By EMILIO CAFASSI*
The government's actions are causing an unprecedented reinforcement of social control, reaching a scope greater than that of the right-wing governments of Menem or Macri
In the Argentine political circus, the script seems to have been written exclusively by the government's pen, with the plot centered on financial policy and, more especially, exchange rate strategy. This emphasis eclipses any debate on the ongoing economic-social reconfiguration, whose deepening is glimpsed through the analysis of the legal arsenal already available.
Through a mechanical association between intervention in the foreign exchange market and the inflation rate, it is intended to offer a solution to an indisputable popular concern: the constant increase in the cost of living, with an official inflation of 79,8% in the first six full months of Javier Milei's management.
During almost the entire month of July, press headlines displayed a series of technical details about the intervention in public finances and the multiple types of exchange rates that exist: official dollar, blend dollar, tarjeta dollar, dollar counted with liqui, MEP dollar, blue dollar , among the best known.[1] In this financial orchestra, the absence of a free quote, although illegal, coexists in a complex but extensive harmony.
The financial and exchange rate variables, the evolution of reserves and the accounting of public accounts contrast sharply with the little impact that the hegemonic media gives to the consequences of the collapse of the socio-productive fabric and the social deterioration caused by these measures. Carlos Pagni, probably the most lucid spokesman for the tribulations of the right, questions himself in the pages of the aristocratic newspaper La Nación if the exchange rate difference does not condition the political gap.
Although, after the debate and approval of the government's legislative initiative, we had already alluded in these pages to the collaboration and action of a majority of legislators and printed and audiovisual media, and judges by default, I consider it necessary to deepen the strategic nature of the agreements legal-political achievements achieved with the three broad regulations in force.
They are: “Necessity and Urgency Decree” (DNU, 70/2023) with which Javier Milei began his administration last December, the resolution known as “Security Protocol” (PS, 943/2023) of the homonymous ministry under the command of Patricia Bullrich, and the call “Ley Combi” (LC), recently approved by parliament under negotiations that reflected the extent to which a substantive and majority political bloc represents a political option as innovative as it is sinisterly acquiescent, capable of rearticulating power relations or, as the media call them, “the gap” .
These three regulations, acting together, symbolize an integral reconfiguration of the Argentine State and economy. Under the banner of modernizing the country through deregulation and privatization, they launch a series of multiple threats to popular interests.
Although we can find antecedents of reduced labor protections, accompanied by market flexibility and liberalization — a well-trodden path to greater concentration of wealth and de facto power — this movement is intertwined with an unprecedented strengthening of social control, which drastically restricts the right to protest and freedom of expression, reaching an unprecedented depth and scope, superior even to those of the right-wing governments of Carlos Menem or Maurício Macri.
It is a political phenomenon that transcends the mere technicalist rubbish of financial anglicisms or the echo of a revived neoliberalism. By brutally synthesizing the essence and magnitude of this formally articulated anti-popular strategy, at least five inevitable axes are revealed. I prefer to run the risk of disturbing the reader with reference to the normative set, rather than falling into the generic narrative of repetitions or simple analogies, as I believe that strategies should be revealed and not assumed.
(i) Economic Deregulation and Market Liberalization. The heart of these legislations beats to the rhythm of a wild market, eliminating any barrier to your empire. The DNU proclaims the deregulation of trade, services and industry, eliminating restrictions that allegedly distort prices and stifle free private enterprise (art. 1).
It also declares the eradication of all regulatory requirements that prevent the spontaneous interaction between supply and demand (art. 2). At the same time, in art. 3, promotes greater insertion in global trade, aligning Argentine regulations with international standards, specifically with the recommendations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). To this end, it repeals laws that restrict economic activity, such as the Supply Law (nº 20.680), the Industrial Promotion Law (nº 21.608) and the Gondola Law (nº 27.545), among others.
These revocations seek to eliminate obstacles to free trade and competitiveness (arts. 4 to 12), allowing the transformation of public companies into public limited companies in 180 days (art. 13), a measure reinforced by the LC in its art. . 48, eliminating public law advantages. This includes state-owned companies and mixed-capital companies. The LC also amends Law 23.696 to facilitate privatization and promote employee participation in the ownership of state-owned companies, encouraging the transfer of shares to employees (arts. 41 to 47) or revoking decrees from previous regulatory frameworks (arts. 36 to 40 ).
(ii) State Reform and Privatization. Articles 13 to 35 of the DNU cover laws and regulate vital sectors such as energy, mining and agriculture, opening the doors to private participation. Examples of this include the repeal of Law No. 18.425 on Commercial Promotion and Law No. 27.113 of the National Public Laboratory Agency. Article 52 reduces state control over privatized companies, freeing their operations from government restrictions.
The LC repeals laws that imposed tax restrictions and subsidies, providing greater flexibility in the management of resources and fees. This includes the elimination of subsidies for public and energy services (arts. 36-40), a measure that paints a scenario where the State is reconfigured, giving way to market forces and promoting a new era of privatization.
(iii) The DNU makes changes to the Employment Contract Law (nº 20.744) and the Labor Law (nº 24.013), paving the way for more agile hiring and dismissal of employees, reducing remuneration and making employment contracts more flexible. These measures include the extension of the trial period and the authorization of alternative compensation mechanisms (arts. 53-70).
Furthermore, it redefines the scope of application of the Employment Contract Law, excluding certain workers, such as those in the public and agricultural sectors, from its more protective provisions (art. 65), or eliminating the principle of the most favorable standard for the worker in case of doubt, thus eroding legal protections for employees (art. 66). The LC establishes a simplified and digitized labor registration system, with the stated aim of reducing informality, although it also weakens traditional labor protections.
It includes changes to labor laws to facilitate flexibility and reduce costs for employers, such as changes to Law No. 20.744 to make labor relations more flexible, allowing more flexible contracts and the elimination of certain labor guarantees (arts. 68 to 70). Although this is the only case in which the judiciary intervened, giving rise to a precautionary measure that leaves the measures suspended, the objective remains clear: the dominant strategy remains and its importance must be given.
(iv) Strengthening Security and Social Control. The PS reverses the long tradition of public street protest that was established with the emergence of the picket movement and coexisted for more than two decades. Today it gives security forces the power to intervene without the need for a court order in the event of roadblocks, classifying them as flagrant crimes. This intervention extends to national roads and other roads under federal jurisdiction (art. 1), authorizing security forces to unblock communication routes with the minimum necessary force.
The intervention must be immediate and without a prior court order (art. 2), applying to any concentration of people or placement of obstacles that reduce the width of streets, roads or avenues (art. 3). The security forces' actions will aim to clear access and communication or transport routes until the space designated for circulation is completely free (art. 4).
Furthermore, it requires the identification of protesters and vehicles, allowing for future legal and administrative actions against protest organizations and participants. This includes identifying perpetrators, accomplices and instigators through filming and other digital means (articles 6 to 8). Culminating, article 11 allows the Ministry of Security to sue organizations and those responsible for the costs of operations and damages, as well as send data to the National Directorate of Migrations in the case of foreigners involved.
(v) Reduction in public spending. The DNU declares a public emergency in several areas, including fiscal and tariff areas, until December 31, 2025, opening the door for drastic fiscal adjustments. This implies the elimination of subsidies and the reduction of public spending (art. 1). State control over prices and tariffs is removed (articles 36 to 50), triggering a new order where public finances are subject to relentless austerity, sacrificing on the altar of economic efficiency the protections and support that once supported consumers most vulnerable.
This quick and synthetic note is not intended to induce the search for retrospectives, whose usefulness I do not disregard for historiography, but rather to appreciate the exceptionality and drama of the growing political consensus that is articulated — in the “caste” — around the phenomenon of Javier Milei , as emerging from a relentlessly regressive transformation of Argentine society. In nautical and aviation jargon, when a catastrophe is imminent, one shouts: mayday!!!
*Emilio Cafassi is senior professor of sociology at the University of Buenos Aires.
Translation: Arthur Scavone.
Translator's note
[1] Official Dollar: Refers to the official exchange rate established by the Argentine government for converting the Argentine peso into dollars. Dollar Blend: is the value of the dollar received by exporters that contains 80% of the official dollar and 20% of the CCL. Dólar Tarjeta: It is for credit card purchases abroad and local payment in pesos, at the official value in dollars plus various taxes, making it even more expensive than the Blue dollar. Dólar Contado con Liquidación (CCL): It is a form of currency movement that allows money to leave the country by exchanging pesos for dollars and then converting them back into reais or a different currency outside of Argentina. Dollar MEP (Electronic Payments Market): It is a way of buying and selling dollars that takes place within the local financial market. Blue Dollar: This is the term used for the dollar that is sold on the parallel market.
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