By EMILIO CAFASSI*
We celebrate the farewell of a government eaten away by corruption, manager of a crisis that pushed thousands into despair, while a handful of friends went to their exclusive paradise of robbery.
On a bend in the corner of the southern continent, where collective memory managed to mobilize itself like a shared echo, the tension in the air turned into uncontainable euphoria. The streets were flooded with white, blue and red, amid hugs, tears and the deafening noise of horns, while speeches were replaced by gestures of recognition.
Uruguay erupted in an irrepressible cry of hope, the fruit of five years of struggle and sacrifice, reflected in waving flags and faces marked by endless days of activism. Each step on the asphalt was a proclamation that vibrated with the echo of voices celebrating not only a victory, but the certainty that history could be written anew, exchanging the tightly closed hands of greed and aggressive rigidity for open, supportive and sensitive palms. There, in that infinite moment, the crowd discovered itself woven by a common thread: that of resistance to make way for a different tomorrow.
Even though the storm was approaching with lightning and thunder, like an ambiguous omen, each boom was celebrated as a salute to honor this curve, no longer geographical, but in its history. Even wet from the rain, the flags waved with a lightness that seemed to reflect collective relief. It was worth coming to Montevideo to experience the celebratory discharge.
We celebrated the farewell of a government riddled with corruption, the manager of a crisis that pushed thousands into despair, while a handful of friends were driven to their exclusive paradise of robbery. Each step on the streets was also an act of remembrance, with the affirmation that a permanent guard will be necessary against the possibility of the nightmare returning.
The previous day began with an unexpected setback that seemed to mark the pace of the challenges to come for a small cauldron of impulses and affections that crossed latitudes, with a common heart from Rio de la Plata: those of us who set out to follow the popular activity by sharing data, reflections, emotions and records. This is not the first time that I have promoted an initiative of this nature.
It worked really well the first time around, and this time I decided to expand it to about 300 friends. I had barely finished manually entering each contact when Whatsapp put a banner with the classic ban icon and the caption: “This group is no longer available, review required”.
Several people received the warning, which came across as a definitive sentence, because – as stated in the text – “WhatsApp uses advanced machine learning technology to evaluate group information, including topics, profile photos and descriptions” and much more, no less frightening, that I will omit in this text. I opened an appeal protocol number that, on the morning of the election, was accepted and the group reopened without explanation by Mark Zukerberg’s company, Meta Platforms Inc., formerly known as Facebook.
In future articles, I will write about the intervention of digital monopolies in public life in general and in political life in particular, especially after the victory of the Broad Front, because it is essential to establish measures to defend and expand human rights and freedom of expression, currently restricted by these supranational corporations. I have created and participated in hundreds of groups. I have never seen anything like it.
During the 15 years of the Broad Front government, the policy on digital technology was exemplary and, in this new administration that is beginning, the development of measures to end illegitimate forms of censorship, promoting respect for cultural differences and human rights, cannot be ignored. The case of X (former tweeter) in Brazil is a clear example of these forms of manipulative violence.
The company, although it eventually returned the management of the group, did so with less than a third of its members called. Re-inviting them on election day became impossible. Let us now turn our attention to the elections, but with the persistent echo of this case, which demands attention in future contributions.
After the publication of last week's column, the research institutes were discussing their latest oracle, which bordered on violating the electoral ban. With the numbers in hand, and after carefully analyzing the methodology published by each company, I created the table below, which requires several caveats. Since the companies deal only with percentages and the Electoral Court prefers to speak in absolute terms, I built a bridge between the two worlds.
I calculated the percentages of the Court's absolute data and, in an exercise of methodological adjustment that borders on alchemy, I projected the absolute votes that the forecasts of the research institutes would have given if we took the total number of votes cast as a constant, with the exception of observed votes [votes cast outside the predefined electoral district, which require additional verification]. In other words, here are the numbers translated to dialogue with any possible interpretation.
It is worth remembering that the Court's result is still preliminary, as it excludes 35.761 observed votes, equivalent to 1,46% of the total, which are probably distributed with a slight advantage for the conservative candidate. In this sense, perhaps the difference between the FA [Broad Front] and the PN [National Party] will be reduced minimally in the final count, or more precisely, the absolute votes of both will increase, but only the percentage or absolute difference could decrease, since among the observed votes there is a significant proportion of votes from military and police officers who participate in the functioning and security of the elections.
The source used for the 7 companies was their reports on their respective websites. In no case were journalistic transcripts used. With the exception of Option, they were all wrong. Although none of them placed Delgado above Orsi, the difference was always less than the margin of error, and although the Ágora can be considered correct, it does not consider the 6% of undecided voters, much more than the margin of error, or the Power plant, which suffers from a small sample size.
Among the seven companies, the four traditional ones stand out, and it is surprising that three of them were ambiguous and erred far beyond the expected margins, with the historical factum as a prime example. However, these companies perform rigorous measurements within the limitations of their resources. Their task is not to theorize: just like a clinical laboratory director, they are not obliged to diagnose a patient's metabolic state, but to record the values with the available instruments, so that someone else can make the diagnosis.
Projection of absolute votes based on percentages reported by research institutes and the primary count by the Electoral Court
Orsi-Cosse | Delgado-Ripoll | Blanks and Nulls | Margin of error | Projection of the result | Sample | ||||
factum | 47.10% | 1.130905 | 46.60% | 1.118.900 | 6.30% | 151.268 | + / - 3.3% | Uncertain | 900 |
Figure | 47.00% | 1.128504 | 46.40% | 1.114.097 | 6.60% | 158.471 | + / - 3.4% | Uncertain | 1000 |
Team | 48.00% | 1.152515 | 46.20% | 1.109.295 | 5.80% | 139.262 | + / - 3.1% | Uncertain | 1000 |
Option | 49.70% | 1.193333 | 45.50% | 1.092.488 | 4.80% | 115.251 | + / - 2.3% | Orsi | 1150 |
Ágora | 47.00% | 1.128504 | 43.80% | 1.051.670 | 9.20%[I] | 220.899 | + / - 3.0% | Uncertain | 1489 |
Power plant | 49.00% | 1.176525 | 46.00% | 1.104.493 | 5.00% | 120.054 | ? | Uncertain | 500 |
nomad | 48.20% | 1.157317 | 46.40% | 1.114.097 | 5.40% | 129.658 | ? | Uncertain | 1285 |
Court Electoral | 49.84% | 1.196.798 | 45.87% | 1.101.296 | 4.29% | 102.941 | - | - | - |
Last week, I pointed out that only a complete reversal of the historical trajectories of the [Republican] Coalition – in all its forms and versions, tacit until 2020 and formalized now – and of the Broad Front could have given Delgado victory. There was no need for polls: in the three scenarios considered, Orsi always came out on top, and the first of them exactly reflected reality, even considering the high level of loyalty of the Coalition, especially in the urban centers of Montevideo and Canelones.
The first scenario projected predicted a victory for the Broad Front by 100.000 votes, a result that was verified with almost total accuracy. This was not due to an exceptional growth of the Broad Front, but rather due to a performance in line with its historical average. On the contrary, the exception was the Coalition, which achieved the lowest level of vote leakage in its last four experiences, all with blanco candidates.
If this had not been the case, the difference would have reached the 130.000 votes predicted in the second hypothesis. But the biggest difference between the Broad Front and the past is not so much quantitative as qualitative. In the first round, the Broad Front's performance was historic in the interior of the country, and it was again so in this round, with nuances. Never before had so many departments been won. I am not in a position to elaborate on the hypothesis of how much this is due to Orsi's emphasis on the forgotten interior, where he comes from, how much of this is due to the dynamics of Pereira's presidency of the Broad Front and his travels, or, finally, to the desertions, crises and corruption in the Coalition's departmental administrations.
Historical gains and losses in Uruguay’s five electoral experiences
Broad Front | Royal coalition | Whites/ | dropouts | Theoretical coalition | |
Nulls | |||||
1999 | 120.847 | 454.793 | 7.891 | -1.283 | -24.187 |
2004 | |||||
2009 | 92.376 | 324.568 | 43.731 | -32.723 | -125.099 |
2014 | 107.381 | 223.140 | 45.526 | -75.426 | -155.938 |
2019 | 202.895 | 492.891 | 3.213 | 43.489 | -99.632 |
2024 | 124.972 | 445.870 | -15.747 | -6.968 | -60.754 |
Average until 1st 2024 | 130.875 | 373.848 | 25.090 | -16.486 | -101.214 |
Current average 2nd 2024 | 129.694 | 388.252 | 16.923 | -14.582 | -93.122 |
The second table, which examines the growth and leakage of votes – including Lust supporters who supported the government – shows a significant decrease in the leakage of votes, except for Batlle's candidacy in 1999, which I attribute to the fact that the blancos are more willing to vote for the colorados than the other way around.
My initial estimate of abandonment, calculated at 0,1%, was inaccurate, since the level recorded was more than double that. However, my projection was more accurate regarding the magnitude of blank and invalid votes than most polling institutes – with the exception of Option – had estimated at more than 5%. Of the 118.725 voters who did not support any slogan in the first round, only 15.784 voted for some option this time, while the count of the observed votes is awaited. Among the 102.941 votes detected so far – always without the final one –, there is a hard core of citizens, characterized by a critical sensitivity and a manifest disagreement.
This group will be essential to consolidate the future growth of the Broad Front, as I suspect that it could include the voters who, in 2004, secured victory in the first round, but who, over time, have allowed themselves to be swept away by disappointment. To regain this ground, it will be crucial to deepen organizational hospitality, integration and pluralism, together with the conception of a concrete left-wing policy without evasive scruples.
The Coalition is now on the defensive, with serious doubts about the strength of its cohesion. Although it has managed to reduce the number of vote leaks to a minimum, it cannot be ignored that this phenomenon has manifested itself more intensely in the interior, where the historical rivalries, forged over two centuries, are more evident and difficult to contain. Will it regroup for the departmental elections in May?
We have lived a week full of emotions, deductive reflections and reality checks. Even in times marked by instability, frustration and electoral volatility, our thoughts cannot meekly surrender to the cold verdicts of polls. Not because they are fallacious, but because, in order to support our analysis, they require empirical verification, which inevitably takes a long time to arrive.
Far from empiricist or rationalist absolutism, it is useful to recognize that the validation times of the two approaches are divergent and that the only solid support point is theory, until the movement of reality demands that it be revised so that it undergoes an updated reformulation. The most dangerous trap is not in reason itself, but in the search for shortcuts that aim to shorten its tedious steps or convert desires into certainties. It matters little whether it is with or without revenue.
*Emilio Cafassi is senior professor of sociology at the University of Buenos Aires.
Translation: Fernando Lima das Neves.
Note
[I] The only research institute that did not consider undecided voters. I will not be the one to resolve this uncertainty, which is why I am forcing this figure of 3,2% of blank and void votes, along with 6% of undecided voters.
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