By EMILIO CAFASSI*
Not just in Venezuela, but throughout Latin America: resistance is as indispensable as transparency and honesty
The two main candidates for the Venezuelan elections continue to proclaim themselves victorious. However, no tangible evidence, physical or digital, has been presented to date. Neither by interested parties nor by electoral authorities. They are driven by haste and anticipation, just like the first presidents of Rio de Janeiro, inflamed in their alignment with the alleged victims of fraud.
They act in the manner of the Roman emperors who, simply by lowering their thumb, illuminated the cruelty of their executioners in the dark night of tyranny. Javier Milei, even before the announcement by the National Electoral Court (CNE), tweeted: “Dictator Maduro, out!!! (…) The data announces a landslide victory for the opposition.” Lacalle Pou, on the other hand, waited for the CNE to tweet: “Not like that!!! (…) You cannot recognize a victory without trusting the form and mechanisms used to achieve it.” The first already had the data even before the elections and the other contested the form, whatever the result.
The fanaticism demonstrated requires no interpretation, to the point that the Uruguayan president called the confessed coup leader Maria Corina Machado, puppet of the puppet candidate, to thank her for her fight “for democracy”! The appeal to coupism is as refractory to democracy as the possible opacity of the electoral process through manipulative fissures.
But so far, the only confirmation is the coup vocation of the main opposition and the Rio de Janeiro presidents who support it. Several long-running previous episodes preceded the penultimate act of the comedy, when a clown, also self-proclaimed and hailed by all existing right-wingers, like Guaidó, walked around the world.
More than a dozen elections have taken place since Hugo Chávez was elected in 1998, including a laudable radical institute such as the recall referendum, without objections or well-founded rejection of the results, including some officialist defeats such as that of the majority in the National Assembly, the only parliamentary body, in 2015. The CNE website remains inaccessible since the electronic voting machines closed. Despite the relevance of the issue, I prefer to leave the matter in this single paragraph while I await such verdicts.
The passage of time has only increased the uncertainty of this issue and the drama that is tearing the Caribbean nation apart. Beliefs cannot replace evidence, as the two aforementioned Rio Plata tweeters do, or the Manichaean indignations that vulgarize the relevance of how, stripping away the altar of what. Otherwise, the post-truth empire will multiply, even from progressive or leftist inclinations.
What is certain is that the two presidents of Rio de Janeiro not only coincide in their fervent coup belief against any alternative regime to neoliberal savagery, but also in an agenda to demolish any impediment to the empire of this type of state of nature for which they are fighting. I argued, to put it succinctly, that Javier Milei is nothing more than an uninhibited Lacalle Pou, or more precisely, the inspirer of his parliamentary agenda and initiative, although in both cases the scriptwriters and the magnitude of the social aggression are different.
Em article posted on the website the earth is round, I tried to summarize in five axes the legal architecture of the regressive project that Javier Milei managed to establish in agreement with broad sectors of the weak political opposition.
If we examine these same guidelines in relation to what Lacalle Pou achieved with the Urgent Consideration Act (LUC), placed in the same order as in the aforementioned article, the correlation will be more evident. They share a focus on deregulation and privatization, as well as strengthening security and social control, based on specific articles for each standard that I detail in the table so as not to spoil the prose and the reader with details.
Comparison of the fundamental axes between Argentine Laws and the LUC | ||
Fundamental axes | Argentine Laws (Articles) | LUC (Articles) |
1. Economic deregulation and market liberalization | Decree 70/2023: Art. 2, 3, 4-12, 13 Combi Law: Art. 48, 41-47 | Art. 239, 240 |
2. State Reform and Privatization | Decree 70/2023: Chapter I (Art. 13-35), 52, 36-50 Combi Law: Art. 48-50, 36-40 | Art. 241, 242 |
3. Labor Flexibility | Decree 70/2023: Cap. IV (Art. 53-70), 65, 66 Combi Law: Art. 53-64, 68-70 | Art. 243, 244 |
4. Strengthening Security and Social Control | Security Protocol: Art. 1, 2-4, 6-8, 11 | Art. 1, 11, 14, 15 |
5. Reduction in Public Spending | Decree 70/2023: Art. 1, 36-50 Combi Law: Art. 36-38, 48-50 | Art. 245, 246 |
However, Argentine legislation presents much more radical and widespread measures to make labor more flexible and reduce public spending, which can be explained by the strength of the labor movement in Uruguay and the prestige and dedication of public companies as autonomous entities and the social security. While the LUC maintains a somewhat more moderate or restrained approach, Argentine laws implement profound changes in these areas. Let's see:
Economic deregulation and market liberalization
The LUC establishes rules that, under the pretext of promoting market competitiveness and private investment, facilitate the opening of markets and reduce state intervention in strategic sectors. In an even more strident echo of this neoliberal philosophy, Javier Milei's Decree of Necessity and Urgency 70/2023 (DNU) declares the deregulation of trade, services and industry, promoting a slavish alignment with international norms, repealing restrictive laws and allowing transformation of public companies in joint-stock companies.
The Combi Law (LC) amends Law 23.696 to pave the way for privatizations, consolidating a legal framework that removes its regulatory role from the State.
State reform and privatizations
The LUC introduces partial privatization mechanisms for public companies and promotes private sector participation in strategic areas, following a script that seeks to weaken the public sector in favor of the private sector. The DNU, in an even more brazen maneuver, promotes private participation in sectors such as energy, mining and agriculture, applying Law 24.156 only to companies with a state majority and introducing changes to the General Companies Law.
The LC complements this onslaught, allowing the privatization of state-owned companies and repealing laws that imposed tax restrictions and subsidies, opening the doors to private capital to the detriment of the public interest.
Flexibility of work
The LUC introduces changes to the labor regime that facilitate hiring and dismissal in limited and specific cases, and intervenes in employment contracts, thus eroding some historical achievements, although in this axis there is less convergence. The DNU goes much further, modifying the Labor Contract Law and the Employment Law, redefining the scope of application of the Employment Contract Law and eliminating the principle of the most favorable rule for the worker.
The LC is not far behind, establishing a simplified work registration system and amending Law No. 20.744, which contributes to the precariousness of employment in a context of increasing lack of protection.
Strengthening security and social control
The LUC modifies the concept of self-defense, introduces sanctions for contempt of police authority and harshly deals with the improper occupation of public spaces and the destruction of electronic devices, reinforcing a repressive apparatus designed to silence dissent. In Argentina, the suffocating Security Protocol of Minister Patricia Bullrich (PS) allows the intervention of security forces without a judicial warrant, the clearing of roads, the identification of protesters and the initiation of legal proceedings against those responsible for operational expenses, configuring a Police state that criminalizes social protest and protects the interests of power.
Reduction in public spending
The LUC promotes the control of public spending and fiscal adjustment, the elimination of subsidies and the reduction of tariffs, measures that hit the most vulnerable sectors of society the hardest. The DNU declares a public emergency in several areas, promoting the restructuring and privatization of public companies, while the LC repeals laws that imposed fiscal restrictions and subsidies, perpetuating an economic model that sacrifices social well-being on the altar of adjustment and austerity.
Obviously, the agenda of right-wing governments is not limited to these five axes, which are also taken exclusively from the article which, for illustrative purposes, attempted to summarize the recent legislative results of the Argentine government. At the same time, each experience will recognize tactical steps and particularities of each application context, without necessarily replicating steps or standards.
But, in foreign policy, pragmatism is more clearly associated with strategy, multiplying convergences. Economic deregulation and privatizations, state reform, labor flexibility, increased security and reduced public spending will certainly not exhaust the agenda of the Venezuelan extreme right, which proclaims itself the winner, but will undoubtedly be part of its program, without a writer, because the electoral stage only requires slogans and commonplaces.
The destitute narrative is not based on mere personal sympathies, but on solid and programmatically crystallizable material interests. Javier Milei and Lacalle Pou not only share the domestic agenda, they also extend their shadow over Latin America, giving a thumbs down to any barrier to contain the voracious venality of capital and its consequent bitter night of spoliation and repression.
However, resistance is as indispensable as transparency and honesty.
*Emilio Cafassi is senior professor of sociology at the University of Buenos Aires.
Translation: Fernando Lima das Neves.
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