By RONALDO TAMBERLINI PAGOTTO*
The Judiciary's leading role empties the streets. The strength of the far right has international support, abundant resources and high-impact communication channels
The coup attempt had been announced since the beginning of 2021, with the peak in September of that year. Bolsonarism walked with one foot within the law (read electoral dispute) and the other seeking the coup path. He spoke about this countless times, referring to 2018 as part of a fraud, but that it would have been impossible to sustain given the supposed volume of votes he obtained. But this would happen in 2022, since, as he has been boasting since Lula's political rights were restored, the system would elect the PT candidate in 2022.
This path entered a critical phase in 2022. In the first phase and with research confirming the Lula's favoritism, he continued to denounce the coup. Between April and June, with more consistent and regular research, his numbers improved. This reinforced his path within the law.
From June onwards, the path was disputed: on one side, defenders of the coup path and, on the other, some betting on the possibility of victory.
Hypotheses about the coup – first phase: the definition of the electoral path
For this, the plans of Paulo Guedes of absolutely inconsequential use of the Union budget to carry out a thousand and one impactful operations: increasing the base and values of Auxílio Brasil, Auxílio Gás, aid to truck drivers, loans (especially for Auxílio Brasil beneficiaries), rolling over of R$90 billion in court orders, etc., not to mention the resources for Parliament via secret budget. Just to name a few.
The articulations for social media operations with international resources and robust support gave his campaign a broad capacity to compete. This bet, which previously divided opinions, was victorious after July 2022, with the first results of the spending. From July onwards, the bet on the electoral route was hegemonic.
The tactic worked. The difference with Lula was reduced, and the campaign gained energy and strength. first round result was celebrated by him: politics was confirming tactical correctness.
The second-round campaign was strong and managed to mobilize more than 70% of the votes in dispute, which were destined for the other candidates in the first round. It was the first time since the institution of two rounds that the Presidency was not won by someone who obtained the vast majority of the votes of the defeated candidates. In the previous elections – Lula 1 and 2, Dilma 1 and 2 and Bolsonaro 1 – the votes in the second round were disputed, and the vast majority – between 60% and 80% – went to the winner. In this election, the opposite occurred: Jair Bolsonaro obtained 70% of the votes in dispute in the second round.
Second phase – the impasse over the path of the coup
After the defeat, the path of coup became the only possibility. And it would have to happen while he was in government. The plot is sophisticated and began on the night of the vote count, with the call for vigils in the barracks and locations of the Armed Forces (FFAA). The reaction was positive: thousands began to occupy the front of barracks and symbolic locations of the three forces, especially the Army.
Apparently, the path to the coup was being mapped out: a situation of chaos due to conflicts between the coup protesters and the left. But this did not progress: Lula celebrated the victory and advocated a peaceful and non-confrontational position. He did not call for demonstrations, did not respond with hostility, nor did he address the issues. Nor did he make political references. And there was no chaos of demonstrations clashing.
With this came the demand to build chaos. The “false flag“[False flag, in free translation from English] is an old method of legitimizing conflicts and wars. And this would require a special area – the black kids, highly capable of operations of this nature.
We all know the plan now. It would depend on cohesion at the top of the forces, since this would be easily achieved at the base and intermediate command sectors.
It is likely that the failures of the coup plan, the unfavorable international situation, with successive recognitions of the fairness of the process and Lula's victory, finally combined with personal resistance - among them that of Freire Gomes - compromised the execution of the plan to prevent the diploma from being sworn in (plan 1) and, successively, to prevent the inauguration via the path of chaos - Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) - and specific interventions: coup.
The variables played a big role in the disarticulation. Bringing the graduation ceremony forward by one week (from the 19th to the 12th) was one of them, since it generated a fait accompli effect and this certainly – only history can tell us – helped to cool down the coup's path.
The civil forces – parliamentarians, sectors of the bourgeoisie and public figures accompanied the process fulfilling clear missions: sometimes it was to encourage the acts and camps; sometimes it was to denounce the assumptions about fraud; sometimes it was to pressure the sectors of the top of the forces to join, with emphasis on the pressure on Freire Gomes and Batista Júnior, with emphasis on the act at Gomes' doorstep, messages, requests for support addressed to him, direct approaches (such as that of Carla Zambelli) and others.
Finally, with the decision to flee in a stampede and create an unprecedented atmosphere of inauguration without passing on the sash, feeding a narrative of fraud and illegitimacy, Jair Bolsonaro handed over the government and went into the shadows.
Third phase – the coup, whatever it may be
With the engagement of black kids in the plot, the difficulties that occurred did not cool the coup plotters' spirits.
The operation changed context and would have to be carried out without the government, which is why the outcome occurred with a large concentration on the clandestine operation led by the military and counting on the cooperation of the resistant sectors of the camps and the supporters – businessmen, especially from agribusiness.
In this way, the plan set the date of January 8th. And it encouraged all kinds of madness, with special action by agents to ensure chaos and the advancement of actions depending on a gross error by the government: the decree of the GLO.
This operation occurred after the failure of the coup planned to take place in December with Jair Bolsonaro in government and seeking to compromise the diploma or, at the limit, the inauguration. Having failed, plan B was this: to induce the government to make a fatal mistake, counting on the collaboration of sectors supposedly within the government.
We know the result. The coup began to be considered with greater focus – or almost exclusively – on what happened in Brasília on that Saturday in January.
The fascists in this process they shot themselves in the foot!
The resounding failure resulted in arrests, a CPI, inquiries, lawsuits and convictions. But the military were almost left out. This shot in the foot weakened the strength of the extreme right, which only emerged from this situation due to Silas Malafaia's initiative in calling the February demonstration. After that, the effort to overcome this very serious error at this time was compromised by the investigations of the PF in the inquiry, culminating in the indictment of Bolsonaro and important military figures.
The result of the PF investigation
The investigation was based on documents obtained by court order, in reports, in the investigations of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) and in loose ends of the entire plot.
The information obtained from the reports resulted in weaknesses. Mauro Cid, the main one, lied and omitted important information. But the cell phone was the biggest source of evidence so far: groups, deleted messages, photos, etc. allowed the investigation to advance to those most responsible.
The source of the investigation was concentrated on figures from the military – mainly Mauro Cid's testimony, and the statements of Freire Gomes and Batista Júnior provided the guiding thread. And this resulted in greater emphasis in the investigation on pointing out a predominance of military personnel indicted.
It is worth highlighting a difference in this field: the military did not leave the leadership in the hands of civilians, partly because of a relationship of deep corporate trust, based on fear and risk to life, and secondly because they did not consider civilians to be capable of conducting operations of this complexity. This may explain the few civilian names and none of the businessmen, who certainly financed – as is already known – and pressured for the coup outcome.
The names deserve to be highlighted. It is the first time in years – probably in decades – with a investigation indicating responsibilities of so many names in command of the forces, especially the largest of them.
But the lack of names of members of parliament who were part of the plot – such as Carla Zambelli herself –, business figures – such as Luciano Hang and others – and prominent figures such as Ives Gandra, who is said to have authored the GLO decree, is striking. He openly defended the GLO path and the support for the right of the Armed Forces to act as an effective moderating power with the support – in the coup thesis – of article 142 of the Federal Constitution.
Scenarios and challenges
O judicial path of the process There are still nuances and variables that do not allow us to have a clear picture of the times, acts and paths. However, by analogy and with a context of the dimensions of the case, it is likely that the reception of the result of the Unified Inquiry will occur with the full reception of the charges, with topical changes, and the process will proceed to the investigation and judgment.
In short, this will be a different path from the January 8 cases in one essential point; unlike the anonymous cases, Dona Fátimas and others, this one will involve big fish – especially commanders and Jair Bolsonaro himself. The big tendency is for Brazil's real forces to play hard so that the outcome of the cases will be in their interests.
The dispute will be incomparable to what we have seen so far, with the examples of Mensalão and Lava Jato, as well as the “catfish” of January 8. It will be a test of our justice system and the judges’ ability to withstand all types – and intensity – of pressure.
In this context, the STF must gain prominence in the “fight” against the coup, partly inevitable because it is a fight at this time with a central focus on the judicial field, but the issue is that this can overshadow the political fight against these sectors and their coup actions.
It is likely that next year will be tough on this issue. The organized supporters of Minister Alexandre de Moraes are watching on TV and waiting for the convictions. Something similar, with due proportions and differences – with emphasis on the differences regarding the observance of legality, with the Mensalão and Lava Jato trials. In other words, with the Judiciary taking the lead.
It is very likely that Bolsonarism will seek a path of denouncing the process (probably copying the struggle of Lula Livre), of social support and political initiative, without losing sight of the fact that the leader will not accept prison. What is very likely to happen is that Jair Bolsonaro will seek an embassy to create a field of open struggle and denunciation against the process, reclaiming political centrality, initiatory action and anti-system discourse.
The challenge to face this situation will be great. The protagonism of the Judiciary empties the streets. The strength of the extreme right has international support, abundant resources, and high-impact communication channels (social networks) and will seek to transform the process into a political trial – in order to fight for the place of the politically persecuted, subjected to a process marked by illegalities and who has no alternative but to rebel.
Rebellion continues to be fought over by the left and right (realistically and demagogically, respectively). And the next period will be one of important, decisive struggles for what will become of Brazil in the next one or two decades.
The left will need to find a path that is capable of denouncing fascism and coups; combined with mass action – on the streets and in the big cities; showing that this dispute is ultimately about projects for Brazil: on one side, the project of surrender, which destroys the national foundations and projects the future into chaos and barbarity. On the other, a camp that wants to dispute the future by affirming a national, popular and democratic project of the broad majorities, constructing an idea of a country marked by the effectiveness of democracy, the breadth of all social inclusions, based on dreams, hope and the appreciation of life.
May this scenario definitively usher in a time when political disputes are open and clear about the country's projects. And may we be able to create a path to establish the standards of the society of the future, demonstrating that at this moment the challenge is to confront, dismantle and defeat the fascist political and social force. This is an urgent task, which will create better conditions to face the enormous national challenges.
*Ronaldo Tamberlini Pagotto, labor and union lawyer, he is an activist in the Movimento Brasil Popular and a member of the executive board of the Brazil office of the Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.
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