By MILTON PINHEIRO*

Bolsonaro has a deep desire to establish a victorious project of rupture

The Brazilian political scene is irrevocably convulsed due to the condensation of the most diverse crises, however, these particularities of the convulsion have in the political crisis the centrality of the most explosive factor of the current conjuncture.

The far-right government of the fascist agitator, Jair Bolsonaro, has been moving in an articulated way to promote not the premises of what would be an administrative action to govern, but, on the contrary, it is guided by tactical paths, the most diverse, that may to make its political strategy possible. For that, he needs actions that organize and give concrete meaning to his point of arrival: his deep desire to establish a victorious project of rupture.

The government's careful examination allows us to assess that Bolsonaro constituted an operative reason and acts gradually to make this project viable. This tactical path has offered trails for it to move from the logic of controlled chaos that operates the set of administrative interventions, carry out changes in the functional profile of the Brazilian State through the coup within the institutions, control – via the centrão – the parliament , develop, as an ideological elam, a relentless attack on the STF, exercise a certain political control of the PGR, advance, based on relations with the monopoly bourgeoisie, in the destruction of public services, have as agitation and propaganda an agenda of obscurantist communiqués that it uses its ideological tools as an axis of inflection to animate the neo-fascist hordes in the political arena and, what is more serious, it builds, with the participation of many far-right hordes, an underground neo-fascist articulation within the Armed Forces and the Military Police.

This background that characterizes Bolsonaro's ideological base is the cultural and political product of the impasses of the Brazilian political transition, in its passage from the 1964 dictatorship to the return to the State of formal democracy. The apparatus of repression was maintained within a new political framework. The contradictions of the amnesty law that rewarded state terrorism became the starting point for the defense of militarism, for praising torture and for insulting those tortured, exiled and killed by the 1964 regime.

On the other hand, the country is currently gripped by the deepest economic crisis of the 30st century. It presents enormous unemployment which, added to a number of discouraged people, exceeds 19 million people. The high cost, hunger, the meager offer of social assistance provided by the State, plus the Covid XNUMX crisis, objectively constitute the open doors for the fair possibility of social upheaval, but also for the appearance among the population of proposals neofascists.

Even with this social inequality fraying the societal fabric, the government's economic policies are aimed at increasing the profits of the various fractions of the bourgeoisie that are enriched from their position in the power bloc, transforming Brazil into a counter of opportunities for toxic agents who act to become new billionaires.

Government and parliament have approved regressive guidelines in relation to labor and social issues, and now they want to destroy – with the administrative counter-reform (PEC 32) – public services and the rights of civil servants in the three segments of the republic. PEC 32, if approved, will reintroduce the political clientelism that existed at the beginning of the XNUMXth century in Brazil. Furthermore, the possibility opens up for the State to become a business portfolio through the privatization of many of its services and the unlimited attack on public funds.

The deliberate inability of the Bolsonaro government to face the Brazilian situation therefore becomes a constructed crisis, which adds to the anti-national agenda of privatizations, feeds the privileges of the military as a state bureaucracy at the service of the government, reinforces the international policy of articulation with neo-fascist forces, it leverages the obscurantist agenda and the sense of rupture, all of which, sets in motion the extreme right field under the leadership of the fascist agitator, Jair Bolsonaro.

The pandemic crisis and the vaccine issue showed that, in addition to the Centrão in parliament, there is also a Centrão in the Armed Forces that acts driven by interests in the gains that business inside the State, through corruption, allow. Regarding the latter, studies on the period of the burgo-military dictatorship of 1964 confirm how active corruption was in the Armed Forces. However, with a submissive or censored press at that time, the disclosure of these actions was always silenced.

Brazil finds itself in a very complex situation with a high degree of risk in the face of threats of institutional rupture. The president, wounded in the ongoing political battle, with low popularity and many complaints about himself and his family, boasts that he is unable to govern due to the control/supervision actions of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and the federative pact (attacks on governors) . Therefore, a tactical action is opened that moves by the threats of rupture that feed the real project of Bolsonaro and his neo-fascist hordes.

Bolsonaro's social base, his neo-fascist vanguard, the president of the republic himself, palatial segments of the Armed Forces, neo-fascist hordes in the FFAA's paid reserve, military commanders, a significant contingent within the PMs, fascist businessmen located in agribusiness, the parliamentary base, Preachers of the trade of faith (whether neo-Pentecostal or Catholic), decadent popular artists, with the indelible presence of activists who operate at the counter of small politics, have naturalized the narrative of the necessary institutional rupture as a way of solving the country's problems...

In addition to this aforementioned perspective, action is also taken to create in common sense the urgency of rupture. The extreme right and the president of the republic began to organize coup procedures based on the logic of riot. And, for that, they located the civic sense of the 7th of September as an ideological/mediatic framework for this possibility.

A major articulation is under way, with underground and public characteristics, to create, from the presence of his blockade in the streets, on September 7th, the necessary inflection to operate the rupture desired by Bolsonaro's project.

To this movement of fracture in the system of formal democracy, segments of parliament, sectors of the judiciary, governors and the corporate press move to operate a pact of political coexistence. The key issue to be understood is that Bolsonaro and his assault block are not interested in this mediation. The necessary emergency brake was not operated by the judiciary and parliament, which would be the impediment of the president.

A bifurcation for action on the political scene thus opened up. In the wake of the mutiny, which may or may not consolidate as a coup, there are powerful forces of the state bureaucracy and monopoly capital. Thousands of soldiers are being dismissed from the parade of military forces. Leaders of MPs Associations claim that in the event of an institutional crisis they will be following orders from the president. There is a sign of invasion in public buildings of other powers of the republic. The right is calling for street fighting.

In the other possibility opened by the political bifurcation, we have some questions and many weaknesses. First, it exists in an important part of the Brazilian left, incapable of examining the concrete reality in motion, at the same time that it acts in a dubious way due to the 2022 electoral process. Second, in this same left it manifests itself, but also in sectors of the field of opposition to the government, an understanding that Brazil has a solid institutional framework. Third, there is a widespread view that there will be no coup, but if so, what does that have to do with me?

Still on this left side, I presume, of this political bifurcation, is parked a significant portion of the Brazilian trade union structure that moves only for corporate issues, even so, with low intensity. At this rapid juncture, it remains for us to warn of the fire signal, what to do?

Can the riot articulated for September 7 be configured as a coup or not, if it is a coup, what would be the capacity of Bolsonaro and his assault block to consolidate an exceptional regime? These questions are on the threshold of events. Therefore, the embryo of the United Front of the left, proletarian and popular, has to move in a radical way to face what will come head-on with history.

In the radical nature of the response, the left and the organizations of the proletarian and popular field, have to advance in the call for their bases to appear in the streets on September 7th. It is important to be able to build the unit of action of this embryo of the United Front, with the perspective of being prepared for the necessary confrontations. The political outcome, opened by this bifurcation, will only be positive for the proletarian and popular camp if the left manages to understand and prepare itself for the different scenarios that the class struggle points out.

After all, walking in the direction of the streets, defending grassroots work, building a united front, advancing in the organization of the general strike as a political instrument in this stage of the class struggle, alongside the struggle for the reorganization of the working class, are instruments that impose themselves to change the balance of forces and move forward in the People's Power project.

In the streets, there will be the future of Brazil.

*Milton Pinheiro Professor of Political History at the State University of Bahia (UNEB).