By CAMILO BUSS ARAUJO*

The premise that fighting imperialism and the extreme right is more important than respecting electoral rules is dangerous

Last Sunday, July 28, 2024, there were presidential elections in Venezuela. Opinion polls showed divergent results. Institutes linked to President Nicolás Maduro's candidacy pointed to his victory, while opinion institutes hired by the opposition assured the victory of Edmundo González Urrutia. What seemed certain was that it would be a close election, given that the opposition, which had boycotted the 2018 presidential election (with around 46% of voters turning out), was in full swing.

After the voting ended and with the expectation of victory on both sides, the following events occurred: (i) On Monday, July 29th, the National Electoral Council (CNE) of Venezuela (equivalent to our TSE) proclaimed the Nicolás Maduro's victory with 80% of the votes counted: Maduro 51,2%, González 44%; (ii) The opposition questioned the result presented and demanded the publication of the electoral records (equivalent to the ballot box). He also reported that his candidate would have won with 70% of the votes, without, however, presenting the materials that supported this conclusion.

Here is a clarification on how voting is done in Venezuela. The voting system is electronic and printed. The voter goes to their polling station, identifies themselves through biometrics, and votes in an electronic ballot box. This ballot box issues a printed voting receipt that is placed in a ballot box. At the end of the voting day, each ballot box issues a report (equivalent to the Brazilian ballot box) with the results of that section. In the same way as in Brazil, based on data extracted from the minutes, parties can carry out a “parallel investigation” in order to certify the result of the election.

The events follow:

The CNE does not publish the electoral records and its website goes offline; The CNE claims that it was the target of a “massive hacker attack”; On July 29, one day after the election, the Carter Center, an international observer of the Venezuelan elections, issues a document requesting that the CNE publish the electoral minutes so that it is possible to validate the results issued by the body; Cuba, Bolivia, Russia, China, Iran, Honduras, Nicaragua recognize Nicolás Maduro's victory.[1]

Nicolás Maduro expels the ambassadors and diplomatic corps of seven countries that questioned the results of the elections. They are: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, Dominican Republic and Uruguay;[2] Brazil, USA, Colombia, Mexico, European Union call for transparency and disclosure of electoral records;[3] On Tuesday, July 30, the Minister of Defense of Venezuela, Vladimir Padrino, declares the total loyalty of the Armed Forces to Nicolás Maduro and that the country was facing an attempted coup “forged again by fascists from the extremist right supported by the northern empire -American".[4]

 At the end of July 30, the Carter Center issued a document attesting that the Venezuelan electoral process did not meet the basic requirements to be considered a democratic election. Among the points presented, he highlighted the fact that the CNE released the electoral result without presenting the vote by section; On the evening of Thursday, August 1st, the United States Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, recognized the victory of the opposition candidate, Edmundo González; Protests have escalated in cities across Venezuela and there are reports of deaths and hundreds of arrests.

 Also on August 1st, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia signed a joint letter in which they expressed solidarity with the Venezuelan people, demanded from the authorities the results broken down by electoral table and asked for action from political actors to contain the escalation of violence.

The joint note contains details that are worth highlighting, indicating a political orientation that looks not only at Venezuela, but at the democracies of the Latin American continent. The first is to direct solidarity to the “Venezuelan people” and not to the government. The second is to demand the publication of the results broken down by voting table and the impartial verification of the results. In other words, three countries with presidents aligned with the left camp did not recognize the result presented by the CNE.

Venezuela, chavismo and opposition

The situation is complex because Venezuela's history over the last three decades is also complex. Firstly because, since 1998, with the election of Hugo Chávez, a popular and nationalist government was built in a country with one of the largest – if not the largest – oil reserves in the world. In 2002, with the aim of making Hugo Chávez's government and his proposed change in the management of the Venezuelan oil company (PDVSA) unfeasible, business and financial sectors encouraged strikes and created an environment of political turbulence that resulted in an attempted coup d'état, in the April 11th.

The military took over the Miraflores Palace, arrested Chávez and placed businessman Pedro Carmona, president of Fedecámaras (Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce), in power. The United States was the first to recognize Carmona as Venezuelan president, therefore endorsing the coup d'état.

As soon as he took power, Pedro Carmona dissolved the National Assembly with a Chavista majority.[5] In response, the Venezuelan population took to the streets of Caracas in defense of Chávez. Hours later, troops loyal to the president retook the Miraflores Palace. Chávez was released and regained power. The coup lasted around 47 hours. The Organization of American States (OAS) criticized the coup attempt. Brazil, at the time led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, positioned itself in the same way.

The episode consolidated a fracture in Venezuelan society between “Chavistas” and “anti-Chavistas”. From then on, a series of measures were taken that put institutions in the spotlight and further intensified the country's division. In 2004, the Chávez government approved a new Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice. This law increased the number of judges on Venezuela's highest court from 20 to 32, allowing Chávez to appoint 12 new judges. Furthermore, the law allowed, with a simple majority, the National Assembly to dismiss judges from the Supreme Court.[6] The measure weakened the independence of the judiciary as it left magistrates at the mercy of the hegemonic group in the legislature, at the time commanded by allies of President Hugo Chávez.

Still in 2004, the opposition called for a referendum that would decide whether or not Hugo Chávez would remain in power. Chavez's victory. In 2006, the president was re-elected with 62,9% of the votes for the 2007-2013 term. In 2009, another popular referendum approved changes to the country's Constitution, allowing unlimited re-elections for the president of Venezuela. Charismatic, popular, with control of parliament and the judiciary, Chávez consolidated his power. However, the scenario changed with his death in 2013 and the appointment of his vice-president, Nicolás Maduro, to succeed him in the presidential elections. The opposition, previously cornered, gained momentum to contest the elections.

The elections were close, with Nicolás Maduro winning 50,61% of the votes. The Carter Center, a body created by former US president Jimmy Carter in 1982 and an international observer of the Venezuelan elections, had certified that the country's electoral system was “the best in the world” in terms of reliability of results. The elections, despite being disputed, had a winner: Nicolás Maduro. However, the opposition demonstrated political strength, which was demonstrated in the following election, in 2015, for the National Assembly.

Two years later, in 2015, the Democratic Unity Table (MUD) won the parliamentary elections. He obtained 56,2% of the votes, winning 109 seats. The Chavista coalition, led by Nicolás Maduro, the Grand Patriotic Pole Simón Bolívar (GPPSB), obtained 37,8% of the votes, leaving just 55 seats. In response, Nicolás Maduro's government used its majority in the National Assembly to appoint 13 new full ministers and 21 substitutes to the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) before the new opposition legislature took office.[7]

In January 2016, after the Assembly swore in three opposition deputies whose election was contested by the government, the TSJ declared the National Assembly in contempt. This declaration of contempt was used by the TSJ to overturn all subsequent National Assembly decisions on the grounds that they were in violation of the law. At the end of March 2017, the TSJ issued decisions 155 and 156. The first allowed President Maduro to use extraordinary powers without the approval of the National Assembly. The more controversial decision 156 transferred the legislative powers of the National Assembly to the TSJ, effectively nullifying the legislative power of the Assembly and allowing the TSJ to exercise these functions directly.

The 2018 presidential elections were marked by opposition protests. Considering it a “marked card election”, opposition members defended the boycott and only 46% of voters went to the polls. The anti-Chavistas did not recognize the result and Juan Guaidó, president of the National Assembly, proclaimed himself president of Venezuela in January 2019. Brazil, governed by Jair Bolsonaro, recognized Guaidó.

In 2021, the UN recognized Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela. With a society polarized between Chavistas and anti-Chavistas, on July 28, 2024, Venezuelans went to the polls to elect the country's president for the next six years. The consequences of the election were mentioned at the beginning of this text and their importance transcends Venezuelan territory.

The left in Brazil and the dilemmas of politics in Latin America

The brief report helps us understand the complexity of the current situation in Venezuela. On the one hand, an opposition that flirts with the global extreme right and that has an attempted coup d'état in its past. On the other hand, a government that uses the discourse of defending “the people against imperialism” and that, under this motto, changed the rules of the game, persecuted opponents and subjected the legislative and judiciary to the head of the executive.

In other words, it eroded what is perhaps the main pillar that supports so-called liberal democracies: balance and autonomy between powers. In 2024, after the CNE declared Maduro's victory, without presenting the electoral records and claiming that 80% of the ballots had been counted, far-right politicians quickly spoke out calling Maduro a dictator. This was the case of the president of Argentina, the histrionic Javier Milei. The left, in turn, split.

While Brazilian diplomacy under Lula's government expressed caution and called for the publication of electoral records, left-wing activists and websites claimed that a new coup, perpetrated by the Venezuelan right, was underway. Analysts consulted by some well-known left-wing portals sought to adopt two paths to justify alignment with the Venezuelan president's policies: (a) The Venezuelan opposition is far-right, fascist. Maria Corina Machado, the main opposition leader, would be to the right of Jair Bolsonaro; (b) Members of the left who criticize Maduro are, in fact, a “neoliberal left” and what is behind the movement is the desire of the United States to capture Venezuelan oil.

No argument deals with the fundamentals, that is, the fact that there was an election and that the results were not published as required by the rules. The National Electoral Council made Maduro's victory official without all the ballot boxes counted and without the numbers per electoral session being able to be verified. If the CNE cannot show the numbers because – as they claim – of a hacker attack, how can it make the winner of the election official?

Both arguments start from one premise: fighting imperialism and the extreme right is more important than respecting electoral rules. And this premise is dangerous on a continent with left-wing democratic governments walled in by the extreme right and political physiologism, as is the case in Brazil.

The Carter Center, invited to observe the 2024 election, stated the following about the latest election: “The 2024 presidential elections in Venezuela did not meet international parameters and standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic. (…) The fact that the electoral authority did not announce results broken down by electoral table constitutes a serious violation of electoral principles”.[8]

The body detailed some of the points considered problematic during the electoral process: Excessive bureaucratization to register new voters, especially those who live abroad (short deadlines, few places to register, little public disclosure); the registration of the candidacy of the main opposition forces was subject to the discretion of the electoral authorities who made decisions without respecting basic legal principles; massive and disproportionate campaign of the situationist candidacy, using official vehicles, public resources, social programs and State employees; attempts to restrict the opposition campaign by persecuting and intimidating service providers in order to generate a dissuasive effect.

After the statement, part of the left that agrees with the procedures adopted in the Venezuelan election questioned the parameters adopted by the Carter Center to support its decision.[9] However, days before the July 28 election, the Carter Center was remembered on an admittedly left-wing portal for its observation services during the 2012 Venezuelan election, in which it attested that the country's electoral system was the “best in the world”.[10] The conclusion of the Carter Center served to define the 2012 election, but it does not serve to define the 2024 election.

Given the context and facts, it is necessary to reflect on the paths taken by the Brazilian government and the left. After all, right-wing and extreme-right groups already have a natural antipathy towards the Venezuelan regime and would clearly characterize the scenario in the neighboring country as a coup. However, there is a clear division on the left over how to proceed. An example of this is the note from the executive of President Lula's party, the PT, which endorsed the results presented by the CNE and recognized Maduro's victory.[11] However, even within the PT there are groups that understand that the prudence adopted by the Lula government is the most appropriate.

The Brazilian government's stance, in line with other democracies and governments of a progressive nature, such as Colombia and Mexico, is to wait and demand the disclosure of electoral records, which break down votes by section. Gustavo Petro published on his social network that “the serious doubts that are established around the Venezuelan electoral process could lead its people to a deep violent polarization with serious consequences”.[12] In fact, violence already occurs. As of Tuesday, July 30, at least six deaths and 749 arrests had been recorded.

Given the current scenario, how to position yourself?

It is true that 32 years ago the Venezuelan opposition attempted a coup that almost overthrew the democratically elected president Hugo Chávez. It is also true that the United States economically boycotts Venezuela and it seems credible that, over the last three decades, part of the Venezuelan opposition has flirted with other coup attempts. However, it is also true that the Chavista regime changed laws and subverted the country's legal system to exercise governance in a clearly divided country. The political movements for the 2024 elections demonstrated that the opposition was more organized than in other times and that, therefore, it would be a fierce election.

It is not possible to say that there was fraud, as the election numbers were not disclosed. However, it seems clear that the CNE, responsible for ensuring the fairness and tranquility of the election, was deeply mistaken in announcing Nicolás Maduro's victory by a narrow margin (51,2%) and 80% of the votes counted. The way the president of Venezuela has behaved since then is also open to criticism. He expelled ambassadors and adopted aggressive rhetoric against his opponents. To top it off, in a scenario of political tension, the country's Armed Forces positioned themselves politically on the side of the president, accusing without evidence that there was a coup underway.

In other words, Nicolás Maduro, faced with the crisis, bet on further inflaming his supporters, calling them into the street, calling Edmundo González, his opponent in the election, a coward and calling on the police to “restore peace” in the country.[13] The actions of the Venezuelan ruler have similarities with the recent Brazilian past and therefore send out a warning signal.

During the four years of Jair Bolsonaro's government, especially between the end of the presidential election and the fateful January 8th, Brazil was on several occasions close to an authoritarian regime. Time after time, Jair Bolsonaro fulfilled the four fundamental indicators that Levitsky and Ziblatt constructed to help recognize an authoritarian politician: (i) rejecting, in words or actions, the democratic rules of the game; (ii) deny the legitimacy of opponents; (iii) tolerate and encourage violence; and (iv) give indications of willingness to restrict civil liberties of opponents, including the media.[14]

Levitsky and Ziblatt's bestseller, how democracies die, was and continues to be cited by left-wing activists to refer to the emergence of the extreme right. They seem to ignore, however, that the authors place Venezuela as an example of an authoritarian regime. Levitsky stated that the last Venezuelan election was “one of the most flagrant electoral frauds in the modern history of Latin America.”[15]

Perhaps, for some left-wing activists, studying the death of democracies is only valuable when it comes to identifying the threats caused by the extreme right. Just like the diagnosis of the international observer of the election, which is only useful when it is to endorse the spectator's point of view. This asymmetry of points of view is dangerous in the face of a Latin America full of authoritarian experiences.

Brazil realized how fragile the pillars of democracy are. In the second half of the 20th century, Latin America found itself taken over by authoritarian governments commanded by the military. At the beginning of the 21st century, left-wing parties won elections through current democratic rules. It was thanks to democracy, even if imperfect, that parties like the PT were able to play the electoral game and win elections. It is in the so-called “liberal democracies” that minorities can express themselves and have the chance to present their political projects. In a democratic regime, alternation of power is not a problem. In Lula's own words, when you lose an election, the loser goes home to lick his wounds to come back better in the next one.

What is happening in Venezuela is very different from that. The practices adopted by Nicolás Maduro are more similar to those of authoritarian politicians like Jair Bolsonaro than to leftist leaders like Lula. The defense of some activists and columnists on the left, with criticisms of imperialism and “bourgeois democracy”, to endorse the actions in Venezuela make it clear that an authoritarian regime is not necessarily a problem. In this case, what differs is not the authoritarian method, but what argument authoritarianism serves. For some, it would be justified to combat corruption and communism. For others, to fight against US imperialism and the Latin American bourgeoisies.

And democracy? Well, that one can wait.

*Camilo Buss Araujo He has a PhD in social history from Unicamp and is a professor at the College of Application at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC).

Notes

[1] View using this link.

[2] View using this link.

[3] View using this link.

[4] View using this link.

[5] The Venezuelan parliament is unicameral, unlike Brazil, which is bicameral, with a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate.

[6] Barroso LR Populism, authoritarianism and democratic resistance: constitutional courts in the game of power. Law and Praxis. [Internet]. 2023, Jul;14(3):1652–85. Available in using this link.

[7] Barroso LR Populism, authoritarianism and democratic resistance: constitutional courts in the game of power. Law and Praxis. [Internet]. 2023, Jul;14(3):1652–85. Available in using this link.

[8] View using this link.

[9] View using this link.

[10] View using this link.

[11] View using this link.

[12] View using this link.

[13] View using this link.

[14] LEVITSKY, Steven; ZIBLATT, Daniel. how democracies die. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2018. p. 32.

[15] View using this link.

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