By VALERIO ARCARY*
The election in São Paulo is the “mother” of all battles. Even if it loses in almost all capitals outside the Northeast, if the left wins in São Paulo it balances the outcome of the electoral balance.
The municipal elections are expected to confirm, on a national scale, a political balance of power that is unfavorable to the left. But there is a paradox. The two currents with the greatest national presence are Lulaism and Bolsonarism. It turns out that the centrists are expected to be the strongest camp in these elections. The collapse of the PSDB, the party that held the position of political and ideological leadership of the ruling class for 25 years, has opened up a leadership crisis for the capitalists.
The pendulum of representation has swung sharply to the right. An extreme right has emerged, led by a radicalized fraction of the bourgeoisie. And the “historical” hard right has been pulverized. The PSDB’s role as a political-electoral center has been taken over by the centrists in the National Congress, with Arthur Lira in the Chamber of Deputies and Rodrigo Pacheco in the Senate.
But the centrão is not a conglomeration of the Center. The centrão is a bizarre alliance front of ten right-wing parties, among them, União Brasil, heir to the PFL/Democrats and PSL, the party used by Jair Bolsonaro to get elected in 2018, PSD led by Gilberto Kassab, Progressive Party, which has a thread of continuity with the Arena of the military dictatorship, represented by Ciro Nogueira, Republicanos, built from the influence of the Universal Church of Edir Macedo and presided by Marcos Pereira, MDB led by Baleia Rossi and Ricardo Nunes, mayor of São Paulo, in addition to Podemos, and the merger of PTB/Patriotas.
This is the format that the right has taken in Brazil, and it should be the political field that will come out on top in the municipal elections. It is not in a position to compete for national power. But without it, Bolsonarism will not be able to defeat Lula in 2026 either.
Three most powerful trends have been expressed so far in the final stretch of the first round of the 2024 municipal elections: (a) the favoritism of the reelection of current mayors as a national phenomenon; (b) a polarization between the right and the extreme right in the North and Center-West; where Bolsonarism won in 2022, in Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte in the Southeast, and in most cities in the South; (c) a strengthening of the extreme right on a national scale with expanded capillarity.
Across the board, the polarization between the two most powerful currents, Lulaism and Bolsonarism, is most pronounced in the Northeast and in the capital of São Paulo. PSOL and PT candidates could reach the second round in São Paulo, Fortaleza, Porto Alegre, Teresina, Natal and Goiânia; and they are also competitive in some large and medium-sized cities such as Araraquara, São Carlos and Campinas, in the interior of São Paulo, and Contagem, Juiz de Fora in Minas Gerais.
The election in São Paulo is the “mother” of all battles. Even if the left loses in almost all capitals outside the Northeast, if it wins in São Paulo it will balance the outcome of the electoral balance. The most likely hypothesis is that Guilherme Boulos will win a place in the second round. But the picture, just a few days before the vote, is one of disturbing uncertainty for five reasons:
(a) a three-way technical tie remains, after a campaign of unusual and relentless violence, and exposure on TV and radio for a month, with small fluctuations in the margin of error of the median of the polls; (b) the last-minute vote definition, the time of the sprint, should favor Guilherme Boulos and Pablo Marçal, who are the candidates with the greatest vote consolidation, and the greatest engagement on the streets and on social networks; (c) the higher rejection rates of Boulos and Marçal are a sideways but not irrelevant indicator; (d) Ricardo Nunes maintains the support of a portion of Lula's voters in the lower classes; (e) Tabata Amaral shows resilience with a vote that fluctuates around 10%.
Although the technical tie is three-way, the decisive dispute seems to be for a seat between Ricardo Nunes and Pablo Marçal who are competing for the same space. The outcome of this fight is unpredictable because it depends, essentially, on the fate of the votes that respond to the appeal of the extreme right, and rests on three factors:
(a) Pablo Marçal will probably have a final push because his candidacy is supported by the most radicalized core of Bolsonarism, and he may also benefit from a surprising “silent” or embarrassed vote that is not captured by the polls that Nunes does not attract; (b) Ricardo Nunes benefits, like most mayors, from a positive or even just regular evaluation of his term in office due to the works carried out, but that counts when expectations are very low, and he will insist on positioning himself in the center as a “safety” option against Guilherme Boulos and Marçal; (c) the tactical calculation of a useful vote for Ricardo Nunes because he would be the candidate who would, in principle, have the best chance of defeating Guilherme Boulos in the second round.
Guilherme Boulos has one foot in the second round, but it will be with “emotion”. Three main factors legitimize this assessment: (a) the anti-Bolsonaro space is in the majority, after all, Lula (47,5%) beat Bolsonaro (37,99%) in the capital, despite the votes of Simone Tebet (8,1%) and Ciro Gomes (4,32%), and his presence may be qualitative to attract votes for Ricardo Nunes, while the absence of Jair Bolsonaro weakens Pablo Marçal, and the role of Tarcísio de Freitas does not compensate for Lula's charisma. (b) Guilherme Boulos remains ahead in spontaneous polls, which indicates the consolidation of his 25%, or something between 28% and 30% of valid votes, if abstention is neither much higher nor lower than 15% (14% in 2022, although these were general elections), while Ricardo Nunes' vote is not very consolidated, and the rejection of Pablo Marçal outside of Bolsonarism is immense; (c) the volume of campaigning driven by activists after the debate Globo network it could be an unstoppable “drag” factor for a useful wave of votes against the danger of the fascist Pablo Marçal, dehydrating Tabata Amaral’s vote.
It turns out that underestimating the far right has been the most constant mistake of the Brazilian left since 2018. Guilherme Boulos' campaign focused on fighting the two candidates from Bolsonaro's party. He did not choose a main enemy, although he focused more on Ricardo Nunes. This choice followed the calculation that Ricardo Nunes positioned himself throughout the campaign, until this last week, electorally, ahead of Pablo Marçal.
But polls, however important they may be, are always a yesterday, a photo in the rearview mirror. The extreme power of Pablo Marçal's campaign is evident on the streets and on social media and, more recently, even in polls. In a political struggle, you have to take risks to win. The electoral dispute does not reproduce the conditions of a fight between only two enemies. Sometimes it is like billiards, a triangular move decides. Attracting the majority of the anti-Bolsonaro vote requires facing Pablo Marçal head on.
Getting the line right for the final debate will be crucial. But the most important thing will be to ignite confidence and enthusiasm among the activists that it is possible to win. A victory is achieved with a lot of struggle.
Guilherme Boulos in the second round: to the streets, to the streets, to the streets!
* Valerio Arcary is a retired professor of history at the IFSP. Author, among other books, of No one said it would be Easy (boitempo). [https://amzn.to/3OWSRAc]
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