Lula government – ​​popularity and state project

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By CARLOS EDUARDO MARTINS*

The lack of commitment to a sovereign project that puts progressivism in the Lula government's foreign policy and public policies at risk

Interpretations of Lula's fall in popularity

The publication of the survey on the approval of the Lula government, by the partnership between Genial Investimentos and the Quaest Institute, sparked debate about the reasons for his decline in popularity. The research was carried out between the 25th and 27th of February, coinciding with Jair Bolsonaro's demonstration on Avenida Paulista, sponsored by Silas Malafaia, and its repercussions.

It was published simultaneously with two other surveys by the same Institute that deal with Lula's statement regarding Israel's action in Gaza and the evaluation of Lava Jato, suggesting possible crossovers. Another survey, carried out by IPEC, formerly Ibope, confirmed the drop in popularity with a different methodology.

While the Genial/Quaest survey used binary indicators of approval/disapproval as its main variable, the IPEC survey used three categories, excellent/good and fair and bad/terrible, useful for measuring the intensity of support or rejection, but which does not allow classifying the regular in approval or disapproval. Both converge in reporting a drop in the popularity of the current President of the Republic.

There were two readings that gained publicity to explain the drop in Lula's popularity. The predominant opinion, which dominated the news in the mainstream press, television and electronic media, was that the drop was explained by Lula's statements about Israel's actions, comparing the massacre in Gaza to Hitler's mass extermination actions. This vision, subliminally suggested by the Institute, was welcomed by the government's communications secretary, Paulo Pimenta, and publicized by the mainstream press and international agencies such as Reuters.

The second reading, which does not necessarily exclude the first, was that the drop in popularity could be explained by the interviewees' perception of worsening economic performance. The Quaest survey showed that 73% of participants indicated the increase in food prices as an expression of this worsening, 63% for bills in general and 51% for fuel. This interpretation is also based on macroeconomic indicators, which record GDP stagnation in the second half of the year, after strong growth in the first half of the year, driven by agribusiness, exports and the expansion of family consumption.

I defend a third hypothesis: that the decline is mainly explained by the political strategy followed by the Lula government, which defines as the axis of gravity of its governability the alliance with the neoliberal center-right, in relation to which it moves away with extreme caution and minimalism, considering this to be a fundamental trait of political realism. One of the pillars of this approach is the strict fiscal policy carried out by minister Fernando Haddad.

Such a strategy, which may facilitate governance in the short term, tends to deteriorate it rapidly in the medium and long term, posing a high risk for the political leadership of center-left forces, such as more recently here in South America, Argentina by Alberto Fernandez and Sergio Massa revealed again. Considering this dimension implies the need to redefine political realism to include greater margins of autonomy, political-ideological initiative and popular mobilization as necessary ingredients of political sustainability.

Ignoring this requirement implies aggravating the difficulties and deteriorating the main asset that the Workers' Party counts on to influence the public agenda: President Lula's symbolic strength and popular prestige. Such an asset must unfold and articulate with the organizational capacity of popular movements to gain resilience in the face of the conservative offensive to reestablish command over the Brazilian federal government, which tends to deepen as the 2026 elections approach. however, it does not appear to be Lula's choice nor that of the main forces advising his government.

The hypothesis of loss of popularity due to criticism of Israel

The hypothesis of the loss of popularity due to the comparison between Benjamin Netanyahu's extermination policies in Palestine and Hitler's genocide was suggested by the Genial/Quest Institute as one of the causes of the drop in popularity. This alternative was embraced by the Chief Minister of SECOM and the mainstream press for two distinct reasons. By Paulo Pimenta, to attribute internal effects to a topic on the external agenda, international relations, shielding the government's economic policies from any criticism.

In interview with the program Live Wheel in October 2023, when asked about the criticisms made by Gleisi Hoffman against the Ministry of Finance, Pimenta stated that the government was united around the policies of Fernando Haddad, who represented him in his agenda at the internal level, inside and outside Congress, and at the international level, this being a decision of President Lula. Pimenta pointed out that Lula's loss of popularity would be temporary, and that the President would be contributing to the change in Brazilian and global public opinion on the issue, transforming the international conflict management agenda.

The large national and international electronic media conglomerates, aligned with the liberal imperialism of the United States, saw the drop in popularity as a pretext to attack the Lula government's foreign policy, attributing this responsibility to it. As we know, the Lula government supported the expansion of BRICS, reestablished financial transfers to the New Development Bank, reinforced the issue of de-dollarization, refused to establish sanctions against Russia, defended negotiation between the parties to establish an end to the war in Ukraine, he reinserted Brazil into UNASUR and CELAC and supports the end of sanctions on Venezuela and the Maduro Government in the reestablishment of the electoral calendar in Venezuela.

This agenda causes deep discomfort and annoyance in the interests of the United States and the dependent and associated bourgeoisie. It is for no other reason that one of the first decisions of Michel Temer's government, after the 2016 coup, was to begin the dismantling of sovereign regional integration instruments, acting to suspend Venezuela from Mercosur, and Brazil and five other UNASUR countries . Michel Temer left CELAC and did not attend the V Summit in Punta Cana, opening space for Jair Bolsonaro to suspend Brazil's participation, and was co-founder of the Lima Group, which tried to coordinate the invasion and coup d'état in Venezuela, episode that later failed in 2019. Jair Bolsonaro went beyond subservient foreign policy direction, withdrawing Brazil from UNASUR, suspending participation in CELAC, entering into conflict with the New Development Bank, and mainly with China.

The resumption of a multilateralist foreign policy that strengthens Brazil's insertion in the Global South bothers the establishment liberal. A survey by Instituto Genial/Quaest with the financial market, from November 2023, before comparing Benjamin Netanyahu's policy towards Palestine with genocide, indicated that 85% disapproved of the Lula government's conduct on the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Matters in Veja, Estadão, Folha de São Paulo, Valor Econômico e Reuters highlighted the relationship between the loss of popularity and the statements of February 2024, when Lula compared Benjamin Netanyahu's policies to Hitler's.

However, this relationship seems very unlikely. There was no mass demonstration in favor of Israel, the Paulista rally made minimal references to the topic, with this role falling to Silas Malafaia. In the Genial/Quaest survey itself, the favorable perception of Israel fell from 52 to 39%, being surpassed by the unfavorable one which reached 41%, maintaining the presence of those who do not know within the margin of error of 21% to 20%.

The topic seems to have been restricted to the upper floor of Brazilian society, although it may have repercussions on the evangelical group, it should not be understood as a relevant independent variable for the mobilization of this group. This group has been mobilizing through the action of its leaders to protect Jair Bolsonaro in the face of STF inquiries, especially the one regarding the coup attempt on January 8, 2023, and for the 2024 elections.

The economy hypothesis

The economy hypothesis was indicated by the Genial/Quaest Institute as another explanation for the drop in popularity. Having suffered a drop in prices in 2023, food products once again put pressure on the inflation index from October onwards. It is noteworthy that the 2023 super harvest was concentrated in the first quarter and that the year registered a strong expansion in the production of soybeans (27,1%) and corn (19%), sugar cane (10,9%) and coffee ( 8,2%), intensely linked to exports – including corn in recent years –, which accounted for more than half of last year's GDP growth, 1,7% of the 2,9%.

At the same time, there was a significant decline in the production of wheat (22,8%), oranges (7,4%) and rice (3,5%). If between January and September there was food disinflation, from October 2023 to January 2024 the prices of these goods rose 4,38%. The forecast for the production of grains, cereals, oilseeds and legumes this year is a drop of 3,2%. The perception of rising food prices by 73% of the population has reinforced the Lula government's initiative to resume CONAB's regulatory stocks, emptied during Jair Bolsonaro's government.

However, structural problems of underfinancing of family farming, concentration of the land structure and its orientation towards exports remain. Only 7% of credit destined for the Brazilian economy in 2023 was contracted at subsidized rates, and that invested in agriculture represented just 1,6% of GDP. BNDES spending is well below the levels reached in 2015, representing approximately 54% of the same and small growth in 2023 compared to the previous year.

Even the New Industrial Policy designed by the Lula government, which contemplates R$300 billion in investments between 2023 and 2026, partly with subsidized interest rates, presents a very modest financial investment for its goals and the country's needs, and if it is fully realized it represents a amount of approximately 2,7% of GDP over a four-year period, bringing together the public and private sectors. As we know, the investment rate in 2023 was 16,5% of GDP, well below the levels of 2021 and 2022, of 17,9% and 17,8%, of 2011-13, when it reached 20,7%, and from 1971-80, when it reached 21,9%.

Whatever the case, the rise in food prices and bills in general did not meet Lula's approval among the poorest segments, according to the Genial/Quaest survey. This fluctuated in the margin of error between 63% in October and 64% in December, in 2023, and 61% in February 2024. The segment that receives a family income between 2 and 5 minimum wages registered a sharp drop in approval. In October 2023 and February 2024 there was a significant drop of 53% to 45%. In the Northeast, approval remained constant at 68% between October 2023 and February 2024, but in the Southeast there was a drop from 49% to 43% and in the South, from 50% to 40% in the same period.

How can we explain the drop in popularity since the rise in prices did not affect the support of the most socially vulnerable segments and regions?

Our hypothesis: centrism and the political front with neoliberalism

In our opinion, the drop in popularity is explained by the strategic limits within which the Lula government began to move, which more seriously reproduces the alliance with financial capital and rentierism, agribusiness, the media monopoly and the military, management previous PT members, only surpassed by the change in monetary policy during Dilma's second term, which limits the space for the elaboration of public policies and coordination with popular sectors.

If the period 2004-2013 was defined, for the most part, by the acceleration of economic growth, fiscal surpluses, and the enormous accumulation of monetary reserves due to the commodity boom and the strong inflow of foreign capital, expanding the margin of maneuver of the government, the 2016 coup d'état and the rise of neo-fascism placed austerity as the cornerstone of its political economy, key to reestablishing high rates of super-exploitation of the workforce. The main pillar of this process was constitutional amendment 95, which limited the variation in primary expenditure to inflation for 20 years.

The political crisis of the alliance that supported neo-fascism and its electoral defeat opened the way for the approval of constitutional amendment 126/2022, which made it possible to replace the spending ceiling with a complementary bill sent to Congress to define budget guidelines. This new legal-political framework allows the government to approve its budget proposals by a simple majority. However, the conquest of this structural space was not accompanied by the initiative to lead the country's political transition to a new political-ideological environment and a new coalition of forces. On the contrary, the strategy adopted by Lula for the 2022 elections was to dispute the alliance with neoliberalism with fascism in order to isolate it, getting closer to several characters who participated in the 2016 coup, but later moved away from the extreme right for its attempts to undermine the liberal political model and to articulate the protagonism of an emerging bourgeoisie in exchange for political loyalty, which threatened the hierarchical position of more traditional and internationalized segments of big capital and their autonomy before the State.

Election and governability began to be sought by Lula and the hegemonic segments of the Workers' Party, guaranteeing big capital a greater margin of security and a lower level of threat in the defense of its interests than the alliance with fascism could. provide. This implied an agenda that mixed contemplating multilateralist advances in environmental protection; diversify foreign policy to deepen the partnership with the BRICS, Latin America and the countries of the Global South, opening new trade opportunities and financial and diplomatic cooperation mechanisms; keep organized social movements under control and with a low profile; restrict the fight against inequality to compensatory policies and the eradication of extreme poverty; manage the advances achieved by the neoliberal offensive in State policies, minimizing their effects or only partially reversing them; promote transparency and reduce patrimonialism and corruption in state management; and limit confrontation with the extreme right in the Armed Forces to the circle closest to Jair Bolsonaro.

Such guidelines were and have been handled as an indispensable condition for electoral victory in 2022 and for the government's political stability. Due to this tactical conception, which removes the space for strategic formulations from the horizon, Lula discards carrying out an ideological political offensive to raise awareness and level of popular organization and operates cautiously within the neoliberal framework and the limits of what Ruy Mauro Marini called the State of the 4th power, in which the Armed Forces act as a praetorian guard of big capital and US imperialism, serving as a moderating power and a force to deter more consistent social and political advances.

However, the supposed pragmatism and inevitability of this orientation, demanded by the centrist segments of the Workers' Party for the 2022 elections, must be called into question, taking reality as a parameter. If we discard the 2018 election as being atypical and compare Lula's vote in 2022 with Dilma's in 2014, we will see that the general percentages are practically the same and the alliance with segments of the center-right and members of the PSDB did not contribute to increase the electoral coefficient of the center-left bloc. In the Southeast region, Lula achieved a small advantage in relation to Dilma's vote in 2014, 45,7% versus 43,8%. In the South, Central-West and Northeast regions there were slightly lower votes, respectively, 38,2% versus 41,1%, 39,8% versus 42,6%, and 69,3% versus 71,7%. In the North region, the current President of the Republic achieved his most clearly lower result, 49% versus 56,5%.

In São Paulo, the alliance with Geraldo Alckmin did not alter the electoral results in any way. The conservative base, hegemonized by the center-right, migrated with overwhelming loyalty to accept the leadership of the extreme right as its new unifying apex. In 2010, José Serra reached 54,1% in the state and Dilma 45,9%, practically the same vote as Jair Bolsonaro and Lula 12 years later, who obtained 55,2% and 44,8%, and Tarcísio de Freitas and Fernando Haddad, candidates for state government, who received 55,3% and 44,7%. In summary, the data shows that the alliance with prominent members of the former PSDB, including Geraldo Alckmin and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was irrelevant to increasing Lula's vote in 2022, compared to Dilma's in 2014.

In relation to the medium and long-term strategies of contesting the State for the center-left bloc, the defense of the anti-fascist front with the neoliberals becomes even more implausible. The center-left's link to a paradigm in deep crisis, the neoliberal, opens space for its effects to reach it and the extreme right to accuse it of being part of the establishment, demagogically positioning itself as an alternative through an agenda that prioritizes violence against groups that it preferentially elects as enemies of the Brazilian State and society: the left, communists, China, organized social movements, feminism, indigenous peoples , anti-racist, LGBTQIA+, ecological struggles, for the decriminalization of drugs, for disarmament and against police violence and incarceration.

The rise of the extreme right, in the United States and the European Union, is largely explained by the link between social democracy and rentierism, which disconnected the pattern of accumulation from social regulations and commitments with workers, prioritizing the generation of fictitious capital.

The choice of neoliberals as the main political partners of the Lula government leads to extremely restrictive public policy options that compromise spending on health, education, and public services in general. Although the Bolsonaro government transferred debts worth R$140 billion to the new government in 2023, it accumulated fiscal deficits of R$998 billion in 4 years. The target projected by Fernando Haddad in the 2024, 2025 and 2026 LDOs is zero deficit in 2024, and surpluses of 0,5% in 2025 and 1% in 2026.

The fiscal deficit of 2,3% of GDP, presented by the federal government in 2023, is well below those recorded in the European Union or the Euro Zone in 2022, which reached 3,3% and 3,6%. The European Commission reiterated that it considers the indicator of up to 3% of GDP as a fiscal deficit to be acceptable for countries that have public debt above 60% of GDP. With the exception of Sweden, Cyprus, Ireland and Croatia, all 23 other countries presented negative fiscal results. In the United States, the deficit reached 6,3% of GDP in 2023, higher than the 5,4% in 2022.

The prioritization of the fiscal dimension of the adjustment of public accounts, to the detriment of the financial one, which once again marks the PT governments in the current administration, is a dramatic concession to the neoliberal paradigm. The target of zero fiscal deficit pursued by Minister Fernando Haddad in 2024 is out of line with that practiced by the main states of Western capitalism, being even more rigorous than the expectations of financial market agents recorded in the Instituto Genial/Quaest survey, from November 2023. 49% considered that the fiscal deficit target proposed by the government would be 0,5%, 18% that it would reach 0,75% and only 20% worked with the expectation of zero deficit. The government did not use the deadline it had to change the fiscal deficit target for 2024, reinforcing the forecasts supported by Haddad against pressure from sectors of the PT to make them more flexible, and now it will only be able to do so through a parliamentary amendment.

It is not, therefore, just about moving in the neoliberal paradigm, but about offering big capital, in particular parasitic financial capital, benefits so that the alliance with the Lula government and the Workers' Party is their option. preference, maintaining the mechanism of what Ruy Mauro Marini called in his last writings the transfer economy, in which the State transfers value to the dominant fractions of capital without any counterpart of productivity (Martins, 2023, p. 70) (Marini, 1989, p. 40).

The concrete effect of this line of action is the implementation of policies for the extremely rich and the extremely poor, neglecting an immense segment in which Lula's popularity falls sharply and compromising the center-left's medium and long-term hegemony strategies. in Brazil. The effort to consider Brazil, under the PT governments, as a mostly middle-class country, from the management of Marcelo Nery at IPEA, in 2012, as a result of the income distribution policies carried out, in the opposite direction to the theses adopted by Marcio Pochmann , aim to legitimize this type of policy.

If we take into account the minimum wage required by DIEESE and cross-reference it with PNAD data on income distribution, we can find that approximately 75% of the Brazilian population does not have a family income per capita sufficient to meet the minimum necessary consumption conditions and depends of free public services, and cannot be relegated to the market and its price variation. One of the main characteristics of the middle classes is the ability to meet their consumer needs in the market.

However, 67% of Brazilian children are enrolled in public schools, 77% of the population does not have health insurance, 42% of the population is not connected to the general or rainwater sewage network, only 27,7% of homes have pay TV. , only 43% have access to streaming services and only 40,2% of households have a personal computer.

Bolsa Família currently serves around 30% of Brazilian families and allocates 1,5% of GDP to them. It represents a much smaller amount than the 6,6% of GDP paid in interest in 2023, with the central government being responsible for transferring 5,6% of GDP to rentiers. To the fiscal goal that eludes the financial nature of the deficit and debt of the Brazilian State, interest pressure is added and significantly restricts public spending on the real sector. The State limits the supply and quality of public services and goods and delegates attention to the basic needs of our population to the market.

The result is both the pricing of social needs, making attention to basic needs more expensive, and the relative and absolute exclusion of a huge socially and economically vulnerable segment of the population from public services, approximately 40% of the Brazilian population who have a family income between 2 and 5 minimum wages, according to the Genial/Quaest survey. It is exactly in this segment that the drop is more pronounced, reaching 11% between August 2023 and February 2024, compared to 7% in the family income segment up to 2 minimum wages and 5% in those who earn a family income above 5 minimum wages. .

Although there was a strong expansion in labor income in 2023, of 11,7%, driven mainly by the increase in the minimum wage and the fall in unemployment, demand pressures collide with supply restrictions, boosting food prices in the face of a highly concentrated land structure, focused on exports and very high cost of credit for investment on which small and medium-sized farmers depend.

The government's insistence on maintaining the target of zero deficit, and even exceeding it through surpluses in 2025 and 2026, restricts the multiplier effects of investment on revenue, especially in a situation of high open unemployment, and violently affects public education employees and health that make up one of the most important fractions of the ideological vanguard of the working class, capable of launching an ideological offensive against neoliberalism.

Instead of welcoming the union movement of these segments, the PT governments imposed a drastic defeat on them in 2012, opting for neoliberal fiscal policies, a position they have not renounced in the current term. This defeat opened space for the right-wing offensive in civil society, the isolation of the government and the 2016 coup.

The Lula government, therefore, does not address the inequality and super-exploitation of the workforce that continue to advance in Brazilian dependent capitalism, despite policies to combat extreme poverty. In 2022, the incomes of the richest 0,1% and the richest 1% were, respectively, 189,2 and 37,6 times greater than that of the poorest 95%, having expanded by 87% and 51% against 33% of the richest. last between 2017 and 2022. Only 9% and 36% of the income earned by the richest 0,1% and 1% came from work, forming strongly rentier segments, which continue to benefit from monetary and fiscal policies.

Despite the skirmishes between the Lula government and the PT on the one hand, and the President of the Central Bank, Roberto Campos Neto, on the other, over interest rate levels, no management to remove him from command of the BC due to insufficient performance was carried out, even though the government has a majority in the National Monetary Council. Roberto Campos Neto opened a process at the CGU to investigate the CGU's suspicions about accounting inconsistencies of R$ 1 trillion, his management devalued the Real against the Dollar by more than 30%, and raised unemployment rates to 14,9%, compromising the BC's goal of achieving the economic well-being of society. Afraid of not achieving a simple majority in the Senate or of upsetting the financial market, Lula preferred not to risk this step. Much less discuss the end of the Central Bank’s autonomy.

The Lula government does not promote any significant ideological offensive to alter the correlation of social and political forces, basing its popularity on the history of struggles, working-class origins and personal charisma, whose useful lifespan in electoral disputes is unlikely to extend beyond the from 2026-2030. It does not challenge the monopoly of the media, the land control of agribusiness, the leading role of financial capital, the neo-Pentecostal offensive and the link of the Armed Forces to the 1964 coup and its restricted and ambiguous conception of democracy, capable of metamorphosing into fascism .

This vulnerability puts at risk the succession of political leadership in the federal government for the center-left bloc, as time accentuates the growing loss of ideological clarity and the absence of an individuality that can compensate for it. If there was an increase in resources for the Ministry of Culture, public universities survive with restricted budgets, smaller than in 2023, and a relative drop in students, currently only 22% of enrollments in higher education; the Brazilian Communications Company remains with economic limitations and TV Brasil reaches only 0,2% of the audience, with PT governments never associating our country with Telesur, or acting to rebuild it as part of a possible revitalization of UNASUL .

If agrarian reform remains at a slow pace, with Lula reserving a fifth of the resources claimed by the MST for the issue this year, evangelical churches enjoy the support of the federal government for the PEC that expands tax exemptions for their business conglomerates. Finally, on the 60th anniversary of the 1964 coup, Lula declared that he was not interested in the topic, kept the Truth Commission buried, abandoned the Museum of Memory and Human Rights project, despite Brazil being perhaps the only country in South America without transitional justice and lead the ranking of homicide numbers in the world.

In the scope of foreign policy, the government assumes a contradictory, multilateralist and centrist orientation, seeking to expand the country's international room for maneuver by linking it to a new emerging geopolitical axis that has its most active pillars, today, in China and Russia. , but at the same time it does not challenge dependence and imperialism in Latin America, seeking the increasingly narrow path of coexistence between rival forces in a world that is deepening its bifurcation: on the one hand, US imperialism and NATO, and on the other the other, a new multilateralist bloc that organizes itself through the articulation of the Global South to reverse global asymmetries and build a cooperative, plural, democratic and peaceful international environment.

If Brazil assumes a discursive role in conflicts in the Middle East, anchored in the BRICS and becomes the host of the G-20 conferences, in Latin American integration it assumes a low profile, not playing a structuring role.

Lula assumes a prominent position on topics on which he has little institutional decision-making capacity, but makes little progress on issues specific to the region where the weight of Brazilian political, financial and ideological influence can be much greater. If he correctly denounced the Palestinian genocide perpetrated by Netanyahu's greater Israel policy, he keeps UNASUR frozen and at the VIII CELAC Conference he did not dedicate himself to sensitive topics such as the crisis of democracy, the penetration of drug trafficking into power structures, territorial conflicts such as that of Essequibo and imperialist pressures on the Mexican border.

Legislative Decree Project 548/2012, which ratifies Brazil's entry into the Banco do Sul, never came to a vote in the National Congress, it was removed from the voting agenda in 2015 and the Lula government has shown no intention of resuming it.

Limited by the commitment to dependence that assumes an extremely parasitic and predatory financial profile in the current phase of world capitalism and by adherence to the precepts of liberal imperialism in the United States, increasingly detached from the development of the productive forces of South America, but guarantor of austerity policies, the social limits of Brazilian democracy, and a low-density regional integration, incapable of challenging its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, the country's international policy is not capable of realizing its vocation of continental leadership, keeping the possibilities underutilized regional and national development projects.

Named proud and active, and not sovereign, instead of independent, from the 1960s, our foreign policy seems to be more interested in highlighting characteristics of interaction and adaptation in an external environment in which it intends to move, than in promoting and leading a new international standard where we want to reach.

It is exactly the lack of commitment to a sovereign project that puts progressivism in the Lula government's foreign policy and public policies at risk. Its dimensions appear to be insufficient or limited for a time in which confrontations are accelerating, in which the extreme right feeds on the dissatisfaction of popular segments with the limitation of center-left democracy projects to propose a turn to transitional political systems towards the fascism, questioning the nature of democracy and the real intentions of the left. Confronting fascism and the extreme right consistently requires another type of political strategy that the alliance with decadent liberal oligarchies cannot provide.

*Carlos Eduardo Martins is a professor at the Institute of International Relations and Defense (IRID) at UFRJ. Author of Globalization, dependence and neoliberalism in Latin America (Boitempo). [https://amzn.to/3U76teO]

References


MARINI, Ruy Mauro. State, economic groups and political projects in Brazil (1945-1988), 1989. Mimeo.

MARTINS, Carlos Eduardo. Ruy Mauro Marini and the dialectics of contemporary capitalism. Reorient: Studies on Marxism, dependence and world systems, v. 3, n.1, p. 38-73, 2023.

Originally published on Boitempo's blog [https://blogdaboitempo.com.br/2024/04/03/o-governo-lula-a-popularidade-eo-projeto-de-estado/]


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