By LUIZ EDUARDO SOARES & MANUEL DOMINGOS NETO*
Today, associating oneself with the hegemonic discourse and usual practices of police corporations has become a political asset in the war against democracy and human rights.
1.
Last Thursday (31.10.2024/21/2003), a meeting scheduled 21 years ago took place. At Lula's invitation, governors and the Minister of Justice met at Planalto to discuss Public Security. This meeting was scheduled and postponed, then canceled, at the beginning of Lula's first term in office, in XNUMX. The XNUMX-year delay says a lot about the difficulties in tackling the problem.
In 2001, Lula was president of the Instituto Cidadania and was a presidential candidate. A working group then formulated his Public Security program. Professionals from different backgrounds, experiences and perspectives debated the issue in public hearings, visits and seminars. The resulting proposal was delivered by Lula to the houses of Congress and to the Minister of Justice on February 27, 2002.
In today's edgy environment, it is difficult to imagine that the then leader of the opposition to the FHC government would be respectfully received by leaders in power, all of whom valued the quality of the proposal.
The newspaper edition The globe On February 28.02.2002, XNUMX, it was highlighted: “Tucanos praise PT’s anti-crime plan”. The Minister of Justice, Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, admitted to adopting measures. “I cannot fail to praise this initiative”, stated the president of the Senate, Ramez Tebet. “This document is, to date, the most serious and complete on public security ever prepared and presented to society”, said Aécio Neves, president of the Chamber.
With weaknesses resulting mainly from the lack of internal data from corporations, the initiative changed the debate. It discarded clichés and worn-out catchphrases. Public agents would no longer argue that “it’s always been this way.” Inertial reactivity and the lack of criticism of established standards seemed to be coming to an end. Diagnoses and planning for public action would become necessary, which would then be evaluated so that errors could be monitored and corrected.
The Plan did not idealize technical rationality and pointed to adjustments of public institutions to constitutional determinations. Democracy would be strengthened. The aim was to control so-called crime, the lethal brutality of the police and the criminal justice system, racism and the class bias that incarcerates poor and black youth, reproducing inequities and violence. Institutions resistant to popular sovereignty would be contained.
Lula won the elections. In January 2003, the new national secretary of Public Security[I] and his colleagues would run the program — perfected with the help of volunteers from different specializations and regions, thanks to the support of Firjan.
It was essential that the 27 governors support the central thesis, the creation of the SUSP, a single public security system inspired by the architecture of the SUS. In June, unanimous support was obtained. The president invited the governors to celebrate the “pact for peace,” as the project was called, in front of authorities from the three branches of government. The proposal would be submitted to Congress, since it required constitutional amendments. There was optimism. Lula had popular support and the consensus of the governors strengthened the proposal.
The governors did not accept out of enthusiasm for citizen security, in line with human rights. Individual negotiations had shown that they were interested in sharing the political burden with the federal government. A restructuring that involved sharing and transferring authority to the Union would be welcome. Insecurity was an inexhaustible source of political weakening. Compliance was pragmatic and logical.
At the same time, the federal government faced a dilemma: would it be worth taking on more responsibilities in such a demanding area? As Leonel Brizola said: taking on security is like embracing a drowning man. So why would the national security secretary visit all the governors? The thorny mission was witnessed by the local media. Perhaps because the success of this quixotic journey was not credible.
The federal government suddenly found itself with a hot potato in its hands. How could it stop the initiative without causing embarrassment? The answer will have to wait for another time. The presidential cabinet had set a date for the meeting, which would be suspended. The passage of time would silence the “pact for peace”. The secretary was removed and the plan was shelved. The government invested in spectacular early morning arrests of white-collar suspects.
2.
But the seed of SUSP had been planted. Sooner or later, due to historical necessity, something would come of it. In the face of crises, stale projects, duly polished, would circulate in the market. SUSP was reborn with a different accent and undeniable legitimacy and coherence when Tarso Genro was Minister of Justice. His national security project with citizenship (PRONASCI) incorporated elements of SUSP, especially its preventive aspect. But Tarso passed, as did the indirect reactivation of SUSP.
The parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff came. The dramatic public insecurity grew and history prepared an oblique irony, typical of tragedies: it was up to Temer to resurrect the SUSP and create the Ministry of Security foreseen in the original plan, from 2002 (at the suggestion of Lula, then a candidate, it was converted into a secretariat with status ministerial).
But the repetition was a farce: the SUSP, approved by Congress in 2018, was enacted so as not to work. It was based on infra-constitutional legislation. It was intended to make people believe that the government was committed to making profound changes to Security. The new rules would never be applied because they would generate federative conflicts; they deliberately did not deal with decision-making processes or defining the authority to coordinate actions. Nor was it by chance that the ombudsman's office was established as an agency devoid of power.
Life went on and the country was pushed to the brink of the neo-fascist abyss. The coup plotters instrumentalized the armed institutions. The gigantic and active “military family” monopolized the police contingents of all spheres of the Union. We narrowly escaped with Lula’s victory in 2022.
Returning to Planalto, Lula once again faced dramatic public insecurity. For months, he flirted with the SUSP, reinserting the need for national coordination at the center of the agenda. But he feared revealing the king's nakedness: the infraconstitutional SUSP would clash with the Constitution. It only made sense to revive it if it were included in the Constitution.
Finally, Minister Ricardo Lewandowski, undaunted, uttered words banned from the government lexicon: he stated that in order to address Public Security it would be necessary to reform the Charter. Finally, the meeting scheduled 21 years ago took place.
In this interregnum, we have regressed from a limited and contradictory democracy to a deteriorated institutional system. Society has found itself besieged by the spread of anti-democratic values, by the reactionary activism of state bodies and by organizations outside the law.
3.
The PEC presented by Ricardo Lewandowski, although less ambitious, contains fundamental elements of the original proposal. It aims to establish a national coordination of security strategies. It presupposes an indispensable line of authority, even if this is not emphasized in public discourse. It faces a real problem: the refractoriness of police forces, true institutional enclaves, to civil and political authority.
Even if appearances suggest otherwise, especially when right-wing governors applaud reprehensible police practices, the fact is that state executives do not command police organizations. Broad autonomy was made possible by the omission of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which should exercise external control over the police, and threatens the democratic State, as we have repeatedly demonstrated in articles, books and interviews.
Members of armed corporations openly align themselves with the extreme right. They establish themselves as independent actors, denying hierarchy and constitutional determinations. Corporate enclaves establish rebellious powers as they attribute to themselves authority that is alien to popular sovereignty and institutional mediation.
This disastrous situation is most visible in the Armed Forces. Commanders present themselves with impunity as representatives of a “moderating power” and impose conditions on established authorities. They seek support from what they call the “military family,” whose composition includes members of the police force.
The PEC proposed by Minister Ricardo Lewandowski makes it possible to restrict the dysfunctionality of public security; it offers minimum support for confronting crime and the erosion of authority founded on democratic principles. By proposing national coordination, it opens up the possibility of reducing the isolation of armed baronies, organized with or without an institutional mask (in the form of militias).
The minister and the president must know that the proposal will not be approved. But it sends an important signal: it takes the government off the defensive and, for the first time in many years, points the way to stopping the institutional chaos that prevents the State from guaranteeing security to its citizens. It frees the federal authorities from showing impotence and from absorbing the conservative agendas of governors. Furthermore, it leaves the opposition with the burden of defending the status quo.
The governors' reaction tends to be the opposite of what it was 21 years ago because the ideological struggle has taken precedence over the old calculation of utility. If Security was only a cause of political wear and tear and it was worth sacrificing part of the supposed power in favor of sharing responsibilities with the Union, today, associating oneself with the hegemonic discourse and the usual practices of the police forces has become a political asset in the war against democracy and human rights.
There is much to consider. For example: the government's failure to take action regarding the ombudsman's office and the role of the Public Prosecutor's Office. But we must salute the political courage, even if moderate, when it returns to the scene.
This provision needs to be applied to National Defense. The Armed Forces remain essentially focused on controlling society and have never given up on interfering in Public Security.
* Luiz Eduardo Soares is an anthropologist, political scientist and writer. Former national secretary of public security. Author, among other books, of Demilitarize: public security and human rights. (boitempo) [https://amzn.to/4754KdV]
* Manuel Domingos Neto He is a retired UFC professor and former president of the Brazilian Association of Defense Studies (ABED). Author, among other books What to do with the military — Notes for a new National Defense (Reading Cabinet). [https://amzn.to/3URM7ai]
Note
[I] Luiz Eduardo Soares, member of the aforementioned working group and co-author of this article.
