Note on the international insertion of Brazil

Image: Aaditya Arora


The intellectual poverty of the Brazilian media, which does not seem to understand the change in the country's foreign policy

Since the country's re-democratization process after 21 years of military dictatorship, a foreign policy has been built in Brazil based on a multilateral vision of the world, but with a focus on the defense of national interests and in tune with the economic, social and political processes in course in each historical period. This trajectory began to change after the legal-parliamentary coup of 2016, having been strongly modified from January 2019, when the Bolsonaro government appointed an ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who firmly believed that the earth is flat and that the great threat to the country concerned globalism, an expression that represents an insult to all those who have held such a position in the federal public service.

On another occasion (Mattei, 2016), we show that Brazilian foreign policy, although apparently it can represent the face of the country's diplomacy, suffers from a multiplicity of social interactions and interests of fractions of social classes, especially the business class; the economic and political interests to which the executive power is linked; the parliamentary political configuration itself originating from different segments and social actors; and the possibility of action by organized civil society in debates and discussions about the insertion of the country in the global scenario.

The 1990s are quite illustrative in this interpretative line, especially if we consider that the foreign policy of that period promoted by the country was one of passive subordination to the international conjuncture dominated by economic globalization and political neoliberalism. In this logic, during the FHC government (1995-2002) a vertical intervention prevailed that privileged certain sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, especially those represented by the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), by the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP) and by the entities representing agribusiness.

It is true that many agreements on some products were being postponed, as well as others that were celebrated but ended up being ignored, as well as some sectors of commodities based on natural resources, whose demands were driven by China's growing presence in the world market. In a way, this subordinate policy and marked by a vertical intervention ended up privileging relations with some countries on which Brazil was very economically dependent, especially the United States. Perhaps this is the reason why the country never had a clear position regarding the Free Trade Area of ​​the Americas (FTAA) proposed by the US, which generated conflicting discussions in several Latin American countries.

In addition, we affirmed at that time that the process of international insertion of Brazil in the beginning of the 1990st century was being significantly altered in relation to the foreign policy of the country that was being followed, mainly in the 2002s, when the neoliberal ideology also became part of part of Brazilian foreign policy. In general, it can be said that the winning political project in the XNUMX elections established two turning points in this trajectory.

On the one hand, by implementing an economic project generically called the “New Developmentalist”, the Lula government (2003-2010) managed to reduce the country's economic dependence on the US and, on the other hand, rearticulated diplomatic actions more strongly towards the South. -South. As a result, foreign policy also began to strengthen relations with so-called “non-developed” countries (also called emerging countries), which gave it the characteristic of a more horizontal policy, even if relations with the great world powers had been maintained. (Mattei, 2016).

For Castelan & Mattei (2016), it is in this context that both Mercosur and the BRICS bloc were prioritized.[I] In the case of the latter, formed in 2009 and which South Africa joined in 2010, Brazil played a fundamental role in the conformation and expansion of the bloc, whose economic and political actions came to be duly recognized by the great world powers. . Whether through cooperation mechanisms, or through the mobilization of investments and mutual trade relations, the bloc managed to establish itself as an important player on the world stage, while at the same time providing a better horizontalization of international relations. In this case, the firm actions of the BRICS in defense of reforms in the quota system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and the constitution of the G-20 within the ambit of the World Trade Organization (WTO) deserve mention. This process changed the pattern of trade negotiations worldwide.

From 2016, Castelan & Mattei (2016) showed that after the impeachment of the 2nd Dilma Government and the rise to power of Michel Temer (2016-2018), the ideological bias of foreign policy began to gain greater effectiveness. This can be seen in the new Chancellor’s (José Serra) inauguration statements on May 18, 2016 when, when listing his “new foreign policy based on ten principles and programmatic guidelines” he stated: “our policy will no longer be in accordance with the ideological conveniences and preferences of a political party and its allies abroad”.[ii] Furthermore, after almost blindly criticizing the existing multilateralism in international relations, which according to the new chancellor did not happen and, worse, only caused harm, bilateralism was defended as the path of the new foreign policy.

As for South-South relations (Mercosur cases) it was just a purely economic and mistaken view, according to many foreign policy analysts in force at the time. In this case, attention is drawn to the mentions in relation to Africa that exposed the central idea of ​​the “new policy”: to open an accelerated process of trade negotiations aimed at opening new markets for Brazilian exports based on a “balanced reciprocity”, revealing an immediate pragmatism .

It is important to point out that over the three years of the Temer government’s term, these ten directives served only as a “Term of Possession of Chancellor José Serra”, since most of them were abandoned, with only the ideology of “de-ideologizing foreign policy” prevailing. , the expansion of bilateral actions, especially with the US, and the weakening of South-South relations, particularly of regional integration processes.

Thus, little by little, the basic pillars of Brazilian foreign policy for decades, which had been linked to the general strategies of Brazilian development, were abandoned. It was in this context that the autonomy and multilateralism of post-redemocratization governments in the country gained ground. In other words, the great mark of this period (1985-2016) was the defense of the diversification of actions, especially in terms of the country's insertion in the new international order, with emphasis on cooperation between countries and regions, facts that repositioned Brazil before the other countries in the world.


The foreign policy of the Bolsonaro government

Between the years 2016-2018, the country experienced an intensification of economic and political conflicts, whose emulations refer to the legal-parliamentary coup of 2016 that elevated Michel Temer to the status of President of the Republic. His general management was marked by major political conflicts and an unfinished economic crisis marked by low economic growth, high unemployment and a significant increase in social inequalities. Politically, it was a period marked by reforms of a neoliberal and physiological nature that imposed major setbacks on Brazilian society.

It was in this scenario that the country elected Jair Bolsonaro as President of the Republic in 2018, a deputy who was part of the “low clergy” of the Brazilian parliament, since in 28 years of consecutive terms he approved only two political projects, in addition to his presence in the parliament to be marked by extreme right-wing radicalism and by social and political conservatism made explicit in his mantra that became jargon in all his public speeches as president: “God, Fatherland, Family and Freedom”. More than a conservative ideology, this mantra represents the recapitulation of the fascist slogans that preceded the Second World War.

It is in this scenario that the Bolsonaro government's foreign policy emerges, whose emphasis is based on some fundamental axes: intransigent defense of conservative liberalism as an economic and political order, which means a strong ideologization of actions; weakening of multilateralism and cooperation and regional integration processes, especially in Latin America, with the ideological justification that Brazil did not relate to dictatorships, but only to countries that could bring economic advantages to the Brazilian people; breaking with the autonomy of foreign policy by inserting itself in a dependent manner with the US and internally aligning that country's interests with Brazil; withdrawal of the country from regional forums (UNASUR and CELAC), in addition to constant friction within MERCOSUR; establishment of conflicting external relations with several countries, especially in terms of trade relations and the treatment of environmental issues, particularly when the subject concerned the preservation of the Amazon; in addition to the discourteous treatment of a Head of State in relation to the authorities of other countries.

Finally, the list of setbacks over the last four years is enormous, causing most foreign policy analysts to qualify Jair Bolsonaro's period as one of great setbacks, since the basic pillars that defined the strategy of decades of Brazilian diplomacy, which built a sovereign, autonomous and effective foreign policy.

Below we systematize some of these ideological passages that were under the guidance of the astrologer Olavo de Carvalho – the Chancellor's theoretical reference – which strongly marked this process of breaking with a tradition of decades in the country's foreign policy. In opposition to the classic policy of defense of multilateralism, there appears the permanent discourse of combating “globalism”, as it is understood that foreign policy should “work for the country”, a practice that opens space for an ideological alignment with the Trump administration (USA), whose hallmark was Brazil's submission to US global interests. In this case, the proposal of the Bolsonaro government to change the headquarters of the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem stood out, breaking with a tradition of Brazilian foreign policy of balance in the Israel-Palestine conflict.[iii]

Another relevant point of this rupture occurred in the forums of the United Nations (UN), with two passages standing out. The first of these took place at the 2019 UN General Assembly when Brazil, for the first time, voted in favor of the US economic embargo on Cuba. At that moment, the president of Brazil expressed himself as follows: “we are in favor of the embargo because that is a dictatorship”. However, it should be noted that the ideological foreign policy brought the country closer to far-right governments in Europe (Hungary and Poland), in addition to deepening subservience to right-wing extremism practiced by the Trump administration. The second mention concerns the country's position during the meeting of the UN Human Rights Council held on March 23, 2021, when Brazil was the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean to vote against the resolution that condemned the impacts of coercive measures, such as economic embargoes.

In the international arena, the following highlights still fit: permanent conflicts with China, the country's main trading partner; the breach of the principle of non-intervention and respect for the self-determination of peoples by mistakenly recognizing Juan Guaidó as president of Venezuela, an attitude that over time turned into a major diplomatic fiasco, since it was a political invention of the government Trump; the non-attendance at the inauguration ceremony of the President of Argentina Alberto Fernandez, simply because the candidate supported by Jair Bolsonaro lost the presidential elections in that country, Brazil's main commercial partner within Mercosur; the great controversies and conflicts established with other heads of state in relation to the problem of the Amazon; etc.

Finally, the set of these facts (and many others) imposed regional and international isolation on the country. This situation became evident when Jair Bolsonaro participated in some international meetings and forums, times when he was not even sought out to meet with the main world leaders. It is precisely this scenario that began to have new airs from 2023, when Lula inaugurates his third government in Brazil.


The first official trip

Still on the day of his inauguration, Lula announced that his first official trip would be to Argentina, Brazil's main trading partner on the South American continent. Considering the problems and conflicts caused by the Bolsonaro government in this relationship with Argentina, Lula's visit on January 23, 2023 signaled a change in the course of Brazilian foreign policy that was underway in relation to the neighboring country. Therefore, more than maintaining the tradition of the new president of Brazil of visiting the neighboring country first, this trip sought to rescue and deepen ties with Argentina in view of its economic, social and political importance in the region.

Specifically in economic terms, Brazil can only gain from this rapprochement, since Argentina is still one of the three main destinations for Brazilian exports. In political terms, a better harmony between these two countries could greatly benefit the progress of negotiations in Mercosur, as well as assist in the final negotiations of the agreement between this Bloc and the European Union, a process that practically went into “stand by” during the Government Bolsonaro. In other words, both Mercosur's repositioning and possible advances on a global scale depend heavily on a normalized political relationship between the governments of Brazil and Argentina.

It should also be noted that on January 25, 2023 (shortly after the CELAC meeting) Lula traveled to Uruguay for a meeting with Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou, whose purpose was to discuss the future of Mercosur in the face of Uruguay's insistence to enter into direct agreements with China, which mortally violates the Bloc's rules. Currently governed by a president characterized as neoliberal, Uruguay is seeking to place itself unilaterally in Chinese trade through its agricultural and livestock production, even if it is quite limited.

It should be noted that this positioning by the President of Uruguay is generating certain dissatisfaction among the other members of the Bloc, which were expressed during the last meeting of Mercosur leaders held in December 2022. On that date, the President of Argentina stated that Uruguay he was not complying with the Bloc's rules, behavior that could lead to a rupture between the Member States. Two aspects are worth highlighting in this debate. The first concerns the note sent to Uruguay in November 2022 by the coordinators of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay criticizing that country's request to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a treaty that seeks to establish a free trade area involving the following countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. In essence, this treaty proposes to remove 95% of tariffs on products and goods traded between these countries. The second concerns the defense of a unilateral agreement between Uruguay and China, without any mediation by Mercosur.

According to the new Brazilian Chancellor (Ambassador Mauro Vieira), this position could ultimately represent the destruction of Mercosur for a very simple reason: the Bloc has a Common External Tariff and if any Member State negotiates different tariffs (lower, for example), these goods would arrive cheaper in that country, but would also end up circulating in other countries because there is an agreement on the free movement of goods and merchandise between the countries of the Bloc. This would end up generating a strong imbalance between imports and exports because there would no longer be tariff policy coordination.

In this sense, it is important to literally register Brazil's position defended by President Lula in a meeting with the President of Uruguay: “I want to tell the President and the Uruguayan press that President Lacalle's claims are more than fair. First, because the role of a president is to defend the interests of his country, the interests of his economy and the interests of his people. Second, because it is fair to want to produce more and want to sell more and, therefore, it is necessary to open oneself as much as possible to the business world. However, what do we need to do to modernize Mercosur? We want to sit at the table first with our technicians, then with our ministers and finally with the presidents so that we can renew whatever needs to be renewed”.

This positioning by President Lula made two points clear: first, that Brazil agrees that Mercosur needs to be renewed (as defended by the President of Uruguay); second, that any agreement with China must be done in Bloc. To this end, Lula pointed out that, despite China being Brazil's biggest trading partner, the country defends that the best thing right now is to make trade agreements via Mercosur.


The CELAC meeting held in Buenos Aires

The year 2023 began, for Latin America and the Caribbean, with a large meeting of the main forum for political articulation in the region, since all the heads of the member states were present, highlighting the return of Brazil, a country that has years no longer participated in the meeting.

CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) is a bloc made up of 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and which currently constitutes the main forum for political articulation of the countries of this immense geographic region. It is important to note that the current structure of this organization derives from a set of political actions that were initially more localized and quite restricted, but which, over time, gained body, capacity for articulation and political density. Therefore, it is important to rescue some relevant aspects of this historical process.

The first step was taken in the early 1980s (1983) which resulted in the formation of Grupo de Contadora[iv] on the initiative of Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela, all against the interventionist policy of the Reagan Government (USA), especially in Central America. In the same decade (1985), Peru, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay met in Lima and formed the Grupo de Apoio ao Grupo de Contadora. With this, the process of more autonomous articulation of Latin American countries in relation to powerful North American interests grew.

From this initiative comes the second important moment with the formation, in 1986, of the Rio Group, which had the presence of the original countries (Grupo Contadora) plus the Lima Group. This Forum was created with the aim of strengthening democracy and economic and social development in the region. It is important to emphasize that from then on a political forum was constituted that articulated the Americas (South and Central), being composed exclusively of Latin American countries. In addition, the Rio Group imposed the responsibility of becoming a permanent mechanism for political consultation on Latin American and Caribbean problems, in addition to enacting greater cooperation between nations.

With the arrival of the “Pink Wave” in Latin America in the first decade of the 2000s (elections of center-left presidents in several countries in the region), the climate became more favorable for expanding political articulations on larger scales. Thus, in 2008 President Lula organized, in Costa do Sauípe (BA), the first meeting with Latin American and Caribbean leaders, but without the participation of the USA. In fact, at that moment, members of Mercosur, Unasur and other Latin American and Caribbean nations met to discuss the future of the Organization of American States (OAS), an organization that, in the opinion of many of the participants, strongly represented the interests of the United States because it was always kept under the influence of that imperialist country. This event resulted in the creation of the CALC (Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean), whose objective was to return to the issue of cooperation and development of all countries in the region.

This process gained momentum in the following years with greater integration between the various initiatives (Grupo do Rio and CALC), and in the meetings held between February 22nd and 23rd, 2010, the decision was made to merge the various groups, a process This gave rise to CELAC, which was made official in 2011 with the aim of seeking greater integration between nations, in addition to strengthening the economic, political and social processes of all member nations. For some analysts, this was a milestone in the fight for autonomy on the part of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Particularly in the case of Brazil, a country that has always exercised a strong leadership in this process, it was a major setback to record that in 2020, under the Bolsonaro government, the country withdrew from the organization and no longer participated in meetings, citing political differences with Cuba and Venezuela. As a result, Brazil lost its protagonism, and the organization has been led by Argentina and Mexico since then. With that, Lula's return to power could enable the country to resume its role on the Continent, since it is practically impossible to think of a Latin America and the Caribbean with stability and development without the presence of Brazil. Therefore, the CELAC meeting held in Buenos Aires (Argentina) on January 24, 2023 was a new milestone for the continent's political organization.


Brazil's return to CELAC and the Latin American and Caribbean scene

In his speech at the official meeting, Lula highlighted having stated, in his first speech after winning the presidential elections in October 2022, that Brazil was back in the world. And there's nothing better than starting this return path with the CELAC meeting. He also noted that since the country's re-democratization in 1985, there has always been commitment by Brazilian governments in favor of regional integration, except in the last government (2019-2022) when, without any plausible justification, Brazil stopped participating in all debates promoted and organized by CELAC.

In this sense, he highlighted that his return is to renew the spirit of 2008 when, in Costa do Sauípe (BA), the first meeting of the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean was held, which continued and resulted in the creation of CELAC in 2011 He also noted that the historical meaning of that moment is still very current, since now they meet without foreign supervision to discuss the problems of the group of countries in the region, aiming to seek their own solutions based on three fundamental principles: solidarity, dialogue and cooperation.

In addition, several points in President Lula's speech can be highlighted, which reveal the resumption of Brazilian foreign policy, so badly treated in the last four years. Resuming the historical trajectory, the President highlighted that the countries of the Continent are marked by many common points: the colonial past; the intolerable presence of slavery and the authoritarian temptations that challenge democracies. Even in the face of all this, the immense cultural richness of indigenous peoples and the African diaspora, the diversity of races, origins and creeds, as well as the shared history of resistance and struggle for autonomy, stand out.

Assuming that there is a clear contribution to be made by the region towards the construction of a peaceful world order, based on dialogue, on the reinforcement of multilateralism and on the collective construction of multipolarity, the President declared that Brazil is back in the region and ready to work side by side with everyone because the country is once again looking to its future with the certainty that it will be associated with its neighbors bilaterally, both in Mercosur and in Unasur and CELAC. Also noteworthy in this field was the dialogue with extra-regional consortia, such as the European Union, the African Union, China, India and ASEAN.

Furthermore, it was highlighted that the CELAC community is a peaceful region that rejects extremism, terrorism and political violence. At this time, Lula thanked everyone for their support in relation to the terrorist acts against the country carried out by a horde of Bolsonaristas on January 08, 2023, who invaded and destroyed the headquarters of the three powers of the Republic in Brasília.

From the energy point of view, President Lula stated that some of the main biomes in the world are located in our territories; strategic natural resources; significant portions of the planet's biodiversity, in addition to the potential of water resources, a key issue for the future of humanity. Therefore, the region has a special capacity to participate advantageously in the global energy transition, given the great potential in renewable and clean energies.

In his speech, the president also mentioned that the recent Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the risks associated with excessive dependence on fundamental inputs for the well-being of societies. For this reason, these crises end up revealing the importance of the countries' integration processes, as it is necessary to join efforts to seek to improve the physical and digital infrastructure, in addition to expanding investments in research and innovation in all countries of the region with a view to creating chains global value.

Finally, the apex of the presidential speech is highlighted: “it is with this feeling of common destiny and belonging that Brazil returns to CELAC, with the feeling of someone who is reunited with himself”. Certainly, this is a well thought-out phrase for a return to a political forum where the country should never have been absent. This is because, following the legacy of the Baron of Rio Branco, Brazilian foreign policy had been acting strongly in the Latin American continent since redemocratization in favor of the well-being of all peoples. In fact, this speech, at the end honoring the thinker Darci Ribeiro – the greatest thinker/defender of indigenous peoples – can be considered one of the best manifestations of a president in all CELAC events.


Some repercussions of Lula's presence at the CELAC meeting

The CELAC meeting, with the presence of Brazil, was highlighted in several organs of the world press. A French newspaper highlighted Brazil's new diplomatic offensive and its influences in the region, whose return to CELAC reveals Brazil's preponderant role for the organization's member states as a whole. In addition, it should be noted that the big news was the discussion of a currency proposal to facilitate foreign trade between Brazil and Argentina, a subject that was considered by the economic journal as a “thorn in the side” of North American pretensions and interests.

It was also highlighted by several international correspondents that President Lula's participation, in addition to being symbolic, represented a nod to the resumption of political relations with other countries beyond the Mercosur border, with the aim of exerting all its influence in the region, as well as reorganize the South-South diplomacy that marked his previous passages as president of Brazil. All this without forgetting its leading role in the global sphere.

To this end, three initial agendas were mentioned at the international level: at the end of January 2023 Lula received a visit from the German Chancellor; at the beginning of February she went to the USA and will soon be in China. In other words, in addition to playing a leading role in the region, the Lula government once again places Brazil in the debates on the world stage. Possible visits to Europe are also being scheduled, particularly in Portugal, still in the first half of 2023. This is a big difference in the trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy in relation to what happened in the last four years.

In essence, these new incursions of Brazilian foreign policy in a strongly bipolar world dominated by the Beijing-Washington axis symbolize the intention of the current government to expand its sphere of influence beyond Latin American borders. Without a doubt, the discussion of environmental issues and climate change is one of Brazil's great assets in this bipolar scenario.


Meanwhile, the resentful Brazilian press….

In a newspaper report Folha de S. Paul, signed by Renato Machado, Victoria Azevedo and Matheus Teixeira, also published on the portal UOL on January 29, 2023, the following title was nailed: “Lula faces wear and tear to consolidate himself as leader of Latin America”. And the arguments used to support such statements are impressive, many of which refer more to Bolsonarist positions than to analyzes of what actually happened during the three days of President Lula's first official trip. In the sequence, it becomes clear that these media arguments are devoid of any analysis of the main issue: the change in the course of Brazilian foreign policy.

The first Bolsonarist argument is based on the assumption that President Lula seeks to establish himself with neighboring countries and as a leader in Latin America, using, again, the BNDES to finance projects abroad. What was the source of this argument? Senator Flávio Bolsonaro's Twitter: “charity with someone else's hat, with yours, with our hat. They want to transform the BNDES into what it was before the Bolsonaro government: a money drain for smart guys”.

The second argument is even more evasive, since it states that “other parliamentarians have already asked for explanations about these initiatives”, but without mentioning who the so-called “others” are. In addition, it is stated that “there are actions in Congress to try to unarchive projects that aim to prevent loans to foreign governments”. Again, these passages reveal the ideological-conservative character of the report, since it is supported by assumptions and without mentioning the agents in action.

The report's third argument is a statement from someone who effectively did not even understand what happened on President Lula's official trip to Argentina and Uruguay, since it is stated that "Lula's trip to Argentina and Uruguay exposed the PT's strategy of prioritize Mercosur, even in unpopular cases, to try to establish themselves as protagonists”. This is the ignorance of part of the Brazilian media, since if those responsible for the article had dedicated a little time to read Lula's speech at CELAC, they could have understood what was being exposed to the other Heads of State of Latin America and the Caribbean .

The fourth argument reveals arrogance and political ignorance. President Lula is criticized for the fact that he claims to be a defender of democracy, but at the same time makes “signals to the dictatorships of Cuba and Venezuela, in addition to proposing the reopening of the embassy in Venezuela”. Nor did this nonsense escape the fact that Lula praised “Argentina – which is governed by his ally Alerto Fernandez – but that the economy in 2022 presented an inflation close to 5%”. In this case, we see how much a basic class in international relations is needed by these journalists!

The fifth argument presented in the report – out of context – abstractly criticizes Lula's speech when he stated that “Bolsonaro did an abominable thing by accepting Guiadó as president of Venezuela”. In other words, they are still trying to defend a subject that not even his supporters in Venezuela recognize him as such.

Finally, the article presents the obvious when it states that “the strategy is similar to the one adopted in his first eight years in government, when Lula was one of the enthusiasts for the creation of CELAC, strengthening relations with neighboring countries”. This outcome shows how much a more serious reading of what actually happened in Buenos Aires between January 23 and 24, 2023 is needed. This is the intellectual poverty of the Brazilian media, from which no different behavior could be expected! [v]

*Lauro Mattei and pProfessor at the Department of Economics and International Relations and at the Graduate Program in Business Administration, both at UFSC.


Castelan, D.; Mattei, L. The Foreign Policy of the Temer Government. Florianópolis (SC); NECAT-UFSC (Text for Discussion No. 021), 2016.

Mattei, L. The interim government and political impasses in Mercosur. Florianópolis (SC); NECAT-UFSC (Text for Discussion No. 019), 2016.


[I] Here, the initiatives to create UNASUR and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) could also be mentioned, which characterizes multilateralism in foreign policy.

[ii] It should be noted that this is a typical criticism of the neoliberal right, which sees partisanship only when relations with leftist parties also occur. Now, when one blindly follows the neoliberal and conservative booklet, these relations do not qualify as partisanship.

[iii] In the end, this proposal was not implemented, and on 15.12.2019 Brazil installed only one commercial office in Jerusalem. If it had been carried out as originally planned, it would have meant that Brazil would be recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

[iv] Contadora is a small island in Panama where the first meeting was held.

[v] Original Version published as Text for Discussion nº 51/2023 NECAT-UFSC.

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