By EDUARDO BRITO, KAIO AROLDO, LUCAS VALLADARES, OSCAR LUIS ROSA MORAES SANTOS e LUCAS TRENTIN RECH*
The Israeli attack on Iran is not an isolated event, but rather another chapter in the struggle for control of fossil capital in the Middle East.
In recent weeks, the conflict, widely known and with repercussions in the public debate, between the Zionist regime of Israel – sponsored by American imperialism with its hegemony of fossil capital (MALM, 2016) – and the State of Palestine has taken on new contours with the heightening of tension, including in relation to one of the largest oil powers in the region, the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The objective of this exhibition is to address the concrete political phenomenon, articulating the dynamics of oil and gas production in the Middle East region, especially in Iran, the target of potential attacks by the Zionist regime, with the hegemonic conflict between the United States and China for control of fossil capital and its implications for the international energy market.
History of relations between Iran, Israel and the United States
On June 11nd, the Washington Post reported that the United States would be emptying its embassies in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, by issuing authorization for the withdrawal of “non-essential personnel”[I] from these spaces in the face of the growing risk of an offensive by the Zionist regime of Israel against Iran, after allegedly having been warned that the regime is “fully prepared to launch an operation against Iran”.
Later, in the early hours of June 13 in Tehran, Zionist forces carried out attacks on several military bases in the country, in addition to having also hit several nuclear bases in the country. In total, more than 80 people were killed, including several scientists involved in the nuclear program, the chief of the General Staff, and the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
The main targets of Israel's attacks were Tehran – a city where members of the high military and political ranks are concentrated – and the city of Natanz – where uranium enrichment plants are concentrated, a fundamental input for the development of nuclear devices – which is just over three hours from the capital. According to the Associated Press, at least six more cities were also attacked.
Following the incident, the Israeli regime, represented by Defense Minister Israel Katz, declared a state of emergency and quickly closed its airspace. Iran has so far responded to the attacks by sending drones and ballistic missiles into Israeli-occupied territory.[ii]
FIGURE 1.[iii]
Although, at first glance, a possible independent action on the part of Israel is obvious – this idea being strengthened by contradictory statements from President Donald Trump, such as the one that he would have opposed the idea of attacking Iran[iv]according to the The New York Times –, it is worth remembering that, without a doubt, this will not be carried out without due scrutiny by the United States government, as has been speculated for weeks: “If military force is necessary, we will use military force,” said Donald Trump. “Israel will obviously be very involved in this. They will be the leaders of this. But nobody leads us, we do what we want to do.”[v]
The president's speech expresses very well (just look and see) the role played by the Israeli regime in US imperialism. The US will certainly act to guarantee its own interests; however, Israel, as an American protectorate, with different contradictions – but resulting in the same phenomenon – from the latter in relation to Iran, should be directly responsible for the offensive.
These have been evident at least since France developed the Israeli nuclear program, becoming a real concern since the 1970s. Iran saw not only its status as a regional power threatened, but also its own political stability and sovereignty. Thus, the start of its own nuclear project (in the 1960s) aimed at producing energy for civilian use caused unease in the Western world in the early 2000s, when it was already known that the Iranian nuclear program could have a major impact on the correlation of forces in the Middle East.
In addition, Iran's historical support for the Palestinian cause is another relevant factor in the intensification of this dispute. Since 1990, the country has maintained strong relations with Hamas, which were formalized a year later, when a delegation from the political group requested the creation of an official office on Iranian territory. After this event, Iran provided material support to the group on several other occasions, such as in the episode of mass deportation of leaders of the group and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Lebanon or in the invasion of the Gaza Strip between 2007 and 2008.
In the first, Iran served as a bridge for rapprochement between Hamas and Hezbollah, in addition to promoting frequent visits by authorities to exiled leaders; in the second, Iran secretly supplied various military equipment essential for the defense of Palestine in the region.[vi]
Iran, therefore, appears as a direct antagonist of the Zionist regime of Israel, while being primarily responsible for the existence and strength of the Palestinian people's most incisive combat front and, it is important to remember, for the existence of the Palestinian people themselves. In this context, Iran is, at the same time, an antagonist of the fossil hegemony of the United States, which, in addition to having its most advanced military detachment in the territory in Israel, exerts strong influence in the Persian Gulf through its various military bases on the west coast and throughout the Middle East.
FIGURE 2.[vii]
Historical Framework and the Iranian Revolution
The current scenario of imminent conflagration, accentuated by the escalation of Israeli violence in Gaza and Iran's alignment with the Palestinian cause, cannot be analyzed as an isolated event. On the contrary, what we are observing is the culmination of a historical trajectory whose ignition point occurred after the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979) (Espírito Santo, 2017).
Therefore, to understand the strategic depth of this confrontation and Iran's role as an energy power in the Middle East (Bhagat, 2005), we will analyze the genesis and reasons that transformed the Persian nation into the main antagonist of North American fossil hegemony in the richest oil region in the world.
Iran's insertion into a momentary dynamic of subordination to the West was sealed in 1953. That year, the nationalist government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was deposed in a coup orchestrated by the CIA (United States) and MI6 (United Kingdom). Mossadegh's “crime” had been to nationalize the oil industry, until then controlled by British capital, in an attempt to reverse the drain of wealth from the country.
The coup restored Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power, consolidating a regime whose role on the geopolitical chessboard was clear: to act as a pawn in Washington's strategy, ensuring the flow of cheap oil to the West and functioning as a bulwark against the influence of the Soviet Union, with which Iran shared an extensive strategic border (Alves, 2020).
A classic model of dependent development was thus structured, in which the economy peripheral Iranian was shaped to serve the interests of the imperialist center (Foran, 1989). Under this logic, the Shah's coup regime promoted an authoritarian “modernization” project known as the “White Revolution” (1963), financed by vast oil wealth. The initiative, however, produced a socially disastrous effect, deepening internal crises (Nakhaei, 2020).
The first point was the concentration of income and the deepening of inequality. Operating under a logic analogous to that of the “economic miracle” (1969-1973) of the Brazilian military dictatorship, the promise of “making the pie bigger and then dividing it up”, the oil wealth was never redistributed. On the contrary, it fed a small Westernized elite, while the vast majority of the population, especially in non-urban centers, remained marginalized (Brandis, 2009).
Secondly, the imposition of state secularism and accelerated Westernization that separated crucial sectors of society. The Shiite Muslim clergy, the majority in the country and known as ulemas, saw its influence and traditions systematically degraded (Varol, 2016). Finally, as in every autocratic regime, stability was maintained by force. Any political opposition was brutally repressed by SAVAK (National Security and Intelligence Organization), the regime's feared secret police, trained and advised by US and Israeli agencies.
In this context, oil was perceived by the population not as a vector of national development, but as the link between the country's subordination and the source of power for a tyrannical regime subservient to foreign interests (Bina, 2017). The opposition, consequently, came together in a kind of “broad front”, composed of liberals, nationalists, socialists and, in a more organized and widespread way, the Shiite clergy, under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who orchestrated the resistance from exile, first in Iraq and, in its final and most decisive phase, in France.
Challenging theories that historically attributed political bargaining power to traditional working-class sectors, such as coal miners in Iran, the Iranian oil workers demonstrated decisive historical agency. As Jafari (2019) points out, these workers, aware of their strategic position in an economy entirely articulated around oil extraction and trade, emerged as the vanguard of the popular uprising. Between 1978 and 1979, a wave of massive strikes, coordinated in the refineries and oil fields of Abadan and Khuzestan province, effectively paralyzed production and exports. The effect on the Shah’s regime was twofold and devastating.
First, on a material level, collective action led to the economic asphyxiation of the state. By cutting off the country’s main source of revenue, the strikers rendered the regime unable to pay its employees and, crucially, its repressive apparatus, the armed forces and security forces. The financial pillar that sustained the monarchy imploded (Jafari, 2018).
The second impact was symbolic and political. In a Hegelian dialectical inversion of power, the workers demonstrated that the de facto control of the country's most valuable resource did not reside in the monarch's palace, but in those who operated the wells and refineries.
Oil, once the ultimate symbol of foreign domination and the Shah’s tyranny, was reinterpreted and transformed “from within” into a weapon of sabotage and popular mobilization, as argued by Timothy Mitchell (2009). For the international community, the signal was unequivocal: the Shah’s regime had lost de facto control over its territory and its main source of power.
However, the victory of the revolution catalyzed by this workers' action created a vacuum of command and control. It was at this moment that the most organized and socially influential "faction," the Shiite clergy under the leadership of Khomeini, moved to consolidate its leadership of the process. The temporary allies of the "broad front" were then systematically neutralized.
Liberals and nationalists, such as those who made up Mehdi Bazargan's provisional government, were quickly marginalized and purged from power (Ostovar, 2009). Then, left-wing organizations: socialists, communists (such as the Tudeh) and guerrillas (like the People's Fedayeen), who had actively fought the Shah's dictatorship, were declared enemies of the new state and of the faith itself.
The reason for this brutal persecution was twofold: firstly, their secular and above all Marxist ideology was fundamentally irreconcilable with Khomeini's project of a state governed by Islamic jurisprudence (the Velayat-e Faqih). Second, as groups with combat experience, organization, and a popular base of their own, they represented an alternative pole of power and a direct military threat to the consolidation of clerical hegemony and its new guard, the Pasdaran (Ostovar, 2009). The revolution, which began with a broad base, was deliberately narrowed to ensure the rise of a Shiite theocracy.
The disruption of Iranian production, followed by uncertainty about the country’s new policy, triggered what became known as the “Second Oil Shock” in 1979. The reduction in supply caused prices to soar, plunging the global economy into recession and reinforcing the lesson learned in 1973: the stability of the Western energy system was dangerously dependent on the political stability of the Middle East, now radically altered (Valladares, 2024).
The troubled relationship between the Middle East, specifically Iran, and the countries of the Western axis continued throughout the second half of the 20th century, and persisted into the 21st century, as discussed later in topic four.
Internally, Iran’s new motto, “Neither East nor West, but Islamic Republic,” translated into a foreign policy that rejected subordination to any of the Cold War superpowers (1947–1991) (Espírito Santo, 2017). National control over oil became the pillar of this sovereignty. This sealed the end of the strategic alliance with the United States and, consequently, with Israel, which went from being a discreet partner of the Shah to being labeled the “Little Satan” and an “illegitimate Zionist entity,” solidifying the hostilities that were the reasons for writing this article (Lewis, 2004).
Two subsequent events are worth mentioning and were relevant. The first was the Hostage Crisis (1979-1981), when revolutionary students, supported by the new regime, stormed the US embassy in Tehran and held 52 diplomats and American citizens captive for 444 days. The act was a direct response to the US decision to take the deposed Shah in for medical treatment, which was interpreted in Iran as a prelude to a new coup orchestrated by the CIA, as in 1953 (Perosa Jr, 2013).
The crisis publicly humiliated the United States, destroyed any possibility of short-term reconciliation, and was used domestically by Khomeini to consolidate the power of clerical hardliners, eliminating the last vestiges of moderation from the government.
The second event was the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Seeing an opportunity in the apparent revolutionary chaos, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, with massive financial and military support from Western powers and Gulf monarchies who feared the “export” of the Islamic revolution, invaded Iran. The brutal eight-year conflict cemented Iran’s perception of a hostile world determined to destroy its new regime.
In response, the country was forced to improve its resilience: it began using oil as a shield, developing parallel export channels to circumvent sanctions, forging alliances with actors not aligned with the Western axis, and defining its energy policy as the backbone of its resistance to the hegemony of fossil capital led by the US (Ostovar, 2009).
The revolution, therefore, not only overthrew a dictator, it removed one of the major oil agents of the Western energy security system, and transmuted him into an ideological and strategic adversary (McGlinchey, 2014). The awareness that oil could be used as a weapon, conceived in the strikes of 1978, became the central doctrine of a state that, ever since, sees its energy resources as the main tool to ensure its survival and project its influence (Zunes, 2009).
The premises of a prolonged conflict were thus consolidated, in which Iran adopted a lasting stance of antagonism towards the United States and Israel, a hostility that continues to this day.
Iranian fossil production and the Chinese approach
As seen above, therefore, the political and territorial disputes between Israel and Iran are not enough to explain the role of the United States in the conflicts; in addition to these, Iran's importance in the international oil market must be added, whose usefulness as a tool of global pressure was demonstrated in the Yom Kippur War (1973).[viii].
Expanding the context, during the land recapture operations led by Syria and Egypt, the United States ensured the maintenance of its main tool of fossil hegemony by providing military support to the Israeli regime. In response, the countries of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed «considerable cuts in their oil production month by month, until the complete evacuation of Israeli forces from all Arab territory occupied since the 1967 war […]» and a total sales embargo on the United States and other countries that supported the Israeli regime.[ix].
In a period of cold war and imminent nuclear danger, oil was (as it still is) a fundamental figure in the context of the reproduction of capitalist life, as fossil capital (MALM, 2016), that is, as a subverter of nature and its temporality, assuming the role of subject of the productive process, imposing its abstract time on the rhythm of the reproduction of labor and the production of relative and absolute surplus value, therefore, acting as a factor counteracting the fall in the profit rate.
Furthermore, it plays a fundamental role, including in the mobility of capital, being, dialectically, an active and passive agent in the exercise of hegemony: while its abundance attracts imperialist agents to the territory where it is located, it is also a fundamental element in the exercise of imperialism itself.
This is manifested in concrete terms in the supply of both domestic use sectors, such as cars for the workforce, as well as armored vehicles, large ships and fighter jets for nuclear aircraft carriers, which depended directly on “black gold” (oil) to function. Therefore, even though the success of OPEC embargoes in the war is questionable — since Israel did not mobilize its troops outside Arab territory — the geopolitical use of oil was proven, with the pressure exerted on international prices making the practice a form of containment of American hegemony in the Middle East in the coming decades.
ipso facto, US control over the region has increased. The lack of bases on Iranian territory does not imply a lack of control; on the contrary, control has come to be exercised from bases near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, located mainly in Kuwait, to contain Iraq and internal problems, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Through these bases, the flow of Iranian oil to other parts of the world has been undermined, in an attempt to slow its economic growth.
Parallel to the development of oil weapon Arab, the United States learned to use the demand for oil as a geopolitical tool, imposing since 1979 a sanction on the amount of Iranian oil imported, restricted to no more than fifty thousand barrels per day[X]. Sanctions have been tightened over time under the pretext of combating Iran's support for terrorism. In 1984, investment, financial assistance and the transfer of military equipment to Iran by foreign entities were banned.
Then, in 1986, the import of Iranian goods and services was banned. The measures were tightened from 1995, during the Bill Clinton administration, with an attempt to mobilize the United States' main allies against the import of Iranian oil.
However, the measure was not very successful, with many countries refusing to adopt a severe stance since the United States continued to buy oil from Iran and resell it to the rest of the world. Furthermore, “as a fungible good, Iranian oil could be traded with other countries in order to be imported by the United States […]”, significantly reducing the impact of these new sanctions. Although the measures were announced as anti-terrorism tools, the unfolding of the conflicts made it quite clear that the attempt to control the Persian Gulf by the United States was, in fact, the main motivator behind them, since the region concentrates about two-thirds of the world's oil and was escaping its ideological domination during the Cold War.
The restrictions imposed on Iran's international trade with the West and the United States' partial control over the main waterways between Iran and the world made it necessary for the country to approach new international partners and create alternative strategies for economic and energy development, including the expansion of its military program and alternative ways of transporting oil.
As for the first alternative, Iran's military spending grew continuously between 1993 and 2006, even while under unilateral sanctions from the United States.[xi]. During this same period, the Iranian government refused to end its uranium enrichment programs, which originated with joint support from the United States and other countries to promote peace in the Middle East (sic) and which were later terminated and reactivated from the 1990s onwards, now with support from Russia.
As a consequence, the UN Security Council imposed multilateral sanctions on Iran from 2006 onwards, endorsed again by the United States and the European Union in 2012, in an effort to curb Iran's military and nuclear advances, resulting in a successive decrease in spending on the military sector.[xii].
Iran's military growth is not unrelated to the discussions in the previous paragraph about oil, but it is added to them; only a large military force in place is capable of guaranteeing the country's sovereignty and its access to international markets even in the face of severe pressure from external agents. Otherwise, the presence of US bases close to Iranian territory would be enough to ensure its complete subordination to foreign interests.
As for the second alternative, Iran has adopted a series of illegal measures to circumvent sanctions and dispose of its oil production. It is estimated that around 80% of the export contraband carried out in Iran is for petroleum products, if not the commodity itself.[xiii].
The main objective of smuggling is to ensure that cargo ships go unnoticed through the main waterway transport channels which, as previously mentioned, are under the control of the United States and its bases, with particular emphasis on the Strait of Hormuz, the main route for transporting Iranian oil to China. In this regard, China itself plays the role of an important trading partner for Iran, due to ideological, commercial and political interests related to control of the Persian Gulf and access to oil.
The relationship between the two countries, however, is not recent, but has been built since 1990. Initially, the tightening of sanctions against Iran in 1995 and the anti-Chinese sentiment that took hold of the American Congress meant that Chinese oil companies did not strengthen their commercial relations with Iran.[xiv].
Later in the decade, the two countries grew closer, both due to the relationship between Chinese oil buyers and Iranian sellers and due to government interests, with partnerships ranging from nuclear development to trade measures. China's imports of Iranian oil increased in the following years, especially from the late 1990s to 2003.
Return to contemporaneity and future markets
Once the historical and political contextualization has been carried out, it becomes possible to analyze the current conflicts from perspectives other than the Arab-Israeli conflict — especially that of the international oil market and the conflict between the United States and China.
Initially, the price of oil futures contracts, one of the main instruments for protecting producers from market risk and an important tool for speculation, followed a downward trajectory throughout the first half of the year, driven by the increase in US production through the policy of intensive permissiveness towards alternative forms of extraction, especially that of shale in the ground.
The higher level of American inventories, together with the lower demand for oil, should, in theory, translate into a reduction in overall production by OPEC, which had already been making cuts for a year with a forecast extended until June 2026; however, as a way of punishing some members for non-compliance with production cuts[xv] and make oil extraction via shale unfeasible, due to its high melting point.breakeven» in relation to platforms onboard Arabs, Saudi Arabia has decided to impose an increase in oil production from OPEC countries at an accelerated pace.
Furthermore, she also realized that “keeping production quotas low, a strategy designed to raise prices, only allowed the United States to gain market share, especially in Asian countries.”[xvi]. The events of the 13th, however, call into question the entire current international strategy regarding oil.
Obviously, in the event of a prolonged conflict between Iran and Israel, and especially if this conflict spreads to the entire Arab world, part of the oil previously exported to international markets by local companies will be destined for the war industry. Coordinated attacks by both sides end up putting major oil producers and physical stocks at risk, further damaging supply in this scenario.
Considering the amount of oil available in the Persian Gulf and other regions of the Levant in North Africa, it can be assumed that the new demand for oil arising from the war will be mostly met by domestic sources, initially minimizing the increase in global demand. Thus, once the scale of the conflict is confirmed, oil prices worldwide tend to rise, with large increases in the value of futures as a way of protecting producers from future uncertainty, as already demonstrated in the daily chart of Brent futures below.
FIGURE 3.[xvii]
US-China hegemonic conflict and the direction of geopolitics
As has been discussed at length, there is a clear issue of interest in the conflict between Israel and Iran, with the US president treating the attack by the Zionist regime in Israel as “successful” and declaring that he had warned Iran that the US has the “best and most lethal military equipment in the world”.[xviii]
The debate that has not yet been brought up refers to the dual nature of the offensive of US fossil imperialism on one of the last native resistance apparatuses in the region, given the broad US military dominance as the distribution of its bases in the Middle East in Figure 1 and its diplomatic representation in the region, the Zionist regime of Israel.
In addition to the phenomenon described, it is also essential to bear in mind China's role in the conflict with the strengthening of its relations with Iran, expressed in commercial and financial agreements with the country in recent years, mainly in the context of Western sanctions, generating foreign exchange to finance, above all, its nuclear program.
Since the beginning of the century, the Republic of Iran has been suffering from direct sanctions on the commercialization of its energy resources. Until the beginning of 2018, the country had reached a high level of oil production, producing almost five million barrels per day and exporting to Western countries or those aligned with its political program, despite the previous imposition of sanctions by the United States in 2011, when it prohibited relations between any country and the Iranian Central Bank, aiming to undermine the generation of foreign exchange by also affecting its oil commercialization[xx]; as for the European Union, when it banned the import and transport of Iranian crude oil in early 2012[xx]. Both measures already referred to the country's nuclear program and the coercion for Iran to abandon it.
However, in 2018, after President Donald Trump reimposed sanctions on Iran by leaving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)[xxx], Iran's trade dynamics have changed completely. In addition to having stopped exporting crude oil to countries in the European Union and Asia, it has started to export all of its production only to China, Syria, the UAE and Venezuela in 2023.[xxiii]. In addition, China's share of Iranian crude oil exports jumped from 25% in 2017 to 90% in 2023.[xxiii].
FIGURE 4.[xxv]
In this way, Iran can recover the level of foreign exchange generation it had before the end of the JCPOA and even expand its production capacity not only of oil, but also of electricity and natural gas. According to a report by the EIA (Energy Information Administration), between 2019 and 2022, Iran acquired a series of contracts to increase crude oil production by more than half a million barrels per day, and acquired more contracts in 2024, to build six crude oil fields along the border with Iraq.
The big issue is that the relationship between Iran and the hegemonic antagonist of the United States did not end with the export of crude oil. In 2021, the two countries (China and Iran) signed an agreement estimated at US$ 400 billion involving the sale of oil to China and even a supposed security agreement between the two countries.[xxiv]. Over the decade, China (and Russia) have declared support for Iran's nuclear program[xxv], most recently in March of this year.
One of the events, however, that raised alarm bells for US fossil capital was the holding of military exercises[xxviii] between Iran, Russia and China along the Gulf of Oman, a region without an effective presence of US military bases but very close to its zone of influence in the Persian Gulf, challenging its hegemony in the region. Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley said that China, Russia and Iran would pose a challenge to Washington “for many years to come.”[xxviii].
Again, one can observe, starting from the surface (Israel vs. Iran war), the inevitable hegemonic conflict for control of fossil capital without which no hegemon can constitute itself as such in the project of global accumulation. The attacks launched against Iran, once again, must be analyzed carefully. It is not a question of nullifying and dispensing with the analysis of the regional contradictions between the two forces that are protagonists of the conflict, but of apprehending it in a historical and material way, in its entirety, considering the different nuances that involve, at the same time and at different levels, the same established concrete phenomenon.
At this delicate historical moment, with the hegemony of American accumulation being challenged after more than a century, the intensification of the (re)division of the world is obvious, and the notion of what to do is dissipating into thin air ever more quickly. There seem to be no alternatives for the future other than barbarism.
*Eduardo Brito is a graduate in economics at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA).
*Kaio Aroldo is a graduate in economics at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA).
*Lucas Valladares is a PhD candidate in economics at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA).
*Oscar Luis Rosa Moraes Santos is a graduate in economics at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA).
*Lucas Trentin Rech is a professor at the Department of Economics at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA).
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Notes
[I] US empties embassies in the Middle East amid risk of Israel attacking Iran, says newspaper | World | G1
[ii] Why Israel attacked Iran: what we know so far about the conflict between the two countries | World | G1
[iii] (5) Live updates: Israel strikes Iran's nuclear sites | AP News
[iv] Trump opposes Israel's plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, says newspaper | World | G1
[v] Trump says Israel will lead attack on Iran if nuclear deal is not reached: 'We do what we want to do' | World | G1
[vi] (REZEG, Ali Abo. Understanding Iran-Hamas Relations from a Defensive Neo-Realist Approach. The Journal of Iranian Studies. v. 4, n. 2, p. 390-393, Jan. 2021, Available at: (PDF) Understanding Iran-Hamas Relations from a Defensive Neo-Realist Approach.
[vii] Mapping US troops and military bases in the Middle East | Military News | Al Jazeera
[viii] 1973 Oil Crisis | BBC NEWS
[ix] Making Use of the “Oil Weapon”: Western Industrialized Countries and Arab Petropolitics
[X] Impacts of US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran
[xi] Military spending and economic growth: the case of Iran
[xii] Do Sanctions Constrain Military Spending of Iran?
[xiii] Illegal Trade in The Iranian Economy
[xiv] China-Iran Relations Through the Prism of Sanctions
[xv] OPEC countries decide to increase production in June
[xvi] Cheap Oil Will Come At a Cost for US
[xvii] Brent Oil Futures Quote
[xviii] Trump says he was warned in advance about attacks on Iran, warns that future attacks will be 'even more brutal'
[xx] US Senate unanimously approves sanctions against Iran's central bank – News – UOL Notícias
[xx] European embargo – DW – 23/01/2012
[xxx] President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal – The White House
[xxiii] (Country Analysis Brief: Iran. 2024; p. 14. Available at: Country Analysis Brief: Iran.
[xxiii] IBID, p. 12
[xxv] IBID, p. 8
[xxiv] China signs broad agreement and will invest US$400 billion in Iran in exchange for oil – Jornal O Globo
[xxv] China, Russia back Iran's nuclear program after Trump pushes for deal; Iran 'can never have nuclear weapons', says G7 | World | G1
[xxviii] Russia, China and Iran hold joint military exercises in the Gulf of Oman – Brasil de Fato
[xxviii] IBID.
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