By JEFFERSON FERREIRA DO NASCIMENTO & MARIA DO SOCORRO SOUSA BRAGA*
The far right and part of the traditional right have adopted an anti-systemic and reformist discourse, associated with moral conservatism and economic neoliberalism.
In recent years, the electoral growth of right-wing parties (of various stripes, including the pro-Bolsonaro party) has given rise to a series of explanatory hypotheses. We point out that the window of opportunity for the strengthening of the right is related to some movements of the left-wing organizations themselves. Cláudio Katz (2016), in Neoliberalism, neodevelopmentalism and socialism, debates the conversion of the Workers' Party (PT) into a party of order.
This change can be exemplified by the complex strategy of reconciling neo-developmentalist policies with neoliberal elements of the macroeconomic tripod, as explained by Alfredo Saad Filho and Lecio Morais (2018) in Brazil: neoliberalism versus democracy. Add to this the complex and sometimes contradictory alliance policy of the political concertation that gave parliamentary support to the PT governments. It is possible to argue — with reason — that the institutional left had limited room to maneuver, given the number of seats in the National Congress. We do not disagree with or intend to disqualify past choices; we are simply discussing elements that should be investigated to explain the present.
There are changes in the institutional left beyond the PT, such as the weakening of the class base in the programs of parties and organizations. However, the fragmented nature of the world of work and the heterogeneity of production relations do not eliminate class situations and their contradictions. This observation does not question the importance of the struggle for the recognition of discriminated groups, but warns of the provisional nature of politics that does not consider the class dimension in the struggle for redistribution, as Ellen Wood has pointed out since at least The retreat from class (1986). Note that the distance between left-wing organizations and a significant portion of workers seems to be growing, as is most evident in the case of app-based workers.
Left-wing organizations also appear to have difficulty in facing traps imposed by the right and far-right. These groups act by criminalizing elements of popular culture, such as funk, organized fan groups and others. This stigmatization is not efficiently addressed by left-wing organizations and entities. However, popular culture is a factor of identification, belonging and mobilization of the working classes.
The proof that the left should face this challenge is in the advance of the right and the extreme right precisely by bringing leaders from the left into their ranks. funk, organized fan groups, amateur football (street football), etc. As contradictory as it may seem, the right wing stigmatizes, but relatively successfully recruits leaders of these movements. The result is in the geography of the votes: some of the left's main hopes face difficulties in obtaining support in peripheral areas, performing better in upper-middle class regions.
In light of these digressions, it is worth asking: do the 2024 elections confirm the advance of right-wing parties? If the results effectively indicate a retreat of left-wing parties in the eyes of the electorate, is the electorate's ideology capable of explaining the situation?
The relative reduction of left-wing and associated parties
To answer these questions, we will use the valid votes for the municipal legislature and the number of councilors elected on October 6. The choice is justified by the unequal structure and nationalization of the parties, which impacts the possibility of launching candidates for mayoral positions and the choice to form coalitions instead of leading them in different locations.
The number of parties fell from 33 to 29, the electorate grew by 5,4% and, associated with the reduction in abstention and invalid votes (null and blank) at the national level, there was a 9,6% increase in valid votes compared to 2020 — meaning 9.751.430 more valid votes. With these considerations in mind, let's look at Table 1:
| Table 1: Total votes for the Legislature of parties registered as center-left, left and linked by Federation in 2020 and 2024 (in millions) | ||||
| Game | 2024 | 2020 | Variation (in millions) | Variation (%) |
| PT | 7,13 | 5,68 | 1,45 | 26% |
| PDT | 4,86 | 5,42 | -0,56 | -10% |
| PSB | 6,61 | 5,00 | 1,61 | 32% |
| PcdoB | 0,88 | 1,70 | -0,82 | -48% |
| PCB | 0 | 0,02 | -0,02 | -100% |
| PSTU | 0,02 | 0,02 | 0 | 0% |
| UP | 0,04 | 0,03 | 0,01 | 33% |
| PSOL | 1,70 | 1,71 | -0,01 | -1% |
| Hammock | 0,71 | 0,72 | -0,01 | -1% |
| PV | 1,24 | 1,90 | -0,66 | -35% |
| PCO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0% |
| Total | 23,19 | 22,2 | 0,99 | 4,5% |
| Source: TSE. Note: parties with 0 obtained less than 10 thousand votes. | ||||
Comparing 2024 with 2020, the left-wing parties as a whole gained almost 1 million votes, but the growth (4,5%) was lower than that of the electorate (5,4%) and much lower than that of valid votes (9,6%). In other words, there was a relative loss: the left went from 22% to 21% of valid votes. Furthermore, the PT practically absorbed the losses of the other parties in its federation (PCdoB and PV) and, despite the ideological heterogeneity, the PSB gained more votes than the sum of the losses of the others (PDT, PCB, PSOL and Rede). In any case, this relative loss of votes resulted in 557 fewer elected councilors. See table 2:
| Table 2: total number of Councilors from Parties registered as center-left, left and linked by Federation (2020 and 2024) | |||
| Game | 2024 | 2020 | Variation |
| PT | 3127 | 2667 | 460 |
| PDT | 2503 | 3430 | -927 |
| PSB | 3583 | 3010 | 573 |
| PcdoB | 354 | 704 | -350 |
| PCB | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PSTU | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UP | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| PSOL | 80 | 93 | -13 |
| Hammock | 172 | 149 | 23 |
| PV | 488 | 811 | -323 |
| PCO | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 10307 | 10864 | -557 |
| Source: TSE and Poder 360 | |||
The PT, PSB and Rede increased the number of elected councilors and, together, absorbed the losses of the PCdoB, PSOL and PV. However, they did not grow enough to compensate for all of the PDT's losses. In some places, the PDT made a major change in positioning to distinguish itself from the PT and its federation, even supporting pro-Bolsonaro candidates (such as in Ceará, where Ciro Gomes enjoyed great political capital), resulting in the loss of 927 councilors — 1,6 times greater than the losses of the bloc as a whole. It is necessary to evaluate the growth of the other parties, see Table 3:
| Table 3: Number of votes for the Municipal Legislature by center-right, traditional right and extreme right parties (in millions) | ||||
| Game | 2024 | 2020 | Variation (in millions) | Variation (%) |
| MDB | 11,34 | 8,62 | 2,72 | 32% |
| PSD | 10,54 | 7,93 | 2,61 | 33% |
| PP | 10,19 | 7,52 | 2,67 | 36% |
| PL | 10,1 | 5,32 | 4,78 | 90% |
| Union | 9,34 | 9,68 | -0,34 | -4% |
| Republicans | 8,17 | 5,48 | 2,69 | 49% |
| We can | 5,60 | 6,83 | -1,23 | -18% |
| PSDB | 4,78 | 6,70 | -1,92 | -29% |
| PRD | 3,51 | 6,26 | -2,75 | -44% |
| Onwards | 3,30 | 2,37 | 0,93 | 39% |
| Solidarity | 2,98 | 4,66 | -1,68 | -36% |
| New | 1,70 | 0,71 | 0,99 | 139% |
| DC | 1,41 | 0,74 | 0,67 | 91% |
| Agir | 1,29 | 0,92 | 0,37 | 40% |
| Citizenship | 1,17 | 3,1 | -1,97 | -63% |
| Mobilizes | 1,05 | 0,75 | 0,3 | 40% |
| PRTB | 0,67 | 1,03 | -0,36 | -35% |
| BMP | 0,66 | 0,41 | 0,25 | 61% |
| Total | 87,8 | 79,07 | 8,73 | 11% |
| Source: TSE. Note: Podemos incorporated the PSC, Solidariedade incorporated the PROS, União Brasil was born from the merger between PSL and DEM, and PRD from the merger between PTB and Patriota. Therefore, to measure the 2020 votes, those that were incorporated and/or merged were added together. | ||||
Table 3 indicates growth in other parties (11%) above the growth in valid votes (9,6%), resulting in the election of 1.763 more councilors than in 2020, as shown in table 4.
| Table 4: Number of councilors by center-right, traditional right and extreme right parties | |||
| Game | 2024 | 2020 | Variation |
| MDB | 8.109 | 7.352 | 757 |
| PP | 6.947 | 6.376 | 571 |
| PSD | 6.622 | 5.700 | 922 |
| Union | 5.482 | 5.547 | -65 |
| PL | 4.957 | 3.463 | 1.494 |
| Republicans | 4.642 | 2.574 | 2.068 |
| PSDB | 3.002 | 4.399 | -1.397 |
| We can | 2.329 | 3.030 | -701 |
| Onwards | 1.525 | 1.042 | 483 |
| PRD | 1.413 | 2.327 | -914 |
| Solidarity | 1.251 | 2.113 | -862 |
| Citizenship | 4.37 | 1.582 | -1.145 |
| Mobilizes | 360 | 199 | 161 |
| Agir | 296 | 214 | 82 |
| New | 263 | 29 | 234 |
| DC | 253 | 122 | 131 |
| BMP | 109 | 46 | 63 |
| PRTB | 97 | 216 | -119 |
| Total | 48.094 | 46.331 | 1.763 |
| Source: TSE. Note: Podemos incorporated the PSC, Solidariedade incorporated the PROS, União Brasil was born from the merger between PSL and DEM, and PRD from the merger between PTB and Patriota. Therefore, for 2020, the councilors elected by the incorporated and/or merged parties were added. | |||
The data presented in tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 form a framework explored in the press. In this sense, the relative loss of parties classified as left-wing and associated parties would result from the success of the right in the municipal elections. These explanations range from the success of Bolsonarism, the crisis of Lulaism and the argument that the Brazilian electorate continues its movement towards right-wing ideologies.
Institutional factors — the weight of history and the effects of post-2015 electoral reforms
In interview with with the BBC, the researcher of the Ipespe Analytics, Vinícius Alves, recalls: (1) historically, right-wing parties have a greater advantage than left-wing parties in municipal elections; (2) the right has many more parties; (3) a greater supply of right-wing candidates (among the five largest parties, 82,54% were from right-wing and center-right parties).[I] Therefore, there is a historical advantage for these parties, offering many more candidates with a greater campaign structure. Therefore, it is important to break down this data, see Table 5.
| Table 5: The six parties that obtained the most votes for the municipal legislature (in millions) | ||||
| Game | 2024 | 2020 | Variation (in millions) | Variation (%) |
| MDB | 11,34 | 8,62 | 2,72 | 32% |
| PSD | 10,54 | 7,93 | 2,61 | 33% |
| PP | 10,19 | 7,52 | 2,67 | 36% |
| PL | 10,10 | 5,32 | 4,78 | 90% |
| Union | 9,34 | 9,68 | -0,34 | -4% |
| Republ. | 8,17 | 5,48 | 2,69 | 49% |
| Total | 59,68 | 44,55 | 15,13 | 34% |
| Source: TSE. Observation: União Brasil was born from the merger between PSL and DEM. Therefore, to measure the 2020 votes, the votes of the aforementioned parties were added together. | ||||
Among the six most voted, only União Brasil saw a reduction, and the loss can be associated with the more direct disassociation of part of the party from Bolsonarism. Given that, in 2020, before the merger, the PSL ran in the elections still very much identified with then-president Jair Bolsonaro and some important figures, despite the break that had already occurred at that time. This helps to understand the growth of the PL, which became the party of Bolsonaro and the main associated leaders. Let's look at the other side in table 5:
| Table 5: Number of votes for the Municipal Legislature by parties, except the six most voted and the Left, Center-left and linked parties (in millions) | |||||
| Game | 2024 | 2020 | Variation (in millions) | Variation (%) | |
| We can | 5,60 | 6,83 | -1,23 | -18% | |
| PSDB | 4,78 | 6,70 | -1,92 | -29% | |
| PRD | 3,51 | 6,26 | -2,75 | -44% | |
| Onwards | 3,30 | 2,37 | 0,93 | 39% | |
| Solidarity | 2,98 | 4,66 | -1,68 | -36% | |
| New | 1,70 | 0,71 | 0,99 | 139% | |
| DC | 1,41 | 0,74 | 0,67 | 91% | |
| Agir | 1,29 | 0,92 | 0,37 | 40% | |
| Citizenship | 1,17 | 3,1 | -1,97 | -63% | |
| Mobilizes | 1,05 | 0,75 | 0,3 | 40% | |
| PRTB | 0,67 | 1,03 | -0,36 | -35% | |
| BMP | 0,66 | 0,41 | 0,25 | 61% | |
| Total | 28,12 | 34,52 | -6,4 | -19% | |
| Source: TSE. Observation: Podemos incorporated the PSC, Solidariedade incorporated the PROS, União Brasil was born from the merger between PSL and DEM and PRD from the merger between PTB and Patriota. Therefore, to measure the 2020 votes, those incorporated and/or merged were added together. | |||||
There was a significant migration of votes to the largest parties, when we look at the group of parties not registered as left, center-left or associated with them: while the six most voted parties gained around 15 million votes, the other eighteen parties lost 6,4 million. Therefore, in addition to the growth of these largest parties winning the majority of the additional valid votes, there was a process of concentration of votes in the largest parties. Something similar occurred in the group of left, center-left and associated parties, with the growth of PT and PSB.
What legislators advocated for in the political reforms implemented after 2015 is happening: the strengthening of the largest parties and the relative loss of importance of the smaller parties, forcing mergers and acquisitions. In other words, we are witnessing a continuous reduction in the number of relevant parties and, following this trend, we should have fewer parties represented in the National Congress in 2026, therefore a reduction in the number of effective parties and in the rate of fractionalization.
"It’s not just an ideological issue, there’s a practical and material aspect to it.”
According to sociologist Tiaraju Pablo D'Andrea, coordinator of the Center for Peripheral Studies (CEP), the strength of the left in the outskirts was related to the presence of effective public policies and a context in which labor rights were more robust. In contrast, the growth of the right would be related, for him, to the capacity of this ideological spectrum to be more present on social media and in the Church and to have more resources available — which effectively arrive through the “[…] residents' association, to the local sports team. It's not just an ideological issue, there's a practical and material thing.”[ii]
Therefore, it is important to highlight a correlation whose analysis is necessary and urgent: the changes in mandatory amendments since 2019 have led to a reduction in the Executive Branch's discretion over the Budget which, combined with the former Spending Cap and the current Fiscal Framework, has reduced the Federal Government's ability to spearhead public policies and their funding, giving parliamentarians unprecedented conditions to direct the Budget and fund works and projects in their electoral strongholds. On this topic, Transparência Brasil analyzed:
“[…] Constitutional Amendment (CA) No. 105 created a new type of mandatory individual amendments. Since then, members of parliament can use the quota to which they are entitled in the federal budget in two ways: by defining how the resource will be spent (through agreements between the beneficiaries and the federal government) or by the new instrument of special transfers, which exempts the parties (members of parliament) or beneficiaries (states or municipalities) from reporting the motivation and details of the expenditure. The money is transferred from the federal coffers directly to the bank accounts of the subnational entities. Such ease earned this modality the nickname Pix amendments […] It was found that the instrument was boosted shortly after the decision of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) that considered the amendments of the general budget rapporteur (RP 9), popularly known as the “secret budget” unconstitutional […] The opacity of the Pix amendments was mitigated, albeit insufficiently, by Normative Instruction (IN) 93 of the TCU, published in January 2024 and by the Budget Guidelines Law (LDO) of 2024” (Transparência Brasil, September 2024, p. 6-7).[iii]
Transparência Brasil believes that the way Pix amendments occur, lacking a better regulatory framework, is, in practice, a form of continuity of the secret budget: there has been an increase in this category of individual amendment as pressure increased on the secret budget until its suspension by the STF. Furthermore, the use of this allocation has reached an extremely high level of nationalization:
Of the 5.570 Brazilian cities, only 1.006 (18%) were not included in Pix amendments in 2024, according to data consolidated up to August. The fragmentation of resources makes it impossible for control bodies to effectively monitor them, and is a consequence of the interest of parliamentarians in quantitatively including as many locations as possible, to the detriment of the quality of spending. Among the “forgotten” municipalities, six have more than 600 inhabitants: Teresina (PI), Jaboatão dos Guararapes (PE), Feira de Santana (BA), Duque de Caxias (RJ), São Gonçalo (RJ) and Brasília (DF) (Transparência Brasil, September 2024, p. 16-17).[iv]
We would like to ask permission to use an illustration from Transparência Brasil to highlight the high degree of nationalization of these resources, see figure 1.
Figure 1: Percentage of municipalities with Pix amendments committed in 2024, by state
Let's look at some figures on the use of these amendments, in graphs 1 and 2:
It is possible to verify the increase in the proportion of Pix amendments among the RP6 amendments concomitantly with the increase in the amount for these purposes. Therefore, the correlation between the quantity and proportion of Pix amendments and the electoral results is notable. Let's look at graph 3:
Eleven parties had access to more than R$100 million in Pix amendments, according to the 2024 LOA. Of these, only four (União, PDT, Podemos and PSDB) received fewer votes than in 2020; the others grew between 26% and 90%, with the largest growth being for PL (the largest amount). A positive highlight for PSB, which achieved the 8th largest vote share and 10th in value; and a warning for PT (5th in Pix amendments and 7th in votes) and, mainly, for União Brasil, PDT and Podemos, which received fewer votes even though they were among the 10 largest beneficiaries. Let's look at graph 4:
Of the 20 parties mentioned, only six had a Pix amendment percentage below 30%, drawing attention to the cases of Novo (9,9%) and PSOL (0,4%). Proportionally, the parties that had a lower Pix amendment percentage have discrepancies that are not only ideological: Novo showed an increase in votes and did not provide details (transparency) in 100% of the resources allocated by these amendments; PSOL had a slight reduction in votes, used an even lower percentage of amendments in this modality and all the amount allocated “via Pix” has regular (50%) or very high (50%) details, according to Transparência Brasil (June 2024).
These numbers allow us to find a correlation. Except for PSDB and União, which showed a drop in the voting percentage, the most relevant parties that forwarded more than 30% of the amendments via “Pix amendments” and, at the same time, reached an amount exceeding R$100 million showed a growth in votes of more than 30%. PT, in turn, had a growth of 26% in votes, had access to one of the largest amounts in Pix amendments, but used only 23,1% in this modality (preferring other types of RP6).
This type of amendment is associated with less transparency, especially due to the fact that only two parties (PCdoB and PSOL) have committed to some level of detail regarding recipient and purpose, and the largest increases in votes are related to the parties that proportionally used Pix amendments the most among the RP6 modalities.
It is worth considering whether the correlation between using these amendments more and improving electoral performance is associated only with improvements and complementation of public policies, with other ways of boosting the campaigns of their allies, or both. Asking this question and investigating the issue will allow us to: (i) understand whether the ideological structuring of the vote is, in fact, the main explanation for the results; (ii) understand whether Pix amendments increase the political capital of parliamentarians and parties exclusively through the public works and policies funded; and/or (iii) whether there are other ways of using these amendments that impact the performance of the parties.
By way of conclusion
We do not ignore the ideological component. Despite being a somewhat controversial topic in national political science, at least two good articles support the relevance of ideology and the coherence between it and the vote cast (FUKS and MARQUES, 2020,[X] SILVA, 2019[xi]). We are, in fact, indicating other paths that need to be better analyzed given the correlations. Another example, if we observe the disputes for mayor, the predominance of right-wing parties is repeated.
About this, the matter of with the BBC states the following: “[…] according to data from the TSE, of the five parties with the most candidates for mayor, four are center-right or right-wing: MDB (1.926), PSD (1.751), PP (1.501) and PL (1.499) […] The only left-wing party among the top five is the PT, which this year launched 1.412 candidacies for mayor […] of the 8.089 candidacies launched by the country’s five main parties, only 82,54% of them were from right-wing or center-right parties”.[xii]
To complete the picture, of the other ten left, center-left and associated parties, four did not elect any city council members and obtained only about 60 thousand votes together. On the other hand, all of the right or center-right parties elected at least 97 city council members, one mayor and the party with the fewest votes obtained 11 times more votes than the four worst left-wing parties combined (more than 660 thousand). Therefore, seven left, center-left and associated parties have some degree of competitiveness against 18 center-right or right-wing parties.
In fact, the left's performance is weak, but it has improved compared to 2020. Furthermore, the numbers indicate a more evident growth of parties linked to the so-called Centrão and with good access to the various types of amendments and which have “fed” their electoral base since the times of the secret budget. In the meantime, it is worth questioning the PT's ability to use resources aiming at electoral results, without forgetting the process of delegitimization that has been underway since at least 2013. In this process, the political and economic turbulence allowed the left to be identified with mismanagement in the imagination of part of the population, favoring the opposition of the right.
At the same time, the far right and part of the traditional right adopted an anti-systemic and reformist discourse, associated with moral conservatism and economic neoliberalism. The left, placed on the defensive, adopted the defense of democratic institutions and was seen as a defender of status quo. There was a distinction: part of the population sees in the institutional left an effort to preserve the political order and, despite moral conservatism, the right took on the discourse of political renewal, managing to mobilize broad sectors of society, uniting criticism with the promise of restored morality and economic order.
In addition, part of the right adopts authoritarian, individualistic and punitive discourses. This is a trap that makes it difficult for the left to discuss public safety. When they do not, politicians from parties identified with the left adopt right-wing agendas: as is the case of Lúdio Cabral (PT), defeated in the second round for mayor of Cuiabá (MT); in the debate on gender; and the use of violence, authoritarianism and punitiveness by the last PT governors in Bahia. There is also, for various reasons, little willingness or inability to restore the primacy of the Executive over the Federal Budget, accepting an austere policy that restricts effective social policies to the Bolsa Família program.
Rescuing Tiaraju Pablo D'Andrea, the outskirts are areas permanently in dispute by different ideological fields and candidacies, making no sense to say that they were left-wing and, due to moral conservatism, became right-wing[xiii]. For him, the left should not be reduced to “[…] just a sector of the intellectualized middle class […] There is another part which is the popular housing movement, the cultural collective, the health movement, the struggles for education, the unionists, the unionized workers”.[xiv]
Therefore, in addition to the ideological orientation of the population, it is necessary to understand what parties and candidates offer voters. Focusing the explanation solely on demand (ideology and electoral behavior), without considering the options presented on the supply side (candidacy and parties), and ignoring how institutional resources favored the political actions of the main “winners” of the 2024 elections, is a way of absolving political actors of responsibility, blaming voters, and leaving things as they are.
*Jefferson Ferreira do Nascimento He holds a PhD in political science from the Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar) and is a professor at the Federal Institute of São Paulo (IFSP).
*Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga and pprofessor of political science at the Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar).
Notes
[iii] Transparency Brazil. “Less than 1% of Pix amendments approved by Congress identify the destination of the resources”. Transparency Brazil: June 2024. Available here
[iv] Transparency Brazil. “Cities with up to 10 inhabitants represent 6% of the population, but 25% of the 'Pix' amendments”. Transparency Brazil: September 2024. Available using this link
[v] Idem.
[vi] Ver note 5.
[vii] Ver note 5.
[viii] See note 5
[ix] Ver note 5.
[X] FUKS, M; MARQUES, PH. Context and vote: the impact of the reorganization of the right on the ideological consistency of the vote in the 2018 elections. Public Opinion. Sep. 2020 (3), p. 401—430. Available at here
[xi] SILVA, TM da. Not so “Flamengo”: questions of position and voting in Brazil. Journal of Sociology and Politics. 2019, 27(69), e005. Available at here
[xii] View using this link.
[xiii] Consideration: in addition to not making historical sense, this argument is used more to disqualify movements in defense of political minorities than to explain the performance of the left. It is a mistake to dissociate the struggle for recognition of diverse social identities from the class dimension, but we do not support a monocausal explanation.
[xiv] View this link.
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