses constituted in the dictatorial period also affected black subjects and black subjects from the periphery. The launch of the Unified Black Movement Against Racial Discrimination in 1978 on the steps of the Municipal Theater of São Paulo was motivated by the protest against the torture and murder in a police station of Robson Silveira da Luz, a young worker from the west zone of São Paulo. In the same act, an organization of prisoners called “Centro de Lutas Neto de Zumbi” denounced the barbaric conditions in which the inmates lived. And militants of this organization started to defend the thesis that “every common prisoner was a political prisoner”, which was not endorsed by most of the organizations that fought for the amnesty of political prisoners.

It is precisely the peripheralization of this agenda that ensured that all this militarized state bureaucracy continued not only to express the narrative of securitization but that it assumed an important role as political agents of the counterrevolution and conservative restoration. However, unlike what happened in the 1964 military coup, this political action will take place within the very context of the country's democratization and politically and daily facing attempts at passive revolution operated by social movements and institutionalized left parties. For this reason, the country's democratization will be inconclusive with the sword of Damocles of retrogression always hovering over the head.

The securitization narrative will be one of the pillars of this counterrevolution/restoration discourse. The aforementioned document from the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), while having the clear objective of maintaining a space of military tutelage over institutions in the democratic period, shifts the idea of ​​an “internal enemy” from regime opponents to residents of the periphery . With this, the wall that prohibits the participation of the broad popular masses in the status of citizenship and the political public sphere is reinforced, even in the presence of formal democracy.

This configuration is extremely important to articulate the two agendas that historically coincided: that of political-institutional democratization and adherence to neoliberalism. The functioning of the institutional structures of liberal democracy is maintained (regular elections, a functioning parliament, “freedom of the press”, judiciary) and, within these institutions, the necessary normative adjustments are imposed for adapting the economy to the neoliberal model: deregulation of work, relativization of social rights and even their suppression, subordination of all public investments to the maintenance of fiscal balance.[xi]

Why is the securitization discourse important? Precisely because it imposes a classification/criminalization of subjects, it sets limits to the scope of citizenship rights, prevents their full universalization. It is precisely in this field that structural racism appears as a legitimizing element.

At work Punishers and urban violence, José Fernando Siqueira da Silva points out that the historical bases of the Brazilian social formation explain the existence of the phenomenon of justice and urban violence in the country: (a) the sociocultural traits of patriarchy originated in colonization; (b) the role of violence in all historical stages of the country's political structures; (c) the oligarchic and authoritarian traits present in all the governments of the republican period.[xii]

Further on, Siqueira states that continued violence and social hygiene underlie a structural process of extermination practiced by security forces and death squads. And that this continued violence expresses a form of power that prohibits the freedom of subjects, transforming them into objects that can be fully manipulated.[xiii] Further on, Siqueira states that: “Adorno and Cardia point out, with relevance, that violence in the Brazilian case has always been customarily rooted, institutionalized and positively valued in the solution of differences and conflicts between gender, social classes, ethnicities, differences involving property, wealth , prestige, privileges. In other words, violence has always been part of the composition of the Brazilian social fabric, involving citizens and institutions – school, family, work, police, prisons, etc. – in a wide network strongly intertwined”.[xiv]

However, Siqueira claims that this structuring violence does not result from a deformation of behavior or is just a remnant of sociability from colonial times. In addition, Siqueira articulates this continued violence with the process of social hygiene which, according to him, has the role of consolidating the paradigm of productive subject or one who adheres to the capitalist social order. “The only person who respects, protects and helps to perpetuate private property is a citizen, all of this is everyone's right and duty”[xv]. This model of citizenship, still according to Siqueira, which is based on the right of those who morally deserve benefits, dismantles the condition of citizenship in the broad and universal sense.

In this way, securitization makes room for another ideological layer, which is the discourse of meritocracy. Bauman states that what he calls “liquid-modern times” are increasingly characterized by individual responsibility for problems that have a social origin. The Polish thinker states that the deconstruction of the state social protection model in the late 1980s has this objective. Well-being ceases to be a collective political project and becomes a personal goal.

The meritocratic narrative layer is a product of the transformations in the meaning of Foucault's concept of biopower. At work The birth of biopolitics, product of lectures given in progress at the France secondary school in 1978/79, the French thinker states that the homo economicus in US neoliberalism redefines himself as “entrepreneur of himself[xvi]. Through other theoretical paths, Vladimir Safatle arrives at a similar idea when he speaks of the “entrepreneurial ideal of oneself”.[xvii]

Foucault states that US neoliberalism is more than an economic model, but a way of being and thinking, of the relationship between rulers and ruled.[xviii] And based on this, he claims that neoliberals reintroduce work in the field of economic analysis. In what way? With the concept of human capital.

Reframing the idea of ​​“capital” with any type of resource that potentially generates income, the neoliberal discourse points out that work is the mobilization of a set of qualities, skills and competences, innate or acquired[xx] – human capital – which, if properly invested, would generate income (salary). Remuneration for work is thus the product of an investment in the worker's human capital. Managing and seeking to expand this human capital is the exercise of this “entrepreneurial ideal of oneself” and the basis for what Bauman calls individual responsibility for social problems.

The merit is, therefore, the supposed ability to manage oneself as a business, to enhance the condition of homos economicus and having the expected results (remuneration for the work performed as income obtained from human capital).[xx]

And why does the meritocratic discourse layer combine with the discursive layer of securitization? Precisely because those who do not have this “human capital” or do not know how to manage it satisfactorily become failed people or “failed consumers” (as Bauman[xxx]) and need to be isolated or separated from the social system.

Foucault analyzes the phenomenon of homos economicus from the US experience. The insertion of this model in Brazilian society takes place in the scenario already described by Siqueira of structuring and structural violence, arising from a sociability formed in the colonial past and more than three centuries of enslavement. Hence, there are Brazilian singularities that help to understand why neoliberalism in its radicality is applied by a government with not only fascist features but marked by a crude speech. The Brazilian neoliberal counterrevolution is a farcical imitation of the US model. The two layers, meritocracy and securitization, interpenetrate and generate tragedy.

The counter-revolution leads to Bolsonaro

It is a fact that the political-institutional characteristics of neoliberalism in Brazil are different in the period of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government (1994-2002) and in the more recent period, both in Temer's post-coup government (2016-2018) and currently with Bolsonaro . And this is not only due to the personal profile of the rulers. The historical conditions of capitalism largely explain these differences.

During the FHC administration period, a model similar to what the American thinker Nancy Fraser calls “progressive neoliberalism” prevailed.

“The progressive-neoliberal bloc combined an expropriative and plutocratic economic program with a liberal-meritocratic policy of recognition. The distributive component of this amalgamation was neoliberal. Determined to free market forces from the heavy hand of the state and the “tax and spend” mine, the classes that controlled this bloc wanted to liberalize and globalize the capitalist economy. (…)”[xxiii]

These goals of globalization and free spending combined with a “progressive policy of recognition”, according to Fraser. The American thinker recalls that recognition and redistribution were pillars of capitalist social welfare policies and the meritocratic narrative (which is transfigured, at the limit, into the entrepreneurial ideal of the self and the radicalization of homo economicus) enabled the separation of recognition da redistribution. This is the basis of the so-called “progressive neoliberalism” which, during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, manifested itself, for example, with the federal government's stance on the international scene in matters such as the fight against racism (Brazil's position at the Durban-1995 incorporated most of the positions of the Brazilian black movement), human rights and the environment.

The big difference from that moment in Brazil is that the contradictions in global capitalism, particularly after the various cyclical crises that are increasingly acute mainly due to the intensification of the concentration of wealth caused by this model of capital reproduction, are much more intense, reducing the room for maneuver . Hence, if progressive neoliberalism in the US of Clinton led to Donald Trump, here, at first, it enabled a certain passive revolution with the governments of the PT cycle, leading to the parliamentary-media-judiciary coup of 2016 and the emergence of the Bolsonaro government that combines economic ultraliberalism with a fundamentalist discourse. It is at this moment that meritocracy meets the securitization that sustains this hegemonic bloc.

At all times during the pandemic, President Bolsonaro demonstrated the appropriation of the meritocratic narrative to legitimize the maintenance of restrictions on public investments. The tone in the government's narratives is that “only the weaklings defend isolation”, “that you need to have courage to face a disease that is nothing more than a little flu”, among others. The constant reference to “male virility” also expressed the contours of his speech.[xxiii]

Final considerations – Bolsonaro is a product of neoliberal capitalism

Separating the phenomenon of Bolsonarism from the model of sociability imposed by capitalism in its neoliberal phase is a theoretical-conceptual aberration. It is more a desire of privileged social sectors with the neoliberal model but uncomfortable with the fact that this is the necessary institutional arrangement.

This is because neoliberal democracy necessarily goes through this process of separation of recognition and redistribution. The empowerment of subordinate subjects will necessarily express the hierarchies that sustain this non-recognition. Hence, the meritocratic narrative – as a universalizing discourse beyond social hierarchies – is another support base. With this, bizarre narratives such as that of the president of the Palmares Foundation (governmental entity responsible for the promotion of black culture), Sérgio Camargo, a black man who attacks and disqualifies the black movement, denies racism and exalts icons of white culture.

Hence, the appeal to a caricatured patriarchal figure is the resource of a government that places itself as the most adequate for the reproduction of capital in the neoliberal phase. It was in this government that the most radical social security and labor reforms were approved, that the promiscuous relations between the State and rentier capital were most intense, that the rhetoric and practice of attacks on social movements and social rights reached the top.

In short, the Bolsonaro government can be synthesized in the barbarism produced by the capitalist system that has exhausted all its civilizing possibilities.

*Dennis De Oliveira He is a professor in the Journalism course at the School of Communications and Arts at USP and in the graduate programs in Social Change and Political Participation at EACH and in the Integration of Latin America (Prolam).


AMIN, S. Delinking: towards a polycentric world. London: Zed Books, 1990

BAUMAN, Z. lives for consumption. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2008

COUTINHO, CN The neoliberal era: passive revolution or counter-reform? In: Magazine New directions. Maria, v. 49, n.1, Jan-Jun 2012, p. 122

FOUCAULT, M. The birth of biopolitics. S. Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008, p. 297 (class of March 14, 1979)

FRASER, N. “From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump – and Beyond” in Politics & Society, v. 17 (n.40), Florianópolis, Dec. 2018, p. 47

HOBSBAWN, E. The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century. S. Paulo: Cia das Letras

KELLNER, D. media culture. Bauru: Edusc, 2001.

MARCUSE, H. The ideology of industrial society: the one-dimensional man. S. Paulo, Jorge Zahar, 1982.

SAFATLE, v. The circuit of affections: political bodies, helplessness and the end of the individual. Belo Horizonte: Authentica, 2018.

SIQUEIRA, JFS “Punishers” and urban violence. S. Paulo: Cortez Editora, 2004, p. 10


“Extermination of the periphery population, a political action thought in the 1980s”. Available in:

Cooperation between “car wash” and the USA took place outside official channels (

“Lava Jato”, the Brazilian trap (


[I] We call internal bourgeoisie sectors of the ruling class whose businesses depend mainly on the State, such as large contractors and companies that supply inputs and equipment to state-owned companies.

[ii] There are several reports published in the media about the irregular collaborations carried out between the protagonists of Lava-Jato and the US State Department (the analysis of the legal irregularities of this collaboration was addressed in an article by the Legal Counsel (see at, accessed 15/04/2021). However, the report in Le Monde expands this view by pointing out that the Operation was a US strategy to defend its interests – see at, accessed on 15/04/2021.

[iii] AMIN, S. Delinking: towards a polycentric world. London: Zed Books, 1990

[iv] MARCUSE, H. The ideology of industrial society: the one-dimensional man. S. Paulo, Jorge Zahar, 1982

[v] KELLNER, D. Media culture. Bauru: Edusc, 2001, p. 25

[vi] HOBSBAWN, E. The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century. S. Paulo: Cia das Letras

[vii] Marcuse, for example, in Eros and Civilization, points out that such a model of sociability resignifies what Freud calls the “principle of reality” into a “principle of performance”, that is, the productive rhythmicity becomes the manager of human life.

[viii] COUTINHO, CN The neoliberal age: passive revolution or counter-reform? In: New Directions Magazine. Maria, v. 49, n.1, Jan-Jun 2012, p. 122

[ix] Same, p. 123

[X] See the article “Extermination of the periphery population, a political action conceived in the 1980s” regarding this document. Available in:

[xi] This political agenda is reverberated by almost all of the hegemonic media that in the 1990s, two years after the enactment of the citizen Constituent, echoed the conservative thesis that the constitutional charter was unfeasible because “it did not fit in the Budget”. It was from that moment that a campaign was generated not to consolidate the constitutional norms but to modify them.

[xii] SIQUEIRA, JFS “Punishers” and urban violence. S. Paulo: Cortez Editora, 2004, p. 10

[xiii] Same, pp. 59-60

[xiv] Same, p. 61

[xv] Same, p. 80

[xvi] FOUCAULT, M. The birth of biopolitics. S. Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008, p. 297 (class of March 14, 1979)

[xvii] SAFATLE, v. The circuit of affections: political bodies, helplessness and the end of the individual. Belo Horizonte: Authentic, 2018

[xviii] FOUCAULT, M. op cit, P. 301

[xx] It is interesting in this regard to see how this idea of ​​human capital acquired it will be the basis for a reappropriation of the discourse of valuing school education on the part of neoliberals. There is a narrative of alleged valorization of education but focused on the formation of an “astute” and “creative” individual, that is, with competence to respond quickly and creatively to heteronomous demands posed by capital. The discourse of “flexibilization” of school curricula and the desired profiles based on “skills” and “competences” goes in this direction.

[xx] Same, pp. 304-305. It is interesting in this passage that Foucault establishes a dialogue between the main ideas of neoliberal economists with Marx and classical economists to demonstrate the subversion of categories, especially the category of work.

[xxx] BAUMAN, Z. Lives for consumption. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2008

[xxiii] FRASER, N. “From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump – and Beyond” in” Politics & Society Magazine, v. 17 (n.40), Florianópolis, Dec. 2018, p. 47

[xxiii] In this respect, it is important to highlight the reflection that Vladimir Safatle makes in The circuit of affections on the nature of these extreme right leaderships that emerge in the XNUMXst century in order to take advantage of the decay of the psychoanalytical role of the “Father” since the advance of industrial capitalism that put classical patriarchy in decay but at the same time generated a helplessness that was transfigured into fear and not potentiated for other affections. See in SAFATLE, V. op cit

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