The first recorded high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) was created by the detonation of a 3,88-megaton nuclear warhead over Johnston Island in 1958. This photo was taken 1.400 miles away in Hawaii, far enough away to avoid serious retinal burns in the eyes of observers in Honolulu (military officials changed the test site from Bikini Atoll because the nuclear fireball could blind people up to 650 miles away).[1]

_______________________________

Early one cold winter night, during a massive winter storm covering much of the central and eastern United States, a 100-kiloton nuclear warhead suddenly explodes 170 miles above Dallas, Texas. Two minutes later, identical nuclear warheads explode over Las Vegas, Nevada, and Columbus, Ohio. Then a fourth, larger 800-kiloton warhead explodes over the southern Yucatan Peninsula.

Electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) are electromagnetic pulse) produced by the first three nuclear detonations will act to almost instantly destroy the solid-state electronics that control the operation of most of the U.S.’s critical national infrastructure—including the emergency power generation and emergency core-cooling systems of 26 commercial nuclear reactors. The E3A electromagnetic shock wave from the fourth detonation will bring about a final collapse of all three U.S. power grids, which will be out of service for a year or more.

Figure 1: The three US power grids.[2]

The nuclear warheads are “delivered” to their target areas by ballistic missiles launched from a submarine located 300 kilometers south of Pensacola in the Gulf of Mexico. The exact identity of the attacker is unknown because nuclear submarines are virtually impossible to detect and track when traveling under the sea. This is a surprise attack by an unknown enemy, a “bolt from the blue.”

The submarine takes only one minute to fire the missiles from a depth of 50 meters. Three missiles are fired on depressed trajectories to reduce the time required for their warheads to reach their designated targets; their flight times are 5 to 7 minutes from launch to detonation. U.S. early warning systems detect the launches, but U.S. missile defense systems do not have enough time to intercept the missiles or their nuclear warheads before they explode at high altitude over the United States.

The locations of these three high-altitude nuclear detonations need not be precise—detonations over other locations to the east and west (over Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, or Alabama, and over Seattle and Los Angeles) would produce very similar results. But the detonations must occur above the Earth's atmosphere and during the darkest hours of the night. The altitude of 171 kilometers and the extreme weather conditions were chosen to maximize the destructive effects of the EMP.[3]

The skies suddenly light up above the United States, but the detonations occur silently because the atmosphere is too thin at these altitudes to transmit sound waves. No explosion or fire effect is created on Earth, but a massive discharge of powerful gamma rays released by the detonations travels downward at three hundred thousand kilometers per second. As the gamma rays penetrate the atmosphere, they rip electrons from air molecules and send them spinning toward Earth at nearly the speed of light. Earth's magnetic field interacts with these massive clouds of spinning electrons, creating gigantic electromagnetic pulses that will reach hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of Earth's surface.

The EMP consists of three distinct waves. The three initial E1 pulse waves centered in Ohio, Nevada, and Texas reach the Earth's surface only a few billionths of a second after the high-altitude nuclear detonations. Ordinary surge protectors do not act quickly enough to protect electronic devices from the effects of E1. A fraction of a second later, the E2 pulse waves arrive with lightning-like effects. Surge protectors that would normally protect against lightning will likely have been disabled by the E1 waves. The final E3 pulse waves (E3A and E3B) will reach the Earth approximately 1 to 2 seconds after the initial E1 waves.

The targets over the continental U.S. were chosen to maximize the effects of E1 and E3B waves on each of the three U.S. power grids. The synergistic effects of these EMP waves will ruin most electronic devices and virtually eliminate long-distance electrical power transmission in the U.S.

Figure 2: Areas of exposure to E1 EMP waves from nuclear detonations 171 kilometers above Columbus, Ohio, Dallas, Texas, and Las Vegas, Nevada. The large circles represent the E1 EMP exposure ranges, and the inner blue circles illustrate areas where power surges created by incident E1 EMP waves could damage off-grid solid-state electronic devices.[4]

E1 electromagnetic pulse destroys solid-state electronics needed to operate critical national infrastructure

EMPs do not harm people, animals, or plants, nor will they cause structural damage to buildings. However, an E1 pulse wave will instantly induce highly destructive electrical voltages and currents in any electrically conductive material located in the huge circular areas beneath the nuclear detonations. Each nuclear detonation creates a large circular area of ​​E1 pulse exposure covering over two hundred and fifty thousand square kilometers (Figure 2). Power lines, telecommunications lines, computer cables, wires, antennas, and even many AC power cables that are hit by the E1 waves will suddenly have enormous voltages and currents surging through them.

E1 waves induce 2 million volts and currents of 5.000[5] to 10.000[6] amperes on medium-sized power distribution lines. Overvoltages of 200.000 to 400.000 volts (in excess of design capacity) occur on the 15-kilovolt (kV)-class power distribution lines that connect most homes, farms, and businesses.[7] In less than a millionth of a second, these damaging voltages and currents surge across U.S. power grids. Unless specifically protected against E1, any modern electronic device that contains solid-state circuitry (microchips, transistors and integrated circuits) that is connected to the grid will be disabled, damaged, or destroyed by this massive burst of electricity. This includes the electronic devices needed to operate all of the U.S.'s critical national infrastructure..

Regions located below the detonation points (represented as dark blue circles in Figure 2) suddenly experience E1 waves powerful enough to induce damaging voltages and currents in electronic devices that they are not connected to the grid. 50.000 volts and 100 amps of current arise in unshielded AC power cables.[8] Cell phones go down along with cell towers; nearly all forms of telecommunications cease. Virtually everything powered by electricity suddenly stops working.

Land, air and sea transportation systems, water and sanitation systems, telecommunications systems and banking systems are all out of service. Food and fuel distribution ceases. Emergency medical services are unavailable. The multitude of electronic devices on which society depends have suddenly stopped working.

EMP E1 cuts power by destroying glass insulators on 15 kV power lines

Massive voltages and currents induced in power transmission lines by E1 waves, combined with extreme weather conditions, act to overload, short-circuit, and destroy millions of glass insulators (in a process called “flashover”) that are commonly used in 15-kilovolt (kV) power distribution lines in the United States (Figure 3). 78% of all electricity in the U.S. is delivered to end users (residential, agricultural, commercial) via these 15-kV lines.[9] The loss of a single glass insulator on a line can disrupt power distribution across the entire line.

Figure 3: Flashover destroys glass insulators on a power distribution line.[10]

As sub-zero weather conditions prevail across much of the US, lights and power are suddenly going out in American homes.

Chaos

In an instant, nearly every electronic device necessary for modern life stops working. The computers, modems, routers, programmable logic controllers, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to monitor, control, and automate complex industrial processes all lie dead. All hell breaks loose.

All rail, port and air traffic control stops working. GPS and fiber optic systems fail. Planes fall from the sky. Motorized valves that control the flow of gas and oil in millions of miles of pipelines suddenly freeze, causing ruptures and explosions. Water distribution systems fail. Control is lost in refineries and offshore platforms. Major furnace and boiler explosions occur in coal-fired power plants. Control over all industrial processes and assembly lines is lost. Remote control systems in every industry suddenly cease operations.

Annie Jacobsen, in her remarkable book, Nuclear War: A Scenario, vividly describes what happens after a nuclear war begins and an E1 pulse wave suddenly disables critical US national infrastructure.

Of the 280 million vehicles registered in the United States, “10 percent of the vehicles on the road suddenly stop working… without power steering or electric brakes, vehicles stall or crash into other vehicles, buildings, and walls. Stalled and crashed vehicles block lanes of traffic on highways and bridges everywhere, not just in places where people were fleeing nuclear bombs, but in tunnels and overpasses, on highways large and small, in driveways and parking lots all over the country… Electric fuel pumping has just come to a permanent and fatal end…

There will be no more clean water. There will be no more flushable toilets. There will be no sanitation. There will be no streetlights, no tunnel lights, no lights, only candles, until there are none left to burn. There will be no gas pumps, no fuel. There will be no ATMs. There will be no cash withdrawals. There will be no access to cash. There will be no cell phones. There will be no landlines. There will be no 911 calls. No phone calls. There will be no emergency communication systems except a few high-frequency (HF) radios. There will be no ambulance services. There will be no working hospital equipment. Sewage is everywhere. It takes less than fifteen minutes for disease-carrying insects to spread. To feed on piles of human waste, garbage, dead bodies…

Billions of gallons of water rushing through America’s aqueducts gush uncontrollably. Dams burst. Massive flooding begins to sweep away infrastructure and people… thousands of subway trains, passenger trains, and freight trains traveling in all directions, many on the same tracks, collide with each other, crash into walls and barriers, or derail. Elevators stall between floors or accelerate to the ground and fall. Satellites (including the International Space Station) spin out of position and begin to fall toward Earth. America’s fifty-three remaining nuclear power plants, now operating on backup systems, collectively enter a race against time.”[11]

However, not all nuclear power plants will be operating with emergency backup systems.

Reactor meltdown in nuclear power plants

In the eastern U.S., 14 large commercial nuclear reactors at nuclear power plants are located in areas where peak E1 pulse incidence fields are in the range of 12.500 volts per meter to 50.000 volts per meter. Five additional commercial reactors in the western U.S. and seven commercial reactors in the southern U.S. are also located in areas with similar E1 pulse ranges (Figure 4). In these E1-saturated areas, damaging electrical voltages and currents are induced within unshielded cables, lines, and solid-state electronic equipment. in of the buildings and structures at these nuclear power plants, as well as the many above and below ground power lines, telephone lines, cables, etc. that run into and out of these plants.

Figure 4: 26 commercial nuclear reactors are located in red circled areas that have peak E1 pulse incident fields equal to 12.500 volts per meter to 50.000 volts per meter.[12]

Thousands of solid-state electronic components (control units, motor-driven pumps, motor-operated valves, temperature and pressure sensors, rectifiers, inverters, switches, etc.) are required to safely monitor, control, and operate nuclear reactors. These components are found in various parts of the active Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) in every nuclear reactor; they are also found inside the emergency diesel generators and battery banks that make up the emergency power systems in every nuclear power plant. All of these solid-state components are unprotected and highly susceptible to damage from the high voltages and currents created by the E1 pulse.

At the time the E1 surges knocked out the grids, the loss of external electrical power triggered an emergency shutdown of all operating nuclear reactors in the U.S.. No electricity is required for an emergency shutdown. However, emergency cooling systems must begin cooling the nuclear reactor core within seconds of an emergency shutdown. Otherwise, the hundreds of millions of watts of heat remaining in the reactor core[13] (the heat is produced by the highly radioactive fuel rods) will cause the reactor core to overheat to the point where it will self-destruct in a matter of several hours or less.[14]

Within a millionth of a second, the damaging voltages and currents created by the E1 pulse wave disable the motor-operated pumps and motorized valves within the emergency cooling systems of all 26 of these nuclear reactors. This power surge also knocks out the emergency power systems at the nuclear plants where the reactors are located. The loss of active emergency core cooling systems and emergency power systems has suddenly made it impossible for these 26 nuclear reactors to remove the massive heat remaining inside their reactor cores after their emergency shutdowns.

The solid-state controls on the giant emergency diesel generators no longer work; the AC/DC interfaces located between the battery banks and the plant’s electrical systems have failed. There is no longer any off-site or on-site electrical power available to operate the active emergency core cooling systems, which would not function anyway because the solid-state electronics found in the motor-operated pumps and valves are damaged and disabled. A forced flow of water cannot be resumed through the reactor core (hundreds of thousands of gallons of water are pumped through the core every minute during normal operation). In most of these reactors, approximately two hundred million watts of decay heat remain in the reactor core—and cannot be removed from the core before the uranium fuel rods begin to self-destruct.

Failure of these emergency systems will quickly lead to meltdowns of the reactor cores at each of these 26 nuclear power plants.[15] This is because nuclear power plants in the U.S. (and many other nations) are not designed or adapted to withstand the effects of EMP. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continues to maintain that EMP poses no danger to the nuclear plants it regulates—even though it has never conducted the comprehensive tests needed to validate its theories (as of 2019, the US Air Force Electromagnetic Defense Task Force forced the NRC to address its concerns about the lack of EMP protection at U.S. nuclear plants, but the NRC refused to take any steps to protect U.S. nuclear plants from EMP).[16]

Fires in spent fuel pools at nuclear power plants

A complete loss of off-site and on-site electrical power at a nuclear power plant also makes it impossible to operate the large cooling systems needed to remove heat from the spent fuel pools, where highly radioactive used or “spent” uranium fuel rods are stored. These pools contain some of the highest concentrations of radioactivity on the planet.[17] The intensely radioactive spent fuel also generates an enormous amount of heat that must be continually removed from the pool or else the water in the pool will heat to the boiling point.

For the 26 reactors that no longer have electrical power either off-site or on-site, the only remaining way to cool the spent fuel pools is to continually pump cooling water into them. However, the reactor meltdown and corresponding release of radiation, combined with the chaos created by the EMP attack, make this impossible. The water in these pools boils away within hours or days.

When falling water levels in the pools eventually expose the spent fuel to steam and air, this causes the rods to heat to the point of rupture or ignition and release huge amounts of radioactivity.[18] Fuel rods recently removed from the reactor core begin to burn at temperatures exceeding 1.000 degrees Celsius, and the fire spreads to older rods in the pool. The radioactivity released from a fire in the spent fuel pool creates an uninhabitable radioactive wasteland that is 60 times larger than the Chernobyl radioactive exclusion zone.[19]

Figure 5: Areas of contamination from a hypothetical fire in a single high-density spent fuel pool at the Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Plant in Pennsylvania, releasing 1600 PBq of Cesium-137 on four dates in 2015[20]

The massive amounts of radiation released by the destroyed reactors and their 26 burning spent fuel pools will turn much of the continental United States into an uninhabitable radioactive exclusion zone.

E1 pulse wave begins destruction of US power grids

The massive E1-induced power surge also hit extra high voltage (EHV) substations in the US (Figure 6), destroying most of the protective solid state relays[21] that protect electrical systems within the grid from damage.[22] This included the relays that activated the extra high voltage circuit breakers, which provided the primary protection against damaging currents to large power transformers (LPTs).[23] There are approximately 5000 EHV circuit breakers of 345 kilovolts (kV) and above operating voltages in the three US power grids.[24]

Figure 6: 1765 extra high voltage substations exposed to E1 from the nuclear detonation over Columbus, Ohio, representing 83% of such substations in the US[25]

LPTs are used in power generation facilities to step up voltage before long-distance transmission (this reduces power loss) and then at the end of transmission lines to step down voltage when power is distributed to American homes, agriculture, and industry. LPTs are absolutely necessary for the transmission of electrical power in the USA (Figure 7). 90% from Electricity in the U.S. power grids passes through old 345 kV (345.000 volts), 500 kV, and 765 kV LPTs; there are only a few thousand such LPTs in the three U.S. national power grids.[26]

Figure 7: The role of large power transformers (LPTs) in the power grid. LPTs are circled in red[27]

The massive voltages and currents created by the E1 waves, which formed within the power transmission lines, also damaged and destroyed the series-connected capacitors on these lines that protected the LPTs from dangerous power surges.[28] The E1 power spike also disabled the electronics inside the LPTs' cooling systems (which are needed by LPTs),[29] and burned small holes in the insulation of the windings inside the LPTs.[30] This left LPTs susceptible to internal short circuits and overheating.

In other words, the E1 pulse waves disabled the safety systems needed to protect the LPTs, as well as damaged some LPTs and left them all quite vulnerable to the effects of subsequent E3 pulse waves.[31]

E3B Pulse Waves Destroy EHV Circuit Breakers and LPTs – US Grids Down for a Year or More

Within a second or two of the nuclear detonations over Columbus, Las Vegas and Dallas, the E3B uplift waves created by these detonations induce current flows in power transmission lines above and below ground. Scientists have confirmed, by “all means of measurement,” that the threat potential posed by the E3 pulse exceeds the intended stress limit that the aging U.S. power grid was designed and tested to withstand.[32] Figures 8, 9 and 10 depict the impact of the three E3B uplift waves.

Figure 8: E3B uplift wave from nuclear detonation over Columbus, Ohio, causes power grid collapse in outlined region. Extreme weather conditions spread the collapse to Florida and Maine.[33]

Figure 9: E3B uplift wave from the nuclear detonation above Las Vegas, Nevada, collapses the grid in the outlined region.[34]

Figure 10: E3B uplift wave from nuclear detonation above Dallas, Texas, collapses the grid in the outlined region.[35]

Because the US has failed to protect its power grids from EMP, all 765 kV LPTs, two-thirds of 500 kV LPTs, and at least 20% of 345 kV LPTs are quite vulnerable to the effects of the E3 pulse.[36] Both the LPTs – as well as the extra high voltage circuit breakers that protect them – are about to be damaged, disabled and destroyed by the combined effects of the E1 and E3B waves.

Figure 11: Moving a large 210-ton power transformer. The combined weight of the transformer and the equipment required to move it is 430 tons.[37] LPTs cannot be quickly deployed even after their replacements have been manufactured and delivered to the US.

E3B pulse waves induce direct current (DC) in long power transmission lines as well as in the Earth itself. The loss of protective relays (due to E1 waves) allows DC currents of hundreds to thousands of amperes to flow into extra high voltage circuit breakers and LPTs.[38] EHV circuit breakers blow and LPTs overheat and self-destruct. LPTs often contain many thousands of gallons of oil for cooling and high-voltage insulation purposes; this oil becomes fuel that generates large fires that quickly engulf large parts of the substation and/or power plant facility where the LPTs are located.[39]

Removing LPTs and extra-high-voltage circuit breakers from the grid leaves most of the United States without power for up to a year or more. This is because extra high voltage circuit breakers[40] and LPTs are not stored. Now, it will be necessary 40 to 60 weeks to replace extra high voltage circuit breakers.[41] LPTs must be custom designed and manufactured, and about 80% of LPTs are made overseas.[42] The current wait time for the manufacturing of an LPT is 80 to 210 weeks.[43]

A final electromagnetic shock wave from E3A increases the destruction of LPTs and extra high voltage circuit breakers

The target of the fourth missile fired by the nuclear submarine in the Caribbean Sea is a point 480 miles (800 kilometers) above the Yucatan Peninsula in southern Mexico. The missile carries an 3-kiloton nuclear warhead; its detonation creates an E3.000A electromagnetic shock wave that produces its most severe effects XNUMX miles (XNUMX kilometers) north of the detonation point.[44]

Figure 12: E3A pulse blast wave from high-altitude nuclear detonation over Central America; the most severe effects are felt in the northern US, 3.000 kilometers north of the blast.[45]

The current flows induced by the electromagnetic shock wave E3A are many times more powerful than those created by the E3B lifting wave.[46] Every state, from the East Coast to the West Coast states of Washington, Oregon, and California, and from Maine to Florida and Texas, will have more than enough current from this single detonation to collapse the entire U.S. power grid (Figure 13). The E3A electromagnetic shock wave delivers a massive blow to surviving LPTs and extra-high voltage circuit breakers on all three U.S. power grids.

Figure 13: The effects of an E3A electromagnetic shock wave from a nuclear detonation over the Yucatan Peninsula cause the entire U.S. power grid to collapse.[47]

Social collapse

It’s the dead of winter, in the middle of a major winter storm, and electricity is no longer available to most Americans, who now find themselves in dark, freezing homes where nothing works. No lights, no running water, no phones, internet or TV, and soon, no food. If their cars can still start, they will find the highways blocked by other cars that were disabled by the initial E1 wave. Gasoline can no longer be pumped out of underground storage tanks. Food deliveries to cities stop. People try to flee regions receiving massive radioactive fallout downwind from destroyed nuclear reactors and pools of spent fuel. Society collapses as millions of hungry and desperate people struggle to survive.

The chairman of a congressional committee investigating the effects of a nuclear EMP attack on the United States has estimated that most Americans would not survive an EMP attack that knocked out U.S. power grids and disabled critical national infrastructure.[48] Despite such warnings, the United States failed to act to protect its power grids and critical national infrastructure—including its nuclear power plants—from the effects of the EMP.

afterword

There are technologies that could effectively protect the U.S. power grid from destruction. Similarly, vulnerable components in critical U.S. national infrastructure can also be protected to a significant degree from EMP (this also applies to vulnerable components in active core cooling emergency systems and emergency power systems in nuclear reactors). Several detailed technical papers explain how this can be accomplished.[49] [50] [51] [52] [53] Cost estimates for adding this protection run into the tens of billions of dollars, which is a small fraction of what the US spends annually on its defense budget.

The U.S. military has long acted to protect its weapons and communications systems from EMP, but every attempt to mandate that critical U.S. national infrastructure be protected from EMP has been defeated. Twice—in 2013 and 2015—bills requiring EMP protection failed to make it to a final vote in Congress because nuclear and electric utilities lobbied against them. Their opposition stemmed from the language in the bills that required utilities to pay for shielding.

Consequently, no significant steps have yet been taken to install equipment and modifications that would protect the U.S. national power grid and critical U.S. national infrastructure against an EMP.

______________________

*Steven Starr is the director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri and a senior scientist at Physicians for Social Responsibility. He maintains the website Nuclear Famine. He is the author of the book Nuclear High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

Note: Open-source Russian and Chinese military texts describe Super-EMP weapons that create E1 EMP waves that are two to four times more powerful than those described and illustrated in this article.[54] If Super-EMP weapons are used in an attack against the United States, the effects of even a high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic wave could be significantly more severe than those described in this article.

NOTES

[1] United States federal government, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons 

[2] US Environmental Protection Agency, “US Electricity Grid and Markets”, downloaded September 01, 2024 from https://www.epa.gov/green-power-markets/us-electricity-grid-markets

[3] Gilbert, J., Kappenman, J., & Radasky, W. (2010). “The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”, Metatech Corporation, Meta R-321, Section 3. 

[4] Image taken from Savage, E., Gilbert, J. and Radasky, W. (2010). “The Early-Time (E1) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”. Metatech Corporation, Meta R-320, p. 7-20 and p. 2-30.

[5] This is a worst-case E1 pulse in a military HEMP in MIL-STD-188-125-1 for an E1-induced current of 5,000 amperes in a transmission line. The characteristic impedance for a transmission line is approximately 400 ohms, thus providing a worst-case peak voltage level of 2 MV. Op. cit. “The Early-Time (E1) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid,” p. 7-3.

[6] Cybersecurity Division of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, National Coordinating Center for Communications, February 05, 2019. “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection and Resilience Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure and Equipment,” version 2.2 UNCLASSIFIED, p. 29.

[7] Op. cit. “The Early-Time (E1) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”. p. 7-27.

[8] Op. cit. “Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection and Resilience Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure and Equipment”, p. 29.

[9] Ibid. p. 7-25.

[10] Orient Power Insulators, downloaded on September 19, 2024. 

[11] Jacobsen, A. (2024). Nuclear War: A Scenario. Penguin Random House, pp. 264-267

[12] Image taken from US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2023). “Map of Power Reactor Sites”, downloaded on August 29, 2024 from 

[13] Clarke, M., (June 2020). “Battery Backups for Nuclear Power Plants”. METTS Consulting Engineers. 

[14] Cook, D., Greene, S., Harrington, R., Hodge, S., & Yue, D. (1981). “Station Blackout at Brown's Ferry Unit One – Accident Sequence Analysis”, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, prepared for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Table 9.7.

[15] Three nuclear reactors melted down at the Fukushima Daichi plant after an earthquake knocked out power lines to the plant and a tsunami subsequently knocked out the emergency diesel generators that provided the primary source of backup electrical power (the battery banks, which provide a secondary source of electrical power, operate for only 8 hours or less). Once all off-site and on-site electrical power was lost, it became impossible to pump cooling water through the reactor cores. Core temperatures in Unit 1 reached 2.800 °C within six hours, and the reactor core melted through the steel containment vessel in less than 16 hours. Sample, Ian (March 29, 2011). “Japan may have lost race to save nuclear reactor”. The Guardian.London. 

[16] Stuckenberg, D., Woolsey, J., and DeMaio, D. (August 2019). “Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF) Report 2.0, LeMay Paper No. 4”, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Appendix 1, pp. 53. 

[17] Alvarez, R. (May 2011). “Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools in the US: Reducing the Deadly Risks of Storage”, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC, p. 1. 

[18] Alvarez, R., Beyea, J., Janberg, K., Kang, J., Lyman, E., Macfarlane, A. Thompson, G., & von Hippel, F. (2003). “Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States”, Science and Global Security, 11:1–51, p. 2.

[19] Op. cit. “Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools in the US: Reducing the Deadly Risks of Storage”, p. 1.

[20] von Hippel, F. and Schoeppner, M. (August 16, 2016). “Reducing the Danger from Spent Fuel Pools”, Science and Global Security, Princeton University, p. 155. 

[21] Solid state relays are particularly vulnerable to the E1 pulse (they have essentially replaced older electromechanical relays) and constitute the majority of relays in extra high voltage substations.

[22] Relays detect abnormal currents and overloads and initiate protective actions to protect the electrical system from damage. Types of relays include transformer protection relays (which monitor overcurrent, overvoltage, and temperature abnormalities) and differential relays, which act to protect transformers from internal faults.

[23] Solid-state control systems have also reportedly been damaged in some extra-high voltage circuit breakers.

[24] Gilbert, J., Kappenman, J., & Radasky, W. (2010). “The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”, Metatech Corporation, Meta R-321, p. 4-2. 

[25] Op. cit. “The Early-Time (E1) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”. p. 7-20.

[26] Many LPTs are at the end of their life expectancy; ten years ago, the average age of installed LPTs in the United States was 38 to 40 years, with 70 percent of LPTs being 25 years or older. US Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. (April 2014)Large Power Transformers and the US Electric Grid”, pv 

[27] US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force. (April 2004). “US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,” Figure 2.1, p. 5.

[28] Series capacitors are commonly used in the Western power grid and are less common in the Eastern and Texas power grids.

[29] Baker, G., Webb, I., Burkes, K., and Cordaro, J. (2021). “Large Transformer Criticality, Threats, and Opportunities”, Journal of Critical Infrastructure Policy, Volume 2, Number 2.

[30] Op. Cit. “The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”, p. 7-34.

[31] Over the Horizon. (August 27, 2019). “Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to America's Electric Grid: Counterpoints to Electric Power Research Institute Positions”, US Air Force Air University Foundation, downloaded September 16, 2024.

[32] Op. Cit. “The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”, p. 3-2.

[33] Ibid, p. 3-7.

[34] Ibid. p. 3-12.

[35] Ibid. p. 3-9.

[36] These are single-phase LPTs.

[37] Omega Morgan, “Going Heavy for a Transformer Transport Near Portland, Oregon”, downloaded on September 11, 2024.

[38] Windings capable of handling up to 3.000 amperes of alternating current can be destroyed by geomagnetic direct currents of only about 300 amperes. See Tennessee Valley Authority, (December 2010).Initial Review of Extreme Geomagnetic Storms to TVA Operations: Findings and Recommendations", P. 5. 

[39] Op. cit., “The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”, p. 5-1.

[40] There are approximately 5.000 extra-high voltage circuit breakers of 345 kV or greater operating in the U.S.; see Gilbert, J., Kappenman, J., and Radasky, W. (2010).The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”, Metatech Corporation, Meta R-321. p. 4-2. 

[41] Colthorpe, A. (September 21, 2023). “Lithium Supply Chain Much Improved but transformers and other components a headache for BESS industry”, Energy Storage News.

[42] LPTs weigh between 200 and 400 tons each and need to be shipped by sea, and moving them to their final destinations is quite difficult. LPTs cannot be moved by rail (100 tons is the normal weight limit for rail transport). LPTs are generally too heavy to cross bridges; traffic lights and power lines must be moved to get them through. Even under normal circumstances, this is a complex process, and trying to move them in post-apocalyptic circumstances—across the US after a year without power—may prove nearly impossible.

[43] Jacobs, K., Barr, A., Chopra, S., and Boucher, B. (April 2, 2024). “Supply shortages and an inflexible market give rise to high power transformer lead times”, Wood Mackenzie. 

[44] There are two forms of E3 waves in an EMP: the E3B elevation wave, which radiates from the areas of the nuclear detonation, and the E3A electromagnetic shock wave, which creates its most destructive effects well north of the nuclear blast; its effects on the power grid are most serious during the darkest hours of the night.

[45] Op. cit. “The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the US Power Grid”, p. 2-4.

[46] Ibid. p. 3-13.

[47] Ibid. p. 3-16.

[48] Graham, Dr. William R., Chairman, Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. (July 10, 2008). “THREAT POSED BY ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK”, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS. 

[49] Kappenman, J. (January 2010), “Low-Frequency Protection Concepts for the Electric Power Grid: Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC) and E3 HEMP Mitigation”, Metatech Corporation, Meta-R-322. 

[50] The Foundation for Resilient Societies. (September 2020) “Estimating the Cost of Protecting the US Electric Grid from Electromagnetic Pulse. " 

[51] International Electrotechnical Commission. (May 17, 2017). “Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Parts 5-10: Installation and mitigation guidelines – Guidance on the protection of facilities against HEMP and IEMI".

[52] Radasky, W. (October 31, 2018). “Protecting Industry from HEMP and IEMI”, In Compliance Magazine. 

[53] Radasky, W. and Savage, E. (January 2010).High-Frequency Protection Concepts for the Electric Power Grid”, Metatech Corp, Meta-R-324. 

[54] Vaschenko, A. (November 01, 2006). “Russia: Nuclear Response to America Is Possible Using Super-EMP Factor,” “A Nuclear Response To America Is Possible,” Zavtra, Zhao Meng, Da Xinyu, and Zhang Yapu, (May 01, 2014). “Overview of Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons and Protection Techniques Against Them” Winged Missiles (PRC Air Force Engineering University; Vaschenko, A. and Belous, V. (April 13, 13); “Preparing for the Second Coming of „Star Wars” , Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye translated in: Russia Considers Missile Defense Response Options CEP2007