By CLAUDIO KATZ*
Donald Trump is trying to reclaim US imperial centrality as the only way to aggrandize his country's capitalists at the expense of the rest of the world.
True to his style as a risk-taker, Donald Trump has wreaked havoc on global markets. He has introduced, withdrawn and revamped a tariff schedule that has unleashed massive chaos. His bravado has recreated the worst financial nightmares of recent decades.
The tycoon has created an unprecedented scenario of a deliberately rushed global crisis. Some analysts believe that he is likely to back down in the face of the adverse results of his measures, but others believe that he continues to scare his interlocutors in order to force them to capitulate.
There is also the superficial impression that Donald Trump has gone mad and that, in his decline, the United States has come under the command of a madman. The tycoon lies, insults, attacks and seems to govern the first power as if it were an investment fund. But in reality, he is following a strategy approved by important power groups and should not be underestimated (Torres López, 2025).
It has three economic objectives: to reestablish the hegemony of the dollar, to reduce the trade deficit and to encourage the repatriation of large companies. The hierarchy and articulation of these goals is the big question at the moment.
Monetary centrality
Some approaches rightly emphasize the primacy of financial and monetary goals over commercial or productive ones. They emphasize that Donald Trump intends to establish a cheap dollar for exports, and a high dollar as a store of value. He intends to favor US exports, while ensuring the privileged status of the US dollar as a world currency (Varoufakis, 2025). The president’s two main advisors – Miran and Besset – confirmed this intention, admitting that trade pressures are an instrument of monetary demands.
In order to achieve the devaluation of the dollar and its continued status as a reserve of value, Donald Trump needs to reinforce the subjugation of the Central Banks of Europe and Japan. This subordination is essential to preserve the role of US debt securities (Treasury Bonds) as the main refuge for capital.
This guarantee determines the influx of excess money in the world to Wall Street. Tokyo and Brussels must continue to buy these securities to validate the dollar exchange rate set by Washington, thus avoiding exchange rate tensions that would collapse the entire project.
Donald Trump demands the continuation of the reign of the dollar and the consequent ability of the United States to finance itself at the expense of the world. Dollar imperialism allows the world's leading power to go into unlimited debt and manipulate all the world's economies in its favor.
To deal with the serious questions that this attribute currently faces, the tycoon intends to recreate the Plaza Accords, which the United States imposed on Germany and Japan in the 1980s. At that time, his two subordinates agreed to support the reduction of the dollar's value and maintain a parity that would guarantee the global primacy of the North American currency.
Donald Trump is adapting this demand to the times and sponsoring new digital currencies linked to the political power of the dollar. The potentate has created a cryptocurrency fund based on his own figure and is promoting this market (stablecoins) as an additional pillar of the dollar. It has already positioned these instruments among the 10 largest holders of Treasury Bonds (Litvinoff, 2025).
The US president dreams of returning the dollar to its original Bretton Woods throne. His plan B is to recycle this centrality to the level achieved by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. In the first case, the US dollar was freed from gold convertibility and began a long cycle of dominance without objective metallic support. In the second, the US currency was strengthened by rising interest rates, the rise of neoliberalism and financialization under the command of the Federal Reserve. These two presidents shared the same profile as Trump as mediocre characters, but they introduced significant changes in the global status of the dollar.
To repeat this feat, the tycoon must curb the trend towards de-dollarization, which threatens the supremacy of the greenback. This erosion is driven by the BRICS, which have begun to design instruments to replace the US currency through payment operations, commercial transactions and financial compensation mechanisms (Sapir, 2024).
There is already a plan to create a BRICS currency that, following a different path from the euro, would have a similar effect. This plan foresees the progressive creation of an issuing bank, with reserve funds and detailed schedules of rhythms, rates and legislation (Gang 2025).
Donald Trump is aware of these threats and has precipitated chaos to unleash a battle against the challengers of the US currency. He is promoting this panic to discipline all the allies under his command. From this centralization, he hopes to rebuild the dollar and restart the global economic system in favor of the United States. But the tycoon needs to limit the scope of the self-generated crisis, because if this upheaval recreates the scenario of the pandemic or the context of the 2008 banking collapse, the tremor will end up affecting its own creator (Marcó del Pont, 2025a).
The immediate barometer of the tug-of-war is the performance of Treasury bonds. Japan has been the largest holder of these securities since China began dumping them. Banks in Europe and other Asian countries also hold significant holdings of these securities. Donald Trump’s plan will quickly collapse if, as suggested in the recent turmoil, US debt holders sell these assets.
But beyond this immediate calculation, the big question is the general capacity of the United States to rebuild its currency. There are several substantial differences compared to the Nixon and Reagan eras. The decline of the first power is much greater, the circuit of imperial domination is eroding, the collapse of the USSR and the debut of globalization are behind us, and China's economic advance is overwhelming. Donald Trump's monetary strategy is also facing great tension with the banks, while Wall Street is watching with suspicion, a course that threatens to cut into the huge profits of recent times.
The tariff boomerang
Donald Trump's second objective is commercial, aimed at reducing the United States' monumental external deficit. This is a medium-term objective, which is not as urgent as the monetary shift and which depends largely on the recovery of the dollar. The tycoon introduces and modifies customs tariffs on a daily basis, due to the complementary role of these instruments in negotiations with each country.
The occupant of the White House has in fact radicalized the protectionist trend inaugurated by the 2008 financial crisis and the decline of trade globalization. Since then, 59.000 restrictive measures have been introduced on international trade and customs tariffs have reached their highest level in the last 130 years (Roberts, 2025a). The trade war that Trump has unleashed with his ostentatious tariff package is in line with this previous trajectory.
The potentate resorted to an absurd formula to penalize different countries. He invented an arbitrary criterion of reciprocity to define the percentage of each punishment, with crazy estimates of the US trade deficit, which omitted the US surplus in services. He also forgot that the trade imbalances were not caused by the sanctioned countries, but by US companies themselves, which located their investments abroad to increase their profits.
The chances of success of Trump’s plan are very slim, since US imports and exports no longer operate as a decisive force in world trade. They fell from 14% in 1990 to 10,35% today, and in that period, the BRICS alone jumped from 1,8% to 17,5%. The tariff war does not, in itself, have dissuasive power, and the sales displayed by the leading power in services are insufficient to tip the scales (Roberts, 2025b). Some estimates even suggest that, if the United States suspended all imports, 100 of its partners could reposition their sales in other markets in just five years (Nuñez, 2025).
The biggest problem with trade wars is the possibility of uncontrollable escalation. In 1929-34, the downward spiral in international trade that followed the Smoot-Hawley package caused a 66% drop in trade, and this collapse had an impact on all competitors. Donald Trump believes that he will avoid this sequence with forced bilateral negotiations from his office.
But past experience suggests a different outcome when conflicts escalate unchecked. The recessionary effect of protectionism on the global economy is as well known as the link between the Great Depression and the decline in trade. Although the most common interpretations superficially associate the two processes—omitting the capitalist roots of what happened in the 1930s—there is no doubt that protectionism triggered, drove, or precipitated the collapse of that period.
The most relevant aspect of a possible repetition of this precedent would be its effect on the US economy, which is now much more vulnerable to global turbulence. This impact is greater because of the centrality of foreign trade, which jumped from 6% (1929) to 15% (2024) of the country's GDP.
Donald Trump is reintroducing protectionism at an inopportune moment in history. Tariffs were an effective tool for the United States in the past, but they no longer serve the same purpose today. They facilitated the rise of emerging powers against competitors who favored free trade, in order to maintain their dominance of the world market. Protectionism was used to great advantage by Germany in the 19th century and by Japan and South Korea in the last century.
But the same tool did not allow Great Britain to stop its decline, and this ineffectiveness is currently affecting the United States. Donald Trump is promoting an unbalanced protectionism because, instead of encouraging nascent industry, he is trying to rescue an obsolete structure. He simply does not realize that the United States is no longer what it used to be.
The dream of a factory return
Donald Trump’s third objective is productive. He favors the return of companies to their home territory and sees this relocation as the only way to effectively restore Yankee hegemony. That is why he has identified the start of his offensive (“Economic Liberation Day”) with the reindustrialization of the country.
Donald Trump is the first president to openly acknowledge the hardships caused by the relocation of factories. He resorts to drastic measures to reverse this misfortune, because he understands that globalization has ended up affecting the power that promoted it. He notes that the American primacy in services, finance and the digital universe does not compensate for the decline in manufacturing and the consequent erosion of the pillar of any economy.
But his industrial repatriation plan is less viable than his monetary or tariff plan. No monetary or tariff alchemy is sufficiently attractive to induce the return of companies that have made high profits abroad. However persuasive the tycoon’s incentives, producing in the United States is more expensive. Industrial recovery would require massive investment, which companies are not willing to make given the current low domestic profitability.
The protectionist shift aims to close this gap, but it faces the difficulty of closing the economy in a scenario of globalized supply chains. The final product of many goods incorporates inputs from factories installed in numerous countries. It is not easy to imagine how the United States could regain competitiveness by recreating old national production patterns. How much would a tariff have to increase to make it cheaper to produce in the country again?
Just look at the case of Nike, for example, which has 155 factories in Vietnam and a monumental number of jobs in that country, supplying a third of the United States’ footwear imports. The difference in production costs is so enormous that a return to the United States seems unthinkable (Tooze, 2025). Decoupling the manufacturing process in China would have a similar impact on companies like Apple.
Donald Trump's economists also claim that his project will be viable if the dollar's primacy is restored and the trade deficit is reduced. They believe that this process will correct the global imbalances in consumption, savings and investment that affect the first power. On the other side, neoclassical and Keynesian critics point out that, in his first term, Donald Trump failed to inaugurate this transformation.
The debate between the two positions revolves around the positive or negative impact of protectionism on spending, income, savings and consumption. But it forgets that the US setback does not lie in these areas. It is the result of the low productivity of the leading Western economy compared to its rising competitor in the East. There are countless indicators of this gap and evidence of its continued widening.
One need only look at the general tendency of American companies to prioritize financial investment, or to operate like a Wall Street ATM, to confirm their declining competitiveness. They tend to spend more on share buybacks and dividend payments than on long-term investments.
Many of these companies have globalized their manufacturing processes to offset high local production costs. But this shift has made them heavily dependent on importing cheap consumer goods from Asia to keep local wages low.
The degree to which they are linked to the supply of Chinese inputs was corroborated by Donald Trump’s own decision to exempt all chips and electronic components from tariffs imposed on the Asian rival. The same problem extends to capital and intermediate goods, which represent about 43% of China’s total imports (Mercatante, 2025).
The US setback is not due to trade mistakes, and its reversal is not the result of a protectionist ultimatum. There is undoubtedly a change in model underway, eroding the international division of labor forged over decades of productive internationalization. But this decline does not usher in the opposite process of industrial nationalization that Donald Trump imagines, because the US capacity to lead this change has drastically diminished.
The setback against China
It is clear that China is the epicentre of the economic war initiated by Donald Trump. It was the main target of the tariffs that triggered the dizzying mutual escalation. Washington's initial 34% was countered with the same percentage by Beijing and the dispute quickly escalated to 84%-104% and 145%-125%. At these levels, trade between the two countries tends to cancel each other out.
The centrality of China in Donald Trump’s offensive has been further reinforced by his decision to maintain sanctions on that country, after they had been lifted for the rest of the world. The very high tariffs on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are part of the same confrontation, as China controls the supply chains of these neighbors and re-exports its goods from them.
Beijing responded firmly, immediately applying reciprocal tariffs and making it clear that it will not accept Yankee blackmail. It has been preparing for this reaction for a long time and intends to fight the battle in terms of productivity, avoiding the devaluation of the yuan. In addition, it is already looking for offsetting customers and is planning specific incentives for Europe and Asia.
Donald Trump's entire policy is a desperate attempt to curb China's advance. This expansion was only just beginning at the turn of the millennium, when the first power stopped receiving income transfers from its Asian partner in its favor. This was the beginning of an unfavorable exchange, which has now reached a peak that is difficult to reverse.
The tycoon intends to change this adverse scenario with drastic actions. But the distance between the two powers is not only due to differences in monetary, commercial or production policies. It is in the social structure and in the management of the State.
In China, there are important capitalist classes that speculate with their fortunes and exploit workers. However, these groups do not control state power, and this limit explains the capacity and autonomy of the political leadership to guide the economy with standards of efficiency.
Donald Trump has no formula for dealing with this disadvantage, which is beyond all his intentions and plans. To make matters worse, he is promoting measures that aggravate the two great evils of contemporary capitalism: social inequality and climate change. He has embarked on a long-delayed battle to sustain American leadership in a system in crisis, but he is accentuating American decline with the measures he adopts, modifies and reestablishes.
The nostalgic imperial lexicon
Donald Trump is trying to restore the imperial centrality of the United States. This is the only way to aggrandize the capitalists of his country at the expense of the rest of the world. The package of sanctions, tariffs and blackmail that he has implemented requires a revitalization of the empire.
The tycoon intends to restore this primacy with a brawler's attitude. He boasts of having obtained negotiations on customs duties with 75 countries, after the scare caused by his tariff schedule. But he masks the reality with a bluster that obscures the real progress of the negotiations.
With the European Union, he is deepening a dispute that began with the introduction and suspension of 25% tariffs. Trump aspires to impose a Euro-vassalage, which would allow him to reindustrialize his country, deindustrializing the transatlantic partner.
The first stage of this operation is the rearmament of the Old Continent, with energy, digital technology and equipment supplied by the United States. The potentate has sown panic among the European elites, who, in a fit of Russophobia, have launched themselves into blind warmongering. They are cutting social spending and are already replacing the much-touted green transition with a gray one, of pure military spending.
But this shift is not without its conflicts, and the quick deal that Trump hoped to sign with Putin (to seize Ukraine’s riches) is not just bogged down by Russia. It has also given rise to an unprecedented conflict between Washington and London over who gets to keep the rare earths spoils (Marcó del Pont, 2025b).
Negotiations with subordinate partners in Asia are more decisive. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines have always responded with unchanging discipline to the American godfather. But the big news in recent years is the growing economic relationship between these countries and Beijing. The scale of this business has raised serious doubts about the anti-Chinese bloc promoted by the White House.
Donald Trump uses explicit imperial messages to make his demands known. He uses such direct language that the start of his second term has prompted numerous journalistic comments of this kind. The traditional concern of the mainstream media about the irritating use of the term imperialism has been dispelled by the tycoon's directness.[I]
The same display of imperial power surrounded the announcement of the tariff schedule. Donald Trump pompously included all the countries in the world in this list, to emphasize that none of them will escape Washington’s lash. He did not hesitate to include nations that do not trade with the United States or to incorporate islands inhabited only by penguins.
But the opulent New Yorker’s imperial proclamations contain more nostalgic ingredients than actual ones. Donald Trump misses the work of distant rulers who combined protectionism with imperial expansion during the glory days of American capitalism.
He particularly praises President McKinley (1897-1901), who emerged as a “Napoleon of protectionism.” He introduced a drastic increase of 38-50% in customs tariffs (1890), while at the same time overseeing expansion into the Pacific (Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam) and the conquest of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and the aspiration for Cuba). Trump idolizes both his virulent defense of industry and his extension, with gunfire, of the US territorial radius (Boron, 2025).
But this evocation clashes with the reality of the 21st century. The tycoon cannot instrumentalize the invasive protectionism of his idol, choosing instead to combine tariff pressure with military prudence. Far from resuming the Pentagon's interventions everywhere, he moderates the invasive impulse to contain the deterioration of Yankee economic competitiveness.
In a gesture of realism, Donald Trump has taken note of George W. Bush’s military failure and Joe Biden’s economic setback. That is why he is trying out a third way of military moderation and monetary-commercial reconfiguration. He knows that the offensive capacity of the United States has been drastically limited by an economy that holds 25% of the world’s GDP (and not the 50% of 1945), compared to China’s growing 18%.
Donald Trump is exacerbating the interventionist lexicon in the face of external adversaries. Like his contemporary predecessors, he needs to counter the economic decline with a grand display of the geopolitical-military power that his country retains.
But the magnate knows that military compensation for economic deficiencies aggravates tensions between the militarist and productivist sectors of the establishment. Warmongers tend to promote destructive campaigns at all costs, which affect the state budget and harm the competitiveness of companies.
Donald Trump navigates between the two sectors, strengthening the economic resurgence with protectionist formulas. He encourages spending on weapons, but limits wars and seeks to limit the negative effect of military gigantism on productivity. The military hypertrophy imposed by the Pentagon is an incurable disease that the American economy has suffered from for a long time and that the tycoon cannot alleviate.
Local tensions
The internal contradictions that affect the protectionist project are as broad as the external tensions. They represent an inflationary effect as the most immediate threat. Customs tariffs will make goods more expensive by simply introducing an additional cost to imported products.
This effect will be significant, both for basic foodstuffs and for more elaborate products. Mexico supplies more than 60% of the world’s fresh nutrients, for example, and it is estimated that a 25% tariff on automobiles manufactured in that country (or Canada) would increase the final price of each unit by $3.000. Donald Trump recently welcomed Honda’s move to build its new Civic in Indiana instead of Guanajuato. But this move would increase the average cost of each automobile by between $3.000 and $10.000 (Cason; Brooks, 2025).
It is true that inflation could also contribute to reducing the real value of the debt, but its impact on the economy as a whole would be much greater than the reduction in liabilities.
All analysts agree that the protectionist shift will have a recessive effect, which could lead to a contraction of 1,5 or 2 percentage points in GDP. A decline in the level of activity, which was outside economic forecasts, is a strong possibility in the short term.
This outlook has strained Donald Trump's relations with the Federal Reserve, which is resisting lowering interest rates. The potentate is in favor of such a reduction to counter the likely decline in production, consumption and employment. The collapse of the markets, triggered by the announcement of his protectionist tariff, has worsened this gloomy scenario and the resulting disputes between the president and the head of the Federal Reserve.
Donald Trump is also continuing his battle with the globalist sectors, which defend the interests of the most internationalized companies and banks. The Davos elite has been discredited by its failures, but is waiting for the opportunity to resume the offensive. If the results of the protectionist shift are negative, this backlash will erupt with force and put the Democrats in the race for the 2026 midterm elections.
The White House chief has surrounded himself with rising businessmen (sharks) who are competing with their traditional counterparts (hawks). establishment gave the green light to his plan, but expected moderate tariffs and a more cautious approach to his first term. The current unrest has led them to demand an end to the presidential campaign. Billionaires are angry about the sharp decline in their wealth caused by the market collapse.
Tensions extend to the tycoon’s own entourage, who has to arbitrate between extreme protectionists (Navarro) and officials with investments abroad (Musk). The tariff control plan itself also leads to the introduction of a tangle of regulations, which clashes with the bureaucratic dismantling promised by the new administration (Malacalza, 2025). The numerous conflicts Trump faces far outweigh those he can resolve.
Imperial Bonapartism
The conflicting external onslaught, the lack of immediate results, the strong opposition from globalists and the fragile internal cohesion are leading Donald Trump to reinforce the authoritarianism of his administration. That is why he will try again the Bonapartist path that he explored unsuccessfully in his first term. He also needs to reinforce the power of the White House to deal with the contraction of investments by American capitalists.
Donald Trump comes from a tough business world and is used to negotiating by pounding the table to gain advantages from the other party. This behavior distinguishes him from his peers in the political system, who are forged in deals, wheeling and dealing and verbal hypocrisy.
To consolidate his protagonism, he launched himself into hyperactivity and stands out as a daily signatory of numerous decrees. He seeks to centralize command to disconcert his opponents and prioritizes loyalty over any other attribute of his employees.
The tycoon tries out his Bonapartist physiognomy in the American tradition of the charismatic leader. He tries to assume the messianic role of interpreter of the nation, stigmatizing migrants and slandering progressivism. With this extreme personalism, he seeks to spread an image of a man predestined to consummate the reunion with the American dream. But this course increases tensions with the establishment globalist, which controls the most influential media (Wisniewski, 2025).
Donald Trump bursts into the void left by the discredit of traditional politicians. He takes advantage of the climate created by the rejection of shady parliamentary business and uses the powers of presidentialism to enhance his image (Riley, 2018).
It uses a preaching similar to that of the conservative camp, which exacerbates the cultural contrast between the United States and the rest of the world. In contrast with the assimilationist tradition, it rejects Latino immigration and praises the English language. It exalts the Anglo-Protestant ideals of individualism and the work ethic, disdaining the Hispanic tradition, which it identifies with laziness and lack of ambition.
Trump's discourse resumes the protectionist (Hamilton) and patriotic (Jefferson) legacy that privileges internal prosperity (Jackson). It disputes with cosmopolitan liberalism (Wilson), which associates this well-being with openness to the outside world (Anzelini, 2025).
With this vision, Donald Trump regenerates the postulates of the sovereignists, who traditionally privileged racism and anti-communism in determining external alliances. The sympathy of this Americanist strand for Nazism included, in the past, an affinity with the Ku Klux Klan and the apartheid South African. This legacy is currently being taken up by Elon Musk and, with this brand, Trumpism is redoubling its campaigns against the multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multicultural profile of the Democratic Party.
The current led by the tycoon expresses an ethnocentric variant of Yankee imperialism, as far removed from Republican neoconservatism as from Democratic cosmopolitanism. It highlights the identity-based aspects of American ideology and emphasizes reactionary patriotism as the substantial component of its creed. However, with this ideological affiliation, it participates in the same imperialist conglomerate as the other two currents.
George Bush, Joe Biden and Donald Trump are three forms of the same imperialism that sustains US capitalism. The different forms of this domination are internal variants of the same bloc. Imperialism is a systemic necessity of capitalism that operates by confiscating resources from the periphery, displacing competitors and suppressing popular rebellions. Donald Trump governs within these parameters and his bluntness makes this affiliation transparent.
Trajectories, ambitions and resistance
It is correct to classify Donald Trump as a lumpen-capitalist, in the sense that Marx gave to upper-class financial speculators involved in multiple frauds. The tycoon's trajectory brings together all the ingredients of this pattern, given the number of frauds, tax evasions, forced bankruptcies, deals with the mafia and money laundering that marked his business career. He surrounded himself with characters of the same ilk, with heavy records in the world of financial caves (Farber, 2018).
But this personal itinerary did not typify his first administration, nor does it define his current mandate. Donald Trump acts as a representative of very important capitalist sectors and leads an administration based on a coalition of Americanist business groups, with digital companies that have deserted globalism. He relies on the steel sector, the military-industrial complex, the conservative fraction of financial power and companies focused on the domestic market, which have been punished by Chinese competition (Merino; Morgenfeld; Aparicio, 2023: 21-78).
Donald Trump won his current term with the support of a digital plutocracy that shelved its preferences for the Democrats. The five IT giants now form the preponderant sector of American capitalism, which needs Trump's bellicosity to confront its Asian rivals.
More controversial is the significance of the new political power that digital billionaires are gaining from Donald Trump. They already have the public chained to their networks and keep their customers tied to a tangle of algorithms. This bond allows them to expand their lucrative intermediation in advertising and sales. Now they are trying to project this power on another scale, through direct control of various branches of government.
These groups form powerful oligopolies, which some people identify with the depredation and capture of income. That is why they use the term technofeudal to conceptualize their activity (Durand, 2025).
Other approaches reject this term, which dilutes the capitalist meaning of companies clearly inserted in the accumulation circuits. Their technological leadership allows them to benefit from the extraordinary surplus value that they absorb from the rest of the system. It does not unfold within the framework of natural rents, nor do they obtain profits through extra-economic coercion (Morozov, 2023).
But both views coincide in highlighting the unprecedented management of social life, which has led a sector to capture significant portions of political power. With the support of Donald Trump, they seek to neutralize, above all, any attempt at state regulation of the networks.
The digital plutocracy is directly involved in managing the levers of the State, to shape political activity in its service. Some authors use the notion of “political capitalism” to describe this appropriation. They note the beginning of the accumulation regime, based on the new dependence of business on a political power, which defines beneficiaries with greater fiscal discretion than in the past. Trumpism could act as an architect of these transformations at the peak of capitalism (Riley; Brenner, 2023).
But his authoritarian drift has also encouraged resistance on the streets. Under a unified and mobilizing slogan (“Hands off”), 150 organizations promoted a successful mass protest in a thousand cities. They began to resume the response from below, which Trump faced in his first term and managed to mitigate upon his return. In subsequent large-scale demonstrations, the rejection of the tycoon and the oligarchs that surround him can be seen.
The marches are channeling discontent with the curtailment of democratic rights promoted by the occupant of the White House. If the erosion of Donald Trump’s domestic legitimacy is compounded by the resistance he is generating in the world, the path will be open for a major battle against his government. From this convergence, an alternative could emerge that begins to replace imperial oppression with the brotherhood of peoples.
*Claudio Katz is professor of economics at Universidad Buenos Aires. Author, among other books, of Neoliberalism, neodevelopmentalism, socialism (popular expression) [https://amzn.to/3E1QoOD].
Translation: Fernando Lima das Neves.
References
Torres López, Juan (2025). ¿Y si lo de Trump es una simple madness personal?, 4-4, https://juantorreslopez.com/y-si-lo-de-trump-no-es-una-simple-locura-personal/
Varoufakis, Yanis (2025). Donald Trump's master economic plan, 19-2 https://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/el-plan-maestro-de-donald-trump-para-la-economia
Litvinoff, Nicolas (2025). Tump, stablecoins and power: the plan to sustain the financial hegemony of the USA 1-4 https://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/trump-stablecoins-y-poder-el-plan-para-sostener-la-hegemonia-financiera-de-eeuu-nid01042025/
Sapir, Jacques (2024) The BRICS challenge the western order, 4-11 https://observatoriodetrabajadores.wordpress.com/2024/11/04/los-brics-desafian-el-orden-occidental-el-fin-de-la-hegemonia-del-dolar-esta-a-la-vista-jaques-sapir/
Gang Gong (2025). https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2025/04/14/can-the-global-south-get-out-of-the-us-dominated-financial-system/
Marcó del Pont, Alejandro (2025a). The new economic strategy of the USA (II): the controlled explosion 07/04 https://rebelion.org/la-nueva-estrategia-economica-de-ee-uu-ii-la-explosion-controlada/
Roberts, Michael (2025a). Trump's advances: some data and consequences (from various sources) https://www.laizquierdadiario.com/Aranceles-de-Trump-algunos-datos-y-consecuencias-de-varias-fuentes
Roberts, Michael (2025b). Argentinean War: ¿El Día de la Liberación? 02/04
Nunez, Rodrigo (2025). The rise in aranceles will cause a deficit in the commercial balance and red provinces, 3-4 destapeweb.com/economia/comercio/deficit-de-la-balanza-comercial-y-provincias-con-perdidas-millonarias-los-escenarios-que-se-manejan-ante-la-suba-de-aranceles-impuesta-por-trump-2025431221
Tooze, Adam (2025) «I only made the mistake of believing in you, the Americans». 06/04 https://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/solo-he-cometido-el-error-de-creer-en-vosotros-los-americanos-el-dia-despues-del-dia-de-la
Mercatante Esteban (2025) Trump, engineer of chaos, 6-4, https://www.laizquierdadiario.com/Trump-ingeniero-del-caos
Rivers, Xulio (2025). I have ideas about Trumpism and the relationship with China, 14-03 https://politica-china.org/areas/politica-exterior/ocho-ideas-sobre-el-trumpismo-y-la-relacion-con-china
MIU (2025). Things that have happened to China in the 30 days that Trump has been president https://miu.do/cosas-que-ha-hecho-china-en-los-30-dias-que-trump-ha-sido-presidente/
Marcó del Pont, Alejandro (2025b). The silent war: United Kingdom vs. EE.UU 10/04 https://www.elextremosur.com/nota/53595-la-guerra-silenciosa-reino-unido-vs-ee-uu-por-el-control-de-ucrania/
Boron, Atilio (2025). Trump y su lejano precursor, 9-2https://atilioboron.com.ar/trump-y-su-lejano-precursor/
Cason, Jim; Brooks, David (2025). Trump confirms aranceles; There's no space, 4-3 https://www.jornada.com.mx/2025/03/04/economia/003n1eco
Malacalza, Bernabe (2025). Trump’s “dark power” in Latin America 9-2 https://www.eldiplo.org/notas-web/trump-contra-america-latina-entre-sus-deseos-y-sus-limites/
Wisniewski, Maciek (2025). United States. Trump and neobonapartism https://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2025/02/28/estados-unidos-trump-y-el-neobonapartismo/
Riley, Dylan (2018). Theses on Fascism and Trumpism, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://sase.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2-Riley-final.pdf
Anzelini, Luciano (2025). Ethnocentrist, Jacksonian and sovereignist, 9-3 https://www.elcohetealaluna.com/etnocentrista-jacksoniano-y-soberanista/
Farber, Samuel (2018). Donald Trump, a lumpencapitalist, Without permission, 4 / 11 https://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/donald-trump-un-lumpencapitalista
Merino, Gabriel; Morgenfeld, Leandro; Aparicio, Mariana (2023). Latin America's international insertion strategies in the face of the crisis of American hegemony and globalist multilateralism. New maps. Crisis and challenges in a multipolar world, Buenos Aires
Durand, Cedric (2025) Reactionary overflow of capitalism: the technofeudal hypothesis Interview https://nuso.org/articulo/315-desborde-reaccionario-del-capitalismo-la-hipotesis-tecnofeudal/
Morozov, Evgeny (2023). No, it's not technofeudalism, it's still capitalism https://jacobinlat.com/2023/04/esto-sigue-siendo-capitalismo2/
Riley, Dylan; Brenner, Robert (2023). Siete theses on American politics”, NewLeft Review 139, https://newleftreview.es/issues/138/articles/seven-theses-on-american-politics-translation.pdf
Note
[I] “Trump dreams of a new American empire” (New York Times); “On the global stage, an imperial Trump offers some positive surprises” (Washington Post); “Trump, the outrageous emperor” (El País); “Donald Trump is trying to establish an imperial presidency” (Le Monde), cited by Anzelini (2025).
the earth is round there is thanks to our readers and supporters.
Help us keep this idea going.
CONTRIBUTE
