the chinese giant

Calligrapher_Huang Tingjian (Chinese, 1045-1105), ca. 1095.
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By CLAUDIO KATZ*

As far from imperialism as it is from the global South.

The imperialist character of the United States is an indisputable fact of contemporary geopolitics. The extension of this qualification to China raises, on the other hand, passionate debates.

Our approach highlights the asymmetry between the two adversaries, Washington's aggressive profile and Beijing's defensive reaction. While the first power seeks to restore its world dominance in decline, the Asian giant tries to sustain capitalist growth without external confrontations. It also faces serious historical, political and cultural limits to intervene with acts of force on a global scale. For these reasons, it is not currently part of the club of empires (Katz, 2021).

This characterization contrasts with approaches that describe China as an imperial, predatory, or colonizing power. It also defines the degree of eventual proximity to that status and what conditions it would have to fulfill to be placed in that plan.

Our point of view also shows that China has left behind its former status as an underdeveloped country and is now part of the core of the core economies. From this new location, it captures large international flows of value and commands an expansion that profits from the natural resources provided by the periphery. Because of this location in the international division of labor, it is not part of the Global South.

Our view shares the different objections that have been raised to the identification of China as a new imperialism. But he questions the presentation of the country as an actor merely interested in cooperation, in inclusive globalization or in overcoming the underdevelopment of its partners.

A review of all the arguments under debate helps to clarify the complex contemporary conundrum of China's international status.

inappropriate comparisons

The theses that postulate the total imperial alignment of China attribute this position to the post-Maoist turn initiated by Deng in the 1980s. They assess that this turn has consolidated a model of expansive capitalism, which brings together all the characteristics of imperialism. They see in the economic subjugation imposed on the African continent a confirmation of this conduct. They also denounce that in this region the old European oppression is repeated with hypocritical rhetorical dissimulations (Turner, 2014: 65-71).

But this characterization does not take into account the significant differences between the two situations. China does not send troops to African countries – like France – to validate its business. Its only military base, at a key commercial crossroads (Djibouti), contrasts with the swarm of facilities that the US and Europe have created.

The Asian giant avoids getting involved in the explosive political processes of the black continent and its participation in “UN peace operations” does not define an imperial statute. Numerous countries clearly outside this category (such as Uruguay) contribute troops to UN missions.

Comparing China with the trajectory followed by Germany and Japan during the first half of the 2014th century (Turner, 96: 100-XNUMX) is equally debatable. This is not a course supported by facts. The new eastern power has so far avoided going down the bellicose path of those predecessors. It reached an impressive international economic prominence, taking advantage of the competitive advantages it found in globalization. It does not share the compulsion for territorial conquest that gripped German or Japanese capitalism.

In the XNUMXst century, China has developed globalized forms of production that did not exist in the previous century. This novelty gave it an unprecedented margin to expand its economy, with guidelines of geopolitical caution, inconceivable in the past.

The erroneous analogies also extend to what happened to the Soviet Union. It is estimated that China repeats the same implementation of capitalism and the consequent replacement of internationalism by “social-imperialism”. This modality is presented as an anticipation of conventional imperialist policies (Turner, 2014:46-47).

But China did not follow the USSR's agenda. It introduced limits to capitalist economic restoration and maintained the political regime that collapsed in the neighboring country. As one analyst correctly points out, the entire Xi Jinping administration has been guided by the obsession with avoiding the disintegration suffered by the Soviet Union (El Lince, 2020). The differences now extend to the external military sector. The new Asian power has not undertaken any action similar to that developed by Moscow in Syria, Ukraine or Georgia.

erroneous criteria

China is also placed in the imperial bloc, based on assessments inspired by a well-known classic Marxist text (Lenin, 2006). It is affirmed that the new power brings together the economic characteristics pointed out by this book. The gravitation of exported capital, the magnitude of monopolies and the incidence of financial groups confirmed the country's imperialist status (Turner, 2014: 1-4, 25-31, 48-64).

But these economic characteristics do not provide sufficient parameters to define China's international place in the XNUMXst century. Certainly, the growing weight of monopolies, banks or exported capital increases rivalries and tensions between powers. But these commercial or financial conflicts do not explain imperial confrontations, nor do they define each country's specific status in world domination.

Switzerland, Holland or Belgium occupy an important place in the international ranking of production, exchange and credit, but they do not play a leading role in the imperial sphere. For their part, France or England play an important role in this last domain, which does not strictly derive from their economic primacy. Germany and Japan are economic giants with prohibited interventions outside this scope.

The case of China is much more unique. The pre-eminence of monopolies in its territory only confirms the usual incidence of these conglomerates in any country. The same happens with the influence of financial capital, which gravitates less than in other large economies. Unlike its competitors, the Asian giant gained positions in globalization without neoliberal financialization. Furthermore, it bears no resemblance to the early XNUMXth-century German banking model that Lenin studied.

It is true that the export of capital – pointed out by the communist leader as a remarkable fact of his time – is a significant characteristic of China today. But this influence only ratifies the eastern giant's significant connection to global capitalism.

None of the analogies with the prevailing economic system in the last century helps to define China's international status. At most, they facilitate the understanding of the changes observed in the functioning of capitalism. What happened in global geopolitics can be clarified with other types of reflections.

Imperialism is a policy of domination exercised by the powerful of the planet through their states. It does not constitute a permanent or final stage of capitalism. Lenin's writing clarifies what happened 100 years ago, but not the course of recent events. It was prepared in a scenario far removed from generalized world wars.

The dogmatic attachment to this book leads to the search for forced similarities between the current conflict between the United States and China and the conflagrations of the First World War (Turner, 2014: 7-11). The main contemporary dispute is seen as a mere repetition of inter-imperial interwar rivalries.

This same comparison is currently being used to denounce the Chinese militarization of the South Sea. It is estimated that Xi Jinping pursues the same purposes that Germany disguised to seize Central Europe, or that Japan disguised to conquer the South Pacific. But it is omitted that China's economic expansion has been consummated, so far, without firing a single shot outside its borders.

It is also forgotten that Lenin did not intend to elaborate a classification guide of imperialism, based on the capitalist maturity of each power. He only underlined the catastrophic bellicose dimension of his time, without specifying the conditions that each participant in this conflict had to meet in order to be inserted in the imperial universe. He placed, for example, an economically backward power like Russia within this group due to its active role in military bloodshed.

Lenin's analysis of classical imperialism is a highly relevant body of theory, but China's geopolitical role in the XNUMXst century is clarified with a different set of tools.

A status only potential

Basic Marxist notions of capitalism, socialism, imperialism or anti-imperialism are not enough to characterize China's foreign policy. These concepts only provide a starting point. Additional notions are necessary to account for the course of the country. The simple deduction of an imperial statute from the conversion of the eastern giant into the “second economy of the world” (Turner, 2014: 23-24), does not allow elucidating the enigmas at stake.

More accurate is the search for concepts that register the coexistence of an enormous economic expansion of China with a great distance from the American primacy. The formula of the “empire in formation” tries to portray this place of gestation, still far from American predominance.

But the concrete content of this category is controversial. Some thinkers attribute to it a more advanced than embryonic reach. They understand that the new power is rapidly moving towards the adoption of a current imperial behavior. They emphasize the change introduced with the military base in Djibouti, the construction of artificial islands in the South Sea and the offensive reconversion of the armed forces.

This view postulates that after several decades of intense capitalist accumulation, the imperial phase is already beginning to mature (Rousset, 2018). Such an assessment comes close to the typical contrast between a dominant imperial pole (United States) and a rising imperial pole (China) (Turner, 2014: 44-46).

But very significant qualitative differences persist between the two powers. What distinguishes the eastern giant from its North American peer is not the percentage of maturity of the same model. Before embarking on its rival's imperial adventures, China should complete its own capitalist restoration.

The term “empire in formation” could be valid to indicate the embryonic character of this gestation. But the concept would only take on a different meaning of growing maturity if China abandoned its current defense strategy. This tendency is present in the neoliberal capitalist sector with investments abroad and expansive ambitions. But the predominance of this fraction would require the submission of the opposite segment, which privileges internal development and preserves the current modality of the political regime.

           China is an empire in the making only in potential terms. It manages the second gross product on the planet, is the first manufacturer of industrial goods and receives the largest volume of funds in the world. But this economic gravitation has no equivalent in the geopolitical-military sphere that defines the imperial status.

 unresolved trends

Another assessment considers that China has all the characteristics of a capitalist power, but with a backward and non-hegemonic imperial outline. It describes the spectacular growth of its economy, pointing out the limits it faces in reaching a winning position in the world market. It also details the constraints it faces in the tech sector compared to western competitors.

From this ambiguous situation, he deduces the validity of a “dependent capitalist state with imperialist characteristics”. The new power would combine the restrictions of its autonomy (dependence) with ambitious projects of external expansion (imperialism) (Chingo, 2021).

But the correct recording of an intermediate place includes, in this case, a conceptual error. Dependency and imperialism are two antagonistic notions that cannot be integrated into a common formula. They do not refer – as center-periphery – to the economic dynamics of value transfer or to hierarchies in the international division of labor. For this reason, they exclude the type of mixtures that the semiperiphery incorporates.

Dependence presupposes the existence of a State subject to external orders, demands or conditions, and imperialism implies the opposite: international supremacy and a high degree of external interventionism. They should not be merged into the same formula. In China, the absence of subordination to another power coexists with great caution in interference in other countries. There is no dependency or imperialism.

The characterization of China as a power that has completed its capitalist maturation – without being able to jump to the next rung of imperial development – ​​presupposes that the first course does not provide enough support to consummate advances towards world domination. But this reasoning presents as two stages of the same process a set of economic and geopolitical-military actions with different sign. This important distinction is omitted.

A similar look at China as a completed capitalist model – navigating the lower level of imperialism – is exposed by another author with two auxiliary concepts: bureaucratic capitalism and sub-imperial dynamics (Au Loong Yu, 2018).

The first term indicates the fusion of the ruling class with the ruling elite and the second portrays a limited policy of international expansion. But since the country is supposed to act as a superpower (in competition and collaboration with the US giant), the passage to imperial fullness is seen only as a matter of time.

This assessment underlines that China has completed its capitalist transformation, without explaining why the delays in its imperial conversion are due. All the limitations exposed in this second field could also be pointed out in the first.

To avoid these dilemmas, it is easier to see that the continuing insufficiencies of capitalist restoration explain the restrictions on the imperial emblem. As the ruling class does not concern itself with the intricacies of the state, it must accept the cautious international strategy promoted by the Communist Party.

           Unlike the United States, England or France, the big capitalists in China are not used to demanding politico-military intervention from their state in the face of business adversity. They have no tradition of invasions or coups d'état in countries that nationalize companies or suspend debt payments. Nobody knows how quickly the Chinese state will (or will not) adopt these imperialist habits and it is not correct to consider this trend as consummated.

Predators and colonizers?

The presentation of China as an imperial power is often exemplified by descriptions of its impressive presence in Latin America. In some cases, it is postulated that it operates in the New World with the same predatory logic implemented by Great Britain in the 2020th century (Ramírez, 2020). In other visions, warnings are issued against the military bases that he would be building in Argentina and Venezuela (Bustos, XNUMX).

But none of these characterizations establishes a solid comparison with the overwhelming interference of the US embassies. This type of intervention illustrates what imperial behavior in the region means. China is miles away from such meddling. Profiting from selling manufactured goods and buying raw materials is not the same as sending Marines, train military personnel and finance coups d'état.

More sensible (and debatable) is the presentation of the eastern giant as a “new colonizer” of Latin America. In this case, it is estimated that the hegemon upward tends to trade a Commodity Consensus with its partners in the area, similar to what was previously created by the United States. This interweaving with Beijing would complement what was sewn by Washington and would guarantee the international insertion of the region as a supplier of inputs and buyer of elaborated products (Svampa, 2013).

This approach aptly portrays how Latin America's current relationship with China deepens the region's primarization or specialization in the basic elements of industrial activity. Beijing stands out as the continent's main trading partner and enjoys the benefits of this new position.

Latin America, on the other hand, has been seriously affected by value transfers in favor of the powerful Asian economy. It does not occupy the privileged place that China attributes to Africa, nor is it an area of ​​industrial relocation like Southeast Asia. The New Continent is courted by the size of its natural resources. The current scheme of oil supply, mining and agriculture is very favorable to Beijing.

But this economic exploitation is not synonymous with imperial domination or colonial incursion. This last concept applies, for example, to Israel, which occupies alien territories, displaces the local population and confiscates Palestinian wealth.

Chinese migration does not play a similar role. It is spread across all corners of the planet, with a significant specialization in retail trade. Its development is not controlled by Beijing, nor does it follow underlying projects of global conquest. A segment of the Chinese population simply migrates, in strict correspondence with contemporary shifts in the workforce.

China consolidated unequal trade with Latin America, but without consummating the imperial geopolitics that continues to be represented by the presence of Marines, the DEA, Plan Colombia and the IV Fleet. The same function fulfills the lawfare or coups d'état.

Those who are unaware of this difference usually denounce both China and the United States as aggressor powers. They place the two adversaries on the same plane and emphasize their preoccupation in this conflict.

But this neutralism overlooks who is primarily responsible for the tensions that shake the planet. It ignores the fact that the United States sends warships to the coast of its rival and raises the tone of the accusations to generate a climate of growing conflicts.

The consequences of this position are particularly serious for Latin America, which has a stormy history of US interventions. By equating this trajectory with an equivalent behavior of China in the future, it confuses realities with eventualities. Furthermore, the role of a potential counterweight to US domination that the Asian power could play in a dynamic of Latin American emancipation is unknown.

On the other hand, the discourses that place China and the United States on the same plane are permeable to the anti-communist ideology of the right. Such diatribes reflect the combination of fear and misunderstanding that dominates all conventional analyzes of the eastern giant.

           Latin American spokesmen for this narrative often include simultaneous volleys against Chinese “totalitarianism” and regional “populism”. With the old language of the Cold War, they alert to the dangerous role of Cuba or Venezuela, as pawns of an upcoming Asian capture of the entire hemisphere. Sinophobia encourages all sorts of nonsense.

 Far from the global south

Approaches that rightly reject the typification of China as an imperialist power include many nuances and differences. A wide spectrum of analysts – who are rightly opposed to the classification of the eastern colossus in the dominator block – usually deduce the country's location in the Global South from this register.

This view confuses defensive geopolitics in the conflict with the United States with belonging to the segment of economically backward and politically submissive nations. China has so far ignored the actions implemented by the imperialist powers, but this behavior does not place it on the periphery, nor in the universe of dependent nations.

The Asian giant even differentiated itself from the new group of “emerging” countries to act as a new center of the global economy. It is enough to note that it exported less than 1% of all manufactured products in 1990 and now produces 24,4% of the industry's added value (Mercatante, 2020). China absorbs surplus value through companies located abroad and profits from the supply of raw materials.

In this framework, the country's rise to the podium of advanced economies is consummated. Those who continue to identify the country with the Third World conglomerate are unaware of this monumental transformation.

Some authors maintain the old image of China as an investment area for multinational companies, which exploit the large eastern workforce to subsequently transfer their profits to the United States or Europe (King, 2014).

This drainage was effectively present in the take-off of the new power and persists in certain segments of the productive activity. But China achieved its impressive growth in recent decades by retaining most of that surplus.

Currently, the mass of funds captured through trade and foreign investment is much greater than the reverse flows. It is enough to observe the amount of the trade surplus or the financial credits to measure this result. China has left behind the main features of an underdeveloped economy.

Scholars who postulate the continuity of this condition tend to relativize the development of recent decades. They tend to highlight delay characteristics that have passed into the background. The imbalances that China faces result from over-investment and processes of overproduction or overaccumulation. It must deal with the contradictions of a developed economy.

The eastern giant does not suffer from the typical hardships that plague dependent countries. It is free from trade imbalance, technological deficiency, lack of investment or stifling purchasing power. Nothing in the Chinese reality suggests that its impressive economic power is a mere statistical fiction.

The new power gained positions in the world economic structure. It is not correct to place it on a level similar to the former agricultural peripheries, subordinated to metropolitan industries (King, 2014). This insertion currently corresponds to the huge group of African, Latin American or Asian nations that supply the basic inputs for Beijing's manufacturing machinery.

China is periodically ranked alongside the United States on the podium of a G2, which sets the agenda set by the G7 of great powers. This assessment is inconsistent with the country's location in the Global South. In that withdrawn environment, it could not fight the battle against its North American rival for the leadership of the digital revolution. Nor could he have played the starring role he displayed during the pandemic.

After accelerated development, China was placed in the position of a creditor economy, in potential conflict with its southern clients. Signs of these tensions are numerous. The fear of Chinese ownership of the assets that guarantee its loans generated resistance (or project cancellations) in Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar or Tanzania (Hart-Landsbergs, 2018).

The controversy over the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka illustrates this typical dilemma of a large creditor. The non-payment of a high debt resulted, in 2017, in the lease for 99 years of these facilities. Based on this experience, Malaysia has revised its agreements and questioned the agreements that place the best work activities in Chinese territory. Vietnam raised a similar objection to the creation of a special economic zone, and investments involving Pakistan revive disputes of all kinds.

China begins to deal with a statute contrary to any belonging to the Global South. At the end of 2018, it was feared that China would eventually control the port of Mombasa if Kenya incurred in the suspension of payments on a liability (Alonso, 2019). The same fear is beginning to emerge in other countries that have high commitments that are difficult to collect (Yemen, Syria, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe) (Bradsher; Krauss, 2015).

indulgent visions

Another line of authors that records the unprecedented role of China today praises the convergence with other countries and the virtuous transition to a multipolar bloc. It sets out these scenarios with simple descriptions of the challenges the country faces in maintaining its upward path.

But these blissful portraits omit that the consolidation of capitalism in China accentuates all the imbalances already generated by surplus commodities and surplus capital. These tensions, in turn, accentuate inequality and the deterioration of the environment. Ignorance of these contradictions prevents us from realizing how China's international defensive strategy is undermined by the competitive pressure imposed by capitalism.

The presentation of the country as “an empire without imperialism” – which operates centered on itself – is an example of these condescending views. It postulates that the new eastern power develops respectful international behavior, so as not to humiliate its western opponents (Guigue, 2018). But he forgets that this coexistence is not only eroded by Washington's harassment of Beijing. The prevalence in China of an economy increasingly oriented towards profit and exploitation amplifies this conflict.

It is true that the current reach of capitalism is limited by the regulatory presence of the state and official restrictions on financialization and neoliberalism. But the country already suffers from the imbalances imposed by a system of rivalry and dispossession.

The belief that a “market economy” rules in the eastern universe – qualitatively different from capitalism and foreign to the disturbances of that regime – is the enduring misconception sown by a great theorist of the world system (Arrighi, 2007: chapter 2). This interpretation omits that China will not escape the consequences of capitalism if it consolidates the unfinished restoration of that system.

Other innocent views on current development often consider China's foreign policy as “inclusive globalization”. They highlight the peaceful tone that characterizes an expansion based on business, and based on principles of gains shared by all participants. These presentations also highlight the “intercivilizational alliance” brought about by the new global interweaving of nations and cultures.

But will it be possible to forge an “inclusive globalization” in capitalism? How to shape the principle of mutual gains, in a system governed by competition and profit?

In fact, globalization has implied dramatic gaps between winners and losers, with a consequent increase in inequality. China cannot offer magical solutions to this adversity. On the contrary, it increases its consequences by expanding its participation in economic processes governed by exploitation and profit.

So far, it has managed to limit the tempestuous effects of this dynamic, but the country's ruling classes and neoliberal elites are determined to overcome all obstacles. They press to insert Beijing in the growing asymmetries imposed by global capitalism. Turning a blind eye to this tendency implies a self-concealment of reality.

The Chinese government itself praises capitalist globalization, extols the Davos summits and extols the virtues of free trade with empty praise of universalism. Some versions try to reconcile this claim with the basic tenets of socialist doctrine. They claim that the Silk Road synthesizes contemporary modes of economic expansion, as pondered in the mid-nineteenth century by the Communist Manifesto.

But critics of this unusual interpretation recalled that Marx never applauded this development (Lin Chun, 2019). On the contrary, he denounced its terrible consequences for popular majorities across the planet. With theoretical alchemies one cannot harmonize the irreconcilable.

Controversies over cooperation

Another complacent view of the current course highlights the cooperation component of Chinese foreign policy. He emphasizes that this country is not responsible for the misfortunes suffered by its clients in the periphery and emphasizes the genuine character of the investment promoted by Beijing. It also recalls that export strength is based on increases in productivity, which in themselves do not affect the relegated economies (Lo Dic, 2016).

But this idealization of business omits the objective effect of unequal exchange, which marks all transactions carried out under the aegis of world capitalism. China captures surpluses from underdeveloped economies due to the dynamics of these transactions. It earns big profits because its productivity is higher than the average for these clients. What is presented in a naive tone as a peculiar merit of the Asian power is the principle of generalized inequality that prevails in capitalism.

By stating that “China does not prioritize” its partners in Latin America or Africa, the world system is postulated to be solely responsible for this misfortune. It is omitted that the protagonist participation of the new power is a central fact of international trade.

To suggest that China is “not to blame” for the general effects of capitalism amounts to glossing over the profits made by that country's ruling classes. These sectors profit through the weighted increase in productivity (with the use of wage-earner exploitation mechanisms) and materialize these profits in exchange with backward economies.

When praising a Chinese expansion “based more on productivity than on exploitation” (Lo, Dec, 2018), it is omitted that both components feed back the same process of appropriation of other people’s work.

The contrast between praised productivity and contested exploitation is typical of neoclassical economic theory. This conception imagines the confluence of different “factors of production” in the market, omitting that all these components are based on the same extraction of surplus value. Such expropriation is the only real source of all profits.

The mere claim of China's productive profile also tends to highlight the counterweight it introduced to the international primacy of financialization and neoliberalism (Lo Dic, 2018). But the limits imposed on the first process (international speculative flows) do not dilute the support given to the second (capitalist attacks against workers).

The reintroduction of capitalism in China was the great incentive for the relocation of companies and the consequent lowering of the labor force. This change contributed to the recomposition of the rate of profit in recent decades. For the Asian giant to play an effective role in international cooperation, it should adopt internal and external strategies to reverse capitalism.

Disjunctives and scenarios

China has left behind its former status as a territory torn apart by foreign incursions. It is no longer going through the dramatic situation it has faced in recent centuries. It confronts the North American aggressor from a condition very far from the predominant helplessness in the periphery. Pentagon strategists know they cannot treat their rival like Panama, Iraq or Libya.

But this strengthening of sovereignty was accompanied by the abandonment of anti-imperialist traditions. The post-Maoist regime distanced itself from the radicalized international politics that sponsored the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. It also buried any gesture of solidarity with popular struggles around the world.

This change is the flip side of his international geopolitical caution. China avoids conflicts with the United States without interfering in Washington's abuses. The ruling elite buried all traces of sympathy with resistance to the planet's main oppressor.

But this change faces the same limits as restoration and the leap to dominant international status. It is subject to the unresolved dispute over the country's internal future. The capitalist course promoted by the neoliberals has pro-imperialist consequences as strong as the anti-imperialist course promoted by the left. The conflict with the United States will have a direct impact on these definitions.

What are the scenarios that can be seen in the fight with the North American competitor? The hypothesis of a distension (and consequent reintegration of both potencies) was diluted. The signs of a lasting struggle are overwhelming and belie the diagnoses of China's assimilation to the neoliberal order as a partner of the United States that some authors have postulated (Hung, Ho-fung, 2015).

The current context also dispels hopes for the gestation of a transnational capitalist class with Chinese and US members. The Asian choice of a different course of neoliberalism is not the only reason for this divorce (Robinson, 2017). The “chinamérica” association – before the 2008 crisis – also did not include amalgamations between dominant classes or outlines of the emergence of a shared state.

In the short term, there is a strong rise of China in the face of an obvious setback in the United States. The eastern giant is winning the dispute in all sectors and its recent management of the pandemic has confirmed this result. Beijing managed to quickly control the spread of the infection, while Washington faced a spillover that put the country at the top of the death toll.

The Asian power also stood out for its international health aid, against a rival that displayed a chilling selfishness. The Asian economy has already resumed its high growth rate, while its American counterpart is dealing with a dubious recovery in the level of activity. Trump's electoral defeat crowned the failure of all US operations to subdue China.

But the medium-term scenario is more uncertain and the military, technological and financial resources that US imperialism retains make it impossible to anticipate who will emerge victorious from the confrontation.

Broadly speaking, three different scenarios could be envisaged. If the United States wins the tussle, it could begin to reconstitute its imperial leadership, subordinating its Asian and European partners. If, on the other hand, China succeeds with a free-trade capitalist strategy, it would consolidate its transformation into an imperial power.

But a victory for the eastern giant achieved in a context of popular rebellions would completely change the international scenario. This triumph could induce China to resume its anti-imperialist position, in a process of socialist renewal. The profile of imperialism in the XNUMXst century is decided around these three possibilities.

*Claudio Katz is professor of economics at Universidad Buenos Aires. Author, among other books, of Neoliberalism, neodevelopmentalism, socialism (Popular Expression).

Translation: Fernando Lima das Neves.

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