By MAURICIO VÁZQUEZ CORREA & ANDRÉS DEL RIO*
On Sunday, we will finally know whether the Broad Front will return to power or whether we will have a second round in November.
The presidential elections will be held in Uruguay next Sunday, October 27, and the electoral landscape clearly presents two major political blocs. On the one hand, we have the main opposition party, the Frente Amplio (FA), made up of progressive left-wing and center-left forces, which governed the country for 15 years, until March 2020. On the other hand, we have the “republican” or “multicolor” coalition, made up of right-wing parties and far-right sectors, which has been in power since then. In this brief article, we will outline the current scenario and its particularities.
The formula for progressive renewal
Within the ranks of the Broad Front, the presidential candidate was Yamandú Orsi, former mayor of the Canelones Department, which after Montevideo is the second most populous jurisdiction in Uruguay. Carolina Cosse, former mayor of Montevideo, who also held executive positions in previous FA administrations, was elected as the vice-presidential candidate. Both represent two figures who are part of the party's renewal, each of them promoted by one of the two majority sectors of the political force.
The Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP), to which Pepe Mujica belongs, promoted Orsi. The Communist Party, in turn, supported Cosse.[I] Currently, the Broad Front is ahead in all polls. According to the latest poll by Cifra consultancy, the Broad Front is leading with 44% of the votes, 20% ahead of the second-placed National Party. In the 2019 elections, the Broad Front had achieved 39,2% of the votes in the first round, but would lose the second round by a paltry margin of 1,3% of the votes.[ii] Now, the situation is stable and the uncertainty of the elections is whether the Broad Front will win the presidency in the first round.
However, the scenario is different within the ranks of the multi-coloured coalition. As it is not a single political party, but several, these elections are presented as an internal election that will allow for the assessment of a possible second round in November.
Multicolored applications
In the recent survey (Opción Consultores), 47% of Uruguayans agree with the current administration of the government of Luis Lacalle Pou.[iii] Despite the support for the incumbent government, the current president cannot run for consecutive re-election. In other words, according to Article 152 of the Uruguayan Constitution, “the president and vice-president shall have a five-year term of office and, to return to office, five years must have elapsed since the date on which they left office”. Thus, 2024 was the year of readjustments and reconfigurations in the multi-colored coalition, with a view to the presidential elections.
In this scenario, the situation of the coalition and its members is as follows. Firstly, we have the National Party, which leads the coalition and to which Luis Lacalle Pou, the current acting president, belongs. The presidential list is composed of: presidential candidate Álvaro Delgado, former Secretary of the Presidency; and vice-presidential candidate Valeria Ripoll, a former trade union leader and former member of the Communist Party. Until recently, Ripoll was very critical of the current Lacalle Pou administration.
The former trade unionist took an atypical turn in Uruguayan politics, leaving the Communist Party to join the Nationalist Party in August 2023. Her selection as vice-presidential candidate is considered a risky bet. The nationalists are associated with liberal sectors in the economic sphere and conservative in the sphere of customs. This presidential candidacy was constructed with the possibility of attracting possible votes from popular sectors in mind.
But its construction was not simple, generating friction within the party, producing a drain of votes to the other formulas of the multicolored coalition.[iv]. According to the latest Cifra poll, the National Party is in second place, with 23% of the votes. Let us remember that in 2019, the PN achieved 28,6% of the votes, coming in second place, although it won the second round with the multi-colored coalition.
In second place, we have the Colorado Party. The chosen presidential candidate was Andrés Ojeda, a 40-year-old lawyer who presented himself as “the renewal” not only within the long-standing party, but also in politics in general. With a focus more on image than substance, Ojeda closes the list with professor Robert Silva as his vice-presidential candidate. The presidential campaign of this formula was unprecedented for the local context.
They hired foreign political advisors, international campaign experts, fake news and all kinds of provocations against their opponents. Aesthetics over substance. A very modern strategy. The Colorados are betting on a strong internal dispute within the multi-coloured coalition, to gain more space in Parliament. They appear as the option of the most right-wing sectors, disenchanted with the choice of the National Party candidate. According to the Cifra poll, the Colorado Party achieved 15% of voting intentions. In 2019, the PC achieved 12% of the votes in the first round.
Thirdly, the other partner of the multicolored parties is the Cabildo Abierto (CA), a party led by former Uruguayan army general Guido Manini Ríos. The CA represents the most conservative and right-wing wing. Its profile is militaristic, leading a fierce defense of state terrorists, especially those who were imprisoned for crimes against humanity during the last military dictatorship. As expected, the ticket for October is headed by the former general together with Dr. Lorena Quintana, who was head of the Adolescence and Youth Program of the Ministry of Public Health. Despite its combative and punitive tone, CA is far from the 11% of votes it won in 2019, in its first electoral race. Currently, its voting intention is at 3%.
Finally, the last multi-coloured member is the Independent Party (PI), with Pablo Mieres, former Minister of Labour and Social Security, as candidate, and Mónica Bottero, former director of the Ministry of Social Development, as vice-president. The PI would represent the most centrist wing of the coalition, with a very low percentage of electoral weight. The PI has only 2% of the votes. In 2019, the PI had reached 1% of the votes.
The undecided represent 10% of the votes, according to several polls[v]. And these are the votes that can change the fate of the elections.
Multicolored strategy: “make the Broad Front lose”.
“The future of the country is at stake in the next five years, and this party has little responsibility for making the Broad Front lose,” in the words of candidate Andrés Ojeda.[vi]
Showing a scarce debate of ideas, the main multicolored motivation reflected in the campaign rhetoric is to try to prevent the Broad Front from reaching government again. There was no shortage of fake news, and even attempts to lawfare. It is worth remembering that a few months ago, at the beginning of the campaign for the internal elections, there was a deception caused by a serious accusation against Yamandú Orsi, who was then a pre-candidate. Once the false accusation was proven, two trans women were sentenced to prison, one of whom was a nationalist leader with a notable media presence.[vii]. There was also no shortage of contracts with international consultants for negative campaigns, such as the case of the Spaniard Alexi Sanmartín.[viii]
Along the same lines, the recent appearance on the Uruguayan electoral scene of far-right media operator Javier Negre, linked to the neo-Falangist party VOX in Spain and the freedom advances by Javier Milei in Argentina, who was mentioned by Ojeda himself on his social networks. Negre, as a media operator, his objective is to defame and establish social falsehoods. Like the dishonest question to candidate Orsi: “Why do you want to import Kirchnerism to Uruguay?
But these operators do not act alone. There are international bridges and dialogues between the far right and local interlocutors, exchanging strategies and methods applied in the current campaign. Negre has become a new partner of the Argentine (digital) media. The daily right, which also publishes fake news and misinformation. Negre's Argentine partner is very close to Milei and had contact with a son of Jair Bolsonaro in the development of a disinformation campaign linked to the attempted coup d'état in Brazil; and participated in a far-right campaign in Chile[ix]. Aesthetics of a journalist, content of an operator.
The right in dispute
Internal competition within the coalition presents its own challenges. One of the lines of dispute is who becomes the leader of the most conservative and hard-line faction. This internal struggle is notorious between the Colorado Party and the Town meeting. O Town meeting entered the political scene in 2019 with its militarism and members with a long anti-democratic record. The Town meeting went from being a novelty to consolidating its space. With surveys indicating a significant reduction in voting intentions for the Town meeting, for Manini Rios, it is a mistake not to capture the hidden vote, which in a context of hostility, the voter prefers not to show his vote.[X]
In turn, in the Colorado Party, Ojeda incorporated deputy Gustavo Zubía, who became a prominent figure in public security. This former criminal prosecutor is the son of General Eduardo Zubia and nephew of General Rodolfo Zubia, heads of military regions II and III during the last dictatorship. Generals Esteban Cristi, Eduardo and Rodolfo Zubia, and Julio C. Vadora were key to the 1973 coup d'état and were part of a secret, ultranationalist military organization called “Tenientes de Artigas.”[xi], whose objective was the defense of “Western and Christian civilization” and the “annihilation of international communism”[xii]. Very familiar speech, if we exchange “communism” for “leftism”. As has become fashionable in neighboring countries.
To give more weight to the right-wing line of the Colorados, Pedro Bordaberry is reinstated as a candidate for the Senate with his own list. Pedro is the son of Juan María Bordaberry, famous and sadly known for having been the coup president who, in 1973, began the 12 years of civil-military dictatorship in the country.
Waiting and with surprises in the Broad Front
The strategy defined by the Broad Front is not to enter into a debate between presidential candidates before October. In this sense, Orsi assured that the debate will take place when “they decide who their candidate is. They will decide this in October, because they have already said 'let's go together'”, said the former mayor in a press conference.[xiii]. This obviously left the multi-coloured party very tense. The candidate stressed that “there are four who think the same way, or at least they all agree”.
But the Broad Front also had an ace up its sleeve by incorporating one of Uruguay's most recognized and popular journalists. Blanca Rodríguez joined the FA after resigning from the helm of Uruguay's most-watched news program, which she had directed for 34 years. Rodríguez is the second candidate for the Senate on José Pepe Mujica's list 609. She undoubtedly represents an important addition to the political force, consolidating expectations in the political space for Sunday.
First round?
On Sunday, we will finally know whether the Broad Front will return to power or whether we will have a second round in November. Here are some points to keep in mind:
The elections will not only choose the next president, but will also renew the entire parliament, the 30 senators and 99 deputies that make it up. In this sense, a good vote in the first round for the FA would be decisive in creating a parliamentary majority. Special attention must be paid to what may happen in the Senate.
Two issues will be put to a plebiscite (and voted on simultaneously). Both aim to change the Constitution and, in order to be approved, they will need more than half of the valid votes: a pension reform that encourages the reduction of the retirement age, promoted by the PIT-CNT trade union; and the empowerment of the State to carry out night-time registrations, something that is prohibited by the Constitution. This action was taken by the conservative coalition in government. The first proposal has the support of more left-wing sectors, but has generated conflicts within the Broad Front, with one party supporting it and the other not. The second proposal has more social support and the Broad Front is against it.
For its part, the Broad Front is better positioned than in the 2019 elections, with a real chance of winning in the first round. That is, reaching 50% plus one of the valid votes. Let us remember that, according to statistics from the Uruguayan Electoral Court, 2.765.903 citizens are currently eligible to vote. Voting in Uruguay is mandatory and can only be done within the national territory.
If the Broad Front does not obtain the necessary votes, a second round with the top two candidates will be held on November 24. In this sense, the numbers are within the margin of error, with the difference being minimal. In 2019, the vote was decided in favor of the multi-colored coalition by only 1,3% of the votes. This indicates that the Broad Front has the capacity to retain the votes from the first round, acquiring some for the coalition. On the other hand, not all those who voted for a party in the coalition have the coalition as their second choice for the second round.
This Sunday, the presidency, parliament and two plebiscites are at stake.
*Mauricio Vázquez Correa holds a master's degree in Contemporary Latin American Studies from the UDELAR-Complutense University of Madrid.
*Andres del Rio is a professor of political science at the Fluminense Federal University (UFF).
Notes
[I] According to the CIFRA consultancy, among those who want to vote for the Frente Amplio in October, 83% are satisfied with the election of Carolina Cosse as vice-president. Data released at the end of August. See at: https://bit.ly/4dRDVNR
[ii] Uruguay goes to the second round in its most disputed elections in 15 years: those between Daniel Martínez and Luis Lacalle Pou. BBC, world. Link: https://goo.su/YRb76m5
[iii] Option Survey: 47% of Uruguayans comply with Luis Lacalle's government management. El País, Uruguay. Policy. September 24, 2024. LINK: Pouhttps://goo.su/piq7Po1
[iv] This is the opinion of several political analysts in Uruguay, including Alfredo Garcé, who stated that the election of the nationalist formula “generates an internal cost” and has an “electoral risk of possible leakage of votes”. https://bit.ly/4cSjHSX
[v] See in: https://goo.su/rNDfw
[vi] To see in: https://bit.ly/3TevyUm
[vii] To see in: https://bit.ly/4dNEXdE
[viii] His work is based on the theory of discourse, a political-sociological theory that is supported by four pillars: society is narrative, hegemony is the form of political action in democratic societies, hegemony is articulated through messages and discourse is constructed through narratology.
[ix] Milei is involved in the campaign in Uruguay with a Spanish ultra-derecha operator and ties to Ojeda, Preve and Cesin warn. M24, Uruguay. Elections 2024. Link: https://goo.su/USsavGk
[X] Guido Manini Ríos: “The Open Council does not unite the rest of the coalition and the fear that the Frente Amplio gains”. El Observador, Uruguay. October 21, 2024. https://acortar.link/qzJQmy
[xi] It is worth mentioning that the former General Guido Manini Ríos, also formed part of the Legión Tenientes de Artigas.
[xii] See article by Pablo Raveca published in Semanario Resistencia, available at: https://bit.ly/479mN3s
[xiii] To see in: https://bit.ly/3ARi6zy
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