By ISMARA IZEPE DE SOUZA & BRUNO FABRICIO ALCEBINO DA SILVA*

The idea that Itamaraty is an institution that is not very permeable to interactions with the internal political universe is unsustainable in light of the evidence

The rise of the far right in Brazil in recent years has been accompanied by repeated attempts to change the narrative surrounding the military dictatorship (1964-1985). While the negative legacy left by the military became evident in Brazilian society in the period immediately following the country's return to democracy in the 1980s, since the government of Jair Bolsonaro, along with the constant threats to democracy, efforts to promote a positive image of that period have intensified.

The controversies surrounding the undeniable success of I'm still here are an eloquent example of this. The film portrays, from the perspective of Eunice Paiva, the disappearance of her husband, former congressman Rubens Paiva, who was killed by the authoritarian regime. On March 2, the feature film made history by winning the Oscar for best international film, an unprecedented feat for Brazil. Amidst effusive celebrations from the progressive camp and the moderate right and the production of fake news by the extreme right, the fact is that the memory of this period continues to be the subject of disputes.

Foreign policy seems to be an exception when it comes to the different narratives about the authoritarian regime, as there is an almost generalized perception about its successes during this period. During the 21 years of military governments, the profile of Brazil's international presence changed significantly, and it is not possible to speak of a “foreign policy of the military regime”. After all, the automatic alignment with the US promoted by the Castelo Branco government (1964-1967) was gradually replaced by a developmental foreign policy, culminating in the responsible pragmatism of the government of Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979), which, in its autonomous and proud character, bears similarities to the foreign policy of the first two governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), also known as Itamaraty, has specific characteristics within the Brazilian public administration. The esprit de corps that characterizes the sociability among diplomats has led the institution to preserve a positive memory of its actions during the military governments, conveying the idea that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was oblivious to the most abject aspects of the dictatorship. The idea conveyed and corroborated by scholars, diplomats and the press was that Itamaraty continued to base its actions on the interests of national development, without allowing itself to be influenced by what was happening in domestic politics.

However, over the last decade, research conducted in academia and in the areas that resulted in the Final Report of the National Truth Commission has shown that the supposed distancing of the Itamaraty from domestic politics and particularly from the repressive apparatus did not exist. While the official stance was one of detachment from what was happening domestically, behind the scenes the Itamaraty participated in the repressive machinery, assisting in the surveillance and repression of Brazilians in exile.

But there was also the other side of the coin, that is, diplomats who were unwanted and persecuted by the dictatorial regime, either because they did not present a posture consistent with the ideal profile of a diplomat, or because they threatened corruption schemes involving military personnel and high-ranking government officials, as the case of José Pinheiro Jobim reveals.

Between connivance and support

Inspired by the experiences of Chile and Argentina, the National Truth Commission was established in Brazil during the government of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) with the aim of investigating and clarifying the serious human rights violations committed by the military dictatorship (1964-1985). The former president herself was a survivor who was imprisoned and tortured during the regime. Among its most relevant contributions, the National Truth Commission dedicated a specific chapter to crimes committed abroad with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demonstrating the direct involvement of Itamaraty in transnational repression and the persecution of political opponents outside Brazil.

O final report, released in 2014, provides documentary and testimonial evidence that is fundamental for the institutional recognition of these violations, reinforcing the need to preserve historical memory and hold the agents involved accountable.

The Foreign Information Center (CIEX), created in 1966, was one of the main espionage and repression mechanisms used by the Brazilian military dictatorship against opponents of the regime who had left the country due to political persecution. Linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Service (SNI), CIEX was a clandestine center that played a crucial role in monitoring Brazilian political exiles and in repressive cooperation with other authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone, especially within the scope of Operation Condor.

Brazilian researchers from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and the University of São Paulo (USP), together with the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, carried out research that resulted in a database with around 8 thousand documents that demonstrate that Itamaraty monitored more than 17 thousand Brazilians abroad. Although Brazilian diplomacy traditionally presents itself as neutral in the face of internal security policies, these documents reveal that Itamaraty was directly involved in the repression, providing detailed information on the activities of exiles, hindering the issuance of passports and granting strategic data to other intelligence services (PENNA FILHO, 2009, p. 44-45).

CIEX did not operate in isolation. It was part of the Intelligence Community of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CI/MRE), interconnected with other repressive bodies of the Brazilian State, such as the CIE (Army Intelligence Center), the Cenimar (Navy Intelligence Center) and the CISA (Air Force Security Information Center) (NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION, 2014, p. 179). These centers exchanged data on the location, activities and contacts of Brazilian exiles in Europe and Latin America.

The existence of the espionage agency shows that the military regime had a systematic and structured repressive apparatus, with Itamaraty as a key player in political persecution inside and outside the country. According to Balbino (2023, p. 11), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only collaborated with the military regime, but also integrated itself into the repressive apparatus, providing logistical and bureaucratic support for surveillance and repression actions.

Among CIEX's targets were well-known figures, such as the deposed former president João Goulart and the former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola. The case of João Goulart is one of the most emblematic. Documents indicate that he was closely monitored by CIEX and by intelligence services from neighboring countries, such as Uruguay and Argentina. The authoritarian regime was concerned that the former president was planning a political return to Brazil, which led to his constant surveillance and the restriction of his movements (COMMISSÃO NACIONAL DA VERDADE, 2014, p. 192).

Leonel Brizola, in turn, became a priority target of Brazilian espionage abroad, especially in Uruguay. Records indicate that Brazilian agents monitored his activities, sending detailed reports on his political meetings and public speeches (PENNA FILHO, 2009).

Another relevant aspect was the repression of exiles with less public expression, but equally considered “subversive” by the regime. CIEX documents reveal that students, artists and trade unionists were also targets of constant monitoring. Many were denied passports and were prevented from returning to Brazil, while others were arrested and handed over to Brazilian authorities in joint operations with the military regimes in the region (COMMISSÃO NACIONAL DA VERDADE, 2014, p. 194).

CIEX also played a key role in the so-called Operation Condor, the network of repressive cooperation between the dictatorships of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay), which allowed the exchange of information about exiles and facilitated kidnappings and murders (PENNA FILHO, 2009, p. 48-49). According to documents analyzed by the National Truth Commission, Brazil actively participated in this scheme, providing data on political refugees and assisting in the capture of opponents in neighboring countries (NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION, 2014, p. 220).

Furthermore, Brazil's support for the 1973 coup in Chile was articulated through the Itamaraty and other organs of the repressive apparatus. Ambassador Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto played a crucial role in this process, providing strategic information and logistical support to the Brazilian military who were planning the deposition of Salvador Allende. According to Roberto Simon (2021), Brazil, under the command of military president Emílio Garrastazu Médici, not only assisted the Chilean conspirators in the months leading up to the coup, but also actively contributed to consolidating the dictatorial regime of Augusto Pinochet.

Thus, CIEX represented one of the pillars of political repression abroad, demonstrating that the Brazilian military dictatorship did not limit its actions to national territory, but expanded its surveillance and persecution internationally. By actively collaborating with other authoritarian regimes and by continuously monitoring its opponents, CIEX contributed to the perpetuation of a system of terror that marked Brazil’s recent history. The analysis of its archives and its activities is essential to understanding the extent of political repression during that period and reinforces the importance of preserving historical memory to prevent such episodes from happening again. The dictatorship is not a “closed chapter.”

Unwanted diplomats

There was another side to the coin: the repression suffered by many diplomats who did not conform to the behavior considered ideal by the dictatorship. Smaller in quantitative terms compared to other ministries, the purge also occurred at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soon after the military coup, the ministries were authorized to initiate internal investigations to identify ideological suspicions and remove civil servants who were critical of the new regime.

In 1964, Itamaraty gained specificity by being able to create its own commission, the Summary Investigation Commission (CIS) led by Vasco Leitão da Cunha, a diplomat chosen by Castelo Branco to head the MRE. The CIS resulted in 97 diplomats being investigated and 20 being dismissed (CARMO, 2018, p. 60).

In 1968, at the height of internal political repression, a new commission was formed to investigate conduct considered deviant and recommend the dismissal of homosexuals. According to Gessica Carmo, medical examinations were required to confirm intimate habits and actions, placing these diplomats in humiliating conditions (2018, p. 65). Others were dismissed for being too bohemian and for having behaviors considered inappropriate. The best-known case is perhaps that of Vinicius de Moraes, who was dismissed and later integrated into the staff of the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Some considerations are also in order regarding diplomat José Pinheiro Jobim, a victim of the military regime for revealing the intention of registering a corruption scheme related to the construction of the Itaipu Power Plant. In the early 1960s, José Pinheiro Jobim was appointed by President João Goulart to talk to Paraguayan authorities about the hydroelectric development of the Paraná River. The project was implemented during the military governments, but the amounts invested in the sumptuous project were absurdly high. larger than initially anticipated.

In 1979, already retired, José Pinheiro Jobim told a small circle of acquaintances that he was preparing a book about the irregularities in the construction of the binational hydroelectric plant. Days later, his body was found and, despite evidence of a hoax, the official version was that he committed suicide. In 2014, the National Truth Commission, when reviving the case, acknowledged that the regime was responsible for the torture and death of José Pinheiro Jobim. In 2018, the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances (CEMDP) ordered that his death certificate be rectified, acknowledging the violent death caused by the Brazilian state.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs between government policy and state policy

Career civil servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to the repressive apparatus through a bureaucratic structure of grandiose proportions, however, many of them were victims of the arbitrary acts committed by the military dictatorship. The cases presented here show that polarized explanations, which point to the entire Brazilian diplomacy generically as a victim or as a participant in the repressive apparatus, do not account for a complex and multifaceted reality.

Therefore, this is not about demonizing or exaggerating the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As in any institution, diplomats are susceptible to assimilating interests from different political and ideological spectrums, and there are certainly those among them who were happy to contribute to the repression and those who were outraged and took the risk of fighting the arbitrary acts committed by the military.

 The Itamaraty is internationally recognized for producing excellent professionals who have demonstrated their ability to masterfully represent Brazilian interests. In this sense, the institution has its merits in the arrow of time, by preserving some traditions, such as the defense of multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, along with the actions of a State policy, there are decisions that are consistent with the priorities of the governments in power, which proves that foreign policy is also a government policy. The idea that the Itamaraty is an institution that is not very permeable to interactions with the domestic political universe is unsustainable in the face of the evidence.

*Ismara Izepe de Souza is a professor in the Department of International Relations at the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp).

*Bruno Fabricio Alcebino da Silva He is majoring in International Relations and Economic Sciences at the Federal University of ABC (UFABC).

References

BALBINO, Camila Estefani de Andrade Simphrônio. Itamaraty and its connections with the repressive apparatus during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985). Final Course Work (International Relations) – Federal University of São Paulo, Osasco, 2023.

CARMO, Gessica Fernanda do. Soldiers in suits? Rupture, crisis and restructuring of Brazilian diplomacy (1964-1969). Dissertation (Master's), State University of Campinas – UNICAMP, Campinas, SP, 2018.

NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION. Final report. Brasilia: CNV, 2014.

PENNA FILHO, Pio. Itamaraty in the years of lead – the Foreign Information Center (CIEX) and repression in the Southern Cone (1966-1979). Brazilian Journal of International Politics, vol. 52, no. 2, 2009, p. 43-62.

SIMON, Robert. Brazil against democracy: the dictatorship, the coup in Chile and the Cold War in South America🇧🇷 São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2021.

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