By TARSUS GENUS*
The former head of the GSI cannot serve as a scapegoat for the Government, which was not prepared to react to a coup d'état, nor can it serve as an instrument for the coup plotters
European and Latin American times are different. The coups are hybrids and are no longer the same, popular subjectivity is no longer divided into classes clearly demarcated by the economy and nationalism – conservative of the historic cultural values of nations in formation – were transformed into archaic and reactionary movements, cultivators of weapons and of violence. This is how it is in Brazil, in Trump's USA, in Russia, in Hungary, in Portugal, in Poland, in Italy, in Spain and in Germany. The vast world of Drummond trembles in a new crisis of imbalances, wars, fascist perversions and gratuitous deaths, outside the context of the traditional wars that we saw in the XNUMXth century.
Sometimes they – the fascists – are in power and promote wars and weapons, sometimes they are in the opposition where they harass the tired liberal democracy. Pierre Bourdieu (Backfires 2, P. 46) rightly says – about Europe under construction – that “across the powers and the powerful (this Europe), which is so un-European, cannot be criticized without exposing ourselves to being confused with the archaic resistances of a reactionary nationalism (which undoubtedly exists unfortunately)” as if we contributed to making it “look modern, if not progressive”. The flame of disaster burns and there are many stones in the way!
The XNUMXth of January will go down in history as a key day for the design of the country's democratic future: a government that was a week and a day old was "taken by surprise" by an attempted coup d'état because, on the one hand, was still present in its information organs and in the information structures that directly supported the President's security, a vast majority of political cadres committed to Bolsonarism and the coup d'état and, on the other hand, because the center of government was lost in space and time. time: it was neither in the occupied Palace nor in the time of the new blows of the hybrid war.
All the people saw road occupations, barracks siege, delirious prayers, financed barbecues, appeals to a supposed God "bolsominion" and even requests for support to extraterrestrials, to save Brazil from communism: the possibility of the coup grew in the bulge of the collective idiotization of the masses, which is the nature of fascism: Reserve generals in the government openly spoke of a saving military intervention, which - in relation to the traditional powers of the Republic - only resisted the STF, led by Minister Alexandre Moraes, accompanied by the his peers more worthy of that collegiate mediation of legality and evaded rights.
Visibly articulated with the coup attempt, groups of government information apparatuses that had not yet been replaced blocked “formal” information to the President, which paralyzed the new political environment of the Chief of the Nation, who did not, therefore, take ownership of what was happening. But the scammers, who knew what they were doing, understood perfectly that – if the coup failed – they would have to take another immediate reaction attitude (soon after the delinquent attempt failed), to be exposed the day after its failure. The task would be to place on the same evaluative plane an invented “omission by the Lula government to block the Coup” – 8 days into the government! – and the coup attempt itself, in addition prepared by Bolsonarism rulers, during its four visible years of political subversion of democracy.
Gonçalves Dias, a decent and honest soldier, integrated within the hierarchical structure of the Armed Forces, would be the ideal “culprit” to “prove” that Lula “liked” the imminent coup movement and even the inertia of his surroundings, to obstruct the occupation of the Palace already blockaded by a bunch of small bandits and big fascist “leaders”. What is appalling is “because” the presidential environment “did not understand” what was so visible: the articulation was so clear and so crystalline, in fact said and repeated by extreme right-wing individuals, who were both in the Federal Audit Court, as well as in the sewers of information, as well as in the networks originating in parliament, driven by (few) active and (numerous) reserve military, as an extreme right that always sympathizes with a regime of force.
General Gonçalves Dias cannot serve as a scapegoat for the Government, which was not prepared to react to a coup d'état, nor can it serve as an instrument for the coup leaders, who, supported by a good part of the business community "the lump” of the country – which prayed for a coup d’état together with a good part of the country’s poor population – stoked and paid for sociopaths who understand that the earth is flat, the Palace is the land of “Mãe Joana” and that God is a bolsomito , attentive to his delusions of grandeur. May the law fall on their heads full of torments and may the feathers not be light!
The most important thing – however – of that January 8th was that the coup failed. But not “because of the resilience of the Brazilian people”, as many supporters of the mystical existence of a “democratic faith” in the spirit of the people have come to say, which, incidentally, is showing itself to be increasingly inert in the face of unfulfilled promises by liberal democracy. The coup failed because the Armed Forces, mostly professionalized, did not embark on the coup adventure. Some because they lacked unity around a “boss”, others because they effectively no longer want coups d'état, others – still – out of respect for the hierarchical norms that govern the institution. And others, perhaps, who may even accept an authoritarian regime, but not at the levels of delinquency of a government as brutally inept and cretinous as that of Jair Bolsonaro.
The good side of the coup attempt is the possibility of a long-lasting political pact in the country and, therefore, the possibility that our Armed Forces discover that beyond the Cold War, in today's multipolar world, the most dignified war that they can stop is a long way from that salvationist vision of the 1970s. This vision certainly still has supporters within the institutions of the Republic and has led, who knows, a good part of them, to look favorably on a sociopathic captain being able to call the National Army “my Army", humiliating its vocation to be an Army of the Nation, which would be lost in the context of a deadly coup d'état against popular sovereignty.
I maintain that what did not happen – a coup d'état that failed – is more important for the future of the country's democratic governments than the unveiling of the immediate motivations of the coup. The search for the culprits is now a function of the justice system and the search for new paths, so that this never happens again, is the responsibility of all democrats and, particularly, of the left that are supposed to be partly influencing the government. The fiscal framework, the fight to defeat hunger and extreme poverty, a foreign policy of dignity and sovereignty started the Lula government well
And these new paths must start from the understanding that our internal and external security are linked, more than ever and forever. With regard to the security of the Brazilian State – in its internal and external dimensions – the hybrid war ended up merging them with no return. And without a doubt January 8 is very crystal clear about this: the failure of the coup was the victory of virtue and this time, which is now opening, can nurture a renewed democracy, which restores the hope that solidarity, equality and justice , still has a place in the hearts of a large majority of the Brazilian people.
*Tarsus in law he was governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, mayor of Porto Alegre, Minister of Justice, Minister of Education and Minister of Institutional Relations in Brazil. Author, among other books, of possible utopia (Arts & Crafts).
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