By JOHN GASPAR*
The Venezuelan issue is highlighted by a myriad of interests, to a greater or lesser extent conflicting with each other, of segments of the great global capitalist class and of the national ruling elites.
Addressing the “Venezuelan Question” is complex, on the one hand, due to the historical proximity of the events in relation to the study, which always leaves one with the feeling of being out of date with the “facts”; and, on the other hand – even more so if one wants to do it critically – due to the multiplicity of expressions of the capitalist enterprise that operate in the Venezuelan scenario, often competing with each other, through schemes that are still not very clear. It is necessary, however, despite such difficulties, to continue with such research, in order to broaden the Brazilian public debate on the subject, beyond the standardized narrative “analyses” of the Brazilian mainstream media and the ideological-pamphlet-like ones of so-called alternative and independent channels, which serve more to hinder discussions by enchanting the national intellectuals than to truly foster them.
In this very brief essay, I intend to explore in detail Brazil’s actions in relation to this issue, taking into account both the interests and the political-economic mechanisms that inform and constrain the actions of the various “state” actors considered here as those involved in the “Venezuelan Question”, namely the USA/EU (Western center of capitalism), the Venezuelan State (PSUV elite) and Brazil, with a view to assessing how our Foreign Policy has been behaving. In this sense, I would like to thank those who directly or indirectly helped me in the construction of the text, especially the dear employees of Itamaraty who were willing to discuss some points of the current PEB with me.
Well then. By “Venezuelan issue” I refer to the problem, highlighted in the aftermath of the 2024 Venezuelan elections, that is currently being faced by our foreign policy makers regarding the handling of the Venezuelan drama, which dates back to Hugo Chávez’s rise to power at the beginning of this century, when the Latin American “pink wave” began, and the shock that the changes he introduced in that country represented in the face of the interests of the Western capitalist center, that is, the United States and the European Union, particularly regarding the ownership regime of companies linked to oil, as well as, and mainly, the upcoming developments in Venezuelan history and its relations with Western powers.
The obstacles, in this sense, to the construction of the so-called “socialism of the 21st century” (characterized by the implementation of national-developmentalist, redistributive, revisionist/educational, anti-imperialist and pan-Americanist policies), by the Euro-American pressure on the Venezuelan-Bolivarian economy and image, on the one hand, which imposes harsh sanctions on that nation under the PSUV government and which aggressively strives for its delegitimization and downfall, and, on the other, by the crystallization of the revolution in the erratic-caricatured figure of Nicolás Maduro, after the death of Chávez, perhaps a turning point for the transformation of Venezuela into a true nucleus of instability in the American periphery – more in the sense of showing itself as a hindrance to regional politics than as a truly counter-hegemonic actor, destabilizing imperial power (which is how it officially presents itself).
In this sense, without the charisma and political sensitivity of his political godfather, Maduro ended up leading Bolivarianism towards a conservatism that, having rigged the institutions of the State, did everything (and continues to do) to maintain them that way, instrumentalizing authoritarianism, at home, and warmongering, abroad, in a diversionism through which he desperately tries to shape the support of the population and of peripheral and/or non-aligned States [with the Western center of the International System] for the PSUVist bloc, as evidenced by the violence inflicted on dissidence, seen on the rise in recent years, and the recent mobilization of the instruments of participatory democracy and the official Venezuelan discourse in favor of the annexation of the Essequibo territory, all in favor of the Venezuelan ruling class and its material interests, capital and political power.
There is, therefore, a myriad of interests, to a greater or lesser degree conflicting with each other, from segments of the great global capitalist class and the national ruling elites of the various actors involved, shaping the regional environment in which Brazilian decision-makers operate, in their bourgeois-nationalist tradition, revived in Lula III, of seeking a better position in the hierarchy of the International System.
In this context, I believe that, taking into account what Brazilian diplomats I spoke with, on condition of anonymity, told me, Brazil, not “covering up” inconsistencies between practice and discourse, much less clear violations of Human Rights universally recognized within the scope of the United Nations – see press releases from Itamaraty, expressing concern, disapproval, etc., both regarding the actions and omissions of the Venezuelan State, as well as regarding the Euro-American sanctions against it – has been working tirelessly to preserve channels of interstate dialogue, as can be seen in the lack of retaliation, on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the criticisms made by Venezuelan agencies and authorities against its employees in general and some of its most important names, such as, for example, Celso Amorim, Mauro Vieira and Eduardo Paes Saboia (as if the PEB did not pass through the President of the Republic, that is, Lula!), as well as in the pacifism [-almost-bordering-on-naivety] of, officially, the country still waiting for the official release of the much-talked-about electoral records, as our diplomacy correctly understands that both feeling offended by the aggressions (and retaliating, even more so, for which we only express our “surprise”), and the direct rejection of the result announced by the National Electoral Council of Venezuela, as actions with a high potential to hinder our dialogue, are “counterproductive”.
And this, in light of the deliberate effort of our diplomacy to present the country to the community of nations as having sufficient independence, stability, institutional continuity, credibility and parsimony so that, for example, we can act as mediators in possible disputes, so that we can define, to a greater degree, international political agendas within the scope of international institutions, etc., in short, so that we can get closer to the centers of world power, with a view, ultimately, to attracting direct investments (which, paradoxically, our elites see positively, in their project) and conquering larger shares of foreign markets (paradoxically preferred by our elites to the national, internal one), in accordance with the current class-based project of primary-export (which our legal-multilateralist tradition of PE serves).
Furthermore, to the extent that I understand pragmatism to be a central characteristic of operating modus of the PEB (in line with what was previously stated) – which can be understood, for example, from the apparent contradiction between, first, the current Brazilian government welcoming Nicolás Maduro, in 2023, at an event held in Brasília, as head of state like any other, and, the following year, the same government being rejected if it invited Venezuela to take a seat with the BRICS+, taking into account the current situation and the vision of such grouping, namely, reform of political instruments and global economic insertion –, it becomes clear, to me, the fallacy that constitutes the Madurista discourse, reproduced by various parts of the Brazilian left.
And such a fallacy can be understood, for example, regarding the connection indicated by the official Venezuelan discourse that our MRE would have with the Democratic Party of the USA, as a mere ideological-diversionary construction, which has as its objectives the discrediting of the objective, legalistic and sovereign Brazilian action (whose interests, although informed by the bourgeoisie that makes up the national ruling elite, which manages the Brazilian State in contact with the world power centers, due to the mechanism of imperialism, are not, however, the same materially, with disagreements between our elites and those of the center standing out), as well as the legitimization of the PSUVist regime as a supposed anti-imperialist bulwark and counter-hegemonic force, which, in fact, it has long since ceased to be in the slightest.
Thus, I see that current Brazilian Foreign Policy is well balanced between the gringo-European imperialism, on the one hand – which constantly tries to force a Westernization of Venezuela, by imposing sanctions conditioned on acting in accordance with its values and adopting economic policies in line with that bloc and favorable to it, so that it can thus profit more –, and Venezuelan diversionism, on the other – which rejects even the scant consensus on matters of institutions, rights and Law, achieved within the scope of international organizations, such as the United Nations and Mercosur, distorting them among its populations and other States, in order to achieve economic-political gains that are not yet very clear –, by not abandoning its tradition of PE and by not losing sight of its “national interests” (informed by a bourgeoisie whose debatable nationalism here, in simplified terms, is understood to exist because, for example, it aims at a better position for Brazil in the relative hierarchy of the IS, that is, because being the empowerment of the “nation” an important element of the project of this class), for any reasons of ideological-vulgar affinity/political camaraderie or imperial-based co-optation, remaining firm, even under fire from different forces and in the face of difficulties created by those involved, in the search for dialogue with the parties to the Question, a dialogue in which I understand, as it seems to me, our leaders, are the remedies for the crisis that afflicts Venezuelans with such pain, and us with such inconvenience.
It is up for future debate how the interests of the masses interact with the class project that Brazilian diplomacy essentially serves. Something to think about…
*João Gaspar is a graduate in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC).
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