By CLAUDIO KATZ*
The four governments that currently constitute the axis of radical governments (Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba) are systematically attacked by US imperialism.
Vladimir Lenin distinguished three types of nationalism and postulated different socialist strategies in the face of the reactionary, bourgeois-democratic and revolutionary variants of this current. Throughout his career, he prioritized the frontal battle against the first branch, contrasting the principles of solidarity of internationalism with the rivalry between powers and the chauvinist ideology of national superiority.
The Bolshevik leader pointed out that, in these cases, tensions between countries were used by the ruling classes to preserve capitalism and reinforce the exploitation of workers. He indicated that nationalism was exacerbated by the powerful to obscure social antagonisms with misleading patriotic counterpoints. He stressed that this counterpoint sustained the subordination of wage workers to their bosses, blocking the fraternity of the oppressed with their class brothers in other countries.
Distinctions and attitudes
The Marxist questioning of nationalism became central when the First World War resulted in an unprecedented massacre. Lenin denounced that the nationalist flags raised by the different sides were the disguise used by the capitalist classes to establish supremacy in the world market (Lenin, 1915).
The Bolshevik leader detailed how the wealthy pitted one people against another to ensure supremacy in business, defining who would pocket the largest share in the dispute. The reactionary nature of this nationalism was determined by the exaltation of identity myths for warlike purposes. This incitement sought to nullify the climate of harmony necessary for social improvements and cultural progress. Its objective was to promote imperial expansionism.
This regressive form of patriotism was also seen in the periphery. There, it was an instrument of the ruling oligarchies against internal foreign minorities and the inhabitants of neighboring countries. They exacerbated border tensions to reinforce militarization, in order to channel popular discontent into confrontations with neighbors.
Vladimir Lenin contrasted these forms of reactionary nationalism in the center and periphery with the two progressive varieties of resistance that had emerged in dependent countries. The first was the conservative nationalism of the native bourgeoisies affected by the domination (formal or real) of the metropolises. The second was the revolutionary nationalism promoted by the radical currents of the popular movement.
The distinction between these two sectors was intensely debated in the early 1920s at the Congresses of the Third International, when initial expectations of a socialist revolution were diminishing in Europe and growing in the East. Based on this distinction, Vladimir Lenin developed an anti-imperialist strategy that prioritized popular protagonism and the convergence of communists with revolutionary nationalism.
The Soviet leader believed that this differentiation of nationalisms had to be corroborated in practice. Conciliatory and combative tendencies were evident in the struggle and in the positions on the left. Hostility or convergence with socialism was an indication of the real mark of each nationalism. Vladimir Lenin emphasized that the realization of anti-imperialist fronts required the acceptance of an autonomous communist militancy (Ridell, 2018).
These assumptions were set aside in practice. The initial convergence in Indonesia was repeated in China, until the replacement of a reformist leadership (Sut Yatsen) by a conservative one (Chiang Kai-shek) led to a brutal persecution of the left. This turn illustrated how bourgeois nationalism can become reactionary when it sees the danger of an anti-capitalist overflow from its red allies.
These first mutations in the time of Vladimir Lenin anticipated very similar sequences throughout the 20th century. Episodes of radicalization and socialist approximation of nationalism coexisted with opposite episodes. The definitive profile of each nationalism was largely defined by these behaviors. There were both cases of reaffirmation of revolutionary, bourgeois or reactionary nationalism and examples of mutations towards complementary variants.
Vladimir Lenin provided an initial classification to guide alliances with these controversial partners. Far from establishing a fixed pattern for the fronts he supported, he emphasized this changing dynamic. He encouraged boldness in forming agreements and encouraged caution in evaluating their trajectory. For Vladimir Lenin, anti-imperialism was not an end in itself, but merely a link in the battle against capitalism. With this perspective, he provided a general guide to characterizing nationalism.
The reactionary side
Vladimir Lenin's classification had an important validation in Latin America during the 20th century. Nationalism defined its profile in close connection with two unique characteristics of the region: the predominance of US imperialism and the mixture of political autonomy and economic dependence.
The preeminence of the first power became indisputable after the displacement of its European rivals and the consecration of the Monroe Doctrine as the organizing principle of the region. The United States carried out numerous interventions in the Caribbean and Central America and imposed its economic dominance over the rest of the continent.
This domination was achieved without altering the formal sovereignty that the main countries had achieved in the 19th century. These achievements distinguished the region from most of Asia and Africa, which emancipated themselves from colonialism late in life. They also distinguished it from the nations of Eastern Europe, which forged independent states with great historical delay. But this independence of Latin America never translated into effective sovereignty and endogenous economic development. Financial, productive and commercial subjection prevailed, frustrating this take-off.
The exporting oligarchies commanded a bloc of ruling classes that validated US sponsorship. This alliance managed the autonomous structure of the States to reinforce the enrichment of a minority at the expense of the rest of society. Reactionary nationalism consolidated this inequity. It increased its presence through inter-regional wars and chauvinistic campaigns against immigrants, indigenous peoples and the African-American population.
In Latin America, the imperial nationalism that prevailed in the metropolises never emerged. But there were many oligarchic variants in moments of border conflict. This reactionary irradiation was seen in Argentina and Brazil during the war of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay (1864-1870), in the Pacific confrontation between Chile and Bolivia-Peru (1879-1884) or in the bloodletting of the Chaco, which pitted Bolivia against Paraguay (1933-1935). Great Britain and the United States fueled these internal struggles for their own benefit (Guerra Vilaboy, 2006: 138-165).
Reactionary nationalism in the periphery adopted similar modalities to its counterparts in the center. It pursued the same objective of involving the masses in confrontations that were alien to their interests. It encouraged the recreation of old myths of the superiority of one nation over another, which the dominant classes used to contain popular discontent and co-opt new sectors of the citizenry that were joining political life (Anderson, P., 2002).
These similarities did not alter the differences between the chauvinism of the periphery and its counterparts in the center. Only imperial nationalism sustained the dispute for the main markets and consecrated the supremacy of one power over another. Its smaller counterparts fought over small slices and maintained strict subordination to the dominant powers.
A similar scenario emerged with fascism in the mid-20th century. In all Latin American countries, attempts were made to copy Hitler, Mussolini and Franco, using very similar words and styles. But nowhere did armed conflicts equivalent to the world wars take place. Nor did mass murder in the name of racial-biological superiority prevail at that time.
In the region, the aim was not to recover geopolitical spaces conquered by rivals, nor was a spirit of revenge imposed or to mobilize the resentment of a desperate population. The fascist objective of containing the threat of a socialist revolution emerged in Latin America a little later, during the Cold War. Repressive dictatorships multiplied, but in different formats from the totalitarian model of fascism.
The ruling classes resorted to such tyrannies to deal with popular defiance, placing the armed forces at the center of state management. Such governments facilitated counterrevolution, coexisting, in certain cases, with disguises of constitutionalism.
The military nationalism of this period adopted an anti-communist profile, following the script that the United States exported to the entire Western bloc. The so-called “defense of the homeland” was not a local conception rooted in a specific identity, but a mere adaptation to the apologia for capitalism propagated by the State Department.
The inconsistency of the patriotism of Latin American dictatorships has always been rooted in their blatant subordination to the United States. All the rhetoric of exaltation of the nation clashed with this submission, and this duplicity also affected the ecclesiastical basis of conservative nationalism. The clerical leadership combined its traditionalist messages with a rudimentary defense of Western values.
The bourgeois variant
The second strand of bourgeois-democratic nationalism assessed by Vladimir Lenin had a more significant impact in Latin America. It emerged as a typical variant of local capitalists to promote industrialization, in tension with the export-oriented agro-mining oligarchies.
This national bourgeoisie aspired to remove its adversaries from the large banks and foreign companies from power and attempted to capture the resources traditionally monopolized by these segments. It resorted to various mechanisms of state intervention to channel the income generated in the primary sectors into productive investment.
This project took root in the second half of the 20th century and was widely seen in the larger countries. In the rest of the region, it emerged in specific sectors, without consummating effective industrialization processes. In most cases, it resorted to the intermediation of military or bureaucrats, with little relevance to the constitutional system. A nationalism developed along the lines of these profiles.
Its theorists extolled the nation as a natural sphere of articulation for the population. They promoted principles of unity to highlight the common belonging of citizens to a territory, a language and a shared tradition. With this ideology, they exposed the specific interests of local capitalist classes as the general interest of the entire population.
This approach allowed them to present the industrialist economic policies of the time as a general achievement of the community, concealing the fact that they perpetuated exploitation and favored the power of the new modernizing elites. They emphasized the priority of the nation's values over social struggle, in order to consolidate their control of the State and to arouse the obedience or adherence of the oppressed.
The two main exponents of this trend were Peronism in Argentina and Vargasism in Brazil. In the first case, it introduced great social achievements, supported by unions and popular mobilization, in a context of marked tension with the United States.
Due to the intensity of social, internal and geopolitical conflicts, the industrial elite itself – together with most of the army and the Church – ended up on the opposite side of this project. At the decisive moments of the dispute, the Peronist leadership avoided confrontation, marginalized its Jacobin wing and reconciled with the status quo. All of Vladimir Lenin's general diagnoses of bourgeois-democratic nationalism were corroborated by Peronism.
In Brazil, Getúlio Vargas debuted with a more conservative profile, with greater commitments to the oligarchy and a strong alignment with the United States. But at the same time, he sponsored a sustained start to industrialization, encouraged by local capitalists. When he outlined a certain defense of workers and an approximation to Perón's model, the dominant groups forced him to move. Here too, the ups and downs predicted by Lenin were confirmed.
The revolutionary current
Revolutionary nationalism developed enormously in Latin America and confirmed the relationship with socialism that the Bolshevik leader had intuited. It promoted anti-imperialist actions in various circumstances of the 1992th century, with numerous acts of resistance to the plundering perpetrated by the imperial oppressor (Vitale, 6: chap. 10, XNUMX).
This movement shared with bourgeois nationalism an opposition to oligarchic regimes, but encouraged popular protagonism. It adopted a Jacobin character and, in contrast to its conventional nationalist counterparts, supported the union of national and social struggles. In some countries it constituted an autonomous force, while in others it emerged in conflictual coexistence with bourgeois nationalism.
In Nicaragua, one of his first epics took place when US troops occupied the country (1926) and the liberal general Sandino formed a popular resistance army. He ended up being betrayed and assassinated, in the first outrages of Somozismo.
Sandino's achievement had an immediate impact in El Salvador, under the leadership of Farabundo Martí, a Nicaraguan fighter who led the first explicitly socialist revolution in the region. This attempt at a worker-peasant government imitated the model of the soviets in several places, but was bloodily defeated. It left as a legacy a great precedent of convergence of communism with anti-imperialist traditions.
This legacy weighed heavily on the Guatemalan revolution of 1944, which combined the military action of Captain Arbenz with the reformist administration of Arévalo, in a government that favored the indigenous majority and the redistribution of agrarian property. The imperial blockade, the betrayal of conservative generals and the armed intervention of CIA mercenaries stifled this radicalization of the nationalist process.
Torrijos' heroic feat in Panama – which led to the sovereign recovery of the Canal in 1977 – was also part of the anti-imperialist milestones in Central America. The United States failed to comply with what had been agreed, took upon itself the right to intervene and launched its Marines in the strategic isthmus in 1989.
A similar dynamic of nationalist radicalism occurred in the Antilles, which the United States had always treated as an extension of its own territory after replacing the declining Spanish empire. Resistance against both powers (and their equivalents in France, Holland and England) gave rise to numerous rebellions (Soler, Ricaurte, 1980: 217-232).
This was the hallmark of the Puerto Rican independence struggle, in the street protests and armed struggle of the first half of the 1965th century. This process was most forceful in the Dominican Republic, when the demand for the return of leader Bosch (XNUMX) led to a US invasion and a heroic resistance under the leadership of Colonel Caamaño.
The leading role of military sectors in revolutionary nationalism was also seen in South America, starting with the Brazilian lieutenant revolt in 1922. Young officers seeking democratic reforms first attempted a coup, then a rebellion, and finally led the long march of the Prestes Column. They did not receive the massive support they had hoped for, but they explicitly converged on the political project of communism.
For most of the 20th century, South America was shaken by intense popular struggles, such as the bogotazo in Colombia (1948), which inaugurated armed confrontations marked by the confluence of liberal-nationalist forces with communism. On a smaller scale, this same convergence occurred in Venezuela, creating the precedent for the main anti-imperialist process of the XNUMXst century.
But the greatest revolution of the last century occurred in Bolivia (1952), under the command of armed miners' militias, who forced the surrender of the high military command. This triumph opened the radical process of the MNR (Estenssoro-Siles Suazo Peace), which introduced social benefits, eliminated qualified voting and initiated a major agrarian reform. The initial containment of this transformation from the top of the State (1956) resulted in the reversal consummated by the right-wing coup orchestrated by the US embassy (1964).
The centrality of the proletariat of Minas Gerais in this revolution repeated classic aspects of Bolshevism, as unprecedented in South America as the defeat and dissolution of the army. In this case, the convergence of the left with radical nationalism was very traumatic and neutralized by the conservative turn of the latter force.
Shortly afterwards, there was a classic process of radical military nationalism in Peru, led by Velasco Alvarado (1968). This leader initiated an important agrarian reform, complemented by the nationalization of essential public services. His replacement (Morales Bermúdez) subsequently led a reaction from conservative sectors that neutralized these achievements, until the return of the old right-wing presidentialism (Belaunde Terry, in 1980). The limits of radical nationalism in deepening the processes of transformation emerged again in this case. Occasional sympathies for the left were not enough to induce an anti-capitalist direction of social reforms and anti-imperialist projects.
The significant presence of military personnel in the region's revolutionary nationalism was as relevant a fact as the general alignment of this current with socialist projects. This affinity with the left determined, in certain cases, the distancing of this current from classical nationalism (for example, Ortega Peña and JW Cooke in Peronism).
What happened in Mexico also clarified the general dynamics of these sectors. Cardenism shared with bourgeois nationalism the opposition to oligarchic regimes, but continued the enormous transformation inaugurated by the monumental peasant insurrection of 1910.
This revolution developed in successive stages, including the Cardenist radicalization. This government (1934-40) deepened the agrarian reform, expanded social improvements, nationalized oil and developed a foreign policy that was very autonomous in relation to US rule.
He sided with republican Spain and promoted a popular education with explicitly socialist overtones. Although it retained some aspects of classical nationalism, Cardenism consolidated strong ties with the revolutionary movement.
Finally, Cuba was an example of the full convergence of revolutionary nationalism with socialism. It embodied, like no other case, the union predicted by Lenin. This materialization can be explained in part by the radicalization of the struggles on an island that, since the end of the 19th century, had fought simultaneous battles against Spanish colonialism and US imperialism.
In the subsequent uprising against the military dictatorships, the revolutionary wing consolidated itself, transforming the triumph against Batista (1960) into the first Latin American gestation of a socialist process. Under Fidel's leadership, the July 26th movement reconstituted the Communist Party and introduced nationalization measures that opened an anti-capitalist path.
The reception of anti-imperialism
The debate on nationalism was the central theme of Marxism throughout the 20th century. Vladimir Lenin's characterization was not immediately assimilated by his supporters in the region. It was a thesis conceived for Asia that omitted the specificities of Latin America. This region was absent from the deliberations of the first Congresses of the Communist International. There, anti-imperialism connected with the Eastern scenario and the rest of the periphery was left in a framework of some uncertainty.
This imprecision was very significant for the Latin American case, since many views of the time attributed a passive place to the region in the predictions of the imminent debut of socialism. In the same way that the Russian revolution was seen as a springboard for the European revolution centered on Germany, the popular struggle in Latin America was conceived as a support for the socialist transformation led by the United States. The lack of a significant industrial proletariat in the South of the hemisphere – in contrast to the enormous centrality of this segment in the North – contributed to this impression of US centrality in the socialist future (Caballero, 1987).
This view was, in fact, closer to the unilinear approach of the early Marx than to the multilinear view that the author of The capital matured in its discovery of the active role of the periphery in the battle against capitalism (Katz, 2018: 7-20). This was an approach more in line with the conservatism of social democracy than with the revolutionary brand of communism promoted by the Soviet Union. These traces of pre-Leninist conceptions within the Communist International itself also explain the scant importance given to the Mexican Revolution and the anti-imperialist uprisings in Central America in the early deliberations of this organization.
The limited consideration given to Latin America by Lenin's followers contrasted with the enormous impact of Bolshevism in the New World. This reception was in tune with the widespread enthusiasm for the revolution and the expectation of reproducing it as a copy in the distant Latin American scenario. The inability to assess the specificities of the region continued in the Congresses of the International that followed Lenin's death (1924-1928), before the dissolution of this organization (1935).
Neglect of the region’s peculiarities was not seen as a defect. On the contrary, it was seen as corroboration of the uniform dynamics of the world revolutionary process. This view prevailed in the official approach presented by Codovilla at the first Latin American communist conference in 1929.
The Argentine leader – closely linked to the Kremlin – opposed Mariátegui’s attempt to outline a specific essay on the Peruvian reality. The criticism of this approach stressed the existence of a single global reality, only fragmented between central and peripheral countries. Latin America was placed in the latter group, with generic indications of similarities with other colonial or semi-colonial regions.
In those years, the so-called “third period” of “class against class” policies also prevailed in the Communist International. All adversaries were lumped together as enemies, in direct contrast to the strategic specificity and tactical flexibility advocated by Vladimir Lenin. The agony of capitalism, the exacerbation of inter-imperialist wars, the intensification of colonial exploitation and the consequent imminence of revolutionary processes were diagnosed, without the need for anti-imperialist alliances.
From this perspective, social democracy was considered “social-fascist” in the center, and, on the periphery, nationalist currents were disqualified as “national-fascist”. The national bourgeoisie was seen as a subject dependent on foreign capital, as much an enemy of the working class as of its foreign partners.
This combination of economic catastrophism, social sectarianism and political short-sightedness stifled any attempt to understand Latin American nationalism. It completely buried the distinctions introduced by Lenin to develop socialist dynamics in the periphery.
This approach had two negative consequences. On the one hand, it accentuated the previous hostility of many Latin American left-wing organizations towards all nationalisms. On the other, it led to artificial and repetitive formulations of the national question. For example, the right to forge a Quechua or Aymara Republic in Peru (contrary to Mariátegui's opinion) was promoted, with arguments that reproduced the scheme of the oppressed nations of Eastern Europe.
Mella and Mariátegui
During this period of the emergence of Marxism in Latin America, two figures emerged who were very close to Lenin's approach to nationalism: Mella and Mariátegui. The former founded the Communist Party of Cuba and had a brief and legendary life marked by heroic actions. He was a rebel within the Communist Party, sympathized with Trotsky and took up Sandino's experience.
Mella was inspired by Martí's writings, drew on the teachings of the anti-colonial war in Cuba and, following the popular figures of that battle (Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo), updated the connection between national and social struggles. In search of this convergence, he revisited the distinction established by Vladimir Lenin between radical and conservative strands of nationalism.
The synthesis he advocated contrasted with the sectarian promotion of a mere confrontation of “class against class”. He recovered the concept of Fatherland as a link in the struggle for socialism and anticipated the anti-imperialist rediscovery of Marx’s texts on Ireland (Guanche, 2009).
Mella maintained an intense polemic with the generic anti-imperialism promoted by Haya de la Torre, leader of the Peruvian APRA, and also opposed his strategy of forging a regional capitalist model in close connection with the national bourgeoisie. He warned of the negative consequences of reproducing in Latin America the alliance articulated in China with local capitalists (Koumintag), which ended in a betrayal with dramatic effects for the communists.
Following Lenin's suggestions, he highlighted the validity of a united front with revolutionary nationalists that did not obstruct the autonomous action of the left (Mella, 2007). This policy cemented the later experience of Cuban revolutionaries, who forged a radical path of union with socialism.
Mariátegui conceived a similar strategy for Peru, after founding the Socialist Party and the workers' federation in that country. He developed his conception in the controversy with the communist officialdom, which rejected the recognition of the national specificities of Latin America and diluted these peculiarities in the status indistinct from semi-colonial situations (Pericas,
2012).
Mariátegui opposed the Eurocentric view, which favored copying the Bolshevik model, and worked to develop programs in accordance with national traditions. He emphasized the importance of the agrarian, indigenous, and national issues in Latin America and rejected the schematism prevalent on the left (Lowy, 2006). He defended a flexible Marxism that drew on Indo-American traditions to articulate an effective project of emancipation.
The debate with APRA on anti-imperialism was a milestone for Latin American social thought. In direct contrast with Haya – who postulated anti-imperialism as the ultimate goal (“we are left-wing because we are anti-imperialists”) – he presented this goal as a step towards the anti-capitalist horizon (“we are anti-imperialists because we are socialists”) (Bruckmann, 2009).
With this approach, he rejected the idea of promoting anti-imperialism “as a self-sufficient movement” and questioned the dissolution of the forces that fought together for national liberation into a uniform organization. He defended the autonomy of the communists and particularly criticized the Aprista idealization of the national bourgeoisie.
Mariátegui highlighted the lack of interest of this sector in achieving a “second independence”, recalling its divorce from the popular masses and its affinity with US imperialism. He emphasized that, in some cases, this sector adopts autonomous positions (Argentina), in others, it makes pacts with the dominator of the North (Mexico) and sometimes reinforces its submission to foreign mandates (Peru) (Mariátegui, 2007).
The singular gestation of a Latin American Marxism initiated by Mella and Mariátegui – in simultaneous opposition to the negation and praise of nationalism – was questioned during the 1983th century. Some critics objected to its “abstract classism” and its consequent underestimation of the role of the national bourgeoisie (Godio, 116: 132-XNUMX). But this objection ignored the fact that both thinkers warned of the danger of renouncing the socialist project in order to support a program of frustrated capitalist prosperity in the region.
Other critics questioned Mella’s “abstract verbalism” and interpreted it as a harbinger of the errors of the “cipaya left,” which ignores the oppressed condition of Latin America (Ramos, 1973: 96-129). But they misrepresented the problem, omitting that this folly affected the Aprista Haya de la Torre more than the precursors of regional Marxism. Far from ignoring the centrality of national struggles in Latin America, Mella and Mariátegui promoted the convergence of this struggle with the socialist project sponsored by Lenin.
Disorientation and reformulations
During the gestation of Marxism in Latin America, the distinction between bourgeois and revolutionary nationalism was assimilated by Mella and Mariátegui, in a polemic against the challenge of both variants promoted by the communist officialdom. But this scenario changed radically with the outbreak of the Second World War, after Hitler's failed compromise with Stalin that led to the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
The defense of the USSR became the priority of all communist parties in the world and determined the stance of these organizations towards governments close to the Allies or the Axis. Praise for the former and rejection of the latter influenced the attitude of the majority left-wing organizations towards the nationalism prevailing in each country. If in the pre-war period these latter currents were equally condemned for their obstruction of the class struggle, from 1941 onwards they began to be approved or rejected according to their alignment with the balanced side in the international dispute.
It is true that the defense of the USSR was a valid criterion for defining the communist position in each country's situation. But the extreme and unilateral adoption of this position led to numerous absurdities. The first exaggeration was visible in the parties influenced by the US CP, which, under the leadership of Browder, sponsored subordination to Roosevelt. This attitude led their Latin American partners not to resist US imperialism, which was praised as a great ally of Stalin against Hitler.
This approach also led to the abandonment of strikes that affected companies in the North. The denunciation of the looting carried out by the Yankee oppressor was replaced by the demand for its “good neighborliness”, to consolidate the anti-fascist fronts with forces sympathetic to the State Department. This idyll lasted until the defeat of the Axis and the beginning of Washington’s Cold War against Moscow (1947) (Claudín, 1978: chap. 4).
In countries where this convergence with the imperialist enemy coincided with the presence of governments aligned against the Axis (such as Mexico), there were no major tensions. But in places where this affiliation was diffuse (Brazil) or non-existent (Argentina), the mistaken characterization of Vargas or Perón as fascists became widespread. In other countries, alignment with the United States led to the integration of right-wing governments (Cuba) or the formation of alliances with conservatism against nationalism (Peru).
This policy was not unanimous in all communist organizations, nor did it imply a simple subordination of these parties to Moscow. However, it generated short-term adversities or irreparable damage in the long term. Critics of this strategy postulated the combination of the international defense of the USSR in anti-fascist blocs with the preservation of anti-imperialist resistance against the North American imperial enemy (Giudici, 2007).
This second position was promoted by thinkers sympathetic to the consideration of the specific problems of the region, which Mella and Mariátegui inaugurated (Kohan, 2000: 113-171). Its promoters noted that the popular and progressive roots of many nationalisms coexisted with the ambiguous international position of these currents.
In the second half of the 20th century, a new shift was consolidated in the Communist Parties towards the formation of common fronts with the national bourgeoisies. They sought to create a scenario favourable to the development of progressive capitalism that anticipated socialism. They disseminated a theory of revolution by stages, which advocated favouring bourgeois expansion to sustain the maturation of the productive forces and the subsequent leap towards socialism.
This strategy once again ignored the differentiation proposed by Vladimir Lenin between bourgeois nationalism and radical nationalism, in order to emphasize, in this case, the transformative virtues of the first trend. These merits made any differentiation with the second trend unnecessary. With such praise, agreements with the exponents of establishment, which pushed the socialist ideal into oblivion. The Cuban revolution broke this conservatism and reestablished Lenin's barometer in the evaluation of Latin American nationalism.
Continuities of the far right
The distinction between three variants of nationalism persists as a legacy of Vladimir Lenin for socialist strategy in the 21st century. Among Marxists, the schematization of this difference, highlighting the class pillars of each variant, has been very common. Reactionary nationalism has been assimilated to the oligarchy, bourgeois nationalism to the national bourgeoisie, and radical nationalism to the petty bourgeoisie.
This merely sociological classification simplifies a political phenomenon that cannot be clarified solely by recording the underlying social interests at stake. But it is useful as a starting point for assessing the profile of each strand.
The current far right defends the interests of the most concentrated sectors of capital. In each country, it expresses a specific articulation of these interests and tends to represent different segments of financial, agrarian or industrial capital. Like the oligarchy of the past, it defends the status quo and the business of the capitalist elite. It strengthens the privileged, channeling general discontent against the most helpless sectors of society. With disruptive attitudes, disguises of rebellion and contestatory stances, it aims to crush popular organizations (Urban, 2024: 24-80).
In Latin America, it seeks to undo the achievements of the progressive cycle of the last decade and implements an explicit revenge for this process to prevent its repetition. It resorts to punitive measures in the face of any crime committed by the poor, exempting white-collar thieves. Its economic strategy combines the Keynesian shift towards state regulation with neoliberal policies of strengthening privatizations, tax exemptions and labor deregulation. It supports the abandonment of developmental industrialism and, without assuming a fascist profile, embodies a clear shift towards reactionary authoritarianism. It seeks to neutralize all democratic aspects of the current constitutional systems.
The contemporary far right takes up many aspects of its ideological predecessors (Sassoon, 2021). It tries to resurrect the old nativist nationalism – with its traditional burden of resentment against foreigners – to glorify the past and deify national identity. It extols “race day” to repudiate the awakening of the indigenous peoples of Latin America and defends the dictatorships of the Southern Cone. It shares the type of nationalist resurgence that followed the fall of the USSR and the more recent exhaustion of neoliberal globalization.
But the reactionary variety of nationalism that has returned to Latin America remains dim, having lost the prestige of the past and lacking a developmental basis. As in other regions, it is reviving the myths of the past. It cannot resort to the nostalgia for global dominance that its counterparts in the United States imagine, nor to the reminiscences of the Victorian past that its British counterparts emphasize. Its scope for action is severely limited by the diminishing autonomy of internal military power.
Their spokespeople reinforce the old anti-communism in tireless campaigns against Marxism, detecting radiations of this evil throughout society. Thus, they accentuate submission to the mandates of the United States. They tend to replace border wars with simple monitoring of Washington's geopolitical priorities.
This far right is advancing in the region at the same pace as its peers in the world, but it is facing significant defeats. Its coup in Bolivia and the subsequent secession of Santa Cruz failed. Its uprising in Brazil and its attempt to subdue progressivism in Mexico also failed. In Venezuela, it is playing a decisive game, reigniting conspiracies, and in Argentina, the final outcome of its attack is still pending. The battle against this enemy is the left's priority.
Progressive reformulationsheap
Progressivism is the contemporary form of conservative nationalism and the bourgeois-democratic trend predicted by Vladimir Lenin. This continuity is obscured by the social-democratic physiognomy that this current represents and by its discourses that are far removed from classical nationalism. It presents a center-left profile, closer to other peers on the planet than to the typical traditions of Latin America.
These differences in form do not alter the conceptual equivalence of current eclectic progressivism with its predecessors in bourgeois nationalism. In both cases, they express the interests of local capitalist sectors, which seek policies of greater autonomy in relation to those in charge, the United States, validate social improvements and come into conflict with the conservative elite that controls the States.
Its industrialist economic policies of the past are recycled in today’s neo-developmentalist format. The limited distance from liberalism reappears in positions regarding contemporary neoliberalism. The old commitments to large agrarian properties are recycled through the current validation of extractivism (Toussaint; Gaudichaud, 2024). The national industries that were created with protectionism and import substitution are revived with more cautious strategies.
Bourgeois nationalism in the past was often led by the armed forces, which played a decisive role in the industrialization process and in confrontations with conservative adversaries. This has changed significantly in the current era of constitutional regimes, which progressivism assumes as its own political system, ideal and unchangeable. The former leading role of the army has been replaced by a body of specialized officials in command of the main areas of the State. This elite is seen as the main instrument for transforming the Latin American reality.
Current progressivism also shares with its predecessor the claim that the nation is the main point of reference for its activity. However, unlike in the past, this sphere is linked to a Latin American project, in line with the regionalization that prevails in other parts of the world.
Progressive projects transcend borders, and the creation of CELAC or UNASUR presents a new strategic centrality, compared to the old policies focused exclusively on the national level. The scope of the nation itself has been revalued along with these changes, incorporating a certain recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples.
The forms of connection between progressivism and its direct precursors are very varied. In some cases, the links are visible (Kirchnerism with Peronism, Morena with Cardenism), in others, they are more ambiguous (Lula with Vargas, Boric with Frei, Castillo with APRA). But in all cases there are links with historical references, similar to the bourgeois national development project.
Like its predecessor, progressivism has gone through different periods. It is currently experiencing a broader and more fragmented cycle than the previous one, and, despite the strong leadership of the last decade, it is raising more moderate considerations. It also faces the fluctuations of very variable circumstances. In 2008, it was predominant throughout the region; in 2019, it found itself on the defensive in the face of the conservative restoration. At the beginning of 2023, it regained its primacy and is now facing a significant counteroffensive from the far right.
Three progressive governments maintain strong popular support. Gustavo Petro in Colombia, with his priority of peace and certain social reforms. Lula in Brazil, with a modest economic relief and the hope of preventing the return of Jair Bolsonaro. López Obrador and his successor Claudia Sheinbaum, who gave the right an electoral beating, in a context of improving the popular standard of living and increasing repoliticization.
The counterpoint to these expectations are three cases of frustration. The chaotic and impotent management of the deposed Castillo in Peru. The disillusionment with Gabriel Boric, who validates the tyrannical management of the military power, the control of the economy by an elite of millionaires and the closure of the constituent dynamic. In Argentina, the monumental failure of Fernández paved the way for the arrival of Javier Milei.
Like its nationalist predecessor, current progressivism includes a sector that promotes more autonomous foreign policies in relation to the United States (Petro, Lula, AMLO), as opposed to another strand that accepts subordination to the State Department (Boric). In this area too, the hesitations of the center-left are fueling the offensive of the far right.
Contemporary radicalism
The four governments that currently constitute the axis of radical governments (Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba) are systematically attacked by US imperialism. This hostility connects them to their predecessors of revolutionary nationalism. Confrontation with the US aggressor remains the main factor conditioning these processes.
The leaders of the historical movement – Sandino, Prestes, Velazco Alvarado, JJ Torres, Torrijos – were as vilified and demonized by the United States as Chávez, Maduro or Evo. This animosity stems from the anti-imperialist consequences of this tradition and its tendency to converge with socialist projects. The Cuban revolution epitomized a fusion that, in the 21st century, gained strength again with the Bolivarian process and the ALBA project.
An innovation of contemporary revolutionary nationalism was its openness to the indigenous and black movements, with the consequent integration of ethnic and racial oppression into the problem of national domination. The formation of the Plurinational State in Bolivia was one of the main achievements of this broadening of the horizons of radical nationalism.
But the current period has also confirmed the changing nature of this trend. As in the past, it includes components close to or contiguous with conventional progressivism (equivalent to the bourgeois nationalism of the past). There are also tendencies towards the authoritarian turn that marked the decline and involution of Arab nationalism (Hussein, Gaddafi, Al Assad).
The future of this space is currently being decided in Venezuela. There is an ongoing dispute between the renewal of the Bolivarian process and its eradication at the hands of the right wing. The latest episode in this prolonged conflict was the elections. The opposition once again presented them as a fraud, repeating the assessment it made in the face of other unfavorable results. These elections were called after detailed negotiations and compromises, which were ignored by the opposition in the face of potentially adverse results.
Venezuela continues to suffer hostility from the international mainstream press, which supports any coup attempt. This persecution is due to the country’s vast oil reserves. US imperialism continues to be involved in multiple attempts to regain control of these reserves and seeks to repeat in Venezuela what it did in Iraq and Libya. If Hugo Chávez had ended up like Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi, no one would talk about what is currently happening in a lost nation in South America. When they manage to overthrow a demonized president, the White House spokespeople forget about the besieged nation. Today, no one knows who is the president of Iraq or Libya.
There is also no mention of Saudi Arabia’s electoral system. Since the United States cannot present the sheikhs of that peninsula as champions of democracy, it simply keeps quiet about the issue. US leaders have reached a compromise with the right on the privatization of PDVSA and are watching with great concern the possible entry of Venezuela into the BRICS. They have already seized CITGO and the country’s foreign currency reserves, increased sanctions and closed its access to any type of international financing (Katz, 2024).
In this case, the validity of Lenin's anti-imperialist strategy is fully demonstrated. This policy presupposes supporting the defense of the government over its adversaries, who operate as pawns of the empire, in a country besieged by economic sanctions and incessantly attacked by the media.
This support for the government does not imply the validation of the official economic policy, the enrichment of the Bolibourgeoisie or the judicialization of social protests. But none of these objections casts doubt on the field in which the left should position itself. This terrain is located in the sphere opposite to the main enemy, which is imperialism and the extreme right. Lenin reasoned in these terms.
Bolivia offers a second example of the current experiences of radical nationalism. There, an initially successful economic model was implemented. The productive use of income and the achievement of productive advances were achieved, supported by the state's guidance of bank credit.
The current situation is very different and is marked by a serious economic downturn, together with great difficulties in advancing the delayed biodiesel, pharmaceutical and basic chemical projects. On the political front, a hard-hit right wing could regain primacy following the split in the MAS. This fracture in the government also reactivates coup attempts, always latent as a plan B of the ruling classes.
The case of Nicaragua illustrates a very different trajectory. It shares with the radical bloc the hostility of US imperialism, but its political course has been marked by the unjustified repression of the 2018 protests. Even more unacceptable was the persecution of recognized heroes of the revolution. There is no doubt that the US aggressor is the main enemy, but this recognition does not imply silencing or justifying the policies of the government.
Finally, Cuba remains the most unique case of the continuity of a socialist epic. After six decades of blockade, the island's resistance continues to generate recognition, admiration and solidarity. But serious economic problems persist, in a context of inflation, stagnation and heavy dependence on tourism.
Since immediate solutions to these shortcomings would mean worsening inequalities, reforms are postponed and the country fails to develop a growth model similar to that of China or Vietnam. In this case, Vladimir Lenin's teachings include an update of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which the Bolshevik leader implemented with a major reintroduction of the market, to deal with the misfortunes of the crisis.
The flexible institutional system that prevails on the island and the generational change in political leadership allow us to bet on achieving a balance between maintaining the achievements obtained and consolidating growth. The defense of the Cuban Revolution is the great brake on the regional offensive of the United States and its right-wing pawns. This resistance continues to be inspired by the convergent ideals of radical nationalism and socialism.
*Claudio Katz is professor of economics at Universidad Buenos Aires. Author, among other books, of Neoliberalism, neodevelopmentalism, socialism (Popular Expression). [https://amzn.to/3E1QoOD].
Translation: Fernando Lima das Neves.
References
Anderson, Perry (2002). Internationalism: a breviary, New Left Review, n 14, May-June Madrid.
Bruckmann, Monica (2009). My blood in my ideas: dialectics and revolutionary press in José Carlos Mariátegui Fundación Editorial el perro y la rana, Caracas.
Caballero Manuel (1987). The Communist International and the Latin American revolution, New Society, Caracas.
Claudin, Fernando (1978). The crisis of the communist movement. Volume 1: From the Comintern to the Kominform. Ibérica de Ediciones y Publicaciones
Giudici, Ernesto (2007) Imperialism and national liberation, Marxism in Latin America, Anthology. LOM Editorial, Santiago de Chile Ed 1940.
Godio, Julio (1983). History of the Latin American labor movement vol 2 Nacionalismo y communismo 1918-1930, México.
Guanche, Julio César (2009). Why read Julio Antonio Mella, Conference proceedings, August-September, Mexico.
War Vilaboy, Sergio (2006). Brief History of Latin America, Havana, Social Sciences,
Katz Claudio (2024). With no minutes, the United States wants Venezuela's oil"
https://argentina.indymedia.org/2024/08/11/entrevista-a-claudio-katz-con-o-sin-actas-estados-unidos-quiere-el-petroleo-de-venezuela/
Katz, Claudio (2018). The theory of dependency, 50 years later, Batalla de Ideas Ediciones Buenos Aires.
Kohan, Nestor (2000). From Engineers to Che, Byblos, Buenos Aires.
Lenin, Vladimir (1915) Socialism and war, July-August 1915 https://www.marxists.org/espanol/lenin/obras/1910s/1915sogu.htm
Löwy, Michael (2006). Introduction, Marxism in Latin America, Perseo Abramo Foundation, Sao Paulo.
Mariátegui José Carlos (2007). Anti-imperialist point of view, in Löwy Michel. Marxism in Latin America, Anthology. LOM Editorial, Santiago de Chile.
Mella, Julio Antonio (2007). The proletariat and national liberation, in Löwy Michel. Marxism in Latin America, Anthology. LOM Editorial, Santiago de Chile.
Pericás, Luiz Bernardo (2012). Mariátegui, the seven essays on APRA and the Communist International, Marxism: Theory, History and Politics, Alameda Publishing House, Sao Paulo.
Branches. Jorge Abelardo (1973). History of the Latin American Nation, Tomo II, La Patria Dividida, Peña Lillo, Buenos Aires.
Ridell John (2018) Should Communists ally with revolutionary nationalism? January 7, https://johnriddell.com/2018/01/07/should-communists-ally-with-revolutionary-nationalism/
Sassoon, Donald (2021). Hobsbawm on nationalism https://conversacionsobrehistoria.info/2021/11/10/hobsbawm-sobre-el-nacionalismo/
Soler Ricaurte (1980). Latin American national ideas and questions. From independence to the emergence of imperialism, Siglo XXI, Mexico.
Toussaint, Eric; Gaudichaud, Franck (2024) Pensar los (nuevos) derroteros de las izquierdas y las derechas latinamericanas en un mundo en crisishttps://vientosur.info/pensar-los-nuevos-derroteros-de-las-izquierdas-y-las-derechas -latinoamericanas-en-un-mundo-en-crisis/
Urban, Miguel (2024). Trumpisms, Back, Barcelona
Vitale, Luis (1992). Introduction to a theory of history for Latin America, Planet, Buenos Aires.
the earth is round there is thanks to our readers and supporters.
Help us keep this idea going.
CONTRIBUTE
