By TIAGO NOGARA*

US reactivates Monroe Doctrine to contain Latin America's multipolar turn

1.

In recent days, high-level meetings between leaders of developing countries in Moscow and Beijing have made headlines around the world. In Moscow, the joint presence of Putin, Xi Jinping and Lula at the parade marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over the Nazis was highly symbolic.

Recalling the third-world solidarity of the “Bandung spirit”, meetings also took place in the Russian capital, such as that between Nicolás Maduro – who leads the Venezuelan resistance against the illegal sanctions imposed by the United States – and Ibrahim Traoré, the surprising young leader of Burkina Faso who inherited the revolutionary soul of Thomas Sankara.

Finally, from Beijing, Lula and Xi Jinping reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation, in contrast to the unilateralism adopted by the Trump administration, while the 4th CELAC-China Forum confirmed the expectation of a new era of vigor for South-South cooperation ties.

All this is happening at a time when the United States, fearing a possible recession, is beginning to show the first signs of backing down in its attempt to step up its tariff aggression against China. As a result, it is natural that there is a growing feeling among political leaders, analysts and observers that a new multipolar order is steadily advancing.

And this is no coincidence. The world has indeed changed, and the economic, political and population weight of developing countries is an irreversible reality. This will have important consequences for the configuration of international relations in the coming years.

However, when specifically evaluating the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, some nuances must be considered in order to avoid the hasty conclusion that American imperialism has irremediably lost vitality, or that we are witnessing an inevitable end to the rescue of the Monroe Doctrine.

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It is important to understand that the Donald Trump administration’s strategy for Latin America is far from moderate, and the region does not play a secondary role in US foreign policy. It is no coincidence that Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first official trip was a tour of Central American and Caribbean countries. It has been more than a century – since Philander Chase Knox’s visit to Panama in 1912, during the construction of the Panama Canal – since Latin America was the destination of the first official trip by a US Secretary of State.

Since the beginning of its mandate, the main objective of the United States in the hemispheric context has been clear: to destabilize and weaken the ties of cooperation between the countries of the region and China. Among the many means used to achieve this objective, two are the most relevant to understanding the current situation: (i) the application of pressure and blackmail on local governments; and (ii) explicit support for far-right political forces in several countries, with the aim of containing the advance of progressive governments.

Regarding the first method, high-ranking authorities of the American government and its various branches have made numerous public statements against cooperation ties between China and Latin America, as shown by the recurring statements of USSOUTHCOM commanders.

In Central America and the Caribbean – where the “Big Stick” policy has historically been most aggressive – there is an explicit attempt to redesign the region’s political and economic ties. Pressure on Panama, which has even included threats of forcible recapture of the Canal Zone, has led the country to announce its withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative and to transfer the administration of two ports along the canal from Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison to the US-based BlackRock.

During a visit to Costa Rica, Marco Rubio endorsed the Costa Rican government’s criticism of Huawei’s deployment of 5G networks. In an official statement, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Arnoldo André welcomed the alignment with the United States: “Costa Rica was recognized, congratulated and praised by Senator Rubio for dealing with the issues appropriately, in line with the interests of the new United States government,” echoing speeches aligned with the paradigm of a supposed “new Cold War.”

Also with the support of radical sectors in the United States, President Bernardo Arévalo maintained Guatemala's subservient diplomatic stance, going so far as to maintain diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

In this same context, the United States has made clear efforts to discipline its regional ally Nayib Bukele, president of El Salvador, who — despite his position on the right of the political spectrum and closeness to Trump — has sought to deepen the country's ties with China. In April, an opinion piece in Wall Street Journal, entitled "El Salvador's Bukele Is a China Ally”, criticized the American government’s complacency regarding Salvadoran ties with China.

Finally, the tightening of sanctions against Cuba and Nicaragua complements this scenario, in which the United States seeks to consolidate a “cordon sanitaire” around these countries and, obviously, Venezuela.

Further south, pressure on Brazil became evident in the months leading up to President Xi Jinping's visit to the country, with several statements by US officials expressing discontent with the possibility of Brazil joining the Belt and Road Initiative.

Although the country has not formally joined the initiative, the Brazilian government has emphasized synergies between its national programs — Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), New Industry Brazil and South American Integration Routes — and the Belt and Road Initiative. Relations with China continue to deepen, to the point that the construction of a bioceanic railway corridor between Brazil and Peru is being considered, with direct support from Chinese companies and expertise.

The diplomatic crisis between the United States and Colombia, which occurred in January, occurred precisely in the midst of a growing strategic disagreement between the two countries, including with regard to Sino-Colombian relations. A traditional ally of the United States and NATO's only "global partner" in the region, Colombia under the government of Gustavo Petro began to adopt an alternative course in its foreign policy, challenging American hegemony and moving closer to China.

In 2023, Gustavo Petro established a Strategic Partnership with Beijing and, over the course of more than a year, rehearsed the country's entry into the Belt and Road Initiative — a measure officially announced during the 4th China–CELAC Forum.

3.

As for the second method — aimed at changing the correlation of political and social forces in favor of the far right and to the detriment of progressive forces — the actions of the Donald Trump administration have also been quite explicit. It is no coincidence that when announcing tariffs on products from several countries, it was precisely Argentina that received the lowest taxes, in an episode publicly celebrated by Javier Milei.

The leading representative of the new far right driven by Trumpism in Latin America, Javier Milei has shown an unequivocal willingness to sacrifice the interests of his own people and even the national business community — as demonstrated by his insistence on disrupting lucrative bilateral relations with China — in exchange for demonstrations of unconditional loyalty to Washington. Under his leadership, Argentina announced its withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative and its withdrawal from the BRICS+ accession process, in addition to having withdrawn from the China-CELAC Forum held in Beijing.

Two other ideological allies of Trumpism in the region, the governments of Daniel Noboa in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, have shown less alignment with anti-China efforts, reflecting the growing tensions between the worldviews of the American right and the concrete interests of part of the Latin American elites.

Although they share the vision of fighting progressive forces and maintain ties with the most conservative sectors of the United States, these leaders also represent fractions of the national economic elites that, in many cases, depend on the success of relations with China.

Still, it is undeniable that the United States exerts far more control over Noboa and Bukele than over their direct rivals — the Citizen revolution, in Ecuador, and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), in El Salvador. For this reason, the diplomatic and intelligence services of the United States did not hesitate to give explicit support to illegal and suspicious measures that marked the elections that returned Daniel Noboa to the presidency, despite vehement accusations of fraud by the opposition.

The attempt to reshape the region's political landscape depends directly on the results of this year's and next year's elections, with decisive chapters in countries such as Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Colombia and Brazil — where the United States will bet on defeating a broad range of progressive governments.

Bolivia is a historical example of American interventions, with the most notable recent episode being Elon Musk's public statement about the 2019 coup against Evo Morales. The current government of Luis Arce faces difficulties arising from the division of the Movement to Socialism (MAS), between its supporters and those of Evo. In this scenario, the right's hope of returning to government through elections after more than twenty years is visibly reinforced by Washington's strategic interests.

In recent years, Honduras has taken an alternative path to that which it had followed in the past, establishing diplomatic relations with China in 2023 under the presidency of Xiomara Castro, who is now seeking to ensure that her successor maintains a progressive political stance and deepens relations with the Chinese. In contrast, the likely candidate of the Liberal Party, Salvador Nasralla, has publicly spoken out against a possible free trade agreement with China and criticized the diplomatic rupture with Taiwan.

In Chile, the right-wing opposition to the Boric government includes several prominent figures of Chilean conservatism, among whom Johannes Kaiser stands out for adopting libertarian and far-right rhetoric similar to that of Javier Milei. Meanwhile, in Colombia, the United States’ efforts to reorient the country entirely towards its strategic and commercial interests are evident. Colombia not only plays a key role as a trading partner, but also as a focal point in attempts to isolate Venezuela and contain the expansion of Chinese influence in South America.

Brazil will likely be the stage for the most important electoral battle in the region. President Lula will seek re-election against a candidate who has yet to be decided, but who will have the support of Jair Bolsonaro, who is currently ineligible.

It cannot be forgotten that, during Jair Bolsonaro's last term, Brazil officially withdrew from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), in addition to having promoted the complete emptying of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and other relevant regional entities that had gained strength in previous years.

Bolsonaro supporters are unequivocal allies of Trumpism, and it is not uncommon for them to march with US and Israeli flags on Brazilian soil. Eduardo Bolsonaro, the former president's son, has been on leave from his position as a federal deputy since March to remain in the United States, where he is coordinating joint strategies with Donald Trump's inner circle.

5.

Finally, the United States’ heavy and ongoing sanctions against Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela have been further intensified at the beginning of Trump’s new term, with the aim of creating fissures in the governments of these countries and strengthening reactionary political and social forces that yearn for the success of “regime change” tactics.

It is undeniable that these two elements—increasing diplomatic pressure on Latin American governments and efforts to reconfigure the correlation of forces by supporting reactionary elements—form the core of the Donald Trump administration’s strategy for the region. The fundamental objectives are to weaken Latin America’s ties with China and contain the new rise of progressive governments.

Recent events, however, have revealed significant weaknesses in this strategy. The unilateralism, imposition of tariffs and blackmail used by the United States have generated certain distrust and disagreements in ties with some of the countries with which it is closest. Trump allies such as Noboa and Bukele have shown reluctance to fully endorse the anti-China offensive, and other conservative governments, such as that of Dina Boluarte in Peru, seem determined not to buy into the rhetoric of a “new Cold War.”

The US offensive has even led some progressive governments to radicalize their positions in the face of Washington's hegemony, as shown by the tone adopted by Gustavo Petro when announcing Colombia's accession to the Belt and Road Initiative.

However, these moves do not represent a definitive outcome of the conflict. As the Panama case clearly demonstrates, pressure from the United States has also produced results favorable to its interests.

Although Brazil is deepening relations with China, it is clear that US pressure played a fundamental role in the country not formally announcing its accession to the Belt and Road Initiative — a gesture that would have heightened the symbolism of bilateral rapprochement.

The aggressive stance of the United States in favor of regime change and the destabilization of progressive governments goes hand in hand with its resolute support for reactionary far-right forces. The recent frauds in favor of Daniel Noboa in Ecuador are just one sign that a period of increasing political and electoral difficulties is approaching for progressive forces in the region.

That said, it is clear that the world is rapidly moving towards structural transformations that are expanding the political and economic maneuvering space of developing countries. The winds coming from the recent meetings in Moscow and Beijing are unequivocal signs of a multipolar world on the rise.

In this context, the relationship between Latin America and China has become increasingly essential, as clearly demonstrated by the results of the 4th China-CELAC Forum, which highlighted a shared vision of development, multilateralism and South-South cooperation. Strengthening these ties is not a merely formal diplomatic gesture, but a vital necessity to ensure the autonomy and future of the region.

However, it is important to recognize that the definitive defeat of imperialism in Latin America will not come only through the international action of national governments – however important this may be. It will also depend on the capacity of progressive and popular forces to resist, at the national level, the historic alliance between oligarchic elites who are pro-sellouts and the hawks in Washington, who continue to work to keep the ghost of the Monroe Doctrine alive.

*Tiago Nogara He holds a PhD in political science from the University of São Paulo (USP).

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