Against the tide of history -

Against the grain of history

10/12/2021

Partners • History • Social movements

By MÁRIO MAESTRI*

Understanding what the left did wrong in the past, so as not to repeat it in the present, is the best and only way to honor our fallen fighters

For fellow Lincoln Abreu Penna

The ruling classes have always used weapons to defend their privileges. Resorting to violence is therefore a condition for the emancipation of the oppressed. It was not Marx's and Engels' rhetorical proposal that violence is the midwife of history. Since its constitution as the most advanced orientation of the anti-capitalist struggle, Marxism proposed the armed assault of the oppressed to power and opposed individual and group attacks, hand coups, etc. In Russia, Marxists have always fought against these slippages. (BROUÉ, 1969.)

Marxism's rejection of that kind of avant-garde violence was not moral. It was born from the conception of a social revolution through the difficult organization of workers for the destruction of the bourgeois order and construction of a new State, in the context of a leap in quality in the organization and awareness of the world of work. Following this trail prepares the world of work for the destruction of the bourgeois order and the establishment of a new State controlled by it. The emancipation of the workers is therefore necessarily the work of the workers.

Marxism understood as essential, to the insurrection of the exploited classes, the tearing apart of society, born from the exacerbation of class contradictions, in the context of the advancement of consciousness and organization of workers. However, even given these conditions, victory is not guaranteed. Insurrection is an art, a science, in which the Third International sought to train its cadres, even publishing a manual on “armed insurrection”. (NAUBERG, 1970.)

León Trotsky described, in a more precise way, for the first time, the social disintegration that makes the insurrection possible, after participating in a privileged position in the Revolution of 1905, as the last president of the Petrograd soviet. In works about that revolt and, above all, in its History of the Russian Revolution, described the decay of the hegemony of the State, when a general social upheaval came to delimit opposing geographic spaces, building a true “dual power” opposing the oppressors and the oppressed. (TROCKIJ, 1905; TROTSKY, 1950; MARIE, 2009.)

In Chile, in the weeks between June 29 (Tancazo) and 11/2013, right-wingers, on the one hand, and workers and popular people, on the other, did not venture far from their neighborhoods, liberated territories belonging to two powers in explosive contradiction. The refusal of the so-called popular leaderships to direct the workers to the assault on power opened the doors to the coup massacre, essential for the population to once again submit to bourgeois hegemony and forget how close it had been to overcoming it forever. (MAESTRI, XNUMX.)

Party against Soviet

In deep social crises, the ruling classes, even when weakened, keep their bodies of power centralized, with the armed forces as the last trench. Workers must build, in an accelerated manner, when there is a revolutionary crisis, organs to centralize their will and action, so as not to collapse. Trotsky saw in the soviets, built by the workers in 1905, the organ of centralization of the insurgent forces, which, according to him, would resurge with the resumption of the revolutionary impulse. What you were right about. He neglected, initially, the importance of the assault and conquest of power by the revolutionary party, the organized and centralized vanguard of the revolutionary classes. Vision shared with Rosa Luxemburgo, one of the causes of the defeat of the German Insurrection of 1919. (BROUÉ, 1964.)

Vladimir Lenin, with a more traditional view of the struggle for power, advocated a not-so-needed insurrectionism for the assault on power. He was initially suspicious of the soviets, which he feared would replace the revolutionary party he was striving to build. The Bolsheviks had little importance in the Revolution and in the soviets of 1905. With the Theses of April 1917, in a hard dispute over the Bolshevik leadership, Lenin approved the need for an immediate struggle for power, before the “dual powers” that had been installed took hold. dissolved, against the workers. The assault took place from the Soviet bodies, in which the Bolsheviks had gained a majority. They came to be regarded as the central axis of workers' power in the new state that, in 1922, was baptized as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — USSR.

In the years following 1917, the concept of armed insurrection was consolidated with the advent of a revolutionary situation, an exacerbation of the previous pre-revolutionary period, born of the growing aggravation of social contradictions and the establishment of a “dual power” in society. The communists had to facilitate and guide the thrust of the class struggle, towards an eventual pre-revolutionary period, which however did not depend on their wishes, since it matured in the bowels of society. They had to organize, intervene and direct the oppressed to the assault on power, when the “revolutionary situation” broke out, without being late or early, which could give rise to – and did give rise to – not infrequently terrible consequences for the workers.

The hecatomb of World War I accelerated a revolutionary wave in Europe that led to workers' insurrections in Russia, victorious, and in Hungary, Germany, Italy, etc., defeated, for several reasons. In 1923, with the fiasco of the second insurrection in Germany, the revolution ebbed. Faced with the new situation, the Communist International fine-tuned its policies to get through that period, waiting for a new impetus for the class struggle. (FRANK, 1979.) Man proposes, God disposes. The ebbing tide facilitated the advent of the bureaucratic-Stalinist order, which would break with the support and suffocate the world revolution, essential for the protection of the USSR, as V. Lenin, L. Trotsky and all the Bolsheviks faithful to the 1917 revolution remembered. ( BROUÉ, 1969.)

Submission of workers

Concerned only with the USSR, where its privileges were based, the bureaucratic-Stalinist dictatorship was interested in maintaining good relations with the capitalist world. For colonial and semi-colonial countries, he defined a national-capitalist revolution, led by the so-called “progressive bourgeoisie”. At the end of World War II, Luís Carlos Prestes and the leadership of the PCB called on workers to “tighten their belts” and not go on strike. It was revolutionary to enrich the bosses… (PRESTES, 2015.) The socialist revolution was for an imprecise future, after the full maturation of the capitalist order. The same collaborationism was promoted in advanced countries. In Italy, the PCI supported amnesty for fascist bandits and disarmed partisan, who controlled and governed regions of Italy. Partisans they returned indignant with the betrayal of the mountains after 1945. (GREMO, 1995.)

Even when Stalinism rehearsed leftist surges, for various reasons, such as the so-called “Third Period”, it reaffirmed class collaboration and turned its back on the workers. At the putsch From 1935, the PCB defended an anti-imperialist and industrialist-bourgeois program. No socialism. And it relied mainly on the communist, nationalist and anti-fascist cadres of the armed forces. It kept the workers in the dark until the outbreak of the uprising. On November 23 and 27, 1935, when calls were made for a coup d'état on the march, some communist and anti-fascist union members believed that it was a Getulist provocation. In addition to the indisputable heroism of the participants, the putsch treated the workers as mere supporters of the revolt and violated the objective and subjective conditions of the social movement. He facilitated the repression and, later, the Getulist coup of 1937, disorganizing the labor and leftist movement for many years. (PRESTES, 2001; FREITAS, 1998.) Karl Marx would say that the “road to hell of the revolution is also paved with good intentions”.

In the 1950s-60s, communists under Muscovite orders proposed an anti-imperialist and industrialist program, under the direction of a ghostly “progressive bourgeoisie”. The proposal to prepare the assault on power, in a pre-revolutionary period and in a revolutionary situation, for the construction of a Soviet order, was seen as leftist Trotskyist and Luxembourgish provocations. Argentine communists embraced the anti-Peronist and anti-worker bourgeoisie and had no qualms about supporting the coup in 1976. The Communist Party of Cuba supported Fulgêncio Batista. In João Goulart's Brazil, with the PCB entangled with laborism and bourgeois developmentalism, on the eve of the coup, Prestes would have stated that the communists were already in the government and that the rightist attempt would be irrevocably crushed by nationalist officials. (MAESTRI, 2019.)

PCB leaders such as Diógenes Arruda Câmara, Apolônio de Carvalho, Carlos Marighella, Jacob Gorender, Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, Mário Alves and the communist militancy were educated under the hegemony of class collaboration and outsiders to the struggle for workers' autonomy. At most, they shared and knew the vulgate of Stalinist and post-Stalinist Marxism, in a bourgeois-positivist industrialist bias. On March 31, 1964, everyone woke up from the collaborationist dream, when the so-called “progressive bourgeoisie” and “anti-capitalist” prominently integrated the coup d'état. The historic defeat of 1964, with repercussions not only in Brazil, took place without any effective resistance.

Resumption of the Revolution

From the 1950s and 60s, revolutionary winds stirred Europe and the world again: defeat of imperialist intervention in North Korea; independence from Algeria; left nationalism in the Middle East; radicalization in Palestine; advancing the struggle in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos; revolutionary situation in France, betrayed by the PCF, in 1968; Worker-student “Hot Autumn” in Italy, in 1969, opposed by the PCI; struggle for the independence of the Portuguese colonies, etc. In the face of Yankee imperialism, the revolution triumphed in Cuba, in 1959, and defined itself as socialist, in 1961. The world once again breathed the pure air of the revolution in progress.

Imperialism and big capital opted for preventive military dictatorships in countless countries, organizing them according to their needs. A reality facilitated by the inexistence, in any region of the world, of a revolutionary Marxist party, representing an important sector of the working world, which would defend the centrality of the workers in the revolutionary process. One of the few exceptions, transiently, was the POR in Bolivia. (LORA, 1971.) The Marxist-revolutionary organizations (Trotskyists), with a socialist program, were fragile and not a few plunged into confusion. In the early 1970s, revolutionary Maoism entered a deep crisis with China's counterrevolutionary alliance with the United States.

During the duration of the world revolutionary impulse, simplistic and simplistic proposals for social liberation spread like wildfire from a small group of guerrillas, holed up in mountains, whatever the conditions of the social movement, and unconcerned about them. Orientation born and fomented above all because of a bad explanation of the reasons for the victory of the Cuban Revolution. The distorted optics of the “Serra Maestra”, in which the workers were completely canceled, was the almost unique interpretation of that magnificent victory. In fact, the guerrilla column as a form of combat for dictatorial orders had roots that predate the Cuban successes. In Paraguay in the 1950s, columns of left-wing guerrillas, liberals, etc. (FULNA, 14 de Mayo) were annihilated by Strosnist repression. They were commonly inspired by the column commanded by Solano Lopéz, in the final moments of the great conflict of 1864-70. (PERÉZ CACERES, 2017-19; MAESTRI, 2010.)

Let's look telegraphically at Cuban successes. After several attempts, on December 2, 1956, just over eighty young guerrillas, almost all alien to socialism and Marxism, disembarked on the island when a planned plan had already failed. putsch anti-dictatorial. Refugees in the Sierra Maestra, they aroused little concern to the dictatorship, as they did not constitute an effective threat to it. In the following two years, a pre-revolutionary period took hold throughout the island, which was expressed in strikes by workers in the cities and in the countryside, student and popular demonstrations, various attacks, etc. The casualties suffered in the Sierra Maestra, caused by the dictatorial offensives, were replaced, with addition, by fighters who arrived in abundance from the cities and from the semi-revolt plains.

unconditional armed struggle

At the height of the crisis, in the middle of the “revolutionary situation”, the guerrilla columns strengthened by the national uprising descended to the plains and broke the national army into dissolution. Without diminishing the essential and perhaps indispensable character of Fidelista columns in the consolidation of the revolution and in its continuation towards socialism, it is not difficult to understand that, if the guerrillas had gone up the mountain, and the urban and rural revolt had not spread, they would have been easily defeated. Perhaps today they would be a footnote in Cuban history.

The Fidel Guevarist narrative transformed the group of young guerrillas, on the mountain peaks, into the “fiat lux”, into the alpha and omega of the revolution, bypassing the decisive role played by the workers, popular, peasant, student movements, etc. rising across the country. Practice has always been the criterion of truth. In the following years, dozens of guerrilla groups repeated the simplistic recipe and were easily crushed by repression, not knowing what had not worked. Among them, the Bolivian focus, by Ernesto Che Guevara, painful proof of the honest belief of the Cuban leadership in the disheveled proposal they spread.

Fidel Guevarism's orientation —foquismo— was dazzling: all it took was a small group of young men armed with courage and a few rifles to climb the mountains, wherever they were, to set off the movement that would result in the conquest of the city and power. No longer workers, but revolutionary youth was now the engine of history. This enormous abnormality, in everything strange and opposed to the revolutionary Marxist orientation of the class struggle and the assault by the workers of power, led to the death and demoralization of thousands, especially young urban and rural guerrillas, especially university students. Some of them, colleagues and companions of mine, more or less close.

The almost total ignorance of Marxism —Fidel Castro defined himself, even in 1959, as an anti-communist— and the youth and lack of political experience of the Cuban leaders help us to understand the romantic nonsense of the “foquimo”, divulged mainly in the booklet revolutiontion in the Revolution, by Regis Debray, from 1967, written after long talks with Fidel Castro and sponsored by the Cuban maximum commander. (FURIATI, 2001; CASTÃNEDA, 2006; DEBRAY, 1967.) The young French intellectual chic radicalized would have revealed, upon being arrested, the presence of Guevara in Bolivia. In 1968, the booklet was passed to me, mimeographed in alcohol, by a colleague from the Engineering Course at PUC-RS, then at the POC, won for the proposal of “unconditional armed struggle”. Years later, back in Brazil, he would participate, in the PMDB, in the robbery of Rio Grande do Sul commanded by Antônio Britto, as governor.

Spreading like an oil slick

Then he furiously read the classics on the Russian Revolution, which presented the difficulties of the Bolsheviks in conquering and organizing urban and rural workers, in the comings and goings of the revolution. I saw in the “focus”, spreading like an oil stain, the story of the carochinha in revolutionary bias. Then, the opposition and social disgust with the dictatorship in Brazil regained steam, but we were light years away from a revolutionary crisis. The working class remained half-moving. In the following ten years, in Brazil, Chile and Europe, I joined Marxist-revolutionary groups that defended the military assault on power, under the general conditions for such. But they were strongly opposed to the autocidal proposals of avant-garde armed actions that we proposed, born mainly of adventurism, immediacy and petty-bourgeois romanticism.

In this polemic, we convinced some comrades and companions of the senseless nature of that proposal, eventually saving their lives or preventing them from knowing terrible, unnecessary physical and moral suffering. We were right to say that the rural and urban focus would never work and would be a huge personal and political disaster. But we lacked elements to explain the success of the Cuban Revolution. At that time, we didn't have the internet, which today provides immediate and exhaustive information on everything, if we look for it well.. Only later did I find, in Vânia Bambirra's magnificent essay, The Cuban Revolution: una reiterpretación, published for the first time in Chile, in 1973, a narrative about the broad situation that convulsed the entire island, thus integrating the Sierra into this totality. (BAMBIRRA, 1973, 1975.)

Fidel Guevarism was the total negation of the Marxist conception of workers' centrality in the struggle against capital. And, therefore, the need for the organization of workers in the cities and fields for the assault on power, in the context of the maturation of the revolutionary crisis, as proposed. For foquismo, the objective and subjective conditions of class struggle and workers' organization and consciousness did not matter. In any place, in any situation, the armed struggle of a small group of militants would produce the revolutionary conditions, which would spread, creating revolutionary armed forces capable of assaulting power. In Fight in the dark, Jacob Gorender named this conception “unconditional armed struggle”, that is, under any conditions. (GORENDER, 2014.)

In Brazil, the Foquisto had a few thousand adherents. It expressed the world views of left-wing and nationalist enlisted men, sailors and non-commissioned officers purged from the armed forces by the coup leaders. And he galvanized the spirit of sacrifice, adventure and immediacy of youth, when he resumed his opposition to the dictatorship, from 1966 onwards. In general, between the former and the latter, political training and experience were scarce. And, in Brazil, the working class had never conquered real political-social centrality, under the dominion of laborism and pecebism. For the youth, “foquismo” was a leading option, with immediate results, to petty, silent, impersonal, semi-covered, long-term work, in support of the autonomous reorganization of workers. In ebb since 1964, the world of work kept itself completely apart from militarist actions, even in cases where it occasionally sympathized with them. They were strange and opposed to their classist essence.

escape forward

The lack of revolutionary Marxist education and practice in the PCB allowed it to collapse like a house of cards after the 1964 coup, without any of its dissidents returning to the revolutionary red thread abandoned in the late 1920s. 1964 or adhered to different versions of “unconditional armed struggle”. Armed options that were not born from the narrowing of workers' possibilities of organization, due to dictatorial repression. The world of work was simply abandoned, as new Prometheus of the revolution emerged. Radicalized petty-bourgeois intellectuals came to propose the lupem-proletariat, the unemployed, the miserable, the youth, etc. as the new vanguard. The majority definition of “anti-imperialist” and “national liberation” armed struggle maintained the collaborationist bias of alliance with the patriotic sectors of the “national bourgeoisie”.

In heavily urbanized regions of the Americas, or without mountains, there was a trial of adapting rural foquism to cities, as in the case of Tupamaros in Uruguay, VPR and ALN, from Marighella, in Brazil. O Urban Guerrilla Handbook, by Marighella, from 1969, was a kind of translation, for the city, of the guidelines of Revolution in the Revolution, from Debray, to the countryside. (MARIGHELLA, 1969.) However, urban militarist organizations generally had the establishment of rural guerrillas as a strategic goal. In Brazil, those directly and indirectly involved in armed actions never surpassed, at any given moment, in the best of times, a handful of thousands, in a country with just over ninety million inhabitants, in 1970. It was a vanguard movement that he did not know the repercussion-acceptance of the social movement, remaining a stranger to it and unconcerned with it. The fall of the dictatorship would be accelerated, in the mid-1970s, by the strong revival and activism of the workers' and peasants' movement, which involved tens of millions of Brazilians and then gave rise to the MST, the PT and the CUT, the last two then respectively anti -capitalist and classist, organizations that, for better or for worse, still determine the present history of the country.

The defeat of the armed struggle was political and not military. In Cuba, in 1957-59, the general revolutionary crisis dismantled the armed forces and fed the guerrilla ranks, as we have seen. In Brazil, the militants cut down by repression and discouragement were not replaced, and the already small armed organizations disbanded more and more. Those organizations, immersed in the concepts of “unconditional armed struggle”, were unconcerned with the end of the “Castelist” recessive cycle, driven, in the post-1967 period, by the “booted developmentalism” of the generals in the service, above all, of the great capital of São Paulo. The acceleration of economic growth (“Miracle”) isolated the urban guerrillas, now exposed like fish swimming in the asphalt. Devices were “blown out” by complaints from neighbors. Since 1970, university students crossed the street to avoid having to greet a militant colleague, as if he were a leper. (MAESTRI, 2019.)

Trials of rural outbreaks were denounced by peasant women frightened by strange, armed young bearded men roaming the woods apparently aimlessly. Guevara's isolation in Bolivia was a paradigmatic example of the total impropriety of the “unconditional armed struggle” and the belief in the solution of social contradictions based on disposition, determination and individual courage. At the end of 1970, I covered a “point” in Praça da Matriz, in Porto Alegre, with one of the last militants of the VPR in Rio Grande. A kid even younger than me, certainly a high school student. He criticized me for not joining the armed struggle, which was in an advanced process of dissolution. In Chile, I found out that, shortly after we met, he had been arrested and “disgraced” on television, so as not to be tortured or perhaps to save his life. I was always astonished at the devastation of that almost adolescent, skinny, skinny man, who had dreamed of following the victorious path of Fidel, Guevara and their guerrillas, and had ended up, in the deepest isolation, pursued by powerful military forces, while part of the population began to get drunk. up with the hoopla of economic expansion. (SILVA, 2021.)

repression for all

The exemplary actions of “armed propaganda”, “bank expropriations”, “kidnappings”, etc. meant that organizations dedicated to the reorganization of workers were equally repressed. The fine mesh of the net thrown by the repression captured large fish and lambari. With the outrageous attempt to kidnap a US consular member in Porto Alegre, the fine flower of repression landed in the state, which enjoyed peace, albeit relative, and put an end to almost all of the organized left.

Armed organizations suffered generally terrible repression, sometimes also by economic interests. In Porto Alegre, a delegate complained that, when he broke up the Trotskyist “apparatus”, he found only books, a typewriter, mimeograph machines using alcohol. And not a dick! Police and military officers became rich by seizing the millionaire funds expropriated by the armed organizations—the equivalent today of tens of millions of dollars! They were torturers, murderers and thieves.

In the mid-1970s, the balance sheet was dire. In Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and so on, tens of thousands of young people in particular had been immolated in a proposal for an unconditional armed struggle, in the fields and cities, against the grain of history. Europe and the United States were also hit by foquist and guerrilla proposals. The Red Brigades and the First Line, in Italy; the Red Army Fraction in Germany; Action Directe e Fighting Communist Cells, in France; the Japanese Red Army; the May 19th Communist Organization, the Weather Underground and the Black Liberation Army in the USA. Unless I'm mistaken, as in Brazil, none of these organizations survived the total defeat, correcting their action, in record of the total vacuity of their proposals.

The denial of the principle of workers' centrality in the revolution and the political rusticity of the main leaders of the armed organizations, not all of them young, in the context of the advance of the world revolution, contributed to the wide dissemination of low-level political proposals that were foreign to Marxism and the world of work. To these determinants, we have to associate pressure and adherence, especially by young people from the radicalized middle classes, to this revolutionary “pret-a-porter”. In Europe, in 1975, young militants vibrated with the “unconditional armed struggle” in Latin America, explaining to me that it was enough to arm the “favelados” to start the revolution.

It is understandable that fearless combatants like Carlos Lamarca and Carlos Marighella embarked on and advanced proposals for an “unconditional armed” struggle. Lamarca was a professional soldier, prepared for armed combat, with no previous political experience. Marighella, a mature political figure with little political training, had embraced Stalinist and post-Stalinist collaborationism throughout his political life. Faced with the general failure of what he had believed in for decades, he jumped from the proposal in which the party that was all, for another in which the party it was nothing. However, political leaders such as Ernest Mandel and Livio Maitan, outstanding Marxist scholars, direct heirs of a political tradition that abhorred adventurism, unreservedly supported these practices, with emphasis on Argentina and Chile. They contributed to thousands of militants ending up in exile, prison, torture, death. However, they did not follow similar guidelines for Europe. And, after the disaster ended, they never carried out a real and consequent self-criticism, which would recommend moving away from any leadership position.

marighella

The film “Marighella”, by Wagner Moura, has already been defined as an exciting left-wing identity bang-bang. It entails the glorification of the militarist opposition to the dictatorship, through the presentation plana of fearless protagonists who sacrificed their lives by going down the dead end of the “unconditional armed struggle”. An option with very serious consequences for the social movement, for the class struggle and for the left in Brazil and Latin America. In its emotional and linear approach, the film does not allow the slightest understanding of the historical events it addresses. This was masterfully accomplished by the film “Lamarca”, by Sergio Rezende, with Paulo Betti. In a way, “Marighella” and its uncritical and romantic evaluation are products of the enormous depression of the Brazilian Marxist left, of the strength of oppositionism collaborationism, of the current enormous ideological hegemony of the exploiting classes. “Dare to fight, dare to win” is right and necessary. But, we understand what we did wrong in the past, not to repeat it in the present, it is the best and only way to honor our fallen fighters.

* Mario Maestri is a historian. Author, among other books, of Revolution and counter-revolution in Brazil: 1500-2019 (FCM Publisher).

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