New data on the job market

Image: Tyler Hendy


Socioeconomic context of the estimated labor market for workers with a profile close to the profile of Bolsa Família Program beneficiaries

"As long as a man can starve to death at the door of a palace from which everything overflows, there will be nothing stable in human institutions” (Eugène Varlin, French revolutionary, combatant of the Paris Commune).


Studies that address the target social stratum of the Bolsa Família Program (PBF)[I] from the perspective of their occupational insertion, they have, on the one hand, contributed to refuting, as well as deconstructing the “laziness effect”, a myth that believed that the program would lead “workers to work less”, by showing the significant participation of beneficiaries in the labor market ; on the other hand, they have presented numerous evidences that this social stratum has accessed occupations where low wages and poor working conditions predominate, or in Marxist terms, are jobs whose productivity mechanisms are guided by the regime of absolute surplus value (Bernardo, 1991 and 2010; Oliveira and Soares, 2013; Barbosa and Corseuil, 2013; Santo André et al., 2015).

Another little-adopted approach, which makes it possible to open up new questions about the subject at hand, is that of a historian who analyzes the PBF from the perspective of class struggle. Simplifying a lot, it can be said that the PBF, in addition to “alleviating immediate material needs” with direct income transfer, is a Program whose fundamental aspect is not limited only to “stimulating demand in the consumer market, but preparing supply in the labor market. The increase in consumption provided by the Program's subsidies is directly aimed at improving the diet of families and especially of children and adolescents, complementing the health care to which they must be submitted; and the positive reflection that this increase in consumption may have on local economies is just an indirect effect of measures aimed, above all, at training the future workforce” (Bernardo, 2010a, Campello and Neri, 2013). In short, it is a program that goes beyond the assistance and philanthropic spectrum. It is strictly capitalist, as in addition to the strategy of forming a workforce, it seeks to incorporate segments of the working class that are working in activities that are not typically capitalist and, therefore, was and is very little understood both on the left and on the right of the political spectrum ( Bernardo, 2010a). In turn, as noted by Barbosa and Corseuil (2013, p.330), “the impact of PBF on the worker's occupational choice” is still incipient in Brazilian research.

However, not only poorly understood, the PBF has been attacked by the Bolsonarist extreme right and, given the importance of this income transfer program, especially for its worldwide recognition of combating poverty, the most prestigious magazine of liberalism reported that the Bolsonaro government “it slowed down the acceptance of new beneficiaries and started canceling benefit payments. The number of families admitted to the PBF dropped from 275 thousand per month to less than 2,5 thousand” (The Economist,, 2020).[ii] (The Economist,, 2020). For electoral reasons, the government tries to redesign the PBF, with the creation of the Auxilio Brasil Program, instituted by Provisional Measure (MP) 1061/2021, without, however', deconstructing it in its purpose, that is, in place of a anti-poverty program allied to labor insertion, what “is in progress is a process of (re)moralization of poverty”, in which a considerable percentage of the most impoverished working class will once again be managed by traditional relationships of charity and clientele ( Bernardo, 2010; De Sordi, 2021). The original PBF, more than boosting the local economy and stimulating consumption, meant breaking with charitable, clientelistic and philanthropic mechanisms, because its strategic objective was to prepare and stimulate to the labor market, combined with income generation and “in helping young people to continue their studies beyond compulsory education” (Bernardo, 2010; Campello and Neri, 2013).

After these brief considerations, the purpose of this article is to outline a summary table of the socioeconomic context of the labor market for this important portion of the working class with lower incomes.[iii][iv]For this purpose, we used information collected from the microdata of the Continuous National Household Sample Survey - PNAD Contínua (PNADC), from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), with a temporal cut in the first quarter of 2021, as well as we made use of the PNAD – Covid-19 (IBGE), 2020, to observe workers in isolation or social distancing. studied those who are beneficiaries of the PBF.[v] 

In this case, we equated part of the issue, shedding light on the position of workers in the income structure of the main job, which allows identifying and characterizing socioeconomic aspects of the workforce employed in a situation of poverty, that is, one that has characteristics of the public target of the PBF. Thus, the path chosen was to order the workforce aged 14 or over according to their usual monthly income from their main job.

Then, these workers were divided into ten tenths, the first being the poorest tenth and the last being the tenth best paid among employed workers.[vi]. From there - and considering the income distribution stratum as a proxy - we can observe the occupational insertion of the poorest segments (1st and 2nd deciles of income) of workers, that is, we approach those workers whose characteristics are observable in PBF beneficiaries .

After defining the parameters to approach and point to empirical evidence regarding this group in the workforce, we prepared a set of indicators only for workers employed in the reference week of the research, with information only for the main job.

In order to get to know these workers better, we will discuss aspects related to the functioning of the labor market, with the aim of contextualizing their occupational insertion. In this plan, we will present indicators in regional, age, racial, sexual and occupational terms associated with the variable of tenths of the income distribution of the main job. With this, our objective is to analyze how the buying and selling relationships of this workforce are established. For example, what kind of job are these workers accessing when we take into account the dimension captured by income and informality?

On the other hand, it should be noted that, as the PNADC also does not make available the monthly household income variable – because it only captures monetary income originating from work -, not including income not derived from work, such as retirement and pensions, rents, donations, etc., we are left unable to estimate the unemployment rate by tenths of the income distribution of unemployed workers.

Labor market numbers – employed workers with the Bolsa Família Program profile

This section brings systematized information on the profile of employed workers distributed in the income structure of their main job, so that all data will be presented according to income deciles. At first, we will present some contours of the poorest employed workers, considering the following attributes: place of residence by region of the country, gender, age group, color/race. In a second moment, we will describe the type of occupational insertion of these workers, based on income, professional qualification, position in the occupation and the rate of informality.


As previously mentioned, it was not possible to measure the unemployment rate of the workers under study. Therefore, the occupational status – if unemployed, for example – was obtained for the workforce as a whole. According to PNADC microdata, the 1st quarter of 2021, the period recorded an unemployment rate of 14,7% of the economically active population (EAP), almost 15 million unemployed people, as shown in table 1, growth of 0,8p .p compared to the previous quarter (Oct-Nov-Dec/2020, where the unemployment rate was 13,9%); and, according to data extracted from the PNADC in reference, occupational situations of the discouraged type (5,9 million people) and unemployed or underemployed due to insufficient hours worked (21,8 million people) make up 27,8 million workers in the condition of underused strength, numbers showing that the labor market is far from responding positively.

 Because the economy, which no longer had satisfactory results, was aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has threatened companies, governments and the population in general, in particular the working class, notably that fraction of workers unable to isolate themselves. social, given its precarious economic insertion, as we will see later (Passaword, 2020). And the economic and health effects of the pandemic have presented prospects with somber tones. The unemployment rate, for example, in the US increased by ten percentage points in April 2020, jumping to 14,7% – the highest since the Great Depression of the 1930s.[vii]Even with vaccines, which reduce deaths and hospitalizations, the virus continues to circulate aggressively, through new strains, increasing the uncertainty of when the pandemic will end. In addition, the costs of covid-19 – in terms of lives lost, goods and services that are no longer produced – tend to linger, especially for societies whose economy is more vulnerable, as in the case of Brazil. (The Economist,.

At the present juncture, there are no consistent signs of a resumption of economic growth, especially due to the mistaken, hesitant and denialist way in which the federal government faced the pandemic, boycotting as much as it could, disregarding three dimensions of coping with the crisis that would mitigate the loss of family incomes and guarantee the financial survival of companies, namely: “social distancing, sanitary measures and economic measures” (Carvalho et al, 2021).[viii]Sanitary and scientific denialism, combined with the economic policy that imposes the prescription of the most despotic version of neoliberalism, shows that the economic perspectives are worrying. In the economic sphere, the Bolsonaro government remains committed to reducing production costs, anchored in the new labor regulations that have emerged in the recent period (labor reforms and total outsourcing, both instituted in 2017, and the social security one in 2019), measures that should prolong the degradation of the level of unemployment, contributing to the deterioration of the standard of living of the population that lives from work. And it should be noted that the unemployment rate was not higher – although it is quite high (14,7%) – because the pandemic has led to a greater transition from occupation to unemployment or inactivity. More than half of the working-age population has been unemployed since the pandemic began to threaten Brazilian society (Costa, Barbosa and Hecksher, 2021). The pandemic scenario pushed a mass of workers into inactivity, preventing them from effectively searching for work, although they wanted to have a job[ix]. By the way, the PNADC, first quarter (Jan-Feb-Mar) of 2020, that is, pre-pandemic, reveals that the occupation level (ratio between employed persons and working-age population) was 53,5%; while in the context of the pandemic, the occupancy level stood at 48,8% and then 48,4%, respectively, in the fourth quarter (Oct-Nov-Dec) of 2020, and the first quarter (Jan-Feb-Mar) of 2021 (Costa, Barbosa and Hecksher, 2021).

Let us now observe the composition of employed workers in the main job income distribution stratum, with a focus on those with lower wages. When looking at table 2, especially the first two strata of income distribution, we have what, in the words of one scholar, constitutes the so-called subproletariat (Singer, 2009). This is a vast layer of the working class for which the worst jobs, if any, are reserved, a situation that makes their living conditions more difficult (Rego and Pinzani, 2013). And when they find work, these workers often act without the minimum labor rights, because they are hired without a formal contract, with lower wages, whose monthly amount received is below the socially considered minimum. Therefore, this workforce is excluded from wage citizenship, as we will see later. There are around 18 million people, making up 21,7% of the employed workforce, with more than 8,5 million in the first decile and 9,5 million in the second decile.[X]That is, it is the proportion of the subproletariat (21,7%) in the proletariat as a whole.[xi] Of the universe of underemployed workers due to insufficient hours actually worked (6,8 million people), which in other terms expresses the underutilization of the productive capacity of the employed workforce, 44,8% are located in the first decile and 26,1% % in the second tenth.

Breaking down by region, as shown in Table 3, it is no coincidence that the largest contingent of these workers is concentrated in the Northeast, precisely because, as the available literature has pointed out, it is a region where the business fabric tends to present a more archaic basis for the reproduction of cheap and overexploited work, which will reflect on less structured labor relations, especially in terms of social protection. By the way, the region has the “worst rates of coverage and protection by the General Social Security Regime (RGPS or INSS)” (Guimarães et al..[xii]According to PNADC microdata for the 1st quarter of 2021, in Brazil, the universe of the poorest employed workforce, that is, those located in the first two deciles of the income distribution stratum, is distributed as follows:

• 7,3 million workers concentrated in the Northeast region, respectively, 4,3 million people (or 50,4%) in the first decile and 2,9 million people (or 31,0%) in the second decile of the distribution from the lowest poor, as this region concentrates 22% of the employed workforce as a whole;

the second region with the highest concentration is the Southeast, with 5,7 million workers, respectively, 2,1 million people (or 25,1%) in the first tenth and 2,3 million people (or 37,4%) in the second tenth of the distribution starting from the poorest, highlighting that this region concentrates 44,9% of the total employed workforce in Brazil.

In relation to the composition of the employed workforce by age - according to table 4 - 18% both for those belonging to the 1st and the 2nd tenths of the income structure of the main job are young people aged between 14 and 24 years old. In general, a hypothesis to be considered to explain this participation is that “early work is part of the youth experience” in the working-class strata in unfavorable material conditions, a moment that can configure a possibility or difficulty in the transition to adult life (Santo André, 2015).[xiii] And, depending on the socioeconomic conditions of young people (as in the case of the social layer located in the first two deciles), there is evidence that this experience affects them more intensely, since early entry into the labor market, often in worse conditions, ends up being a determining factor in the strategy of helping support the family, since income from work is the main source of access to commodified goods and services. Overall, the young workforce represents 11,7% of employed workers. While older or more experienced workers – 25 to 59 years old – in the same socioeconomic condition, that is, in the 1st and 2nd deciles, although with a significant participation in this age group, respectively, 50,2% and 52,7 %, have the lowest percentages when compared to the other deciles of the income distribution stratum.

Analyzing the composition of the employed population by sex, as illustrated in Graph 1, there is a greater presence of women in the poorest stratum of the labor income distribution. They appear with 51,5% of participation in the first decile and with 50,1% in the third decile of the distribution starting from the poorest, which reveals that their work capacity is better used in these strata. One hypothesis for the trend towards greater participation of women in the contingent of employed people in the most impoverished sectors of the working class is the increase in families headed by women in this social stratum, many of which have single-parent arrangements (women with children) and who have woman responsible for family survival. In the others, especially in the strata closest to workers with better incomes, especially from the seventh decile onwards, the workforce is predominantly male.

Although the rate of female participation in the economically active population (EAP) has increased –which is evident above all in the poorest strata of the working class– it is noted that there is a strong gender bias in the division of labor, since this can be measured when looking at incorporates the income variable into the analysis, for example, an indicator that reveals the unfavorable situation of female workers in the workplace, even when they have equal or higher qualifications than men. To a large extent, this is explained by the “inequality in the distribution of professional work time and domestic and family work between men and women” (Sucupira, 2016). In this regard, the Covid -19 pandemic has dramatically affected women, in particular those with minor children who depended on day care centers and schools, services blocked by the pandemic. Women, according to data from PNAD -COVID19, from November 2020, “had a higher percentage of leave due to the pandemic (they were fired or on leave). In the month in question, data from PNAD-Covid19 recorded 17,2% female unemployment, against 11,9% for males. And, 3,6% (more than 1 million people) of the female workforce were on leave due to distancing; for men the percentage was 1,7% (827 thousand people). When data began to be collected by PNAD-Covid19, in May 2020, 15 million workers (18,6% of the workforce) were busy and away from work due to social distancing, of which 8,7 million were women (23,5%) and 7,2 million were men (15%).

From the capitalist perspective, in particular among the universe of archaic, authoritarian and nationalist bosses, who promote sexist and ethnic prejudices, stimulate social resentment, and where a large portion of the workers under study is inserted, the specificities - in this case, of the gender of the class worker –, are used to reinforce economic exploitation; and archaic work environments tend to assign women less productive capacity.[xiv]

In terms of color/race – another attribute used in capitalist exploitation relations to divide workers, pitting them against each other – what the data indicate is that non-whites (grouped as black/brown/indigenous) are the majority among the employed workers in situations of poverty. In the case of the 1st poorest decile, they make up 71,2% of the workforce and continue to predominate up to the 6th decile, as per graph 2, respectively, 62% (2nd dec.), 2% (66rd dec.), 3 .59,3% (4th decade), 54% (5th decade), 52,2% (6th decade). From this point of view, it is possible to observe little or no possibility of social mobility for this fraction of the working class, characterizing a society stratified by strong social and economic inequalities; and there is in the labor market, one of the moments in life in which discrimination is present -, the most complete expression of this. Thus, workers in this situation are doubly disadvantaged, because they are doubly discriminated against – by poverty and by color/race. For them, lumpenization is becoming more and more credible.

occupational insertion

The occupational trajectory of the workers under study is mostly part of low-productivity sectors of economic activity. In the Marxist matrix, it means that they are sectors of the economy that operate in an absolute surplus value regime, a context in which the productive structure lacks sophistication, which, as a rule, means where long working hours, cheapness of the workforce prevail. and the exploitation mechanisms are based on punishments and threats (Bernardo, 1991). This observation acquires relevance when one observes revealing indicators of the real material conditions of existence of this employed population, such as, for example, those related to the position in the occupation, the rate of informality, qualification and, mainly, income. As we will see here, these are workers with a high level of economic insecurity.

With regard to the real income usually received by the poorest workers, it is observed that many even earn a minimum wage, as in the case of those in the first and second deciles of the labor income distribution, as illustrated in graph 3.

In the case of the first decile, where 8,5 million employed workers are concentrated, the average remuneration is less than one third of the current minimum wage, whose value is R$1.100,00. Only from the fourth tenth, which concentrates almost 5 million employed people, there is the stratum whose average remuneration is equivalent to the minimum wage.

Another indicator that elucidates inequality in the labor market is the percentage of income from work appropriated by the poorest decile (10% – 1st decile) and by the best paid decile (10% – 10th decile) in the structure of labor income distribution. It can be seen that the tenth poorest worker absorbs only 1,34% of total labor income, while the percentage appropriated by the tenth best paid worker is 37,14% (according to table 5).

In the case of qualification, an attribute intrinsically linked to wage gains and, consequently, to the type of occupational insertion, it is noted that most of the poorest workers – 56,5% located in the first and 46% in the second decile–, have low qualifications. , as shown in table 6. This indicator makes it possible to observe, for example, which fraction of the working class remained busy and not away from work, because they were working remotely. Data from PNAD – Covid-19, from November 2020, are quite enlightening in this regard, as of the 7,3 million workers in this situation, the majority (76% or 5 million people) have high qualifications, that is, they are between the 5th and 9th deciles of the income distribution stratum. And only 10% of low-skilled workers (2,2 people), predominantly in the first two deciles (as shown in Table 162), worked remotely.

For this fraction of the working class, informal work is no exception, it is the rule, as illustrated in Graph 4, with 95,6% of the total employed in the first decile and 85,3% of the total employed in the second tenth affected by informality. That is, almost all of these workers, due to their more unstable work trajectory, are included in the context of employment and informal work in the capitalist economy. Part of this high level of labor instability, which points to a situation of deterioration in the conditions of occupational insertion of this workforce, can be attributed to the peculiarities of the economic segments where it is employed.

This category includes agricultural sectors (26,0% and 15,9%, respectively 1st and 2nd deciles), specifically activities linked to family or subsistence agriculture, commerce (16,3% and 18,8%, respectively, 1st and 2nd deciles) and domestic services (16,5% and 11,6%, respectively, 1st and 2nd deciles), as shown in table 7 referring to groups of activities. As they are sectors with little or no competitiveness in terms of productivity, they tend to resort to lowering the cost of labor for employed personnel, which can often open precedents for the incidence of illegality in the hiring (without a formal contract) of workers . Another part is explained by the social origin of the workers, if they come from popular circles, their occupational trajectory is already traced. Thus, the social effects related to the origin of workers belonging to the most impoverished sectors of the population end up functioning as if it were a type of “social prison” (Bernardo, 2000).

Many of these workers are inserted in elementary occupations (29,9%, 25,1%, and 29,9%, respectively, 1st, 2nd and 3rd deciles – formed by domestic service workers in general, cleaning workers, vehicle washers , windows, clothes and other manual cleaning, among others). Another contingent of workers (in 26%, in the 1st and 2nd deciles) is found in the group of service workers, trade and market vendors, made up of cooks, waiters and bar attendants, hairdressers, salespeople, especially street vendors, among others. others, as shown in Table 8, referring to occupational groups.

Although informality is not synonymous with precariousness, it is clearly in line with the degradation of labor relations, notably because it is a type of occupational insertion conducive to configuring situations of instability in contracts and labor relations. And when we add up the number of people employed in informal activities in the first two deciles of the labor income distribution, starting with the poorest, whose monthly income is less than the minimum wage, we arrive at 17 million workers without any level of protection, as most of them work as employees without a formal contract and on their own, as shown in table 9. Of the 7 million employed and in remote work, according to PNAD – Covid-3, of November 19, only 2020% (15 , 2 million people) were informal workers

For the working class as a whole, the level of informality is 40,4% of the employed population, as shown in Graph 4. In this regard, it is interesting to consider that the labor market has been increasingly characterized by precariousness, flexibility and deregulation, signs that have also been presented in the world of work in advanced capitalist societies, where profound transformations in the social relations of production have taken place, because capitalists have been committed to the expansion of outsourcing and subcontracting as “a new way of articulating the exploitation of workers”. more qualified with that of the less qualified, giving capitalism an enormous plasticity” (Antunes, 2006; Mézáros, 2006; Bernardo, 2009).

In general terms, it is in this context that capitalism has expanded, with an increase in new patterns of exploitation and management of the workforce through the flexibility of its processes, expanding the type of precarious work (underemployment, part-time work, temporary work, outsourced ), even in countries where skilled labor is concentrated, that is, in advanced capitalist societies, where the economic fabric has greater innovative, organizational and technological capacity (Gala, 2020). And it is in this context, therefore, that capitalism has spared no efforts to overcome any barrier that prevents the increase in productivity (Bernardo, 2009). By the way, it is worth a parenthesis about this expansion of capitalism, which stimulates increased productivity and, consequently, drives economic development. Under these conditions, a movement takes place guided by what has always happened in the history of capitalism: the combined operation of uneven development, applied both within the same “geographical region” and within the same “sector of activity”, where economic expansion and modernization take place. coexist with traces of “backwardness and weaknesses”, as, for example, in the case of Brazil. As a result of this, and contradicting catastrophic theses about the end of employment, new working classes tend to be incorporated, because new jobs are created – in much greater numbers than “those destroyed” (Antunes, 2003; Bernardo, 2000, 2009 , 2011; Silver, 2005).

And, finally, as noted, an important portion of the Brazilian working class experiences conditions of economic instability, given by precarious work and accentuated by the pandemic. In this context, it is to be thought that, instead of preserving the workforce, in order to move towards a developed capitalism, since the parliamentary coup of 2016, the social destruction of work has been promoted, which implies further downgrading the workers' standard of living. Since 2016, therefore, and currently, with a mixture of trickery, incompetence and deliberation, the managers at the head of the Brazilian State have rejected, at least for the workers, the option for the capitalism of abundance, suggesting condemning the other participants of the population to misery economically active (EAP). In the capitalist horizon these managers produce and manage the precariousness of workers' lives have been sufficiently profitable. For them, therefore, this has been enough.

*Marcelo Phintener, ssociologist, holds a master's degree in philosophy from PUC-SP.

Article originated from a presentation held at the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea), in Brasília - DF, in August 2017.


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[I] For a detailed consultation on the Bolsa Família program, see Campello and Neri (2013).

[ii] Such indifference, combined with the effects of the pandemic and the way the federal government faced it, several previous advances in poverty reduction were reversed, aggravating food insecurity. By taking Brazil back to the hunger map, the weaknesses of the welfare state were also exposed. . “There are already 2018 million Brazilians”, continues the magazine, “in a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity”

[iii] According to the Ministry of Citizenship, people with per capita income equal to or less than R$ 89,00 are considered extremely poor; and people with per capita income equal to or less than R$ 178,00, or equal to or less than half the minimum wage are considered poor.

[iv] We adopted income as a poverty criterion, although poverty does not only reflect “deprivation of money and material resources”, as it is multidisciplinary and, therefore, also concerns the deprivation of social opportunities, access to basic services (such as education, health, nutrition). In turn, not being able to count on an economic base that guarantees the minimum of well-being in terms of living conditions, means that absence or insufficient income is one of the main sources of poverty.

[v]According to the Ministry of Citizenship, reference July 2021, 14 million families (or 44 million people) receive the PBF.

[vi] In the case of the best-paid worker, this refers to the 10th income decile, whose average salary is above R$ 10.000, as will be seen later.

[vii] According to Bloomberg of 07/07/2021, based on a report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – ​​OECD, “about 22 million jobs disappeared by the end of 2020 in industrialized nations”.

[viii]The economic damage was only not greater thanks to the Emergency Aid - AE, "instituted in April 2020, with the aim of, in the midst of the pandemic, whose impact was stronger on the informal labor market, to restore the income of families affected by the crisis economy triggered by it” (IBRE Blog, 2020). Also according to the IBRE Blog (2020), in August 2020, “the program reached around 66 million beneficiaries in August, with half of the population living with at least one member who received the transfer, according to PNAD Covid-19. The program is currently the largest experience of social spending in Brazil, with a monthly amount of R$ 50 billion per month, that is, at least R$ 200 billion in its entirety - compared to R$ 30 billion per year for Bolsa Família, BRL 56 billion per year for BPC and BRL 17 billion for Abono Salarial.” As for support to companies, with the aim of reducing the impacts caused by the pandemic, in order to try to guarantee the survival of the production unit, the Emergency Support Program for

Company (PESE), whose objective was to fund the payroll of small and medium-sized companies. According to Valor Econômico newspaper, on 08/07/2021, 113 thousand companies accessed this credit line, reaching almost 2 million workers. Also according to Valor Econômico, edition of 14/06/2021, other emergency lines of credit were created to maintain the financial health of companies, such as the Emergency Credit Access Program (Peac), from BNDES. and the National Support Program for Micro and Small Companies (Pronampe).

Research by Correia et al (2020), which assessed the costs and benefits, especially the economic one, of blockades to slow down the spread of the 1918 Spanish flu, which infected 500 million people, mainly affecting many workers of working age, and killed 50 million, shows that public health measures, such as social isolation, mandatory use of masks, have not necessarily harmed the economy and bring greater medium-term benefits. Analyzing American cities, where the highest number of deaths caused by the pandemic occurred, because they did not impose measures to contain the spread of the Spanish flu, the study observed worse economic performance, measured in terms of local industrial employment and production when compared to those that intervened early and incisively , with non-pharmaceutical measures, to slow down the spread of the virus and thereby preserving more lives. In other words, the study reveals that, as pandemics are very harmful to health and society, a temporary interruption in the economy is necessary to preserve the workforce and future workers, without whom economic activity does not move. In the case of Brazil, by boycotting the measures that would protect the population in general and workers in particular from the spread of the Covi-19 virus, by hesitating to present material aid measures for workers and the financial health of companies, as well as by hesitating to buy vaccines to fight the virus, wouldn't the Bolsonaro government be promoting a type of eugenics?

[ix] According to data from PNAD-Covid-19, from November 2020, the last edition of this survey, in absolute numbers, almost 12 million workers stopped looking for a job due to the pandemic. When PNAD -Covid-19 started collecting data, in May 2020, there were 20 million workers in this situation.

[X] According to information captured in the microdata of the Single Registry for Social Programs (Cad Único) database and management of the PBF, 2018, the latest available, and which accounts for more than 70 million registered people, the contingent of people aged 14 or over who were integrated into some employment relationship, that is, who worked on the last day of the month and reference year of the registration, was 15,1 million people, of which 58,3% were self-employed (part time or self-employed) ), whose average income for this job was BRL 354,62. Thus, such information shows how calibrated the PNADC 1st quarter of 2021 is, when we capture in the survey workers whose characteristics in terms of work and income are observed in the profile of the PBF public.

[xi] In Marxist terms, the concept of the proletariat is used here as a synonym for the working class and vice versa. Because it is within this framework that we understand the working class or the proletariat, as social beings who live off the sale of their labor power (Antunes, 1999).

[xii]It is also the region that has suffered the most from the economic recession, registering the highest unemployment rate (18,6%). In absolute numbers, there are over 4 million workers or 29,7% of the economically active population (EAP) unemployed in Brazil, which currently accounts for 14,8 million people.

[xiii] From another perspective, we can consider that, when young people enter the world of work early, the conditions are created to anticipate competition among active workers, intensifying the struggle for material survival within the working class. Regarding this conflict, see Bernardo (1991) p. 215-216.

[xiv] Except in large transnational companies, where work environments tend to be more democratic, the identity agenda has been incorporated, and issues such as racism and sexism are present in workforce management as a strategy to harmonize the relationship between employee and employer, so that identity and diversity have been applied to reinforce the increase in companies' productivity. A report by Fortune Global magazine is enlightening in this regard. In its 2021 edition, of the 500 largest companies in the world, 23 are managed by women. In 2020, there were 14. And the magazine notes: “The list of female CEOs has also become much more diverse this year; in 2020, only one black woman headed a Global 500 company. In 2021, there are six black women serving as CEOs of the Global 500. These numbers represent an all-time high. Since the Fortune began tracking the number of female CEOs in the Global 500 in 2014, the statistic fluctuated between 12 and 17. While these numbers represent a major recovery from 2020, the leadership of the Global 500 – and therefore the global economy – it is still predominantly male. Twenty-three female CEOs amount to just 4,6% of the total.” And further on, the magazine argues: “This year, that number has grown thanks to some leadership changes. Karen Lynch in 2021 took over as CEO of CVS Health, ranked No. 7 on the Global 500. CVS is the highest-ranked company in both the Fortune 500 and the Global 500 to be led by a female CEO. There have been more leadership changes at state-owned companies that have already increased the number of women running Fortune 500 businesses; now these changes are doing the same for the Global 500.” In this regard, see Pablo Polese (2020)

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