By GILBERTO MARINGONI*

There is minimal chance that the Lula government will adopt clearly left-wing policies during the remainder of his term, after almost 30 months of neoliberal economic options.

In early March, at an event at the headquarters of BTG Pactual, Edinho Silva, former mayor of Araraquara and presidential candidate for the Workers' Party, discussed the situation in the country and the Lula government with representatives of the financial system. Amidst his defense of closer ties between the federal government and the market, the PT member emphasized: “With polarization there is no rationality, with polarization one cannot conceive (…) an agenda of unity for the country, regardless of party differences.”

“Polarization,” considered a major problem in political life, has been increasingly highlighted in editorials, opinion pieces, and statements by Brazilian political leaders and intellectuals. What does it mean to end polarization in one of the most unequal countries in the world?

Convergences in the economy

The defense of the “end of polarization,” as presented by the PT leader, appears to be in stark contrast with the far right, but it reveals its opposite when the debate reaches the economy. Edinho Silva’s preaching aims to solve a medium-term problem – to organize an electoral front that opposes neofascism in 2026 – and not to make profound changes to the country’s institutional structure. There should be a logical continuity between the two initiatives – elections and changes –, but that is not the case.

At the same time, viewing polarization as the greatest evil on Earth can be a mixture of illusion, opportunism, and prevarication in the face of the risks posed to Brazilian democracy. If we consider that the proposals of the far right are incompatible with institutionality, polarization becomes a vital necessity. It is something that must be emphasized—not lamented—so that the population is clear about what is at stake and can make clear choices. The experience of the Bolsonaro government shows the coup-mongering, authoritarian, elitist, denialist, exclusionary, and submissive to imperialism nature of the far right. How can we not polarize with a regime like that?

The view that polarization should be avoided raises at least three problems.

The first indicates that despite all attempts to find differences in economic management among the country's main political forces, the opposite is evident. There is great convergence – from the center to the extreme right – on the need for a permanent and redemptive fiscal adjustment, which subordinates the State's action to high finance.

The second problem lies in the fact that those opposed to polarization do not make clear the basis for building a hypothetical unity of forces. On the part of the mainstream media and the right, there seems to be a certain nostalgia for the times of the so-called “single thought”, a neoliberal utopia derived from the famous phrase of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, “There is no alternative”.

The third is that “polarization” is not something or someone with a will of its own, capable of imposing points of view, as if it were a rational being. Complaining about “polarization” is like lamenting “the fight”, “the disagreement” or the “lack of love” between people. “Polarization” is a relationship of opposition between two poles, two points of view, two behaviors.

Based on these three points, it is worth asking: is there real opposition in what matters – in economic projects – between the front led by the PT and the forces gathered around Jair Bolsonaro? Both have as their touchstone, to a greater or lesser degree, austerity policies.

The neoliberal consensus

The creation of a neoliberal consensus in society is an essential condition for its implementation. If we think about it, it is not easy to convince the electorate that cuts in education and health funds, the sale of efficient public companies and the loss of social rights represent advantages for the majority. This is not a convergence that can be achieved through the free flow of ideas and public debates, but through a solid unity between different sectors of big capital (which includes the media and big tech).

This coalition's main task is to repeat in unison a set of half-truths and dubious values ​​without counterpoints. There is no lack of excessive use of force to impose them. Dissonant voices were disqualified, ridiculed and even eliminated in order to create a great consensus, which gained the air of a new civilizing value.

The current neoliberal hegemony was achieved through the support of a significant portion of the left. Let us not forget the role played by the British Labour Party, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, the French, Italian and Chilean Socialist Parties and Peronism in the 1980s and 90s. In the Brazilian case, the neoliberal model was imposed on society during the first government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), who was considered progressive at the time, and his measures were never challenged in practice by the Workers' Party administrations.

Neoliberalism was implemented in much of the world in the 1980s and 90s and is experiencing a second and more aggressive phase since the 2008 crisis. New types of coups began to emerge in Latin America, through the Judiciary and Legislative branches, with an aura of unquestionable legality, as in Honduras (2009), Paraguay (2012) and Brazil (2016). The articulation for the outbreak of the impeachment The fight against former President Dilma Rousseff involved multiple actors from the three branches of government and the cream of financial capital and agribusiness. It was the famous front “with the Supreme Court and with everything,” as former Senator Romero Jucá summed it up.

The wide bridge

Months before the coup, at the end of October 2015, the Brazilian right took to the streets with its programmatic synthesis, centered on the economic agenda. Despite Dilma having delivered on almost all of the demands of the financial world, such as a fiscal adjustment that raised the unemployment rate by 6,6% in December 2014 to 11,3% in March 2016 (IBGE), the top of the social pyramid wanted more. This “more” became known under the title of “A bridge to the future”.

Packaged in a 20-page booklet, his text summarized an aggressive orthodox program, which included, among other things, the following: “It is necessary first of all to end the constitutional links established, as in the case of spending on health and education. (p. 9) (…) Another element for the new budget must be the end of all indexations, whether for salaries, social security benefits and everything else. (p. 10) (…)

“The first objective of a fiscal balance policy is to halt the growth of public debt and then begin the process of reducing it as a percentage of GDP. The normal instrument for this is to obtain a primary surplus capable of covering interest expenses minus GDP growth itself. (p. 13) (…) [It will be necessary] to implement a development policy centered on private initiative, through transfers of assets if necessary, broad concessions in all areas of logistics and infrastructure, partnerships to complement the supply of public services and a return to the previous concession regime in the oil sector, giving Petrobras the right of preference.”

The “Bridge to the Future” is a programmatic formulation, the limits of which should not be disregarded by any government. The reasoning presented by the PMDB, prepared by some of the best minds in the world of money, served as a kind of financial constituent project for the restructuring of the Brazilian State. It is a work in progress, which does not allow for setbacks in the measures adopted.

Beacon for regressive reforms

The document served as a guideline for labor and social security reforms, the spending cap and fiscal framework, the privatizations of Eletrobrás, BR Distribuidora, sanitation, public-private partnerships (PPPs), investment partnership programs (PPIs), infrastructure concessions (ports, airports and roads), the autonomy of the Central Bank, etc. These are changes to subordinate public power to the dynamics of the financial market and the export agroeconomy.

Planning Minister Simone Tebet, in an interview with journalist Míriam Leitão on March 12, outlined the path of consensus intended for the coming years: “In 2027, whoever the next president is, he or she will not govern with this fiscal framework without generating inflation, public debt and destroying the economy. So we have a window of opportunity, which is not now and not on the eve of the 2026 elections,” because no one wants to deal with this on the eve of the election, says the minister.

The window of opportunity, according to her, will come after the election, “whether President Lula is a candidate or another candidate, [the task is] to do our fiscal duty, cut spending, (…) create a more rigorous framework, which does not kill the patient, but which guarantees sustainability to reduce debt, interest rates, inflation and make the economy grow”.

Regardless of which government is elected, economic management must remain untouched, as if investment options and allocation of public resources were made based on obscure “technical” guidelines, as market operators and members of the government’s economic area propagate.

It is always worth asking “Techniques in favor of whom?”, as observed by political scientist Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (1935-2019), in a small and prophetic book entitled Who will carry out the coup in Brazil?, launched in 1962. Simone Tebet in practice proposes a consensual coup among the major political forces with parliamentary representation, to hamper the next administration.

Given this comprehensive sum of pressures, efforts, consents and agreements in the implementation of the program that fueled the coup against Dilma, how can one say that the main feature of Brazilian life is a “polarization” that is not revealed in economic policy?

Great interests untouched

Consensus – and not polarization – is the result of choices made to avoid putting secular interests at risk. To a greater or lesser extent, all of these choices over the last 30 years have deepened liberalizing measures and weakened state structures in the social and development-promoting areas.

At the same time, the consensus for fiscal austerity generates tension and instability, as it implies that the interests of a wealthy minority prevail over those of the majority of the population. Above all, its imposition over party guidelines generally leads governments elected with great popular expectations to frustrate their social bases, contributing to the common sense that “all politicians are the same.”

Lula's third term is the result of the formation of a broad political front between opposing parties, which was essential to defeat the far right, in a delicate situation in the country's life. Although the visible face of this coalition is marked by the presence of conservative leaders, the real convergence involved a considerable portion of Brazil's GDP, a broad spectrum of political parties, from the traditional left to the right, including the 2016 coup plotters and disassociated sectors of the far right.

However, throughout the first year of the administration, it became clear that the broad front had as its unifying amalgam a severe program of spending cuts, which is similar to the “Bridge to the Future”. Although the government is taken over by private interests, especially in the Ministry of Education, there are commitments not to touch sectors such as the Armed Forces, or concessions in the area of ​​infrastructure, that its foreign policy is erratic and that the communication policy continues to prioritize relations with traditional media, with emphasis on Globo, among other initiatives, the Lula government has marked differences with the Bolsonaro administration in the political sphere. When it comes to democracy, the PT administration seeks to position itself on opposite ground to that of the former captain.

The coup as a real threat

The threats that surround the country cannot be minimized, from the attempted coup of January 8, 2023, to the permanent presence of the extreme right as a mass phenomenon in society. The victory of radical reactionism from North to South in the 2024 municipal elections is an expression of this rooting.

If polarization is not structural in the disputes, what is the reason for the spread of hatred and the authoritarian threat in society? Everything indicates that there is a kind of fight between electoral supporters on the networks and in the streets, encouraged and strengthened by party leaders who seek at all costs to depoliticize the 2026 elections, removing from the scene a real dispute over direction. The confrontation between what can be called progressive neoliberalism and the extreme right is a dispute to see who implements the financial program more efficiently and with less social conflict.

Faced with this dilemma, the classic question arises: what should we do? It is worth noting that President Lula – as former minister José Dirceu has noted with great accuracy – leads a center-right government, with no expectation of transforming the Brazilian social structure. Even so, for the majority of the population, the current government is left-wing and its main opponents are on the right. It is very difficult for a candidacy centered on Lulaism to be overtaken by the left, a trend that has little expression in society and in the parties with representation in Congress.

The 2026 electoral confrontation, fueled by artificial intelligence, a rough game of big tech and programmatic tiktoquization will take place in the terrain of vulgarity, of fake news, of the sanctimonious, moralistic agendas and full of personal attacks. It is unlikely that politics will be in the commanding position of the major candidates. At the same time, there is minimal chance that the Lula government will take on clearly left-wing banners in the remainder of his term, after almost 30 months of neoliberal economic options.

Despite this, if the economic team's planned slowdown does not get out of control and if some kind of material relief is extended to the base of society, it will be possible to face the extreme right with a chance. Two years ago, there were conditions for change and the present could be different, even with the growth of neo-fascism around the world. Before 2026, we must fight for the present.

*Gilberto Maringoni is a journalist and professor of International Relations at the Federal University of ABC (UFABC).

Originally published in the print edition of Le Monde Diplomatique Brazil April 2025.

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