A diffuse dissatisfaction

Image: Dayvison Tadeu
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By BRUNO RESCK*

The distance between federal management and the working people creates a vacuum that can be exploited by opportunistic speeches from the extreme right

1.

When talking to a third-party janitorial worker at the building where I work, I was confronted with a reality that many prefer to ignore: the gap between economic figures and the real lives of workers.

In these informal chats in which we did not go beyond the limits of common sense, the conversation reached a unanimous conclusion: how high food prices were at the supermarket. At this point, one of the outsourced workers mentioned that he receives something around R$1.200,00 per month and reported the difficulty in making this amount last until the end of the month. The conversation ended, and each person went their separate ways.

However, I kept reflecting on that exchange. Every time I pass a crowded bus stop or see long lines at public hospitals, that brief conversation comes back to me. This reality made me reflect on an apparent contradiction: the positive economic figures presented by the current government contrast with the decline in President Lula's popularity.

When that gentleman receives his paycheck at the end of the month, does he think about GDP growth? Or about reducing unemployment? Will he feel motivated to vote in 2026 to defend democracy against the far right, or will his choice be guided by everyday frustration?

Official figures show low unemployment, but hide a precarious job market. The CAGED reveals high turnover and low starting salaries, which means that many workers do not achieve financial stability. In addition, it is necessary to consider the high informality and the worrying unemployment rate among young people aged 18 to 24, which is around 15%. Informality, in turn, fosters the illusion of entrepreneurship, which, in practice, often translates into precariousness and overexploitation of labor.

In the first two years of the Lula III government, some categories of workers saw real gains in their salaries. However, inflation in fuel, health insurance, rent and, especially, food erodes this increase, making it almost imperceptible to the population.

Another alarming factor, which contrasts with the government's positive indicators, is the level of household debt. According to the National Confederation of Commerce of Goods, Services and Tourism (CNC), 2024 ended with 77% of Brazilian families in debt. This debt scenario is accompanied by successive record profits for banks, which continue to drain workers' income.

Given this scenario, we can see a divided society, filled with a certain air of distrust and discouragement. Despite the government's efforts to improve its communication, those who live on the "factory floor" notice the lack of enthusiasm regarding the current management. Ultimately, to communicate better, you need to have something to communicate.

2.

Lula won in 2022 by uniting different political forces against the far right. Now, this same alliance limits his actions, as he depends on a mostly conservative Congress and a financial sector that is pushing for austerity. Even so, there is room for progressive measures that do not depend exclusively on the Legislature, such as strengthening public banks, Petrobras, and wage appreciation policies.

Can this widespread dissatisfaction in society be explained simply as a problem of communication? Or of the limits of governability? Or is there something deeper?

Since 2003, the PT governments have not broken with the neoliberal dogmas of the Washington Consensus – floating exchange rates, inflation targets and primary surpluses. On the contrary, the PT administration has reaffirmed its faith in the sustainability of the Fiscal Framework and in maintaining the independence of the Central Bank. In almost fifteen years of government, the Workers' Party has not changed the structures of Brazilian rentier capitalism or our role in the international division of labor.

The austerity imposed by Minister Fernando Haddad's Fiscal Framework prevents investments in improving and expanding public services. In contrast, neoliberal logic makes it possible to transfer these services to the private sector. The BNDES under the Lula III government continues the “Bridge to the Future” program inaugurated under the Michel Temer government. One of the policies of this program is Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) that allocate public funds for concessions for roads, ports, parks, schools and daycare centers. In this way, big capital gains twice: first, by capturing resources from the public budget through public debt; second, by appropriating state goods and services through concessions and privatizations.

Despite its progressive rhetoric, the current government has made no effort to reverse the advance of outsourcing in the public and private sectors. On the contrary, the precariousness of work has been intensifying day by day. There is no sign that the privatization of strategic companies will be reversed to help the country develop. Instead, the government continues to present fiscal adjustment packages that directly impact the most vulnerable segments of the population, beneficiaries of programs such as Bolsa Família and Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC). These are the eternal neoliberal reforms.

Well, a specter is haunting Brazilian politics: the specter of the June 2013 protests. At that time, the PT leaders failed to realize that, more than a reflection of patrimonialism or the influence of social media, what brought thousands of protesters to the streets was dissatisfaction with the low quality of public services. The major urban centers were veritable powder kegs ready to explode.

Despite social advances such as policies to combat hunger, the expansion of the federal education network and a period of economic growth resulting from the tree de commodities which made it possible to increase public investment, there was growing dissatisfaction among different sections of the population.

Although the country experienced a sense of euphoria and optimism during President Lula's second term, there was a lack of public urban transportation, security, education and health policies. This set of dissatisfactions came to light in June 2013 when the then mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddad, announced an increase in bus fares. This measure was considered extremely important for balancing the city's finances, but it served as a trigger for the outbreak of large demonstrations that, in less than twenty days, spread throughout the country's cities and took over the Esplanada dos Ministérios in Brasília.

How can we explain that economic and social advances never before seen in the history of this country were vanished into thin air in a matter of months? Or in a broader time frame, until the 2016 coup? There is a short-sighted view that attributes the events of 2013 and 2016 to a middle-class revolt and the phenomenon of social media. These are explanations that seek an external factor to overshadow criticism of the economic model of Lulaism, which kept intact the structures of domination, capital accumulation and overexploitation of the workforce.

Workers know how to do math. Workers do not need to be supervised. Explanations like “poor right-wingers” place the responsibility for their problems on the shoulders of workers. They create a kind of moral bond or a certain air of ingratitude on the part of voters who do not vote for the workers’ party – or for progressive parties. It is true that the world of the 21st century has proven to be complex and the rise of the extreme right, fueled by the ideology of entrepreneurship and the faith of prosperity theology, is notable. On the other hand, it is also true that the extreme right has found fertile ground in the last four decades of consolidation of neoliberalism.

If there is one thing that the PT governments should have learned from the 2013 protests, it is that promises of economic growth are not enough to guarantee popular support. The common worker does not live by indicators, but by the concrete reality of his daily life.

3.

If the Lula III government wants to reverse the scenario of apathy and distrust, it will need to go beyond communication and actually address the country's structural obstacles. To do so, it is essential to break with the Fiscal Framework, which imposes a logic of permanent austerity and stifles the State's ability to invest in infrastructure, public services and job creation. Sustainable economic growth depends on a strong State, capable of boosting national industry, reducing inequalities and ensuring that development reaches everyone.

Expanding CONAB and agrarian reform policies could help stabilize food prices, while strengthening public banks and expanding productive credit would allow small and medium-sized businesses to avoid being held hostage by the high interest rates of the private financial sector. Ending the Fiscal Framework does not mean fiscal irresponsibility, but rather replacing a model that strangles public investment with an economic policy that prioritizes social well-being and strengthening the productive sector.

Furthermore, it is essential that the government rebuild its ties with the grassroots and listen to those who experience the impacts of economic policy on a daily basis. The distance between the federal government and the working people creates a vacuum that can be exploited by opportunistic speeches from the far right.

If dissatisfaction is growing even in the face of positive indicators, it is because these numbers do not translate into concrete improvements in the daily lives of the majority. The government needs to open real channels for popular participation, strengthen councils and social movements, and ensure that its decisions are shaped by the needs of the population. More than announcing measures, it is necessary for people to feel part of the country's reconstruction project. Otherwise, discontent will continue to grow – and may be captured by political forces that offer even more regressive responses.

*Bruno Resck, geographer, is a professor at the Federal Institute of Minas Gerais (IFMG) – Advanced Campus Ponte Nova.


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