By VICTOR MORAIS*
A profile of the Minister of Finance in the Lula government
“I see the crowd blocking all my paths, but the reality is that I am the nuisance in the path of the crowd” (Chico Buarque, hindrance).
“I am the cordial man\ Who came to establish racial democracy\ I am the cordial man\ Who came to affirm racial democracy\ I am the hero\ Only God and I know how it hurts” (Caetano Veloso, The hero).
Historian Nicolau Sevcenko used to tell his students that “USP is a womb”. I had the greatest proof of Nicolau Sevcenko's sentence last semester, when my professor in one of the undergraduate subjects was Fernando Haddad. This essay aims to point out some impressions that I gathered during this semester of living with Professor Fernando Haddad in an optional course on city management in the Social Sciences course at the University of São Paulo. More than sticking to the classes, however, I seek here a (perhaps risky) synthesis of Fernando Haddad's thinking as a professor-politician, in order to try to understand how his academic background influences him in taking attitudes within institutional politics.
1.
Fernando Haddad is, above all, an event. Every time an intellectual enthrones himself in politics we have this event. Since at least Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, who presided over Argentina from 1868 to 1874, a tradition has been established in intelligentsia Latin America to intervene directly in the State in the name of modernization and progress, against the archaic. It is worth remembering that, in the case of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, these entities came at the expense of many spoliations, especially of the indigenous populations in the notorious desert campaigns.
Modernity would be, in this case, exclusive. Progress would only come if certain popular traditions were eliminated and/or assimilated to the procession of winners – see that his great work brings precisely the dyad “civilization” and “barbarism” (I am referring to “Facundo – civilization and barbarism"[1845][I]). Therefore, it would not be a question of a choice – civilization or barbarism – but of a constant bellicose coexistence between one thing and another. It turns out that in this Argentine experience, there was awareness and desire for exclusion. Civilization had to weigh more in the balance than barbarism.
In the Brazilian experience, an analogous scene could be found in the military campaigns against the village of Canudos, Bahia, at the end of the 1930th century. There, the drive for modernity – conservative, exclusionary – led to popular uprisings enraptured by a messianic leader like Antonio Conselheiro, a monarchist and Sebastianist. The same modernity, incidentally, that would expel populations from tenements in the center of Rio de Janeiro in the name of a Haussmannian urban reform. It turns out that in XNUMX a new entity appeared in this process, which continued to be conservative and modernizing at the same time. With Vargas, the corporate state, industry and the urban working class, we seemed to be the very raw material of modernity as a becoming.[ii] The archaic would be annihilated, but archaic beings would become modern in the name of their freedom (in a more revolutionary reading, in the name of their liberation). Celso Furtado, in his pre-1964 work, was perhaps the one who best embodied this.
It turns out that 1964 came. And soon after, it would be Chico de Oliveira who would put the equation in proper terms, in conclusion, in his Criticism of dualistic reason (1972)[iii] that there would not be the opposition between archaic and modern that his master Celso Furtado had advocated in Brazil's economic formation (1959)[iv] And this would happen simply because without maintaining the archaic, there would be no development of the modern, breaking, in this way, with a long tradition in the Brazilian intelligentsia that the modern should overcome our structuring archaisms and that would have had its apex during the national pact -developmentalism buried by 1964. In other words, uneven and combined development.
I went all this way around to return to Fernando Haddad for one reason: Fernando Haddad is the result of this long tradition – and perhaps he is the last chapter of this story, as I will try to explain in the lines that follow. In Fernando Haddad, this line of interpretation of Brazil takes on unique contours: modernization would be possible regardless of whether or not it depended on the archaic. Utopian tropics? Well, it would be our manifest destiny – and Fernando Haddad would be willing to do anything to make it exist, including unpopular measures, as will be seen later.
2.
Graduated in Law, Master in Economics, Doctor in Philosophy and professor in the Department of Political Science, always at the University of São Paulo (USP), Fernando Haddad would become enthroned in politics when, in 2001, he joined the government of Marta Suplicy in the city of São Paulo. São Paulo, going from there to compose the Lula government, in 2003. But his political-partisan trajectory dates back to before: in 1985 he would be elected president of the traditional academic center XI de Agosto, of the Faculty of Law of USP, SanFran.
This is important information as it places Fernando Haddad at the epicenter of the student movement of a new era, despite the punishments that were announced at that time. Although he did not adhere to Trotskyism, which was very much in vogue at that time (see the performance years before the Liberdade e Luta trend, Libelu), Fernando Haddad was against the currents that defended the so-called “real socialism”. This led him to a syncopated Marxism – which would find an example in his future texts, such as his doctorate or even the “Theses on Karl Marx”, published in the journal of the Institute of Advanced Studies at USP[v] – which would be able, for example, to recognize the need to agree on a unity to confront the dictatorship that was dying.
In other words, Fernando Haddad would be the result of the redemocratization of 1985 and of what was envisioned building from then on. If it is true that this democracy would also agonize until the establishment of the Real Plan, in 1994, it is also true that after it a social pact was instituted that lasted at least until June 2013, when an unrecognizable, dormant Brazil exploded. But we'll talk about June later. I would like to take advantage of my mention of the Plano Real to continue the sequence with which I started this profile: that of the leading intellectual, bringing this tradition, in Brazil, to the center of the debate. The reason: it was precisely another USPian, another Fernando, to whom the post of “savior of the homeland” fell. I am referring, as the reader must have guessed, to the sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), with whom Haddad has deep elective affinities, although they belong to different historical times.[vi]
FHC also represented a Marxist left which, in his case since the Hungarian Revolution (1956), had broken with the official line of the Brazilian Communist Party, the Party, which believed in “real socialism” and which, after the “Moscow Processes”, it would build the so-called “cultural frontism”, an alliance with the bourgeoisie for national modernization. In 1956, at the apex of the national-developmentalist pact, FHC began to grope an intellectual agenda, also critical of that pact, which would only be fulfilled in the moment of agony for this model of country, represented by the civil-military coup of 1964. shadow of this event that FHC will conclude, in Industrial Entrepreneur and Economic Development in Brazil (1964)[vii] that the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie did not have a national project, in order to be prone to integration with global capitalism. Any national horizon could only come with the left – “The question will then be: sub-capitalism or socialism?”, concludes the book. Roberto Schwarz, in the essay “A seminar by Marx”, will point out that it was precisely this agenda that FHC was willing to fulfill as president.[viii]
Marcos Nobre usually uses the expression “Republic of the Real” to designate the period between the end of the Itamar Franco government, when the new currency began to circulate, and the disruption of June[ix]. Apart from possible criticisms of this nomenclature, I believe it is possible to take advantage of it: this period would not exist without the cause that elected Fernando Henrique. Therefore, it is the discourse of intellectual authority that manages to explain FHC's election and reelection. Under the discourse of political praxis FHC imposed on Brazil the intellectual authority of the Real Plan, which rewarded him with the unprecedented fact of two victories in presidential elections in the first round. As we will see, this is precisely what will explain Fernando Haddad's failure in the 2016 municipal elections, in which he ran for re-election as mayor of São Paulo. It is also about something around the place of ideas. What matters to us at this point, however, is that this authority, a central feature of the leading intellectual, built an empire of reason during the Republic of the Real that linked with triumphant neoliberalism and technocracy. In everything opposite to what Fernando Haddad refers to, although there is confusion in both around the ideas of “scientificity” and “rationalization”.
In other words, if in FHC there is evidence of the inefficiency of central sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie in building their own agenda other than that of passivity to the winners of international capitalism, so that only dark transactions would remain as a result – see the alliance with Marco Maciel and the Liberal Front Party, which anesthetized the hard right until June –, for Haddad the Brazilian bourgeoisie would not be an obstacle that would cancel his agenda, which in FHC would only be realized through an alliance with it. In Haddad, the changes towards modernization would occur with or without an agreement with the bourgeoisie. This occurs because of all Fernando Haddad's actions – pragmatic or not; unpopular or not – are based on one of those elements that Max Weber called “autonomous spheres of value”[X][xi]: modern science.
Science, by the way, which is a central word for Fernando Haddad: his academic production has a scientific intention and all his measures as a politician are guided by it. Something, incidentally, that is still a contradiction for someone who joins the Brazilian portion of those influenced by the Frankfurt School. Going back to Max Weber, the central author for Fernando Haddad, his “autonomous spheres of value” would be one of the pillars of modernity and would seek to break with the unity of the good, beautiful and true. And they would be autonomous precisely because of their way of functioning, which would only require legitimation by their peers. Examples of “autonomous spheres of value” would be modern science, modern art and… modern politics.
It turns out that Brazilian politics and modern politics are not the same thing – see the election of the captain in 2018. In Brazil, as Roberto Schwarz reminds us in his seminal essay “Ideas out of place”, the liberalism of the ruling political classes of the XNUMXth century reproduces characters of an ideological comedy as it sustains the modern slavery of black Africans[xii]. In other words, Brazilian institutional policy has not yet gone through the emergence of Max Weber's “autonomous spheres of value”, either because it accepts everything to survive even when it is no longer possible, or because, under the heavenly cloak of a limp democracy , it gives the false impression of assimilating the assumptions of modern politics, in Weberian terms.
This explains Fernando Haddad's measures that, while mayor of São Paulo, failed. If it is true that there was hyper-exploitation by the mainstream press in the opposite direction to these measures simply because Haddad belonged to the Workers' Party, at the time in crossfire with the majority communication vehicles, it is also true that these measures went against a spirit of June, as will be seen below. In summary, as after June the population becomes insurgent, that is, destructive, there would be no room for Weberian “autonomous spheres of value”.
By implementing actions such as reducing maximum speeds on marginal roads, the “De Braços Abertos” program, among others, Haddad was betting on a public spirit of cooperation, in which each citizen would help build a better city. In other words, self-protection. It turns out that this presupposes a civilizing pact broken by June, as will be seen later on, so that measures taken in the name of the common good, the city, translate into measures against the insurgent freedom to destroy, kill - the case of marginalized women is exemplary in this regard. sense. In other words, an impasse that Fernando Haddad was unable to resolve as mayor and perhaps even today: how to govern an insurgent population?
3.
It's also mister to say that, in the wake of all these issues, Haddad has an intellectual agenda that could be summarized as the idea of reinventing socialism. He, who declares himself a socialist to this day, does not think of it in the traditional way that prevailed until then. He knows that the Brazilian defeat in 1964, here in close affinity with FHC, does not allow for many alternatives. But unlike his department colleague at USP, who shares the neoliberal maxim there is no alternatives (TINA), for Haddad it is necessary to make a path between these stones called Civil-Military Dictatorship and neoliberalism. The first, which buried any possibility of a syncretic progressive project in Brazil in the last century; the second, which established an empire of reason in Brazil that immobilized a series of agendas and public policies – to the point that Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval spoke of “neoliberal revolution” to describe Reagan, Thatcher and their consequences[xiii].
But none of that would be an obstacle for Fernando Haddad, as seen. It would be necessary to “refound socialism”, in light of the defeat that the end of “real socialism” represented. It would not be, in short, time to make scorched earth, but to build the future, now in a new time in the world marked, according to Paulo Arantes, by decreasing expectations[xiv]. Now, that this is the greatest challenge of our time, there is no doubt.
That the audacity of Fernando Haddad in proposing his own path - as demonstrated by the aforementioned Theses on Karl Marx – be an encouragement in times of normalization of barbarism, ditto. But ultimately, as we shall see, none of this would serve in a post-June Brazil, in which the population itself would rebel against itself. The model invented by Fernando Haddad for a “new socialism”, the result of those long-lost years of polarization between toucans and petistas, would no longer serve. It molded. And his choice in view of this fact seems to me to be a crucial point in explaining the failures in the campaigns he ran for post-June, especially in 2016, when what was on the agenda was his administration as mayor.
4.
Going back a bit, Fernando Haddad joins a long tradition of the so-called “training school”, which goes back, at the limit, to Gilberto Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda and Caio Prado Jr. The “training school” dreamed of the leading intellectual as a leader of the nation as a promoter of progress, of development, as seen in the lines above. As 1964 interrupts this process, the “training school” finds itself cornered, leaving it with only negative criticism (identified with Frankfurt par excellence) as a vehicle of resistance against the established hecatomb. Maximum examples of this process would be in the aforementioned Roberto Schwarz, Chico de Oliveira and Paulo Arantes[xv]. Fernando Haddad, their offspring, however, could not agree less with this, since he renounces the specified criticism as a method, in order to understand that it is possible for capitalism and socialism to go together, on the same side of the equation. The last chapter of the “training school” would thus be its non-training and, who knows, its capitulation.
It is difficult to make mistakes when we talk about Fernando Haddad, since he has full conviction in whatever actions he takes. I try to understand this interpretation of modern politics and modern science as a radical commitment to modernity, whatever the cost. What modernity are we talking about is another point. At that cost, it would even be worth losing a crucial election like the 2016 one for whites and nulls, so here we enter a crucial point for understanding the past, present and future of Brazil: I am talking about June 2013.
5.
According to Paulo Arantes, June was about “how we are governed, how we govern ourselves and how now we don’t want to know about it anymore”[xvi]. The ignition key of June was precisely about the relations that Henri Lefebvre saw between “use value” and “exchange value” of the city[xvii]. According to Lefebvre, the city's cohesive forces stem from its festive community, its potential for, why not, use, in constant tension with the city's financeable value, that is, its investment capabilities, its exchange. I say that June was the result of this tension for one reason: Lulism.
According to the political scientist André Singer, Lulism would be a class conciliation movement between the charismatic figure of Lula and some sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie – the one that FHC proposed did not have a national project in the 1960s. which would have weakened the spirit of Sion, the founding soul of the Workers' Party, there would have been intense social inclusion of the less favored, but via consumption[xviii]. Its apex would have occurred in the final years of Lula 2 and the beginning of Dilma 1, with the program “Minha Casa Minha Vida” – to harass the bourgeoisie, in an international crisis with a cascading effect since the bankruptcy of Leman Brothers, in 2008, large contractors they would build popular housing at low cost, which would be financed by the government for the most needy populations.
If, on the one hand, this held our economy back until at least 2014, when the fiscal debt exploded – which would justify Joaquim Levy’s departure to the Treasury during the ephemeral (and battered) Dilma 2nd –, on the other hand, it generated an even greater hardening of tensions between “use value” and “exchange value” of the city. This is because, far from the big centers, restricted to non-heterogeneous zones, the “Minha Casa Minha Vida” condominiums generated ghettoization, opening the doors to their militia formation. There would be little, in short, of “use value”. It is in this context, under this background reason, that June must be understood.
6.
When the left-wing demonstrations erupted in June against the increase in São Paulo's metropolitan transport fares to R$3, a new Brazilian people showed up – and here it doesn't matter where June came from, that is, the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL); what counts is its product: confused streets in eruption. June would thus have represented a contestation by Lulista society to Lulism: it was no longer possible to wait, wait, wait for the train. The “penseiros”, waiting for the train of the revolution, decided to do it ahead of time and without agreeing with the expected heralds of the process.
After performing at the Ministry of Education one of the least lame parts of the weak reformism that, according to André Singer, characterizes Lulism – see the wide increase in access to higher education in the country[xx] – Fernando Haddad achieved the feat of being elected mayor of the largest metropolis in Latin America. It turns out that “the best city in South America” described by the tropicalistas in “Baby” was no longer the same. While the whole of this official country was trying to build an agenda for progress, an urban genocide was setting in motion, which the Racionais MC's best denounced. Not even Luiza Erundina and Marta Suplicy managed the herculean mission. Ditto Haddad, but not because he tried, but because it was impossible. He didn't have time. The reason? June.
When June broke, Fernando Haddad was in the sixth month of municipal administration. And, once the pressure cooker had exploded, he decided to take a stand against June. Let me explain: for Fernando Haddad, June represented the emergence of a new way of doing politics, a non-agreed way, without direct leaders[xx]. The Brazilian general jelly that Datena's program advertises. In other words, Junho was against what Fernando Haddad stood for; was against mediation, for example. June preached the revolt of all against all, anarchy, while Fernando Haddad understood that that political way would be apolitical, so that the germ of barbarism now established there would be born. However, it is worth asking: to what extent is this manner not the result of years and years of hard work of depoliticization? More: cornered by the official discourse of Lulism, wouldn't there be only this way of manifesting and raising concrete, quick improvements in each one's daily life?
In the end, the fact is that Fernando Haddad still hasn't come to terms with Junho. He chose to face June, so he ruled the rest of the time by prioritizing the aforementioned “autonomous spheres of value”, for example. But how to govern an insurgent population, anti-government, anti-mediation, perhaps even anti-democracy as we knew it until then, repeating the old prescription? Fernando Haddad, the most tropicalist of the Schwartzians – because he believes that Brazil has a solution – preferred Chico Buarque and dared to resist. He preferred to pay to see. With the pardon of the teleologism, he ended up with what he ended up with: a crippled country, heading for a civil war like never before in its history.
Not that it's Fernando Haddad's fault, pointing out the culprits is not what matters. What is interesting is to note how the attitude – perhaps even heroic – of resisting June, and which can even understand within it that June is irreversible, that something new was born there, that it is here to stay, also brings with it the idea of believing in science, in democracy, believing that it will be possible to find a light at the end of the tunnel. And that, to do so, it will indeed be necessary to ally with our most archaic sectors possible – how can we not remember the handshake with Paulo Maluf, whom Haddad himself would classify as a reactionary years later, in the 2012 mayoral campaign? Tropicalist attitude? The fact is that there was a conscious choice there not to govern with Junho.
7.
Here we are in 2022. Fernando Haddad was chosen by the Workers' Party to run for governor of the country's most important state, São Paulo. He led the polls throughout the pre-campaign and campaign of the first round and ended up defeated by the June candidate (already capitulated), Bolsonarist Tarcísio de Freitas. But since not everything is blackheads, Lula was elected President of the Republic. Fernando Haddad was confirmed today as Lula's Minister of Finance 3. And here comes the question: will Fernando Haddad choose to maintain resistance, valuing mediation, ignoring the language that June imposed on the country?
I don't know how to answer for sure, but I have the intuition that Fernando Haddad is aware of the irreversibility of everything that happened, even if he insists on resisting, on accepting that it would be possible to govern despite June, thus completely renouncing negative criticism and taking the path as official spokesperson for the party-political chronicle. It would be untrue to say with determination and precision that June still echoes a long crisis in Fernando Haddad's project, however, on the other hand, it doesn't take much effort to denote an irresolute binomial between the country that was and the country that was not - and how to interpret this duality.
Lulismo generated inclusion and exclusion, as had also occurred in the national-developmentalist pact of the Era of Formation (1930 – 1964). It so happens, and that is where the crab jump lives, that Haddad became the second public figure of Lulism, behind only its founder and leader, Lula, when he took the lead in the 2018 presidential elections. bitter years of retraction in the Workers' Party until the annulment of Lula's convictions, in March 2021, Haddad, becoming the second soul of Lulism, had to renounce any critical capacity other than that of Lulism. He became, in other words, the intellectual of Lulism, its operative face behind the scenes, its Paulo Martins phoenix and antipode that now resists in an inverse key to that of the Glauberian character of earth in trance.
Hence, Fernando Haddad simply cannot admit, at least publicly, that June represented, as seen, a fundamental break in Brazilian society, that is, irreversible, so that any discourse currently in vogue of “reconstruction of Brazil” is completely outdated . Because you don't want to "rebuild" anymore. Did you deconstruct yourself so much that you forgot to build? The fact is that the disruption that Captain Messias, the unnameable, caused by enthroning himself on the Plateau, will not end with his collapse at the end of this 2022, in the case of a symptom – in the interregnum the most morbid symptoms can appear, according to Gramsci. This fear feeds another: that the return of Lulism to power will not give rise to this popular dissatisfaction against everything and everyone, funneling social tensions and causing a permanent climate of revolt.
In any case, it is worth reflecting: how can we imagine a speech to rebuild the country after the storm, when, deep down, what remains is an empty feeling of de-ideologization? Postmodernity? It remains to be seen whether or not this very cordial intellectual will be an obstacle in the way of the crowd that has been dragging the tram of History in this tropical country called Brazil, confused and out of control. That it hurts, it hurts, there are no doubts left.[xxx]
*Vitor Morais is studying History at the University of São Paulo (USP).
Notes
[I] See the Brazilian edition in SARMIENTO, Domingo Faustino. Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism. São Paulo: Cosac & Naify, 2010.
[ii] RECAMAN, Luiz. Neither architecture nor cities. Afterword to ARANTES, Otília. End-of-line urbanism. São Paulo: Edusp, 2001, p. 220 apoud ALAMBERT, Francis. The reinvention of the Week. In: __________. History, art and culture: essays. São Paulo: Intermeios, 2020, p. 15.
[iii] The essay was collected in OLIVEIRA, Francisco de. Criticism of dualist reason/The Ornitorrinco. São Paulo: Boitempo editorial, 2003. The book forms a kind of manifesto against the still-unnamed Lulism, which had “kissed the cross”, according to Paulo Arantes.
[iv] See the edition in FURTADO, Celso. Economic formation of Brazil. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2007.
[v] In his doctorate – HADDAD, Fernando. From Marx to Habermas: historical materialism and its adequate paradigm. Thesis (Doctorate in Philosophy). São Paulo: FFLCH/USP, 1996 – Haddad sought to investigate (and refute) Habermas' criticism of Marx, in order to establish an “appropriate paradigm” for this critical current. This impression of refounding socialism, as will be discussed later, would open wide in HADDAD, Fernando. Theses on Karl Marx. Advanced Studies, no. 12, v. 34, 1998, pp. 98-99.
[vi] Forcing the argument a little and thinking in terms of the avant-garde, it is possible to say that, temporally, FHC is for 1964 as Haddad is for 1985. until then, it was led by liberal sectors, mainly dissatisfied with the national-developmentalist tendencies – to the right, it is true – of Geisel, which, in the light of the international economy, brought about the serious economic crisis that the Real would only “solve” in 1985. I adopt this temporality for the reason that FHC captures the spirit of 1964 and builds, from there, an agenda that aims to break with 1994, which would be identified with redemocratization and his measures as president in the 1964s. 64, in the sense of deepening the democratic regime and the welfare state at that time still to be built. What Haddad perhaps did not expect was to see his agenda interrupted (cancelled?) by the uplift of the deep country that acted for and legitimized 1990 in 1985. That this happened through elections and against Haddad himself, the candidate defeated by this agenda in the election that year's presidential election, can only make Haddad's understanding more urgent.
[vii] The current edition can be found in CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique. Industrial entrepreneur and economic development in Brazil. Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Civilization, 2020.
[viii] SCHWARZ, Robert. A seminar by Marx. In: Brazilian sequences: essays. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1999, p. 99.
[ix] A good balance of the period from this author's point of view can be found in NOBRE, Marcos. Immobilism in motion: from the democratic opening to the Dilma government. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2013.
[X] Discussion of Weber's “autonomous spheres of value” can be found in WEBER, Max. Sociology essays. São Paulo: LTC, 2010.
[xi] As this is an essay, I allow myself to doubt the “autonomous spheres of value” in Haddad. However, I begin the analysis at this point based on my experiences with regard to the first classes of your course that I attended at FFLCH/USP. In the first classes, whose theme was the rebirth of cities in the Late Middle Ages, Haddad was emphatic in valuing the model of the city, but also of rationality born there, paving the way for, some time later, the emergence of Weber's autonomous spheres of values. My conviction seemed to be confirmed even in a speech by Haddad himself: “Whoever wants to govern a city needs to take this into account”.
[xii] See SCHWARZ, Roberto. Ideas out of place. In: To the winner, the potatoes: literary form and social process in the beginnings of the Brazilian novel. São Paulo: Editora 34/Livraria Duas Cidades, pp. 09 – 31.
[xiii] See DARDOT, Pierre/LAVAL, Christian. The new reason of the world: essay on neoliberal society. São Paulo: Boitempo editorial, 2016.
[xiv] ARANTES, Paul. The new time of the world: the experience of history in an era of decreasing expectations. São Paulo: Boitempo editorial, 2014, pp. 27 – 97.
[xv] A good reference for the Formation school can be found in NOBRE, Marcos. From “philosophy” to “networks”: Philosophy and culture after modernization. German Philosophy Notebooks, no. 19, Jan.-Dec. 2012, pp. 13 – 36.
[xvi] ARANTES, Paul. After June, peace will be total. In: The new time of the world: and other studies on the age of emergence. São Paulo: Boitempo editorial, 2014, p. 453
[xvii] See LEFEBVRE, Henri. The right to the city. São Paulo: Centauro editions, 2011.
[xviii] The ideas of these lines are dear to SINGER, André. The meanings of Lulism: gradual reform and a conservative pact. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.
[xx] There are those who rightly criticize Haddad's excessive role in the Ministry of Education in favor of private universities, which would have become a true laboratory of individualist entrepreneurship. However, I think that the Quota Law must also be taken into account as a measure that does not equalize the balance, but that also takes a reformism stricto sensu (read: not-slow) to the educational field.
[xx] Haddad's views on June can be found in HADDAD, Fernando. I lived in my skin what I learned in books. Piaui, June, 2017. And also in HADDAD, F.ernando; ALONSO, A. ; FREIRE, CET ; MARQUES, E. ; NOBRE, M.; ALMEIDA, MHT ; FIORE, M. . New Studies interview Fernando Haddad. New CEBRAP Studies (Printed), v. 103, p. 11-31, 2015. Haddad's statement in response to Marcos Nobre regarding the possibility of this new way of doing politics (in Haddad's view, anti-mediation) being something that would become permanent, may also demarcate his anti-mediation stance. -mediation, but this time via the imposition of bombs and truncheons by the Military Police in the name of order. After all, science...
[xxx] Thanks for the meticulous reading and assertive comments by Julio d'Ávila, Lucas Paolillo, Marcelo Coelho and Ricardo Galhardo. Responsibility for any mistakes lies, however, with the author.
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