Marielle Franco and federal intervention



The federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro was not just aimed at the issue of public security in the state. It was a fundamental part of a political project

Post by Marielle Franco on Facebook, four days before she was murdered.

“We will not allow it to become the Amarildo case, whose murder demoralized the UPP program”
(Carlos Marun, cited in HIRABAHASI; RODRIGUES, 2018).

“I could have announced the solution to the Marielle case, says Braga Netto”
(RESENDE, 2019).

When discussing the possible motivations for the murders of Marielle Franco and Anderson Gomes, the Federal Police's final report provides an overview of Marielle Franco's political activities in the two years she was a councilor: “Her short term was marked by the defense of women , racial equality and the LGBTQIA+ agenda (…) Marielle was also notable for her harsh criticism of politicians, notably those from the PMDB/RJ (…); for the repression of police violence in needy communities; as well as for her opposition to the recently decreed federal intervention, in February 2018, having even been appointed President of the Intervention Oversight Commission, a few weeks before being victimized. However, based on the facts portrayed in Ronnie Lessa's award-winning collaboration, the determining reason for his death would be related to an issue carried out in a more discreet way by his parliamentary mandate, namely: the defense of the right to housing” (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2024, p .258).

In 2016, the Brazão brothers infiltrated the PSol informant Laerte Lima Silva (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2024). In his plea bargain, Marielle Franco's killer cites Laerte Lima to justify the issue of housing as motivation for the Brazão brothers to commit the crime to him: “in the words of Ronnie Lessa, Laerte could have 'decorated the peacock', taking the brothers the mistaken overestimation of Marielle Franco’s political actions in this area” (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2024, p. 184).

During 2017, Marielle Franco voted against Bill 174/2016, prepared by then councilor Chiquinho Brazão. The project aims to regularize subdivisions in neighborhoods in the northern region of Rio de Janeiro (CÂMARA MUNICIPAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2018). These regularizations were in the commercial interest of the Brazão brothers.

On May 26, 2017, Marielle Franco voted against the constitutionality of the bill. Of the 42 councilors present, 38 voted for constitutionality and 4 voted against (DCM, 2017a, p. 12). On November 23, 2017, Marielle Franco voted against the replacement for the Bill. Of the 34 councilors present, 27 voted in favor and 7 voted against (DCM, 2017b, p. 19). The votes against, specifically, from Marielle, would have angered Chiquinho Brazão (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2024, p. 227).

The Brazão brothers began negotiations over the murder of Marielle Franco with Ronnie Lessa in September 2017 (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2024). Therefore, before the second vote related to Bill 174/2016. Police Chief Rivaldo Barbosa, at the time director of the PCERJ Civil Police Homicide Division, participated in planning the crime. When the murder occurred, the police chief had just been appointed Chief of Civil Police by the federal intervener in the State of Rio de Janeiro.

It was up to General Richard Nunes, who served as Secretary of State for Public Security during the federal intervention, to choose the Chief of Police from “a list of five names originating from intelligence from the Eastern Military Command” (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2024 , p. 49). According to the general, his favorite for the position was delegate Delmir Gouveia who, despite not being on the list, had worked with him in the Maré pacification operation. However, the delegate declined the invitation.

Police chief Rivaldo Barbosa was chosen because of his work, between 2012 and 2015, heading the Capital Homicide Police Station (DHC), especially his investigation into the Amarildo case. The Undersecretariat of Intelligence, commanded by Richard Nunes, contraindicated the name of Rivaldo Barbosa. However, the general considered that the alleged reasons were not based on objective data (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2024).

The Federal Police did not ask General Richard Nunes which four other delegates made up the list. The reasons that could have motivated Chief Delmir Gouveia not to take over as Chief of Police were also not questioned. Of course, if the other delegates on the list declined the invitation, only the name of Rivaldo Barbosa would be left.

Before taking on the coordination of federal intervention, General Braga Netto was the Military Commander of the East. It is understandable that the list for Chief of Police was drawn up by the intelligence service he commanded. On the other hand, Chiquinho Brazão was one of the chiefs of the PMDB, the party of the president of the republic that decreed federal intervention, it is likely that he or someone from his political group suggested the name of Rivaldo Barbosa.

Among the agendas of Marielle Franco's political activism were pacification operations and federal intervention. Raised and trained in the Maré community, Marielle Franco completed a master's degree in administration on the UPPs.

In the chapter “Popular organization and possible resistance”, Marielle Franco (2014) emphasizes the importance of popular participation in the defense of human rights. Among the projects developed by residents, Marielle highlights the Santa Marta's popular primer: police approach (VISÃO DA FAVELA BRAZIL, 2010).

The production of the booklet had the support of several groups and organizations, including: Amnesty International, Justiça Global, Grupo Eco and the Human Rights Commission of the Legislative Assembly, which at the time was chaired by Marcelo Freixo and coordinated by Marielle Franco. The booklet describes the forms of police approach that must be reported by the community.

Weeks before she was murdered, Marielle Franco was chosen to join the City Council committee that monitored the intervention (DCM, 2018, p. 3). Engaged in the campaign Lives in Favelas Matter, in various spaces and media, Marielle Franco was already warning of the danger of federal intervention increasing police violence and the number of innocent victims in communities.

There is no doubt that his work would be decisive in pointing out any irregularities in the intervention. In the pacification experiences that involved the Brazilian army, activists such as Marielle Franco played a fundamental role in denouncing human rights violations. 

"A nice bandit is a dead bandit"

On February 16, 2018, the first day of the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro, General Augusto Heleno gives an interview to the radio Bandnews FM. In his speech, Augusto Heleno evokes his experience as commander of MINUSTAH (United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti), between 2004 and 2005: “I have advised that the rule of engagement be modified. In Haiti we had rules of engagement that allowed a subject who posed a real danger to society, that is, who was the bearer or actor of a hostile act or intention, to see the flexibility they gave to me, the commander, and also to the scene commander. (…) Up to sergeant level, he had the power to decide whether what was happening was a hostile act or intention and, given this finding, he could act to the point of lethality, he could kill the individual. In certain actions that I have seen, filmed in Rio de Janeiro (…) of criminal organizations (…) they make real provocations to legal force. (…) He has a pistol in his hand, he has a rifle that he insists on showing off, a machine gun, he could be killed” (O GENERAL, 2018, s/p).

The following day, deputy Carla Zambelli (2018), founder of the movement In the streets, posted the recording of this interview on his YouTube channel. In addition to having a thousand “likes” and more than thirty thousand views, General Augusto Heleno’s positions were praised by the channel’s followers. In one of the comments, a follower supports the slogan of deputy and delegate Sivuca: “a good criminal is a dead criminal”.

Use of force in peace operations

In work carried out in 2019, Major Armando Crescencio analyzes the use of force in peace operations (peacekeeping), that is, in missions commanded or authorized by the UN, such as MINUSTAH, and Law and Order Guarantee Operations (GLO), such as the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro. In an annex to the research, Crescencio presents the rules of engagement in combat with the enemy, issued by the MINUSTAH military command.

According to Crescencio (2019), the use of the expression peace operations has historically proven to be incorrect, as it encourages the non-use of force in the popular imagination. Comparing MINUSTAH and the 2018 GLO, in Rio de Janeiro, Crescencio recognizes the greater use of lethal force in operations carried out in Haiti: “the national (Brazilian) scenario, formed by the limitations imposed by law and the pressure of public opinion exerted a greater restriction on the use of force, which helped to opt for a new approach to using force” (2019, p. 75-76).

In rigorous research, Vice Admiral Carlos Braga (2012) analyzes the implications of the use of force in peace operations. Even recognizing the importance of this tactic for the protection of civilians, Braga warns of the danger of the peace operation turning into a war operation: “After a certain point, the beneficial results produced by these operations no longer compensate for the negative effects, stopping contributing to your success. However, most of the time, it is very difficult to clearly identify where these limits are located” (2012, p. 59).

From this same perspective, Doctors Without Borders activist Tamara Jurberg points to the difficulty, in a peace operation, for soldiers to recognize: “a certain threshold to say who the 'enemy' is, which makes it difficult to balance between protecting civil rights and the guarantee of security” (2016, p. 88).

According to the analyzes of Carlos Braga (2012) and Tamara Jurberg (2016), errors and excesses in the use of force can compromise the cooperation of the local population and humanitarian organizations. This is precisely what happened in the MINUSTAH peace operation, commanded by the Brazilian army.

Brazilian model of pacification

In the book The myth of the democratic peace operation, Arturo Sotomayor, a public security specialist, maintains that the heavy work of policing was placed in the hands of Brazilian soldiers and commanders because: “they had anti-gang training and knew how to 'clean' favelas” (2014, p. 139).

In addition to operations in Haiti, which began in 2004, the Brazilian army worked in pacification operations in favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Between 2000 and 2007, the army participated in the operations of the Special Areas Policing Group (GPAE). In 2008, the Pacification Police Units (UPPs) began to operate in several communities in Rio (JURBERG, 2016). Haiti functioned as a laboratory for intervention doctrines (CARVALHO, 2023). Between 60 and 90 percent of the soldiers who were in Haiti later worked in the UPPs (HARIG, 2015).

The Brazilian model of pacification foresees three stages. Initially, a large number of security forces seek to “clean up the favelas”, that is, “hunt down members of violent gangs and drug traffickers” (SOTOMAYOR, 2014, p. 87). Security forces then create fixed bases in the favelas and open space for civil society organizations to provide services to residents. In the last stage, the forces should dismantle their fixed bases, “leaving behind civilian and peaceful neighborhoods” (SOTOMAYOR, 2014, p. 87).

The non-governmental organization (NGO) Viva Rio participated in the activities of the GPAE and the UPPs and, at the invitation of the UN, also worked at MINUSTAH (ALBERNAZ; CARUSO; PATRÍCIO, 2007; JURBERG, 2016). In addition to creating and implementing social and educational projects, Viva Rio develops training and training programs for police and army officers (SOTOMAYOR, 2014).

At MINUSTAH, Viva Rio promoted social and cultural training programs for women in the favelas and worked in partnership with soldiers (the blue helmets), cleaning canals, creating emergency brigades against natural accidents, distributing products of basic needs and in the organization of security patrols (SOTOMAYOR, 2014).

Viva Rio was one of the few NGOs that worked alongside the blue helmets. There was a language barrier, since the vast majority of Brazilian soldiers were not fluent in English or French. On the other hand, international NGOs distanced themselves from the security forces after serious human rights violations in operations carried out in favelas (SOTOMAYOR, 2014).

Complaints from civil society organizations

The Haitian police were involved in organized crime. In one of their reports, activists from Human Rights Watch analyze the situation: “Police illegality continues to be one of the main elements of general insecurity. The Haitian National Police (HNP) is completely ineffective in preventing and investigating crime. Furthermore, they themselves are responsible for arbitrary detentions, torture, beatings and excessive and indiscriminate use of force. They also face plausible accusations of having committed extrajudicial killings and of involvement in drug trafficking and other criminal activities. (…) The police commit abuses with almost total impunity” (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2007, s/p).

The report also denounces situations of violence and intimidation against Haitian human rights activists and journalists: “On September 21, 2006, Bruner Esterne, coordinator of the Community Human Rights Council – Grand Ravine (CCDH – GR), was killed by unknown individuals when returning from a meeting about the July massacre in Grand Ravine” (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2007, s/p).

In 2005, two organizations to protect journalists were created, the Association of Independent Media of Haiti (AMIH) and SOS Jornalistas (COMMITTÉ TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, 2006).

Amnesty International also highlights the impunity for crimes against Haitian journalists: “Six Haitian journalists have been murdered since April 2000 and no one has been brought to justice. The last to be murdered was photojournalist Jean-Remy Badio, shot dead on January 19 (2007), in Martissant, a neighborhood in Port-au-Prince, apparently, there is a relationship with his reports on gang violence in the region” (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2007, s/p).

In a 2005 report, activists from Harvard University's law school and the organization Justiça Global denounce human rights violations in the first year of UN operations in Haiti (HARVARD LAW STUDENT ADVOCATES; JUSTIÇA GLOBAL, 2005).

The report highlights that the Brazilian military command was not following the guidelines of Resolution 1542, drawn up by the United Nations Security Council.

This Resolution determines that MINUSTAH must: “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack; (…) support Haitian institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, particularly those of women and children; (…) collaborate in investigations of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, (…) to put an end to impunity” (UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 2004, p. 3).

In its conclusions, the Harvard/Justícia Global report maintains that: “MINUSTAH did not effectively investigate or report on human rights abuses; it did not even protect human rights defenders. (…) Instead, it has provided unconditional support to police operations that have resulted in illegal arrests and detentions, unintentional civilian injuries and deaths, and deliberate extrajudicial executions” (HARVARD LAW STUDENT ADVOCATES; JUSTIÇA GLOBAL, 2005, p. 51).

July 6, 2005 in the Cité Soleil favela

In the early hours of July 6, 2005, General Heleno coordinated a major operation in Cité Soleil, the largest slum in Port-au-Prince. The operation involved 300 soldiers, 20 armored vehicles equipped with cannons and a helicopter (SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL, 2005). The objective was to capture Dread Wilme, leader of one of Cité Soleil's gangs.

Criminals were killed in the operation, including Dread Wilme. According to General Heleno, no soldiers died and there were no records of innocent victims. MINUSTAH spokesperson, Colonel El Quafi Boulbars “told the media that the bodies were not recovered because the soldiers had more to do” (SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL, 2005, p. 3).

The operation received little press coverage (DUNKEL, 2005). However, the day after the operation, public school teacher and human rights activist Seth Donnelly, who was part of the San Francisco Labor Council delegation, went to Cité Soleil and prepared an extensive report on the operation: “Our delegation found several evidence that indicates that on the morning of July 6 there was indeed a massacre carried out by UN military forces in Cité Soleil” (SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL, 2005, p. 2).

According to reports from residents, after blocking all exits from the favela: “UN forces launched the offensive, shooting at houses, shacks, a church and a school with machine guns, APC tanks and tear gas (…) they shot people in the back who tried to escape the tear gas” (SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL, 2005, p. 2).

Some mothers were killed with their children inside their shacks, many people were hit while heading to work. A video recorded by a favela resident records several murders. At least 30 people in the community lost their lives.

A Doctors Without Borders hospital base helped 26 people, many of them women and children. They were transported by Red Cross agents and not by MINUSTAH soldiers, as determined by the rules of engagement in the matter: “procedures after shooting” (CRESCENCIO, 2019, p. 78).

According to a Red Cross employee, a week before the operation in the Cité Soleil favela, UN military forces took the local president and another employee of the organization for interrogation: “the employee described the detention as a form of intimidation” (SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL, 2005, p. 5).

In another operation in the same community, in December 2006, UN officials prevented Red Cross vehicles from entering Cité Soleil to treat injured children (HALLING; BOOKEY, 2008). Sent to hospitals or morgues, favela victims become countable.

Asked about the deaths of all these people, General Augusto Heleno “defended the operation, asking the human rights delegation why they only seemed to care about the rights of the 'bandits' and not the rights of the 'legal forces' in the country” (SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL, 2005, p. 3).

In November 2005, with the support of other activists, politicians and academics, Donnelly filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission of the OAS (Organization of American States), accusing a series of violations by the Brazilian and American governments in Haiti (BACOCCINA, 2005 ).

The US State Department was informed of the July 6 operation and the activists' complaints: “Numerous reports and some human rights groups have estimated that UN troops killed between 50 and 70 civilians that day. An internal UN investigation into the events confirmed that MINUSTAH soldiers killed seven people during the operation. The report also cited the possibility of additional civilian casualties during the exchange of fire between MINUSTAH soldiers and gang members in Cité Soleil, but the investigation was unable to confirm how many people died in the crossfire. P).

Where's Amarildo?

On a Sunday night, July 14, 2013, after fishing, bricklayer's assistant Amarildo de Souza, 43 years old, returned to his home, a single-room shack in the Rocinha favela, where he lived with his wife Elizabete Gomes and his six children, when he was detained for investigation by UPP police officers. It was the last night of Operation Armed Peace, carried out by police forces (BRUN, 2013).

Amarildo was taken to the UPP headquarters in Rocinha. According to Major Edson Santos, commander of this UPP, Amarildo was quickly released. However, he did not return home and was never found again. As Eliane Brun found out: “Rocinha has 84 cameras. That Sunday, the two cameras in front of the UPP had problems” (2013, n/p). The GPS on the police cars would also not be working.

A few weeks later, the deputy delegate of the 15th DP, in Gávea, Ruchester Marreiros, who participated in Operation Paz Armada, stated in his investigation that Amarildo and Elizabete were part of the drug trade. The investigation indicates that Amarildo disappeared after being kidnapped by drug traffickers in his home. Marreiros also called for Elizabete's arrest (AMARILDO, 2013, s/p). At the time, Tião Santos, from Viva Rio, told the French press that the hypothesis of Amarildo's kidnapping by drug traffickers could not be ruled out, “with the aim of discrediting the UPP” (RAYES, 2013, s/p).

The chief delegate of the 15th DP was Orlando Zaccone, who years later would found the group: Antifascism Police (RUSSO, 2017). Zaccone immediately questioned Marreiros' investigation: “This strategy of disqualifying the disappeared is old and carried out by the Brazilian military dictatorship” (SENA, 2013, s/p). The case was forwarded to police chief Rivaldo Barbosa, then head of the Capital Homicide Police Station (DHC).

Popular mobilization and dissemination by the groups Mães de Maio, Rede Comunidades e Movimentos Contra a Violência and Rio da Paz were fundamental to the campaign Where's Amarildo? (TAVARES, 2016). According to Marielle, what could have been just another name on the list of missing people in favelas and communities with UPPs, became a cry of revolt against this model of pacification: “This scenario was marked, in 2013, by demonstrations which took place from June onwards, not only in Rio de Janeiro, but in the main Brazilian cities. The busy streets and the brutality of the police ended up expanding the population's perception of police actions across the country. The phrase 'the police who repress on the avenue are the same ones who kill in the favela', launched by the Network of Communities and Movements Against Violence, or 'in the city center the bullet is made of rubber, in the favelas the bullet is real' symbolize a sad performance by the security forces of the state of Rio de Janeiro” (FRANCO, 2014, p. 92).

On the first Father's Day after Amarildo's disappearance, in a Sunday article for the mainstream press entitled “Father”, Caetano Veloso also compares police violence in demonstrations to violence against this poor family in the Rocinha favela: “In addition to the abuses displayed in the repression of marches, the disrespect for this family's life screams that brutality against poor citizens does not even pretend to be ashamed of perpetuating itself” (2013, s/p).

One day before the publication of this article, upon being honored at the Gramado Film Festival, Wagner Moura lamented the disappearance of Amarildo: “There in Rocinha, a favela in Rio de Janeiro, there is a family with six children, (…) the father One of these boys is called Amarildo, he was returning from a fishing trip and was approached by police officers from the Rocinha UPP, they asked him to show the documents, he promptly did, (…) but, even so, he was taken to the UPP headquarters and never more was seen, (…) this guy's children don't know why their father won't be there tomorrow. (…)I want to honor Amarildo’s children with this award” (WAGNER, 2013, s/p).

At the end of 2013, Paula Lavigne, Caetano Veloso and Marisa Monte launched the Somos todos Amarildo campaign and donated part of the proceeds from a show to Amarildo's family to buy a new house (TORRES, 2013).

According to Marielle Franco's analysis, Amarildo's disappearance should not be taken as an isolated fact, “since there are signs of continuity in the disappearance procedures, typical of the PM's way of acting and how the 'pacification' forces act . There are thousands of cases in the state of Rio de Janeiro of people who disappear and never return to family life” (FRANCO, 2014, p. 106).

After two months of investigations, conducted by Rivaldo Barbosa and Ellen Souto, the final DHC investigation was forwarded to prosecutor Homero das Neves Freitas Filho (GOMES; WERNECK, 2013). At the beginning of October, shortly after receiving the 180-page final inquiry, Homero Freitas Filho told the press that Amarildo had been murdered by police at the UPP headquarters in Rocinha.

Like other people tortured by the police in the same place, Amarildo probably underwent sessions of asphyxiation and electric shocks, suffering from epilepsy and was unable to resist the atrocities (BOTTARI; RAMALHO, 2013).  

Following the information from the DCH investigation, Homero Freitas Filho confirms part of the investigation prepared by Ruchester Marreiros: “Amarildo was not a drug trafficker, but he provided small services for drug trafficking. He was a barbecue chef for the drug trade. There is testimonial evidence saying that he has already taken over the drug trafficking weapons store” (PROMOTOR, 2013, s/p).

Amarildo's family lawyer, João Tancredo, vehemently contested this accusation by prosecutor Homero Freitas Filho (PROMOTOR, 2013).

At the beginning of the investigations into the murders of Marielle Franco and Anderson Gomes, the prosecutor in charge was also Homero Freitas Filho. The Federal Police's final report for this second case argues that Homero Freitas Filho's negligence and omission in years of supervising homicide investigations in Rio de Janeiro “allowed the advancement of criminal organizations” (POLÍCIA FEDERAL, 2023. p. 13 ).

At the beginning of 2016, judge Daniella Alvarez Prado, from the 35th Criminal Court of the Capital, convicted 12 of the 25 military police officers accused of torture, murder, hiding Amarildo's body and procedural fraud. Among them was the commander of the Rocinha UPP, Major Edson Raimundo dos Santos, sentenced to 13 years and 7 months in prison (CASO AMARILDO, 2016).

Three years later, in 2019, Major Edson Santos was released on parole for good behavior. In 2021, he was reinstated to the ranks of officers of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro: “The reinstatement decision was published in the state's Official Gazette on January 29th, signed by the Secretary of State for the Military Police, Colonel Rogério Figueredo de Lacerda” (VASCONCELOS, 2021, s/p).

Final considerations

As army commander, General Eduardo Villas Bôas had direct interference in the implementation of federal intervention. On April 3, 2018, two months after its beginning, the presenter of Jornal Nacional, from Globo network, ends that edition by reading a message from the general: “In this situation that Brazil is experiencing, it remains to ask the institutions and the people who is really thinking about the good of the country and future generations and who is only concerned with personal interests? (…) I assure the nation that the Brazilian army believes it shares the desire of all good citizens to repudiate impunity and respect the constitution, social peace and democracy, as well as remaining attentive to its institutional missions” (JORNAL NACIONAL , 2018, n/p).

Confirmed months later by the general himself, this message was intended to warn of the imminence of a military intervention in Brazil, if the STF approved, the following day, President Lula's habeas corpus (GIELOW, 2018).

O habeas corpus was rejected and Lula could be arrested before the presidential elections: “They voted to grant habeas corpus: Gilmar Mendes, Dias Toffoli, Ricardo Lewandowski, Marco Aurélio and Celso de Mello. For rejection, the following voted: Edson Fachin, Alexandre de Moraes, Luís Roberto Barroso, Luiz Fux, Cármen Lúcia and Rosa Weber, whose vote was the most expected” (ROSSI, 2018, s/p).

The federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro was not just aimed at the issue of public security in the state. It was a fundamental part of a political project. In these terms, as argued by the then government secretariat minister Carlos Marun, the murder of Marielle Franco could not turn into another Amarildo case (HIRABAHASI; RODRIGUES, 2018).

Following the clues from Ronnie Lessa's plea bargain, the Federal Police report clarifies many things. However, police chief Rivaldo Barbosa and the Brazão brothers were certainly not the only ones interested in hindering the investigations.

In MINUSTAH, in the UPPs and in the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro, there were several cases of human rights violations. A broad and thorough investigation into all pacification operations carried out by the Brazilian army is urgently needed.

Days after the decree that determined the intervention was signed, Marielle Franco gave an interview to journalists and activists Caio Castor and Pedro Nogueira, there she was already concerned about the fate of Brazilian democracy: “A historic day, unfortunately, of pain, mainly, for those who live in favelas or favelas, when, suddenly, (…) the illegitimate president Michel Temer establishes a federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro. (…) Who watches the watchmen? Today, who is accountable? (…) Our democratization process is now even threatened, because of what is in place: servers, health, chaos in several areas and security intervention, which helps to control even more what was already being controlled before” (CASTOR; NOGUEIRA, 2018, s/p).

* Paulo Fernandes Silveira Professor at the Faculty of Education at USP and researcher at the Human Rights Group at the Institute for Advanced Studies at USP.


ALBERNAZ, Elizabeth; CARUSO, Haydée; PATRÍCIO, Luciane (2007). Tensions and challenges of community policing in favelas in Rio de Janeiro: the case of the Special Areas Policing Group, Sao Paulo in Perspective, v. 21, no. 2, p. 39-52. Available in:

AMARILDO: delegate Ruchester is investigated by the CGU (2013). Newspapers in Brazil, October 25, 2013. Available at:

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2007). Haiti: fear for safety/ death threats, UA 71/07, March 20, 2007. Available at:

BACOCCINA, Denize (2005). Group accuses Brazilian troops of abuses in Haiti, BBC Brazil. Available in:

BOTTARI, Elenilce; RAMALHO, Sérgio (2013). Investigation concludes that Amarildo was tortured to death, The Globe, October 2, 2013. Available at:

BRAGA, Carlos (2012). Use of force in peace operations: solution or problem? In. KENKEL, Kai; MORAES, Rodrigo (org.). Brazil and Peace Operations in a globalized world: between tradition and innovation. Brasília: IPEA, p. 49-68. Available in:

BRUM, Eliane (2013). Where is the Amarildo? Time, August 5, 2013. Available at:

RIO DE JANEIRO CITY COUNCIL (2018).  Complementary Bill No. 174/2016. Available in:

CARVALHO, Vinicius (2023). Brazil in MINUSTAH: exporting a domestic understanding of civil-military relations to a UN peace operation, Conflict, Security & Development, v. 23, no. 2, p. 153-177. Available in:

AMARILDO CASE: judge condemns 12 of the 25 accused military police officers (2016). G1, February 1, 2016. Available at:

CASTOR, Caio; NOGUEIRA, Pedro (2018). Marielle warned: 'democracy is threatened'. Pavio Agency; Bridge Journalism. Available in:

COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (2006). Attacks on the Press 2005: Haiti. Available in:

CRESCENCIO, Armando (2019). Law and Order Guarantee Operations (GLO) in perspective compared with the use of force in Peace Operations – reflections of the use of force in MINUSTAH for the Brazilian Army's actions in GLO after Haiti. Monograph (Research in Military Sciences, emphasis on Defense) – Army Command and General Staff School (ECEME), Rio de Janeiro. Available in:




DUNKEL, G, (2005). Labor delegation reports massacre in Port-au-Prince, Workers World. Available in:

FRANCO, Marielle (2014). UPP – The reduction of the favela in three letters: an analysis of public security policy in Rio de Janeiro. Dissertation (Master’s in Administration). Postgraduate Program in Administration at the Faculty of Administration, Accounting Sciences and Tourism at the Fluminense Federal University (UFF), Rio de Janeiro. Available in:

GIELOW, Igor (2018). “Bolsonaro is not the return of the military, but there is a risk of politicization of barracks”, says Villas Bôas Folha de SP, November 11, 2018. Available at:

GOMES, Marcelo; WERNECK, Felipe (2013). Amarildo was tortured in Rocinha, says police, Examination, October 3, 2013. Available at:

HALLING, Matt; BOOKEY, Blaine (2008). Peacekeeping in name alone: ​​accountability for the UN in Haiti. Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, n. 31, p. 461– 86. Available at:

HARIG, Christoph (2015). Synergy effects between MINUSTAH and public security in

Brazil, Brasiliana: Journal for Brazilian Studies, v. 3, no. 2, p. 142-168. Available in:

HARVARD LAW STUDENT ATTORNEYS; GLOBAL JUSTICE (2005). Keeping the peace in Haiti?: An assessment of the United Nations stabilization mission in Haiti using the fulfillment of its mandate as a parameter of success. [Report coordinated by James Cavallaro]. Cambridge: Harvard Law Student Advocates; Rio de Janeiro: Global Justice. Available in:

HIRABAHASI, Gabriel; RODRIGUES, Paloma (2018). Minister says the government will not let Marielle become 'new Amarildo', Power 360, March 19, 2018. Available at:

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2007). Human Rights Watch World Report 2007 – Haiti. Available in:

JORNAL NACIONAL: Globo uses message from the army commander to threaten STF, Fórum, April 3, 2018. Available at:

JURBERG, Tamara (2016). Is there a dialogue between MINUSTAH and UPPS? Plurimus Culture and Development in Magazine, v. 7, p. 71-97. Available in:

GENERAL Augusto Heleno speaks to Bandnews FM about the federal government in Rio de Janeiro (2018). Bandnews FM, February 16, 2018. Available at:

FEDERAL POLICE (2024). Final report. Police Inquiry 2023.0059871-SR/PF/RJ – Inquiry No. 4954/DF. Rio de Janeiro: Regional Superintendence in the State of Rio de Janeiro. Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP). Available in:

PROSECUTOR says that Amarildo was killed for being a source of information about drug trafficking (2013). G1, October 2, 2013. Available at:

RAYES, Chantal (2013). In the favelas of Rio, the disparities of “pacification”, Libération, August 23, 2013. Available at:

RESENDE, Leandro (2019). He could have announced the solution to the Marielle case, says Braga Netto, Veja, January 11, 2019. Available at:

ROSSI, Amanda (2018). By 6 votes to 5, STF denies habeas corpus and paves the way for Lula's arrest. BBC News Brazil, April 4, 2018. Available at:

RUSSO, Guilherme (2017). A thousand faces of a real man, Trip, November 1, 2017. Available at:

SAN FRANCISCO LABOR COUNCIL (2005). Growing evidence of a massacre by UN occupation forces in Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Cite Soleil. [Report coordinated by Seth Donnelly]. San Francisco: San Francisco Labor Council. Available in:

SENA, Yala (2013). At PI, Zaccone says that the delegate uses dictatorship techniques against Amarildo, Terra, August 8, 2013. Available at:,6bb8ea1e58f50410VgnVCM20000099cceb0aRCRD.html

SOTOMAYOR, Arturo (2014). The myth of the democratic peacekeeper. Civil-military relations and the United Nations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

TAVARES, Ana (2016). 'Where's Amarildo?' Question asked in 2013 took to the streets in Rio and even abroad, The Globe, September 30, 2016. Available at:

TORRES, Lívia (2013). Amarildo's family celebrates house purchased in Rocinha with donations, G1, October 29, 2013. Available at:

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2004). Resolution 1542 (The question regarding Haiti). New York: UNITED NATIONS (UN). Available in:

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2006). Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Available in:

VASCONCELOS, Caê (2021). Police officer who investigated Amarildo's killer criticizes PM's return to the corporation. Bridge Journalism, February 4, 2021. Available at:

VELOSO, Caetano (2013). The Globe, August 11, 2013. Available at:

VISION OF FAVELA BRAZIL (2010). Santa Marta's popular primer: police approach. Rio de Janeiro: Amnesty International; Global Justice; Human Rights Commission of the Legislative Assembly. Available in:

WAGNER Moura is honored at the Gramado Film Festival (2013). TVE RS, August 11, 2013. Available at:

ZAMBELLI, Carla. (2018). Interview by General Augusto Heleno about federal intervention in RJ on Rádio Bandnews, Youtube. Available in:

the earth is round there is thanks to our readers and supporters.
Help us keep this idea going.

See this link for all articles