The possible of the impossibility of educating – Kant, Freud and Lacan

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By MIRMILA MUSSE*

Expecting something from the other implies the absence of the assumption of knowing about oneself

“Let us start, therefore, from this observation: the psychoanalyst, when he tries to “teach what psychoanalysis teaches him”, disorganizes the accepted ways of teaching, disorganizes them in the regroupings of knowledge operated by the university and disorganizes them in the face of the way the latter treats them. transmits” (Eric Laurent).[1]

1.

For psychoanalysis, teaching touches the impossible, while betting on transmission seems to be the way through which one can gain access to some knowledge. Contrary to the demands of the master's discourse, psychoanalysis has questioned since Freud, then with Lacan, teaching based on categorical truth. It is a complex game: one that teaches giving up knowledge as the only truth and, thus, leaves the way open to the desire for knowledge of the learner.

The need for the transmission of concepts and disciplines for the knowledge of psychoanalysis is evident. But this transmission “needs the contribution of each of its practitioners to find its proper place in the world” [2]. The mere transmission of a concept is dead knowledge. To convey something is to be aware that the truth can never be told in full.

In 1783, Kant warned that teaching a theory does not prevent it from being questioned. On the contrary, achieving the freedom of reason towards enlightenment is precisely to make use of your own reason. He who teaches a theory also has another function. In the position of “savant”, this same individual in his own name has complete freedom and even the duty to make use of his reason to “make the public aware” of his own questions about the theory, because “it is not at all impossible that in their utterances the truth is hidden.” [3].

In 1803, one of Kant's students, Theodor Rink, edited the material for one of his professor's courses, About pedagogy.[4]. These are classes taught in 1770 for a pedagogy course at the University of Königsberg. Kant builds some fundamentals about the act of educating, with principles and practical advice to educators. Its basic premise sustains and seeks to demonstrate throughout the course that man “is the only creature that needs to be educated”,[5] aiming to achieve good and freedom.

Education prepares, from this point of view, the moral conscience for the construction of the “character formation” of the individual, based on judgment and ethics. The “discipline of man”, as he names education, also ensures that “animal inclinations” cease to prevail in human beings. But without it, the same “deviates from his destiny, deviates from humanity” [6], that is, of the realm of liberty.

Moral character should, according to Kant, be taught to the child in the first years of life and be transmitted from the subsequent generations. It would be necessary to offer him, from the beginning, good examples of how to do certain things, as well as the duties and rules to be fulfilled. The practice of rationality, based on the examination of one's conduct, is interested in knowledge not only of the individual dimension, but also of the social and collective dimension. It is up to the teacher, according to him, to teach his student to learn to understand, reason and, finally, become wise. Man learns thoughts and to think through an educational process at the end of which he achieves to walk alone with the use of his own reason. Under a kind of “temporary guardianship”, the student finds his own instruments to achieve his autonomy.

If, on the one hand, education constitutes the basis for differentiating man from the animal, on the other hand, Kant admits that the art of educating is one of the most difficult tasks of human existence, since it depends on the ability to forge an inclination towards pursuit of good. Only then will there be a solid formation of morals for him. The philosopher also adds the act of governing as another extremely difficult activity: “Among human discoveries there are two extremely difficult ones, and they are: the art of governing men and the art of educating them”.[7]

Education presents for Kant a duality between desires and rationality. In this dispute, the latter must win, because only within society and culture can moral freedom be found. If this does not happen, we return to the primitive state. The coercion of social laws constitutes an essential path to moral freedom. Thus, by mainly developing the good use of reason and morals, education contributes to man's goal of conquering his humanity: freedom.

More than a century after the publication of this text, in Preface to Aichhorn's 'Misguided Youth' (1925)[8] and Endless and Endless Analysis (1937)[9] Freud takes up the Kantian idea that the craft of governing and educating are impossible, adding to them the work of “healing”, which in the second text is replaced by “analyzing”. Even if the author of these two texts does not develop his thesis on the impossibility of each of these tasks, we can think of a congruence, in the first text, between psychoanalysis and education and, in the second, between psychoanalytic theory and the end of a analysis.

Freud acknowledges the existence of these impossible trades, but does not directly offer an explanation for the claim. At first glance, it should be noted that these are those that are exercised through words. Bearing in mind the formations of the unconscious, Freud demonstrates that often something escapes from speech and language. In addition to involving the subject in what he says and in what escapes his saying, he reaffirms that there is something that cannot be said from language.

2.

For Freud, it is impossible to guarantee that the signifier for the speaker has the same meaning for the listener – an idea later developed by Lacan. Another way and again, something gets out of control of speech. Faced with this sequence of thought that revolves around the subject, we could raise a first hypothesis that, for Freud, the art of governing, teaching and analyzing are difficult or impossible because one cannot predict the certainty of the effectiveness of the initial objective proposed in such cases. professions. In other words, they would have their effectiveness, but not their accuracy.

Em Preface to Aichhorn's 'Misguided Youth', Freud recognizes the educators' interest in psychoanalysis, but, already at that time, he notes that the best psychoanalytic instruction is the educator's personal analysis. It enables, according to him, the construction of knowledge about suffering and the symptom by the individual, carried out, therefore, without a universal solution based on the imposition of pre-established truths, as one might think about pedagogy.

In this Freudian theory, what escapes language is close to what Kant describes about the concept of “knowledge”. As for this one it is not possible to affirm the existence and know the “thing in itself”, it is about questioning the way in which knowledge is formulated, making use, for that, of the critical reason. Contrary to its predecessors, who explained knowledge from principles considered universal, whether moral values ​​or those defined by religion, the Kantian theory maintains that it is the subject himself who has the conditions to understand the possibilities and limits of experience . The phenomenon, unlike the idea of ​​a reality considered natural, is represented in thought and reason. The thing in itself of a supposedly pure reality is unattainable, as its access is conditioned by sensitivity and rational faculties. It is only possible to become aware of the phenomenon when it presents itself in thought.

In one of the texts of the book collection Lakant,[10] Jorge Alemán, in conversation with Jacques-Alain-Miller, also refers to Freud's dialogue with Kant, this time from the Kantian concept of “categorical imperative”. The central point of this dialogue establishes a relationship between the Freudian notion of “drive” and the Platonic separation between superior and inferior desire, used by Kant. When dealing with the subject, Freud uses the term “starry sky”[11] and asserts that, ideally at least, human conduct should be guided by reason. However, he questions the divine origin of consciousness, pointing out that even if "it is something 'within us', it does not exist from the beginning". During early childhood, it is the parents who will constitute this moral formation, assumed by the superego in the face of the sexual drive. This same celestial metaphor was taken up again from a phrase by Kant in Critique of Practical Reason, to speak of desire.[12]

Miller[13] states that, for Kant, there is only one categorical imperative: the maxim of the subject's will determining its action that can always hold simultaneously, while acting, of the principle of moral legislation. The autonomy of the Kantian subject, supposedly achieved from reason through experience and practice, is close, according to Miller, to the divided subject of psychoanalysis, that is, barred. When autonomous, he is subject to the moral law that he gives himself, and there is, in this operation, a gap between the legislating subject and the subject subject to his own legislation.

Both Freud, in Preface to Aichhorn's 'Misguided Youth', as Kant, in about pedagogy, refer the two offices of teaching and governing to the individual level in different ways. If, for Kant, it is up to the subject to intend to reach the moral law through constant critical reflection at the moment of action, for Freud, educators can, in analytical practice, build knowledge about suffering and about the individual's own symptom.

Em Endless and endless analysis, Freud, reaffirms the impossibility of crafts, adding a reference to analysis: “It seems, however, that analysis is the third of those 'impossible' professions, over which one can be sure of insufficient success. The two others that have been known for much longer are to educate and to govern”.[14] The failure or insufficient success of the act of analyzing would be linked to the end of the analysis. Conceiving this end depends on the construction of two types of knowledge: the continuation of the construction of psychoanalytic theory, but also of clinical practice in view of the end of an analysis. This second case, according to Freud, consists in suppressing all repressions and filling in gaps in memory.

We know that Lacan unfolds this theoretical impasse by proposing the pass as a solution to a possible end of the analysis. In the same Freudian logic, there are two knowledges at play: a formalized teaching and the singular transmission of the end of an analysis inscribed in the presentation of a testimony of pass which carries a singular and non-universal output.

Although the jobs of governing, teaching and analyzing are part of the different ways of constituting a social bond, as Freud pointed out, we quickly conclude here that, as pointed out by him, in these jobs there will always be a failure that does not guarantee their effectiveness.

Freud develops in Discontents in Civilization[15] reflection on psychic suffering from the subject's relationship with the other. This malaise is an inevitable result, the price to be paid for consenting to the symbolic via language. With Lacan, the effect of this operation introduced by language is precisely to make access to all reality impossible. In this sense, the malaise of language is incapable of including all the real that is presented to the subject, something escapes from language and becomes impossible to represent.

Bearing in mind the way in which social ties are developed, Lacan recovers this Freudian impossibility, naming it “not all”. However, this improbability present in the entanglement is, for him, precisely the engine of its possibility. If, on the one hand, the result of the incompleteness of the discourse leaves something to escape, on the other hand, this is the only reason why it is possible to move the desire towards the connection with the world.

By inserting, in this reflection, desire and articulating, in language, the jouissance of discursive logic, Lacan develops in 1969-1970, the Seminar XVII. It is worth mentioning that it is not by chance that this seminar is named The opposite of psychoanalysis.  In May 1968, the political and social movement started by students broke out in France, putting established values ​​and institutions of power in check. Still representing this historic moment, the cover of this Seminar refers to one of the emblematic scenes of this movement. It shows a young man with a mischievous smile in front of a soldier. This moment became a milestone for Lacan's reflections on teaching, in the same year in which he was invited to direct the Department of Psychoanalysis at the then Experimental University of Vincennes. The creation of this new university was also the result of the May 1968 student movement and the setting for future Lacan seminars.

In addition to springing from this historical moment, Lacan's reflections on teaching also allowed him to advance in issues involving the transmission of psychoanalysis. In early 1968 and 1969, he gave three lectures, later compiled in the book entitled My teaching.[16] Returning on that occasion to the path taken by him and which point of arrival he would like to reach with the transmission of psychoanalysis, but without ceasing to dialogue with philosophy and science, Lacan oriented all his conferences at the time towards a return to Freud and the concept foundation of psychoanalysis, namely, the “unconscious subject”. As for his own conception of the teaching of psychoanalysis, he states: “No, I do not teach at all. My speech is not a teaching, they try to make it a teaching, that is nonsense, we will get nowhere”. His provocation is, as always, radical. How is what is taught not teaching?

Em The Reverse of Psychoanalysis. Lacan develops the “discursive mathemes” as a way of understanding the social bond, while pointing to the impossible meaning of this bond. We could say that the impossibility of the Lacanian real was bequeathed by the idea of ​​the impossibility of the three trades, addressed by Freud in the “Preface to Aichhorn's 'disoriented youth'” and in Endless and Endless Analysis? and earlier by Kant? What for Lacan escapes knowledge, represented by the real, does it dialogue with the absence of guarantee of the effectiveness of the teaching, governing and analysis of Kant/Freud?

3.

In order to try to understand how Lacan approaches the issue of teaching, it is necessary to start from the concept of “knowledge” for psychoanalysis, which necessarily implies differentiating the concepts of “transmission” and “teaching” of knowledge. For psychoanalysis, the only possible knowledge is that of the unconscious that can, somehow, be transmitted, but not taught. For this, it is necessary to start from the premise that it is in the unconscious that the key point of this knowledge is constituted.

Em knowledge triangle, Miller states that teaching is not the transmission of knowledge, since this is directed towards a point of not knowing, that is, to a hole. According to him, Lacan “[…] belies the formula according to which […] teaching is the transmission of knowledge. […] Treating the unconscious as knowledge is necessarily separating teaching and knowledge. The unconscious, if it is knowledge, is not knowledge that can be taught”.[17]

Anaëlle Lebovits-Quenehen[18] resumes the discussion about teaching for psychoanalysis. According to her, it is only possible to theoretically teach a concept if the one who teaches is aware that in this knowledge there is a hole that establishes a non-knowledge. Teaching only has its place if there is an invention around this articulation between knowing and not knowing. This inversion between one and the other can awaken something in the desire to know of the one who transmits a concept. If you intend to fill in the hole, the one who teaches places himself on the side of the know from the master.

The master's discourse, as well as that of the hysteric, the university and the analyst are themes developed by Lacan in the Seminar XVII. These four mathemes are composed of four fixed places: the agent (the one who says, who dominates the social bond), the other (to whom the discourse is addressed), the production (the effect of the discourse, what remains) and the truth (the support of what is said). From these fixed places, four structuring elements of the discourse circulate: signifier 1, signifier 2, object a (cause of desire and more of jouissance) and barred subject (the subject's becoming). From this discursive dance result the four speeches presented above.

When entering the discursive logic, the subject renounces a part of jouissance, but there is a remainder that remains and does not cease to fail to be inscribed. Each of these discourses locates the place the subject occupies in the social bond, revealing his subjective position in relation to those fixed places mentioned above. Especially regarding the social, it refers to the discourse that is conveyed, being determinant of each group, or rather, to their way of using language in the social bond.

This resumption of these four speeches is important to understand an aspect of the impossibility of the jobs described by Kant, Freud and perhaps Lacan. If, on the one hand, there is the renunciation of jouissance, this is exactly what causes a hole of not knowing and which moves the subject in search of knowledge. In his approach to the four discourses, Lacan inserts a bar between the fixed place of their production and the truth, thus inscribing the impossibility. For this reason, the truth cannot be told in its entirety.

The discourses of the master, the hysteric and the university aim, each in their own way, to tamp down knowledge, offering a solution for the real that escapes their logic. In the first type, impossibility is placed between the agent (master) and knowledge, indicating that the latter also acts in the act of “governing that which cannot be mastered”, “[...] of commanding knowledge”.[19] The master knows nothing of his jouissance, as he is on the side of the slave (reference to the master-slave relationship developed by Marx). In the hysterical discourse, the subject's impossibility consists in trying to dominate the master signifier and points to the inconsistency of knowledge in the other, since more enjoyment is placed there in the place of truth. In the university discourse, however, between knowledge and the object resides the impossibility of educating by commanding knowledge, that is, the subject believes he has mastered knowledge. Covering the real by the instance of jouissance, such discourses try, in a failed way, to erase the singularity of the subject, that is, the subjective division in each one of them.

In the analyst's discourse, as described by Lacan, between the object a and the subject divided there is the impossibility of healing. But by including more than jouissance in the discursive logic, it is possible to go beyond that through the analytical act. The analyst's discourse puts knowledge in the place of truth. Warned that it can only be said in half, the analyst, with the interpretation, aims at the construction of a unique knowledge that can only be produced from the unconscious, when knowledge emerges from the enunciation in the form of an enigma: This “[… ] is the only [speech] to demonstrate that there is an impossibility in relationships, fundamentally what sustains the discourse in its denominator, where knowledge (S2) occupies the place of truth through a “leap” through the barrier of the impossible”.[20]

The effect of the analyst's discourse as a knowledge in the form of an enigma is characterized by intending to be more of the order of enunciation than of the statement: “[...] therefore, do not expect anything more subversive from my discourse than not intending a solution” [21]. According to Lacan, the analytical discourse is the only one that does not put itself in the place of mastery, it does not have domination as its function.

Another addendum on the university discourse is worth mentioning here, as we could expect the production of knowledge from it. But this is not, according to Miller, what happens, since pedagogy, by separating knowledge from surplus-enjoyment, allows knowledge to triumph over jouissance.

Here, a caveat is necessary regarding the implications of the theme in the formation of an analyst. The analyst's discourse is the one that can produce knowledge originating from the subject's own, only in this way is it possible to build it. More than that, there is no way to train an analyst if it is not for the analysis process: “I never spoke of analytical training, I spoke of formations of the unconscious. There is no analytical training. An experience is extracted from the analysis, which it is completely wrong to describe as didactic”. The analyst's discourse is subjected to the practice of analysis, when the assumption of unconscious knowledge comes into play, which is not exposed, but assumed. The engine of an analyst's training thus occurs in his analysis, not in the accumulation of theoretical knowledge.

When talking about teaching in psychoanalysis, it is taken into account that the one who learns needs to want to want to know. Even if those who teach are aware that there is a lack of knowledge in their knowledge, this does not guarantee that the one who learns will learn. Not knowing is a condition for teaching. But in view of the one who learns, it is also necessary for him to be aware that knowledge is never complete. The motor of the movement of wanting to know is only the fact that he knows that he doesn't know, that is, taking into account his jouissance.

4.

Let's return to Kant[22] to think about how the production of knowledge takes place from speculative and practical reason, at this moment in view of Lacan's more of enjoying. In Katiana's logic, it is only possible to learn from experience, in practice. In this sphere, the individual also needs to be in a relationship that is not static, but dynamic.

Em Critique of Pure Reason,[23] Kant articulates the use of reason to experience, trying to find answers to the practical use of the first of them. Both speculative and practical reason focus, he says, on three questions: What can I know? What should I do? What can I expect? [24]. Such questions constitute the axis of Kant's philosophy, developed in respectively in Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Critique of practical reason (1788) Criticism of judgment (1790).

The three questions can only be understood if they are articulated. The first question is, according to him, speculative since it is only possible to know through experience. The second, of a practical nature, deals with what morally can be done. The third deals with both practical and theoretical reason, since, knowing morally what one can do, it is possible to know what one can know. But this last question can only be thought of from an ideal, that of happiness. He can only hope to hope for something who in practice takes the moral law into account. On the other hand, the theoretical knowledge of things is apprehended by knowledge: “Hope finally leads to the conclusion that something is (which determines the ultimate possible end), because something must happen; knowledge, to the conclusion that something is (that acts as a supreme cause) because something happens”.[25]

Theoretical knowledge and that of practice yearn for happiness, or rather, for the pursuit of it. Taking it as a goal, the moral law can indicate how we can become worthy of the first of these. About the theory, one can learn from the “inclinations that want to satisfy themselves” and what would be the natural causes that can “operate the satisfaction”. Whoever manages to answer the first question uses his reason, that is, his freedom (based on moral principles), with knowledge beforehand, to become worthy of happiness.

It is worth mentioning here that the knowledge made possible by pure reason is caused by respect for freedom and can be demonstrated from the history of man based on the moral law. Furthermore, the moral freedom of reason grounds free acts in an objective reality based on experience. On the other hand, knowledge of the law of nature cannot be demonstrated from “speculative principles of reason”,[26] nor thought from the point of view of individual reality or free acts. In nature there is no possibility of thinking an objective reality or determining the practical use of reason.

One of Lacan's interests in Kant resides at this point. In the text “Television”,[27] Lacan comments on the three Kantian questions. He structures Kant's first question (What can I know?) as follows: “There is a knowledge that ex-sists in the unconscious, but that can only be articulated in discourse. What can be said about the real that comes to us through this discourse?” [28]. In the Lacanian reformulation of the Kantian question, we can draw three conclusions: it is only possible to know what is structured by language; the unconscious is structured like language and, therefore, the knowledge is supposed to be the subject of the unconscious.

As we saw above, knowledge for Kant is directly linked to the pursuit of an ideal of happiness, but without ever reaching it. From the critique of reason, the permanent search for knowledge, for an ultimate cause of it, for the unconditioned, is possible. But as stated in Critique of Pure Reason, reason without reference to empirical objects cannot build knowledge: “thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind”. Knowledge submits to a limitation, to the empirical intuitions of experience, even if it is necessary to constantly seek this ideal through the moral law.

It is a question, in Kant, of thinking knowledge from the analysis of the conditions of its possibility, the beforehand of human knowledge, arriving, through his transcendental investigation, at a doctrine of the limits of reason. This necessarily implies being clear, for Kant, that there is a limit to knowledge, due to a cognitive deprivation imposed by the very structure of reason. But knowing that you don't know everything is the possibility to resort to the structure of morality. It is not, therefore, a passive acceptance of not knowing, but a diagnosis that instigates the search for knowledge in another domain, in morality. Analogously, in Lacan, as seen in his approach to the four discourses, in order to teach and learn something, it becomes necessary to be aware that this knowledge as truth will always be the not-all, that is, the means said, that is , half-said, because “what is at stake now is extracting the real from the structure: that which in language does not constitute a cipher, but a sign to be deciphered”.[29]

The question “What should I know” is read by Lacan from the practice of psychoanalysis: “A question that returns to me – What do I do? [...] to extract from my practice the ethics of well-say",[30] and completes: “only ask 'what to do' the one whose desire is erased”. This is not a personal question, but the ethics of psychoanalysis, the ethics of the well-say.

For Kant, we have seen that it is only possible to do something from a moral law that is valid for all, since individual morality is fair by itself and in itself. In the categorical imperative, the law is born of the individual, but it cannot be arbitrary, since it is totally abstract and disembodied: “Proceed only according to that maxim, by virtue of which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”. Thus, any individual action or will, whether of oneself or of the other, has as an end in itself the morality of all. The individual determines the motivation for action, but it is universal insofar as it is not particular or subjective.

Miller points out that the question “what should I do?” it is an inaugural mark of modernity that, by designing the imperative of “for all”, indicated the absence of particularity. But if the individual resorted to the Kantian universal law, he would necessarily give up his own knowledge, in Lacanian logic. the ethics of well-meaning, taken up by Lacan, necessarily implies taking into account something of the real that is outside of meaning and, therefore, does not enter into the logic of discourse and the symbolic.[31]

In the same sense, the logic of the Kantian maxim submitted to the test of the universal is for Lacan the best way to make the real disappear.[32] On the horizon of this last Kantian question is not meaning, but reality. However, if we are not aware of the opacity of meaning that needs to be explicit in a transmission – and not implicit –, there is no way to transmit something. Thus, if on the one hand there is no way to dispense with meaning in order to convey it, since we are in the logic of discourse, on the other hand, it is necessary to take into account what escapes it.[33]

Finally, Lacan inverts the third Kantian question (What can I expect?), starting from the subjective position “Where do you expect from?” In this formulation, one no longer speaks of the place of the one who transmits psychoanalysis, but of the subject's space in front of his unconscious, that is, the position of the analysand. Lacan completes: “Hope to elucidate the unconscious of which you are subject. But only those whose desire is decided”. Thus, something from the unconscious is expected, assuming a knowledge whose desire for it becomes the engine of its search.

According to Kant, there is an intrinsic relationship between the use of reason and the conquest of happiness insofar as it is characteristic of this the requirement that we must become worthy of it. Man's hope in a future, when the world corresponds to the demands of the rational will, indicates that, for the philosopher, human activity can be finalized and oriented, aiming at a certain end.

In Lacan, reason is situated in the order of discourse, and it is possible to expect something only from desire, from “a subject [who] is capable of not hiding his agalma in his pocket, in the face of the avatars with which desire is presented”.[34] The Kantian hope of ascension to happiness shifts in Lacan to the order of suicide. Expecting something from the other implies the absence of the assumption of knowing about oneself.

* Myrmilla Mousse is a psychoanalyst, member of the Brazilian School of Psychoanalysis and the World Association of Psychoanalysis.

Originally published in Entrevários: journal of psychoanalysis, No. 18, 2020.

Notes


[1]LAURENT, E. “Reflections on the current form of the impossible to teach 1”. In: Express Mail, n.4, Electronic Magazine of the Brazilian School of Psychoanalysis, https://www.ebp.org.br/correio_express/2019/05/22/reflexoes-sobre-a-forma-atual-do-impossivel-de-ensinar -1/. 2004

[2] Ibid

[3] KANT, I. (1724 – 1804). “An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”. in: Immanuel Kant, selected texts. Editora Vozes, 1973. p. 108

[4] KANT. I. (1770). About Pedagogy. Piracicaba. Unimep publisher. 1999.

[5] Ibid. p.11

[6] Ibid. P. 12

[7] Ibid. p 20

[8] FREUD, S. (1925). "Preface to Aichhorn's Misguided Youth". In: Complete works, Editora Imago Rio de Janeiro, v. 19, 2006.

[9] FREUD, S. (1937-1939). “Endless and interminable analysis”. In: Moses E. Monotheism, Compendium of Psychoanalysis and Other Texts – Complete Works, vol. 19

[10] Miller.JA. Lakant, Editorial Tres Heches. Buenos Aires. 2000.

[11] FREUD. S. (1933). “Explanations, applications and guidelines”, Conference XXXIV. Standard Brazilian Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. v. 22. Imago Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1976.

[12] MILLER. ALREADY. Lakant Op.Cit. p.21

[13] MILLER. ALREADY. Lakant Op.Cit. p.87

[14] FREUD. S. “Terminable and interminable analysis”, Op. Cit. P. 282

[15] FREUD S. (1929) Civilization's Discontents. In: Brazilian Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Imago Publisher. Rio de Janeiro. vol. XXI. 1996.

[16] LACAN. j. My Teaching. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2006.

[17] MILLER, JA. “The knowledge triangle”. In: Online Lacanian Option, n.24, (2007), p.8.

[18] Clin-a advanced course of 2019, (text titled Dossier: Conversation about Teaching, published in this issue of the Journal intermissions),

[19] LACAN. J. (1969-1970). The Seminar, book 17: The Reverse of Psychoanalysis. Rio de Janeiro: J. Zahar, 1992. p. 445

[20] CARRIJO, LF “If there is a School, why an Institute?”. The Transmission of Psychoanalysis at the Institute: The Clinical Experience of CLIN-a. Relicário Edições, 2019. p. 74

[21] LACAN. J, The Seminar, book 17: The Reverse of Psychoanalysis, (1969-1970), Op. Cit. P. 66

[22] The initial objective, focused on a reflection on Lacan's dialogue with Kant, was born, in 2019, during the research core offered at the clinic, entitled Psychoanalysis and Politics, coordinated by Luiz Fernando Carrijo da Cunha. From this discussion, an unpublished text was produced entitled Kant with Lacan, co-authored with Milena Crastelo and Rubens Berlitz.

[23] KANT, I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon, 2001

[24] Ibid. P. 639.

[25] Ibid. P. 640.

[26] Ibid. P. 641.

[27] LACAN, J. (1973), “Television”. In: Other Writings. Rio de Janeiro, Jorge Zahar Ed. 2003.

[28] Ibid. P. 535

[29] Ibid. Ibid.

[30] Ibid. P. 539

[31] MILLER. ALREADY. Lakant Op.Cit. p.42

[32] Ibid. Ibid.

[33] POPADIUK, C., BERLITZ, R. “Dossier: Conversation about Teaching”, In: Magazine intermissions, No. 18. 2020.

[34] MILLER. ALREADY. Lakant Op.Cit. p.42

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  • PEC-65: independence or patrimonialism in the Central Bank?Campos Neto Trojan Horse 17/06/2024 By PEDRO PAULO ZAHLUTH BASTOS: What Roberto Campos Neto proposes is the constitutional amendment of free lunch for the future elite of the Central Bank

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